Category: Halacha

This section of Shul Chronicles focuses on practical and historical issues in Halacha, including family law, minhag, contemporary halachic debate, and communal practice.

  • May Paper/Plastic Cups Be Used For Kiddush?

    May Paper/Plastic Cups Be Used For Kiddush?

    Doubled Kiddush Cups and Vacation Sundry

    Rabbi Moshe Taub

    January, 2024

           “Can one toivel a new utensil in the various lakes surrounding Champions Gate in Orlando?”

          I get this question at least once every ‘Yeshiva Week’.

       For those unfamiliar with the above neologistic term for winter vacation -as I was when I first arrived in Queens- do not fret, as it has its own Wikipedia entry!

    “Yeshiva Week is the informal term for a vacation period occurring annually in mid to late January, in which many Jewish day schools and yeshivas afford time off to their students. It is primarily a North American phenomenon…

        Rabbanim could give weeks’ worth of shiurim focusing only on the most common ‘vacation’ shailos.

    From the common:

         “We are driving to Florida and will be breaking up the trip with a hiking trail/park where we will also be spending the night. Would a new teffilas haderech be required the next morning when we get back on the road toward Florida?”

    To this classic:

        “May I ask or hint to hotel staff to open my hotel room door on Shabbos?” [See this author’s article in the yarchon HaEmek, 2005, “Ha’Milon B’Halacha” (hotels in halacha)]

         When I lived in Buffalo, the most common shailah among visitors was:

    “Does one make the beracha oseh maaseh bereishis upon seeing Niagara Falls?”

        I had the good fortune to discuss this latter shailah with many poskim who would frequent that shul, such as Rav Belsky and, lhbchl”ch, Rav Shlomo Miller.

    Rav Asher Weiss was once davening by us and chose this question as his topic when he spoke to the shul following shacharis.

          A summer guest visiting Buffalo once shared the following story:

        Rav Dovid Feinstein and Rav Meir Zlotowitz were once travelling together, and arrived at the Grand Canyon. Rav Dovid expressed uncertainty if this same beracha of maaseh bereishis may be made. As they were conversing about the intricacies of the question, the sky precipitously darkened and suddenly began to grumble. A crash of lightning ignited the darkened atmosphere, if for a moment. That was enough time to be able to say the beracha (on the lightning) and have the Grand Canyon in mind!

          One may think that there is a need for a unique sefer focusing only on the myriad potential as the most common vacation shailos, if not for the fact that some sefarim already include sections on that topic. For example, one of the chelakim of ‘Shoshanas Yisroel’ (Toronto, 2021), by Rav Mordechai Kanner, has an entire subsection dedicated to inyanei chofesh, along with the psakim of Rav Shlomo Miller.

           In this post we will focus mainly on just one ‘vacation shailah’. I am choosing this question because it is not only common when away for a Shabbos, but also arises from time-to-time even when at home.

        This shaliah may also serve as a lesson in other ways, as we shall see.

           May a disposable cup be used for kiddush on Shabbos? What about glass cups found in one’s hotel room/rented vacation home?

         There are many issues here to unpack – pun intended – and we will seek both clarity and brevity.

    However, we must start at the beginning:

         The Shulchan Aruch (siman 271:10) rules that the kos kiddush shares its rules with the halachos for the kos of bentching (siman 183).

     Among other rules, this would. mean that the kos for kiddush mustn’t be:

    • cracked
    • chipped
    • have holes

        While a wobbly base may be fine, it is best to use another nice kos if available.

    If no other kos is available, many posit that one may then use a damaged one, so long as it fulfills the most basic requirement of kiddush:

    • It must securely hold a reviis of wine (between 3.5 and 5.5oz), without leaking.

        If even this is unattainable, then I suggest that one should simply make kiddush on the actual bottle of wine! (I infer this from the words of Rav Vosner, Kovetz M’Beis Levi, vol. 3, p. 70; this is also explicitly stated in Piskei Teshuvos, siman 271 note 246; Rav Scheinberg is also quoted saying the same by Rabbi Simcha Bunim Cohen, The Radiance of Shabbos, p.82 note 4).

         While all normal cup material (e.g. glass, ceramic, plastic, etc.) would be acceptable, it must be a serviceable utensil; a usable kos. Of course, there is a hiddur mitzvah -as with many mitzvos – to seek silver.

    Relating to the popularity of using silver for mitzvos, a quick-yet-fascinating aside: Why is silver sought, and not the more prominent gold? Why aren’t there ‘Gold Stores’ in Lakewood and Yerushalaim?

        Some explain this ‘silver custom’ as stemming from the fact that ‘kos’ is the same gematria as ‘elokim’, a name of Hashem that represents His din/strict justice. To balance this, we avoid gold which too represents din due to the chet of the egel hazahav/golden calf. In addition, silver balances the ‘din’, as it represents rachamim/mercy (see Kaf Hachaim; perhaps this is due to the mitzvos that are performed through silver, e.g. pidyon haben).

          Indeed, the Chovas Yair states that while all ordinary materials are fine, if one had a choice between silver or glass, silver should be chosen.

    Surprisingly, Rav Yaakov Emden quotes his father the Chacham Tzvi that when one is faced with such a choice – glass is preferred! Although the latter is a minority opinion, it is based on a chazal (berachos 51) and a halacha (271:10) that urges one to gaze at the kos shel beracha during kiddush (in addition to looking at the Shabbos neros). The Chacham Tzvi understands this as meaning looking at the actual wine inside the kos (see Kovetz Halachos, Shabbos vol. 1, p. 387 note 23 for more sources).1

         Either way, glass (and all common materials) would certainly be acceptable for kiddush, and almost all hotels and vacation homes have glass cups. Could these, possibly-treif, cups be used for kiddush?

        Without getting into the minutia, many respected vaadim allow caterers to utilize a hotels’ (cleaned) glassware for cold items and beverages. If you’ve ever attended a kosher gala or event at a fancy location the chances are high that you drank from such a glass (and sefardim are even more lenient regarding glass).

           But assuming such glasses aren’t available, or if one’s rav says they should be avoided (perhaps due to wine/whiskey’s charif status), could disposable plastic cups be utilized?

    Plastic’ or ‘Paper’ is not the issue; rather it its intended disposability.

    Is a one-time use cup considered a halachic ‘cup/utensil’?

          The same question would be true for those new ‘fancy’ kos-like disposables, that are made to look like silver kosos, are cheap plastic, and come in packs of twenty.

    Never mind their look, if the driving intention of both its manufacturer and the consumer is for one-time use, these ‘fancy plastics’ may be no different than cups from Walmart.

      (Our question is not to include those flimsy paper cups found by water coolers which are most certainly unacceptable – as it can’t hold liquid with any confidence).

        In 1968, Rav Moshe Feinstein confirmed (Igros Moshe, oh”c, 3:39) that he indeed doesn’t allow even the stronger disposables for kiddush. Although, he writes, if one is stuck one “…may have reason to be lenient”.

       Others, such as Rav Nissan Karelitz, are more pragmatic, stating that if in one’s region such cups are at times used more than once (like on vacation, perhaps) then conceivably they may be used for kiddush (Chut Shani, shabbos, vol. 4 p. 95).

       Others, such as Rav Scheinberg, fully allow plastic throwaways to be used for kiddush, stating that they have the status of a full-fledged utensil.

         If one is stuck it would seem best to use either the hotel glass cup or a non-paper disposable cup.

         What about those who we see double-up a plastic cup and then make kiddush? Does this help in any way?

    I would contend that this practice is derived from a misplaced halachic memory; a remnant from the days of cheap paper cups, when, in a situation where one had to rely on disposables, one would have to double-it; just so it wouldn’t leak the shiur!

    It seems to me, la”d, that this has no relevance to our stronger disposables (however, some talmidei chachamim may still be doubling up plastic disposables for another reason: in case those watching will copy him one day, and do so with flimsy cups. By showing them the doubling option, he is saving them of a potential future halachic dilemma)

         There is a deeper message in all of this: being consistent in halacha.

        While it may appear as a chumrah to say one should avoid, if possible, disposable cups for kiddush, this psak also contains a kulah. The reason why most don’t toivel (aluminum) disposable pans is because their very disposability blocks its status as a true kli/utensil! (Although, there’s a way to make both these leniencies compatible – as a pan cannot easily be used a second time after a baking/roasting, as opposed to a cup which is easily washable).

    One can’t enjoy the benefits of its non-kli status by hilchos tevila, while also enjoying its kli status for kiddush!

          Halacha is not about leniency or stringency, just consistency.

    1. Once, when sharing these halachos to 12th grade Bais Yaakov girls, one student made a haunting suggestion: “Perhaps we use silver and not gold because silver tarnishes. This is a reminder that frequent mitzvos need to be ‘polished’ from time-to-time, so as not to become stale. ↩︎
  • Hagbah’s Half-Pesuk

    Hagbah’s Half-Pesuk

    Saying Half-verses & Another Siddur Mystery

    January, 2026

       It is always a delight when a reader introduces themselves and shares a thought on something I had written or on a matter related to our many topics.

      As it relates to our perennial topic of siddur imponderables, I will share an email Ami received, as well as some possible solutions to the question this reader raised. Let us hope that his question galvanizes each of us to pay more attention to the siddur!

       The difficulty pertains to the holy moment of hagbah, when the Torah is lifted for all to see. We will soon discover that the vitality of hagbah may date to the times of Moshe rabbeinu.

       Not only is this a time mesugal for ruchniyos growth (see Magen Avraham that when looking at the ksav one can receive an ‘ohr gadol’), it is also a rare occasion where halacha goes out of its way to demand of us to be mindful of the women who are in shul.
    The Shulchan Aruch states (siman 134):

    “One shows the ksav of the Torah to those standing to one’s right and left, to those in front and behind, for it is a mitzvah for all the men and women to see the writing and to bow and to say ‘v’zos Hatorah…’.

       With this brief background, let us share what this reader noticed, and that many of us missed:

    Dear AMI,
      I hope this note finds you well. I’m writing with a question related to tefilah and minhag, and I was hoping you might be willing to forward it to Rabbi Moshe Taub.
    This is a question that people in my circles haven’t been able to answer.
    When we lift the Torah during hagbah, we say ‘v’zos haTorah asher sam Moshe lifnei Bnei Yisrael’ (devarim 4:44), and then add ‘al pi Hashem b’yad Moshe”’(bamidbar 9:23), creating a stitched pasuk.
        While the minhag to recite ‘v’zos haTorah’ appears in maseches soferim 14:14, there’s no mention of this bamidbar fragment.
    This Shulchan Aruch also does not mention it. While this addition does appear in the siddur of the Shelah ha-Kadosh (1565–1630 CE), and from my understanding, the Shelah ha-Kadosh would have had access to the Shulchan Aruch.
    Does anyone know of a primary source that addresses who instituted this addition, where it originated, and why ‘al pi Hashem b’yad Moshe’ was added to ‘v’zos ha-Torah’?
    T.T., Toronto Canada”

         This is indeed a fascinating question, and good on him for noticing this oddity!

      It is critical for the reader to note that, as a rule, we are never to recite an incomplete pasuk (berachos 12b)- especially out loud, so to have this minhag develop and accepted is indeed odd.

       One may now wonder, “Don’t our teffilos include many stitched-together pesukim from across Tanach? However, those are largely whole pesukim, or, at times, simply borrowed terms utilized by the anshei knesses hagedolah (often, Artscroll, in their shrewd decision to share the sources for many of the phrases found in our siddur, Selichos, etc. may have inadvertently caused some to miss that many of these are mere paraphrases).

       This email can be broken down to four mysteries:

    • Why do we have to add to meseches soferim’s suggested verse – V’Zos HaTorah – at all?
    • Whatever the reason for this addition, why did we choose this verse specifically?
    • How are we allowed to recite this partial pasuk?
    • Finally, and not mentioned in the email: the mystery of this half pasuk only widens when we consider that there are several pesukim that state ‘al pi Hashem b’yad Moshe’, including even from tanach (yehoshua, 22:9)! in Bamidbar alone, at least four Pesukim have the phrase of “al pi Hashem, begging the question: From which verse is this being taken?!

       To unpack all of this, we must first understand the source for hagbah.

    By the kelelos of sefer Devarim, the pasuk curses those who do not uphold the Torah. The Ramban interrupts this to being referring to the shul/chazan who does not literally hold up the Torah for all to see (27:26; see Beis Yosef).

    The Be’er Hagoleh to the Shulchan Aruch (ibid.) brings this Ramban as one of the main sources of our hagbah.

     In other words, hagbah is our fulfillment of a Torah protection against one of the arrurim!

    The goal of this public display of the Torah is to demonstrate our safeguarding for an unchanging Torah; showing off it un-manipulated state. It now makes perfect sense why chazal urge is to make a battlecry at this moment- declaring in words-after-action how our Torah is intact and remains identical to the Torah from the days of Moshe.

    Hence: ‘V’zos hatorah asher sam Moshe…’.

      So fundamental is the act of hagbah, and this declaration that went along with it, that basic halacha desired it to be performed before krias HaTorah! Indeed, this is how the Shulchan Aruch rules.

    The ashkanazi minhag to perform hagbah only after leining was due to a past concern regarding the more-simple Jews. Often, these unsophisticated Jews saw hagbah as the main event -as opposed to the leining – and would therefore not even stay after for the actual kriah.

    So, Ashkanazim we switched it until after kriah.

       Now that we know hagbah’s purpose and halachic history- as well as the likely reason chazal have us recite this pasuk (V’zos…)- we can now resolve our remaining questions.

    As to the concept of reciting additional pesukim by hagbah, some versions of meseches soferim indeed bring the addition of “Toras Hashem temmima…”.

    However, many, including the Vilna Gaon, argue that this was a later addition, not part of the authoritative girsa.

     While the email-er is correct that we already find our addition of “Al Pi…” in the Siddur HaShelah, however, the Tzelusa D’Avraham wisely notes that the Shelah makes no reference to it in his commentary. In other words, it may just be a printers’ addition due to it already being a widespread custom.

     The questions remaining:

    • Which pasuk of “al pi Hashem” is being referenced?
    • How are we allowed to recite a half pasuk?
    • Why do we add to the pesuk of “Al Pi Hashem…” at all?

    Rav Chaim Volozioner resolves some of these questions.

    He posits that the half-verse being referenced is from bamidbar 9:22, describing our journeys in the midbar.

    More, he argues that it must be said in its entirety (Shaarei Rachamim, siddur HaGra; Dover Shalom in Otzar Hatefillos).

       Nevertheless, the minhag of the majority seems to be to only recite the half pasuk.

    The Aruch Hashulchan is very bothered by this, leaving that question unanswered. 

       However, we could answer the half-pasuk issue by math soaking the many sources who posit that such recitals are not always a concern. This can be evidenced by those who start their Friday night kiddush with the words yom hashishi or va’yehi erev, neither of which are at the start of the pasuk!

    This is explained by many as follows: when we are reciting an incomplete verse in a teffila or a praise it is of no concern, especially when the context is clear (see, e.g., shu”t Maharam Shik 124).  

    Such an approach however may feel unsatisfying in our case, as not all concur with this lenient approach to half verses (see, e.g., shu”t Chasam, Sofer 10; e.g. that that begin kiddush at the start of the pasuk) yet most ashkanazim still say this half pasuk by hagbah.

        I would therefore suggest the following approach to all of our questions, lulei d’mistapinah.

    While the provenance of our adding ‘al pi Hashem’ is unclear, we have sources for many other (full) pesukim that were added through the generations, including ‘Toras Hashem temima’ as alluded to above (a full list of these verses can be found in Encylpodia Talmudis, 8, p. 170).

       Each of these added pesukim have one common denominator: they highlight that our Torah is from Hashem.

       If, as the Ramban stated, hagbah’s goal is to make us alacritous to the kiyum/continuation of the Torah-indeed one of our Ani Maamins– then we run into a frightening risk.

    As we saw above, the simple of the ashkanazim would leave after hagbah, which is why it was moved to the end. For such people who often only knew Torah – ceremony and content-through this proclamation, we may have been concerned for another of the ani maamins: that the Torah was written directly from the word of Hashem.

    Why?

    Because the verse chazal share-V’zos HaTorah- only mentions Moshe’s writing!

       Since the goal is to aid the simple in accepting and celebrating our Torah, we were cognizant of corrupting their emunah, chalila.

      This may be why some added ’Toras HASHEM Temimma…

       Bear in mind that before the advent of the printing press, everything was said by heart and many could not even read. It therefore became far easier to just add these three word “al-pi-Hashem” to stave off this very real concern. 

       Indeed, Lulei D’Mistapina, I would posit that perhaps this phrase (al pi Hashemis not even referencing a Pasuk at all!! Rather it is a kinuy, a maxim, (see nedarim 10a).

     Such kinnuyim may be done so long as Hashem’s name follows two words prior (see Tzelusa D’Avraham p.371-372; this would seem especially true during davening when Hashem’s name is used even outside of pesukim.

    One thing I know for certain: so much Torah is hidden in our siddurim and minhagim!

  • Why Do We (Often) Change Tunes/Niggun In the Middle of Lecha Dodi?

    Why Do We (Often) Change Tunes/Niggun In the Middle of Lecha Dodi?

    The fascinating reasons & sources behind the Minhag to switch Niggunim in the middle of Lecha Dodi, specifically by Lo Sovoshi.

    Published in May, 2023 in Ami Magazine

    Rabbi Moshe Taub

    There are certain minhagim that we scarcely notice until they are brought to our attention. A few weeks ago, a shul member approached me and said with concern, “Rabbi, whenever Mr. X davens at the amud Friday night, he uses the same niggun for the entire Lecha Dodi! Maybe we can explain to him that he is supposed to switch the niggun at Lo Seivoshi.”

    People may dismiss such a complaint on the grounds that this change in niggun is not a halachah and that the  minhag is not universal; in fact, some have the minhag not to sing Lecha Dodi at all! (For a complete list of minhagim for Lecha Dodi, see Kovetz Beis Aharon V’Yisrael, 70, pp. 135-138.)

    Although certainly not a reason to reprimand a chazzan, the fact that this change in niggun is a popular minhag Yisrael should give us pause, especially since the premise for niggunei Shabbos is rooted in basic halachah. (See posts on other other ‘siddur mysteries’)

    The Rema states a halachah in Shulchan Aruch (siman 281) that we should add melodies to our davening on Shabbos to lengthen the tefillah and make it sweeter.

    The Arugas Habosem comments, “Since on Shabbos there is a great need to daven with complete joy and energy, and because niggun awakens the heart to the joy in mitzvos Hashem, I will quote from the Maavar Yabok [d. 1639]: ‘The Zohar teaches of a special sanctuary in Shamayim that is only opened through song… The song of the chazzan who sings is brought up to the highest realms… And for this reason there is a minhag for the mispallelim in shul to sing [with the chazzan] on Shabbos and Yom Tov” (Otzar Hatefillos, p. 331, and Maavar Yabok, sifsei tzedek, ch. 31; for more sources in halachah for the importance of singing during davening on Shabbos, see Kovetz Halachos, Shabbos, Vol. 1, p. 297, note #5; see also Asifas Gershon L’Shabbos and Piskei Teshuvos, siman 267, notes 35-38).

    There are several suggested reasons for the Lo Seivoshi niggun change, but first, some brief background on Lecha Dodi.

    Chazal state that on Erev Shabbos, Rabi Chanina would dress in his finery, stand and declare, “Let us go out to greet the Shabbos Malkah.” Rav Yannai would put on his Shabbos clothes and declare, “Bo’i kallah bo’i kallah” (Shabbos 119a and Bava Kama 32b; see also Shabbos 26b).

    The pronouncement “Lecha Dodi”is not given in this Chazal; the expression comes from Shir Hashirim: “Lecha Dodi…come, my beloved, let us go out to the field, let us lodge in the villages” (7:12). Based on this and other sources, Rav Shlomo Alkabetz composed the words to the piyut Lecha Dodi in the 1570s or 1580s.

    Some posit that we should omit the phrase Lecha Dodi altogethersince we no longer go outside to greet Shabbos (Yosef Ometz, siman 589).

    The author of the Shulchan Aruch, Rav Yosef Karo, who was a contemporary of Rav Alkabetz, writes, “One should wear nice clothes and celebrate the arrival of Shabbos as one would to greet a king or a bride and groom. Rabi Chanina would wrap himself (in finery) and stand waiting in the evening as Shabbos was approaching and say, ‘Come and go out to greet the Shabbos Queen,’ and Rabi Yannai would say, ‘Bo’i kallah bo’i kallah’” (Shulchan Aruch, siman 262:2).

    Anyone familiar with the Shulchan Aruch knows that it is rare for the author to quote directly from the primary source, as he does here. It is likely that the piyut of Lecha Dodi was already well accepted at the time of this writing.

    A friend shared with me an email from Rav Zilberstein’s kollel, in which he explained that the change in niggun at Lo Seivoshi is based on our relationship to the Shabbos “bride.” In the piyut, we follow the pattern of the two steps of halachic marriage—eirusin and nisuin. At weddings nowadays, we do both of these steps under the chuppah back to back, separating them with the reading of the kesubah. On Shabbos, we separate these two stages of our relationship with Shabbos by changing the melody.

    There are even earlier discussions of this practice. Rav Shlomo Zalman Geiger (d. 1878) was a rav in Frankfurt at the time of Rav Samson Raphael Hirsch. Partly due to his disagreement with Rav Hirsch’s perceived change in certain practices, Rav Geiger composed a sefer comprising the shul minhagim for Frankfurt throughout the year in a sefer titled Divrei Kehillah. Since he was also a baal tefillah, he cites many of their niggun practices as well.

    There we find this custom, although with a slight variation. The minhag in Frankfurt was to change the niggun, but not at Lo Seivoshi, the sixth stanza; it was changed at the fifth stanza, Hisoreri. This was because the initial letters of the first four stanzas spell “Shlomo.” This is an allusion not only to the author’s name, but also to “Ben Shlomo”—Moshiach (see Rambam, who describes him as Ben Shlomo in his 13 Ikkarim, Peirush Hamishnayos, Sanhedrin; see also Divrei Hayamim, 1:22:9-1). Indeed, the stanza before Hisoreri mentions Ben Yishai.

    Rav Geiger writes that in Frankfurt, they would sing a simpler tune until Hisoreri, and then switch to a celebratory niggun, alluding to the complete geulah. They would then return to the original niggun at Bo’i Kallah (ibid., p. 61).

    As for the current practice of changing the melody at Lo Seivoshi, some suggest that until that point, the piyut describes our hope for geulah, and from Lo Seivoshi onward it describes that era.

    Nevertheless, some still suggest changing the melody earlier, as they did in Frankfurt, so that the four stanzas that spell “Shlomo” can be sung with the same melody, and the next four stanzas, whose initial letters spell “Halevi,” can be completed with its own melody.

    Over 25 years ago, in the well-known Torah journal Beis Aharon V’Yisrael (Vol. 84, pp. 131-132), Rav Aryeh Butbul requested from its knowledgeable readership the source for this change in niggun, and many talmidei chachamim wrote back with sources and suggestions.

    One respondent cited the sefer Mekor Hatefillos, which states that we change the melody simply because in larger shuls some mispallelim may get lost and not know which stanza the shul is up to! The niggun change aides them in resuming unified singing (ibid., Vol. 86, pp. 142-143).

    It should be noted that some consider the possibility that people will lose the place as a reason to avoid this minhag altogether since a chazzan may struggle to finding his second niggun (Ha’admor Rav Dovid of Luluv; see Mekurei Tefillah, 4:52)

    Another respondent told an amazing story that demonstrates deference for this minhag (ibid., Vol. 87, pp. 116-117).

    When the third Rebbe of Vizhnitz, the Ahavas Yisrael, was escaping the town of Vizhnitz during the First World War, he wound up in another town for Shabbos. The gabbai honored him with the amud on Friday night. Although the minhag in Vizhnitz was not to sing Lecha Dodi, the Rebbe acquiesced to the local custom.

    However, when it came to Lo Seivoshi, the Rebbecontinued with the same niggun with which he had begun, causing a minor tumult. The gabbai explained the issue, and the Rebbe changed to a different melody at the next stanza, V’hayu Limshisa.

    Rav Geiger concludes that this is why Vizhnitz still has the minhag to change the niggun at V’hayu Limshisa!

    Although we have only scratched the surface of this piyut, it is enough to realize that we should not reject out of hand any minhagim regarding the way it is recited. Minhagim are important! ●

  • Is A Post Tisha B’av Kiddush Levana An Halachic Myth?

    Is A Post Tisha B’av Kiddush Levana An Halachic Myth?

    We all have memories of reciting Kidush Levana right after Maariv Motzai Tisha B’Av -do all agre with this practice?


    Let’s examine the surprisingly controversial minhag of reciting kiddush levana immediately after maariv following Tisha b”av.
    One of the many jobs of a rabbi that often gets overlooked is his monthly creation of a luach and calendar. While technology has made this task seem simple, the truth is that many rabbanim create their monthly calendars the old-fashioned way. In fact, each year in Beis Yaakov 12th grade halacha final, a giove the same final question as extra credit. “If dawn is at 7:16am and sunset is at 6:02, whe is the earliest time one may acceoct an early Shabbos? Please show math.” While today we have myzemanim, I di think it is essential that every frum household has one member who can approximate zemanim.
    Yet, for a rav, irrespective of how he arrives at their times, dates and zemanim, there is almost always some politics involved.
    When I arrived at one my shuls, I increased the time of Shabbos by a few minutes. Many complained. I must state that I have never made changes to any shul minhag without first speaking to the prior rabbanim. I need not here, and again, repeat the story of the Rema and his shamash, and the dangers in leaders assuming historical reasoning and then arguing on, and changing from, that mere hypothesis.
    The president approached me, “Rabbi, I think the issue some have with this is not so much that you changed the time, but that the other shuls in the area have not gone along with this, making it confusing to many who use both luachs”. I explained that my change is based on halacha -about which I can’t, nor would they want me to, compromise. That closed the conversation, as I have been blessed, always, with wonderful and understanding presidents.
    However, I couldn’t resist calling him back to point out, “You know, I also shortened the zman for taanisim. Did anyone complain about that?” I am not belittling concerns and complaints -and, the truth is, I very often make errors or overlook a serious concerns or conflicts, such as legal holidays, seasonal changes, times for selichos -it is hard to keep track of it all. A classic example: “Should shachris during the weekdays of Chanukah be at a rosh chodesh’ s time, or that of a regular Monday and Thursday?”. One the one hand, Chanukah also has leining and hallel; but on the other hand, unlike rosh chodesh, there’s no mussaf; but on the other hand, hallel on Chanukah is longer, etc.
    It may sound amusing, but this one enquiry-and others like it – often leads to many heated -although respectful-arguments. As I often point out in shul, “That halacha can be precise to the second is not unique, and we indeed see from these debates that we all care about just a few minutes when it comes to sleep, catching our bus, traffic, etc.”
    I can spend a whole series discussing just this one area of the rabbinate. Perhaps some time, iy”H, we will. But for now, let us discuss an issue that comes up year-after-year when I make the schedule for the month of av.
    In addition to zmanei krias shma, teffila, etc., the secretary will send me a list of times that need to be filled for a particular month, and a day like tisha b”av, such as the taanis’ s start and end, eichah, kinnos, shiurim, chatzos yom, etc.
    But there is one space I am asked to fill that is always a concern: “Kiddush levana following Tisha B’av, not before: Time X”.
    To most, this may seem innocuous. We all have memories of leaving shul after the taanis with the kiddush levana cards in hand; of pushing through our hunger and dancing afterward while tired.
    But this is not so simple.
    In hilchos kiddush levana (siman 426:2), after stating that one should be dressed nicely and in good spirits when performing kiddush levana, the Rema in the Shulchan Aruch, states,: “We do not perform kiddush levana before Tisha B”av or before Yom Kippur. However, one may perform this motzai yom kippur -as one is then infused with joy then. However, one may not do so after Tisha B’av or any other taanis (as one is not in the best of moods or in the best of cleanness or clothing)”
    The Mishne Berrua adds that even in a year like this one when Tisha B”av falls on Thursday, we would still delay kiddush levana until motzai Shabbos, 12th of av.
    So then why does it seem that this is not followed? Should I omit this recital from my shul’s luach?
    The Mishneh Berrura does say that if one eats and/or drinks a little following Tisha b”av then according to many one can indeed say it. This would also be conditional ,he writes, on them wearing (real) shoes.
    But, still, it doesn’t seem that many are careful to do these first.
    This brings us to Toras hanistar.
    A little later, in the laws of Tisha B”av, (siman 551:8) the Rema seems to contradict himself, writing, “the custom is not to perform kiddush levana until after Tisha b”av”, implying that one may do so immediately following this fast!
    The Be’er Heitiv (#25) clarifies: “See siman 426:2 [however, this contradiction is explained] since the Ari”zal states that one should do kiddush levana motzai Tisha b”av since on this day moshiach will be born…”.
    So that al pi kabbala there is a direct reason to perform this mitzvah at this time, while according to nigleh (reveled, basic halacha) this taanis and all others are the same: one mustn’t say kiddush levana then, with the caveat that, according to some, exchanging to normal shoes and have already eaten would then allow for it.
    For the confused reader, the Chofetz Chaim adds (Shaar Hatzion, 426:9) that if one wishes to follow the basic halacha and delay his recital, and has also not eaten nor exchanged shoes, but his shul is reciting it following the taanis, he may join them if the alternative is to say it alone at a later date. Meaning, performing this mitzvah with a multitude of people (b’rom am) trumps the other concern of being in an unbecoming state for this beracha.
    We should also point out that the Vilna Gaon and others disagree with the while idea of waiting to begin with. Why delay a mitzvah until after any date? Rather one should perform this mitzvah as soon as it becomes available!
    The minhag is to conclude kiddush levana by singing “tovim meoros shebara elokeinu yatzarum b’daas b’vina ubahskeil -wonderful are the lumineires that Hashem created, He formed these with wisdom, insight and discernment”. This is taken from the teffila kel adon, said Shabbos morning, that dates back to the days of chazal.
    Our greatest luminaires on earth are our gedolim whom we follow, and who create our calander. Shul rabbanim are but like the moon, only reflecting the light of the poskim and gedolim – our ‘sun’.
    The goal of this article was to examine an area of halacha about which few may be aware, and not to cause machlokos. We will all follow whatever our rabbanim tell us, as they guide us in present-day minhag yisroel, reflected off the actions of our gedolim.
    May our learning of this topic, and the acceptance of whichever minhag our shul follows, allow that this be the year when ben Dovid reveal the ultimate light upon the world.

  • Halacha: Finer Points, History, and Common Misconceptions

    This article serves as a starting point for those who are new to exploring halacha beyond surface-level conclusions, with selected discussions illustrating broader patterns.

    Halacha is often encountered through brief rulings or isolated practices. Yet many areas of Jewish law cannot be properly understood without examining their historical development, underlying assumptions, and commonly misunderstood details. What appears straightforward on the surface often proves far more layered upon closer study.

    Some halachic topics require careful clarification of popular myths, while others demand historical context to make sense of contemporary debate. In still other cases, modern technology raises questions that earlier generations could never have imagined, requiring established halachic principles to be applied with both precision and intellectual honesty.

    This article serves as a starting point for those exploring halacha for the first time, linking to in-depth studies that examine sources, history, and modern application.


    Clarifying Common Misconceptions

    Certain halachic ideas are widely discussed yet poorly understood. These topics benefit from slow, source-based analysis rather than slogans, folklore, or partial quotations.

    Examples include:

    Each of these discussions illustrates how misconceptions can persist when original sources are not carefully examined.


    Halacha in Historical Context

    Many halachic practices only become clear when viewed through the lens of history. Understanding when, why, and under what conditions a practice developed often resolves debates that appear confusing or contradictory today.

    Examples include:

    History does not replace halacha — but it frequently explains it.


    Human Complexity and Halachic Analysis

    Some areas of halacha involve deeply human realities that resist simplistic categorization. These discussions require sensitivity, nuance, and a willingness to confront difficult questions honestly.

    Examples include:

    Such topics demonstrate how halacha engages with real people and lived experience.


    Technology and New Halachic Questions

    As technology advances, halacha increasingly intersects with modern innovation. While new tools do not automatically generate new law, they often raise questions that demand careful application of long-standing principles.

    Examples include:

    Here, halacha’s durability is tested not by abandoning tradition, but by understanding it deeply enough to apply it correctly.


    Rabbinic Authority and Method

    Underlying all halachic discussion is a broader question of method: how halacha is analyzed, transmitted, and applied. Examining rabbinic authority and interpretive frameworks helps explain why sincere scholars can reach different conclusions.

    Examples include:


    A Note on Scope

    This site does not aim to provide practical psak halacha. Rather, it explores halacha as a living system — rooted in classical sources, shaped by history, responsive to human complexity, and challenged by modern life.

    Each article stands on its own. Together, they form a broader conversation about how Jewish law is studied, understood, and lived.


  • Halachos of Chanukah: A Basic Guide

    Halachos of Chanukah: A Basic Guide

    Rabbi Moshe Taub, 5786 -Written for YIH Membership

    Tonight, with the commencement of the 25th of Kislev, we begin celebrating the eight days of Chanukah.

    • These eight days were designated as Yamim Tovim (festivals) by the Sages, and Hallel is recited every morning.
    • Al Hanissim is inserted in the blessing of the Shemoneh Esreh and in the second blessing of Birkas Hamazon (Grace after Meals).[1] 
    • If Al Hanissim was omitted, the Shemoneh Esreh or Birkas Hamazon need not be repeated.
    • It is customary for women to avoid certain labors (actions avoided during chol hamoed) for the first half-hour time-period that the Chanukah lights must burn.

    The Lighting Obligation

    • All members of each household, who are above 12/13 years of age, share an equal obligation of lighting Chanukah lights.
    • The basic obligation is that each household kindles just one light on each night of Chanukah for all who live there.
    • Both men and women are equal in Chanukah’s lighting obligation and must make sure to light—or that Chanukah lights are lit—in their place of residence.
    • In this, Chanukah is no different from Shabbos whose basic law requires one to make sure that just one candle be lit in each home (chovas hadar). For Shabbos, we gift this mitzvah to women; on Chanukah, we gift this mitzvah to men. Although there is deep significance to this custom, the fact remains that men and women share the exact same obligation in both Shabbos and Chanukah candles.
    • Therefore, if there is no adult male (above the age of thirteen) in the household, the woman of the house must kindle. This is like Shabbos, where if there is no woman there, the man must still light.

    It is common practice that children kindle their own lights as well.

    Although one candle per night suffices, for centuries, it is common practice to follow the Talmud’s ‘Mehadrin min HaMehadrin‘/SuperBeautification method: starting with one candle on the first night and then adding one addition candle on each subsequent night.[2]

    When to Light

    • We should strive to kindle the lights about ten to twenty minutes after sunset.
    • The lights should burn for at least half an hour, but it is best if they remain lit until rush hour traffic ends, if possible, or until family dinner concludes (an hour or two).[3]

    Should one need to light LATER:

    In such cases, one should have an other member of the household light in the more-proper time. However, if this will harm shalom bayis or chinuch habanim then waiting to light later -when everyone is together-may be apt. A rav should be consulted.

    Assuming no one else is home during the proper lighting time, one may indeed light later[4].

    In extreme cases such as due to travel, etc., the lighting may be done at any point during the night, until daybreak, so long as others in the home are/will be awake. If one lives or is staying alone, or, if others in the home cannot be awakened for whatever reason, one may nevertheless light, and with the berachos.[5]

    Like with all other ‘passing mitzvos‘, one who is forced to light late must try not to eat a full meal before they light, or must at least create a shomer to remind them.

    If one needs to light EARLIER:

    • In cases of extreme need/circumstances (such as one who has a flight around lighting time), one may light as early as plag ha’minchah.
    • During this time of year, plag will come out to about 40 minutes before sundown. The exact timeframe should be checked on a website like: https://www.myzmanim.com/search.aspx
    • When lighting this early, one must still make sure that there is sufficient oil/wax for the light to burn for at least one-half hour past sundown.

    Friday/Motzai Shabbos

    • On Friday, the eve of Shabbos, the custom for well-over five-hundred years is to kindle the Chanukah lights prior to the kindling of the Shabbos candles.
    • One must make sure that at least one of the Chanukah lights will burn into Shabbos and through the entire half-hour period following sundown.
    • IN SHUL: Following Shemoneh Esrah at the conclusion of Shabbos Chanukah in shul, the Chanukah lights are kindled  before Havdalah.
    • AT HOME: one may follow the same order, or he may perform Havdalah first, whichever is the minhag of that house.

    Simply put: As opposed to in a shul, at home either order is fine (the reasons behind this are fascinating, yet beyond our scope here).

    Where to Place Lights

    Chazal demand that the lights be placed at or near the outer part of the doorway facing the street. The reason for this was to publicize the miracle.

    • HOWEVER…Nowadays, the accepted custom is to kindle the lights indoors, even on one’s kitchen table (!), so long as members of the home will see it.
    • In other words, the pirsumei nisa of today is fulfilled through those living in the home.
    • In fact, this was behind the motive for the minhag of Chanukah gelt –to keep the family inside awake whilst the flames are glowing (Avnei Nezer as brought in Siach Sarfei Kodosh; this would also explain ‘Chanukah gift-giving’. See also Emes L’Yaakov to siman 670, with footnote #582)
    • Nevertheless, it is appropriate and praiseworthy to place the lights where they will be visible from the street. Specifically, if possible, on the left side of an open doorway opposite the mezuzah or at least by a window facing the public domain.[6] 

    – One should not light outdoors in America (unless, of course, one has a specific custom otherwise) [6a] –

    • Ideally, the lights should be between 12 and 33 inches above the ground.

    To Recap:

    • Leaving the menorah on one’s kitchen table, etc., is sufficient.
    • The discussions of where to place the menorah (one’s window, door, etc.) are referring to a hiddur mitzvah (an extra beautification of the mitzvah).
    • While the ancient custom is for the kindling to be increased each subsequent night – one light on the first night, two on the second, etc. – in cases of need (like when in a hotel) the basic mitzvah can be performed by kindling just one light each night for an entire household, and this may be relied upon in cases of extreme need.

    The Procedure for Lighting

    • On the first night, one kindles the lamp at the extreme right of the menorah.
    • One adds one extra candle each night going to their left and begins lighting starting from there (the far left) and, from there, going right.

    Facing the menorah on, say, the fourth night, the left side of the menorah will be empty, and one starts with the candle on the far left and continues to the right until the first candle is lit.

    • There are alternative views regarding the order for placement and lighting that each home must follow. What is recorded above is simply the most common custom.

    What Type of Candle//the Myth of Olive Oil:

    • One may use any stable fuel or candle for the lights
    • While the Shulchan Aruch/Rema do suggeststhat some type of oil is preferred so as to recall the miracle, zecher l’ness [7], they do not mention Olive Oil.
    • While it is true that the Talmud teaches us that for both Shabbos lights and Chanukah olive oil is the most common and best stable fuel source, this law is omitted by the Shulchan Aruch (by hilchos Chanukah; he does indeed mention this regarding Shabbos -see my forthcoming sefer, iy”H, where all this is discussed).
    • Nevertheless, the common minhag today is to go out one’s way -when feasible – to use olive oil for Chanukah.
    • The Maharal suggests that using olive oil – and not just any oil – is an even greater zecher l’ness, although he is in the extreme minorty (see Dibros Moshe, shabbos who argues strongly against this position; See ‘Chanukah: Mysteries and Histories‘, Rabbi Moshe Taub, 2026, iy”H).
    • If olive oil is not available, any other oil which gives a steady and clear flame (that does not emit an offputting odor) may be used, due to the miracle happening through oil.[8]
    • Modern wax candles are also 100 percent permitted, so long as they will last through the times mentioned above.

    Sundry

    • As with any mitzvah that is dependent on time, once the time for kindling has arrived (around sundown), one must try to avoid excessive work, eating meals/washing, etc., before kindling the lights.
    • When lighting the menorah, the appropriate blessings are recited, with Shehecheyanu recited on the first night only.
    • Most Sefardim and Chassidim omit the word “shel” from the berachah of L’Hadlik Neir.[9]
    • Many Ashkenazim, however, keep that word as this is the version found in the gemara.
    • Each person should follow his custom. If one does not have a custom, either way of saying this berachah is fine, so long as a person seeks to remain consistent through the days of Chanukah.
    • One must light immediately following the berachos, without any talking or singing.
    • Therefore, even the recital of Haneiros Hallalu is only commenced after the first candle is lit.
    • Some have the custom to light all of the candles first before Haneiros Hallalu is begun. Either way, at least one candle must be lit right after the blessings, before speaking or singing.
    • The custom for close to eight hundred years is to sing Maoz Tzur following the lighting. This poem takes us on a journey through the many exiles of the Jewish People and speaks of our endurance and salvations at the hand of Hashem.[9a]
    • The period after the lighting is known as a special time for prayers, and we are encouraged to pray to Hashem for all of our needs.[10]

    If one misses a night of lighting, it can’t be made up, and one simply continues lighting the same number of lights as everyone else on the additional nights.

    • One may not derive any benefit from the burning lamps, and it is for this reason that we add the extra shamash candle, (i.e., in case we do benefit, it is considered to be from this shamash.)
    • Hallel and a special leining are recited each day of Chanukah during Shacharis.

    NOTES


    [1] See my forthcomingh sefer for several explanations why Chanukah is omitted from Mayan Shalosh.

    [2] This too will be discussed in detail in my forthcoming sefer, iy”H.

    [3] Kuntros Chanukah U’Megilah, in the name of the Brisker Rav, et al. Most poskim view this as merely a chumrah. Cf. Chazon Ish who would actually put out his Chanukah menorah after thirty minutes had passed (Neir Chanukah, os 17, in the name of Rav Chaim Kanievsky).

    [4] Shevet Halevi states that it is better for a person himself to light later than at the proper time through a shaliach.

    [5] See Shaarei Tzion, Orach Chaim 672:15 with Igros Moshe, Orach Chaim 4:105:7.

    [6] See link as to why in chutz la’aretz we made this change to light indoors.

    [6a] Ohr Zaruah 133:2; Sefer Ha’itur, Aseres Hadibros,Chanukah 114:2; See also Shu”t Minchas Yitzchak 6:67; Kovetz Shulchan Melachim,Kislev, 5766; see Yerech L’Moadim, p. 112; See Darkei Moshe, siman 671:9; See Chidushei Anshei Shem to Berachos 38a; See,Aruch Hashulchan 671:24 as well as Moadim U’Zemanim, vol. 2, siman 140, fn. 1; Cf. Shu”t Yaavetz 149, who allows, although does not urge, such encasements; See Shu”t Imrei Noam 2:22; Cf. Rav Elyashiv in Shu”t Kovetz Teshuvos 1:67, pp. 98–101.

    [7] See forthcoming sefer on this issue and its history.

    [8] See Mishnah Berurah 673:4,and chapter below.

    [9] See forthcoming sefer on this issue and its history.

    [9a] As to why we chose this pizmon for Chanukah, I would suggest two approaches: A) On a true chag one may not read or discuss sad events, B) Being the last of the established chagim of chazal, Chanukah can look back through history, C) On that theme, Chanukah was preview for-and is closest to -our the final galus, making it the appropriate time to look back at all prior exiles and their salvations, thus giving hope for our final salvation from our current exile.

    [10] This will be discussed in detail below .

  • Yehudis & Latkes: Solving Two Chanukah Mysteries

    For more on Chanukah see:

    Why We (still) Light the Menorah Indoors

    &

    Chanukah’s Absence from Mishneh & Brevity in the Talmud

    We are all taught as children about the heroine within the story of Chanukah, Yehudis. As we will show, there is a lot more here than meets the eye.

    I. THE KARTOFFEL KERFUFFLE
    Take a poll on what is the most common Chanukah food staple, and

    latkes would come in at number one, with sufganiyot nipping at their heels. However, fried potatoes are a very recent addition to Chanukah. While most assume that potatoes were first brought to Europe either

    by the sixteenth-century conquistadors or by Sir Walter Raleigh, either way they only reached widespread use during the mid-1700s. Indeed, the fact that most of us make the berachah Ha’adamah on potatoes proves how late potatoes entered Jewish kitchens.

    Briefly, some argue that the proper berachah should be Shehakol, like mushrooms. This is due to several halachic factors, and especially the fact that close to one thousand years ago the Aruch used an odd term to refer to these truffles: “tartfulls” (which I always assumed was simply a transliteration of “truffle.”)

    Some, especially early Chassidishe poskim, asserted that the Aruch was referring to a kartoffel, a term used for the lowly potato. While there are a number of reasons that most poskim argued with Shehakol being the berachah for potatoes, an important factor was the point that the Aruch could never have been referring to a potato, as he did not even know what they were back then.

    If latkes, while a nice minhag, do not and could not have any provenance in classic minhagei Yisrael—and are certainly not brought in the Shulchan Aruch—is there any truly halachic food on Chanukah? Yes, there is!

    II. CHEESE, PLEASE

    The Rama makes an interesting aside in the Shulchan Aruch.2 While discussing the lack of an official obligation to make a seudah on Chanukah, the Rama adds that there is an inyan to be marbeh b’seudos and to eat cheese on Chanukah. We have finally found a clear minhag relating to food on Chanukah.

    The explanation for this minhag is likely familiar to many. Cheese was one of the foods Yehudis fed the enemy so as to later trap and kill him. The Mishnah Berurah fills in the rest of the story: “Yehudis was the daughter of Yochanan Kohen Gadol and there was a law…so she fed cheese to a leading general so as to tire him. She chopped off his head [causing] the enemy to flee.”3 This is no small matter, and it is more than a story.

    The Gemara teaches that women are also obligated in mitzvas neir Chanukah because “they, too, were in this miracle.”4 While many Rishonim, like the Ritva,5 understand this simply to mean that they, like the rest of Klal Yisrael, were in turmoil, Rashi understands the reasoning differently. He explains that it means that they were at the center of our salvation. Without mentioning Yehudis by name, he gives us this same story as the reason that women are obligated in Chanukah lights.

    The Ran6 goes one step further, quoting an unknown Midrash. While he, too, does not mention her name, he does add to the story by claiming the heroine was the daughter of Yochanan Kohen Gadol. A few years later, the anonymous sefer Kol Bo puts it all together as we know the story today, resulting in the heroine being identified as Yehudis the daughter of Yochanan Kohen Gadol.

    In fact, Tosafos7 takes women’s centrality to Chanukah one step further. In the name of the Rashbam, it is stated that on both Chanukah and Purim, we were only saved because of the two famous women in each story, and for this reason, all women are obligated in these days, even though they are mitzvos bound by time. Rav Eliyahu Hakohen M’Izmir, the Orah V’Simchah, even wonders why, then, it doesn’t say in Al Hanissim

    Bimei Mattisyahu v’Yehudis”!8

    III. A CHANUKAH CHUMRA FOR WOMEN

    Because of the above, another halachah is codified. The Shulchan Aruch9 brings a minhag that women should refrain from doing melachah (accord- ing to most this only includes that which would also be forbidden on Chol Hamoed) during the first half hour that the Chanukah neiros are burning. Many wonder why this halachah/minhag is codified to apply specifically to women. While the Be’er Hagolah and many others simply explain that this is because it is more common that they are home at that time and therefore should have a reminder that they cannot benefit from these lights, others give another reason.

    The Mishnah Berurah explains: “This minhag is unique to women be- cause the neis happened through them!”10 Again, we see their centrality to this Yom Tov.11

    IV. WHO WAS YEHUDIS? WHO WAS YOCHANAN?

    If Yehudis was the daughter of Yochanan Kohen Gadol, would that not make Mattisyahu her brother? After all, we say in Al Hanissim, “Bimei Mattisyahu ben Yochanan Kohen Gadol.” In addition, which Yochanan is this? The Gemara teaches that one should not trust in himself until he dies, for Yochanan was a tzaddik and served as Kohen Gadol and then became a Tzeduki at the end of his life!12 Could this be the father of Mattisyahu, the father of Yehudis? If so, why would we mention him in a tefillah of praise? He left Toras Chazal!

    The Imrei Noam13 brings from the Vilna Gaon, and the same is brought in the Seder Hadoros, that in truth there were two Yochanans. The first is the one we mention in Al Hanissim. Mattisyahu would then have a grand- son that he would name after the baby’s great-grandfather, Yochanan. It was this second Yochanan who would go on to become a Tzeduki.14 There are still others15 who say that this Yochanan was indeed one and the same as the Tzeduki, and they each offer varying explanations as to why we still mention him by name in such a lofty tefillah recounting this neis.

    But the mystery is not yet over. Many wonder—like Rashi and others who assert that Yehudis’s story is so central to the neis—why Chazal do not mention it at all. It’s not even found in Megillas Antiochus. (Although, I would answer that the Ran indeed did seem to have a Midrash that discussed the story.)

    The Ben Ish Chai suggests that the story of Yehudis took place many years earlier and is only being remembered on Chanukah. This explana- tion requires further study, for it would make her father being named Yochanan Kohen Gadol a tremendous coincidence. It would also call into question Rashi’s view regarding the women’s obligation in mitzvas Chanukah being due to the story of Yehudis being so central to the neis. However, even the Ben Ish Chai still maintains that this story—although not during the classic Chanukah story—took place during the Greek rule over us.

    This is as opposed to Sefer Yehudis (of unclear origin, see below), which places her events in the time of Nevuchadnetzar. Indeed, Rav Yaakov Emden also states that this event took place during Bayis Rishon.16 Even if, according to other sources, this incident indeed took place during the Chanukah story, the piyut for the second Shabbos Chanukah names her Chanah, brother of Yehudah Hamacabi, continuing to add to the confusion.

    The Aruch Hashulchan combines many versions of these events and says that (as the first piyut for Shabbos Chanukah teaches) the Greek king was livid when he heard how the Jews killed his general after the wedding of the daughter of the Kohen Gadol; at a later time in the story, there was a woman named Yehudis who fed the enemy dairy. Like the Ben Ish Chai, he is asserting that these events did happen around the time of Chanukah, although not necessarily during the main events.

    In Megillas Taanis (the earliest work of Torah She’baal Peh), the story of Yehudis is recorded (by the date 17th of Elul) without her name, only describing the woman as the daughter of Yochanan Kohen Gadol. It also states that it was her brother Mattisyahu who avenged an evil act against her. This, to me, seems most authoritative and is also in line with the piyut mentioned by the Aruch Hashulchan. As for Yehudis, as he states, she must have been another woman who later took matters into her own hands.

    As we say each Chanukah and Purim when we delve into their various mysteries, there is so much more to minhag Yisrael than meets the eye. One thing is for sure: this Yom Tov, like Purim and geulas Mitzrayim, could not have ever occurred without nashim tzidkaniyos.

    NOTES

    2  Shulchan Aruch 670:2.

    3  Mishnah Berurah, ad loc., seif katan 10.

    4  Shabbos 23a.

    5  See also Tosafos to Pesachim 108b.

    6  Ad loc.  Megillah 4a.

    8  See also Yafeh L’Lev 5:682:2, as brought in Shiltei Gibborim to the Mordechai on the second perek of Shabbos.

    9  Shulchan Aruch, ad loc., seif 1.

    10  Mishnah Berurah, ad loc., seif katan 3.

    11  See also Pardes Yosef, Chanukah, pp. 149–50.12  Berachos 29a.

    13  Ibid.

    14  In a later chapter, “Chanukah’s Many Bracketed Words: Part II,” we further discuss who this Yochanan was and how his name—and perhaps more—can be included in our siddur.

    15  The B’nei Yissaschar as brought by the Klausenberger Rebbe in Divrei Yatziv, Orach Chaim 282; Divrei Shaul; Rav Sternbuch in Moadim U’Zemanim 2:137.Mor U’Ketziah 670.

    See Also:

  • Apple Computers, Privacy, and the REAL fruit of the Garden of Eden?

    2014

    Rabbi Moshe Taub

    I was talking with an old friend recently when, out of character, he asked what I spoke about in my drasha this past Shabbos.

    After I went over what I thought was a novel idea that I shared from the pulpit, he responded with disappointment. “You didn’t mention the controversy with Apple?”

    He was of course referring to the issue presently being widely debated. The FBI is seeking access to the IPhone of the terrorist behind the San Bernardino attacks.

    Amazingly even the FBI cannot get past the 4-6-digit code that unlocks the phone for the user each time he uses it.

    It is of particular embarrassment that immediately upon descending on this killer’s home the FBI made the horrible blunder of resetting the passcode on his computer –thinking that this will gain them access to stored backup from the phone –when in reality that ended all backups, leaving the actual phone – which they can’t seem to open – the only source for the potential data they wish to discover.

    For their part, Apple Inc. is fighting a February 16 court order demanding that Apple create a program, or a window, that would bypass this encryption, thereby allowing the government to discover what may be important information. If such information indeed exists on this phone, this may prove helpful in thwarting future attacks.

    Apple contends that there is no such thing as a unique window just to gain access to this one phone, rather, Apple argues, by creating such a program they are creating a way into all phones. Such a program can then be misused and abused.

    My friend explained that people are curious as to the Torah’s perspective.

    He continued. “In my shul the rav explained that the ‘right to privacy’, at least as embraced in modern culture, is not a Torah ideal. Pikuach Nefesh certainly trumps any ‘right’ that may or may not exist”.

    One of the great challenges of rabbanus is being asked questions relating to the news of the moment. Often times, the answers to these questions need the counsel of a major posek, as they are not always so black and white.

    This rav is certainly correct that all too often we tend to put too much faith into democracy, believing that the morals upon which the United States was founded –as well intentioned and wonderful as they indeed are – are the highest form of principles.

    While it is true that it has been argued by great poskim, like Harav Babad in shu’t Chavtzolos Hashurin and the Netziv by the dor hapalgah that other forms of governance are inherently wrong, or dangerous, this does not mean that democracy is always kodosh.

    It is also true that if the argument is between pikuach nefesh and protecting our privacy from a distant and perhaps minimal threat of the government abusing this work-around, then pikuach nefesh would certainly be the victor.

    But there are other halachic matters to consider. While I am not ruling one way or the other, nor discussing all sides of this question, there are other ways to view this particular question from halacha’s perspective.

    Tim Cook, the CEO of Apple made an interesting observation about our modern times.

    If one wanted to learn about someone, from where would one glean more information?

    • Being given free unencumbered access to search their home
    • Being given free unencumbered access to their smartphone

    For the readers who, thankfully, do not use such devices, the answer is most obviously the smartphone. Users of such devices have stored credit card and banking information, passwords, correspondence regarding home mortgages, finances, work payment slips, birthdays, social security numbers, private conversations between friends, family and rabbanim. This is not to mention the tracking software that allows parents to know where their children are at all times, as well as all work-related emails to discover.

    Never before in the history of man has something so small carried this much potential to create havoc.

     In other words, it is being argued that the fear is not so much the American government getting hold of this window into all phones, but our common enemies. Recent news has made us aware that even the secretary of state may use private devices (although not private emails) to share the most sensitive of state information. Imagine if bad actors get a hold of this software that Apple is being asked to create. Would they not use it to discover secret codes to our energy infrastructure, or air traffic control data, or where the children of highly placed diplomats are?!

    Assuming, for the sake of argument, that Mr. Cook is correct, let us explore some of the halachic considerations and ramifications.

    The first question is if we risk a possible present danger (i.e. perhaps finding out, via access to this particular phone, if other plans are in place) for a future greater possible danger (i.e. the dangers of creating an access to all phones)?

    Rav Chaim Ozer in his shu’t Achiezar, for example, rules that if a patient is in a possible life threatening situation and a procedure can be performed that will possibly cure him, but also may bring about his death –then one may not perform this procedure. Such a view may support Apple’s position.

    Of course, how we weigh different levels of risk is beyond the scope of this column. The curious reader can start with “Dangerous Disease & Dangerous Therapy” by Akiva Tatz where this issue is delved into.

    A second halachic consideration goes back to something once mentioned a few years ago in these pages. The Chazon Ish wondered about the case of an arrow that is heading toward a group of people and will certainly kill them. Let’s say that one has the opportunity to divert it so that it will miss this group of people –yet instead kill another, single person; what should one do?

    Much of the halachic discussion hinges upon how action is defined. As we know from hilchos Shabbos, not all actions are equal. There are gramas, garmis, psik reisha, and others—various forms of indirect or noncommittal action, not all of which are actually deemed actions by Torah law.

    The Chazon Ish suggests that one who diverts the arrow can consider this not as an act of killing someone but of saving of many.

    Yet, for a number of reasons, the Chazon Ish was hesitant and did not rule.

    The Tzitz Eliezer is more certain. He proves that inaction, the principle of “Shev v’al taaseh (sit and do nothing),” is better, implying that in such a case, an “error” of omission is always safer than one of commission.

    So that here, perhaps, when considering the risks of action (creating this access point) and risks of non-action (not knowing if we are lacking information from this particular phone) shev v’al taaseh may just be the better path.

    A third halachic issue related to this case might be the question of an immediate versus a later (potential) risk. Rav Ovadia Yosef dealt with this issue regarding the release of potentially dangerous prisoners in order to save lives. He rules that the immediate concern should come first. While this would support the FBI in our case, many prominent poskim disagree with Rav Yosef in this regard and argue for the greater risk of the two –whichever it may be –winning out.

    In short, this current debate seems complex from a halachic perspective.

    In the spirit of Adar, let’s end on a lighter note. Perhaps we can explain why, according to recent polls, over half the country supports Apple in trying to block the action of the FBI.

    There is a myth found uniquely in the non-Jewish world that what was eaten from the eitz hadaas was an apple. In truth, while Chazal offer many suggested items, an apple is never among them. Rather it is likely that the ‘apple myth’ came from confusing the Latin word for evil, malum, with that of for apple, mālum.

    Perhaps it is therefore ingrained in so many of our fellow citizens to keep away from Apple Inc.!

  • Exploring the History of ‘Dvai Haser’ & Other Sheva Brachos Mysteries

    Exploring the History of ‘Dvai Haser’ & Other Sheva Brachos Mysteries

    – Who Composed Dvei Haser?

    – Is it ‘Chami Mori’, or ‘Mori Chami’?

    – Why is Hagafen Sometimes the First and Sometimes the Last Beracha?

    Rabbi Moshe Taub

    September, 2023

    I. Chami Mori, or, Mori Chami?

    Since I am a kohen, I was asked to lead bentching at a recent simchah on my wife’s side of the family. My father-in-law was sitting to my left, so I began by saying, “B’reshus rabbanan v’rabbosai v’chami mori (my father-in-law and rebbi)…” 

    After bentching, my brother-in-law’s brother, Reb Moshe Wilhelm, a talmid chacham and reknowned mechanech in Lakewood, said to me, “The minhag is to mention your shver differently than the way you did it. ‘Chami mori’ sounds too much like chamor [donkey], so the minhag is to reverse it and say, ‘Mori chami.’”

    What do I know? Maybe I had lived in out-of-town communities for too long and never heard of this practice, or perhaps I just hadn’t paid enough attention.

    But was his assertion true? Indeed, for one’s father, one says “avi mori”—my father, my rebbi—the same order that I had used for my father-in-law.  

    When I arrived home, I did a little digging. I found that in the Rishonim, both orders were used; sometimes they called a father-in-law “mori chami” and sometimes “chami mori.” I found variations for fathers, too. Some gave the honorific “avi mori,” while others said “mori avi” (see shu”t Tashbeitz 2:129 and shu”t Maharam Shick, Orach Chaim, hosafah 5; cf. Daas Zekeinim, Bereishis 37:15, inter alia).

    Interestingly, I once saw a nice explanation for why the order for a father is reversed for a father-in-law—an idea that has nothing to do with a donkey!

    In the natural order of events, one’s father is his father first and only later becomes his rebbi. But a father-in-law is first a rebbi—either literally or through learning about him and his family—and only later becomes a father-in-law, which is why the order is reversed.

    Truthfully, it is always nerve-racking to perform a ritual aloud because you never know when you may be walking into a minefield.

    I often repeat the story of an individual who approached Rav Yaakov Kamenetsky, zt”l, at the Viennese table at a wedding and asked the rosh yeshivah what brachah he should make on a complex dessert that contained many ingredients; he was also concerned about whether it was considered pas haba b’kisnin. Rav Yaakov is purported to have smiled and answered, “Which brachah? A quiet one!”

    But there are times when we can’t be quiet, when we need to make a public choice. This certainly comes up at sheva brachos, as we shall see.

    II. Hagefen: First or Last Beracha of Sheva Berachos?

    I have been at many sheva brachos where the person who is given the honor of reciting the first brachah makes a Hagefen. This is, of course, an error, since we end with that brachah. (If this mistake occurs, the halachah is that we simply continue from there, with no Hagefen at the end.)

    But who can blame a person for this error? Under the chuppah, sheva brachos does open with Hagefen, and that is what people have in mind (see Rosh on Pesachim, ch. 10:8, and Shulchan Aruch, Even Ha’ezer 62:9).

    Why do we start shevah brachos under the chuppah with Hagefen but close with this brachah the rest of the week?

    Many cite an obvious reason for this switch (see the Mordechai on Pesachim ad loc, in the name of Rav Nissim Gaon, and the Magen Avraham, siman 190:1). During the year, we often bentch over a cup of wine even when there is no simchah (see Shulchan Aruch, siman 182 at length). 

    Therefore, if the Hagefen at shevah brachos is made immediately following bentching, it would not be apparent that it is being recited for the chasan and kallah. This concern doesn’t exist at a chuppah, where bentching is not recited.

    It should be pointed out that although it is standard practice to make the Hagefen at the end during the week of sheva brachos, some do have the custom of reciting it at the beginning (see, e.g., Shulchan Hatahor 190).

    I once heard another explanation al pi drush (good material for a speech if needed). Chazal state that a marriage is invei hagefen b’invei hagefen (Pesachim, 49b). Why do they compare it to grapevines? 

    We know that all matter in the physical world weakens with age. This is known as the second law of thermodynamics, the law of entropy. 

    But it is not the case with grapes. 

    If grapes are not taken care of properly, they turn into vinegar. But if they are processed in a special way, they will turn into wine—which is unique in that it improves with age!

    Under the chuppah, two grapevines— two families—come together. Once the couple begin their life together, the wine begins to age, becoming more precious. In order to symbolize this, we “age” the wine brachah as well, leaving the Hagefen until the end.

    III. The To’ameha Challenge

    In preparing for Shabbos sheva brachos, in addition to all the seudos, we had to arrange a catered to’ameha in our home on Erev Shabbos. When many people are coming in from out of town, the minhag is to have hot food available for them before they change for shul on Erev Shabbos.

    I was reluctant to do this, however, because eating on Erev Shabbos is a serious issue, and I was concerned that people would find fault with it (of course, I also wanted to save some money).

    The Shulchan Aruch rules (249:2) that we must limit what we eat on Friday as we go into Shabbos. However, I then thought that perhaps this is more applicable to those who are traveling with children, who may be hungry and cranky after a long trip. If that’s the case, then even if a parent sampled some of the food, there would be a basis for relying on the practice. 

    After more thought, I came up with what I thought was a brilliant idea—turning the to’ameha into a sheva brachos

    How would this help? We have all heard of a seudas mitzvah. But have you ever wondered what halachic difference it makes whether a meal is a mitzvah or not? The truth is that it does make a difference, and one ramification is that such a meal may be allowed even on Erev Shabbos (see Shulchan Aruch Harav 249:8; cf. Ketzos Hashulchan 69:7).

    But I ran into two issues with this scheme. For one thing, how would we be sure that everyone would arrive at the same time? And secondly, could we really inconvenience the chasan and kallah before Shabbos, as well as the many people who would need to come in and leave quickly? 

    On top of that, I remembered that not all poskim agree that a sheva brachos is considered a seudas mitzvah (see Pri Megadim 444:9 and 38:7).

    I approached my wife with all of my findings. She gave me a funny look and said, “Um…Erev Shabbos is Asarah B’Teves.”

    IV. The History of ‘Dvei Haser

    One Erev Shabbos I was walking to my shul in Buffalo when I saw a teenage boy on the steps strumming on his guitar.

    “Can I help you?” I asked.

    He explained that although he was not religious, he would be attending an NCSY kiruv Shabbaton and had been told to wait here to be picked up.

    He then shared a frustration. “The rabbi there claims I can’t play my guitar on Shabbat. This is very upsetting—I would have hoped that Judaism appreciated music. Instead, it stifles it!”

    I asked him to wait a minute, and I ran inside and grabbed a Tanach. Then I returned and sat down next to him.

    “Did you have a bar mitzvah where you read from the Torah?” I asked. 

    “Yes.” 

    “Okay, so let’s look inside this volume, which contains all of our holy writings.” 

    Leafing through the pages, I asked him if he noticed that all of the text in every book of Tanach had something in common. 

    “Well, it’s all in Hebrew,” he replied.

    “True. But look more closely,” I challenged him.

    It took him a moment, but then he answered, “Oh, the trop!”

    “Exactly,” I said. “Far from not appreciating music and song, Yiddishkeit places musical notes under every single letter of the Tanach! In fact, the reason we do not play music or do certain other music-related acts on Shabbat is because of this very passion for song. We fear that the excitement may cause a person to get so lost in melody that he may come to transgress one of the Shabbat prohibitions. 

    “Our history is full of music, from King David’s harp awakening him at midnight each night to the song our people sang at the Yam Suf. And there are many other songs as well. Regarding Shabbos, we proudly declare, ‘Mizmor shir l’yom haShabbos.’ Although we do not use musical accompaniment on Shabbos, song and melody are Shabbos essentials.”

    The power of music—and its ability to sway a person in a good or bad direction—may help us unravel the mysterious minhag of Dvei Haser, recited at the beginning of sheva brachos in many communities.

    This piyut was composed by Rav Donesh Halevi ben Berat (d. 990). Rav Donesh was a talmid of Rav Saadia Gaon and is often cited. Like many paytanim, he was also an expert grammarian and an authority in Lashon Hakodesh.

    In fact, his disputes with Rav Menechem ben Saruk (often quoted by Rashi) over Hebrew grammar remain unsettled today. Rashi’s grandson, Rabbeinu Tam (d. 1171), wrote a treatise defending Rav Menachem against in these debates, while Rav Yosef Kimchi (d. 1170) defended Rav Donesh. {Rav Donesh is quoted by Rashi to Devarim 28:28 and other places}

    One can find the signature “Donesh” in the first four stanzas of “Dror Yikra,” the popular Shabbos zemer that he composed.

    Perhaps his most often recited composition is Dvei Haser, in which his initials are encoded as well (Shulchan Ha’ezer 9:4).

    Many explanations are offered for the reason he composed this piyut and why it is placed before the zimun during the week of sheva brachos

    The Mateh Moshe suggests an interesting approach. It is based on a ban on certain types of music that was instituted by Chazal while we are in galus because of our year-round mourning for the Churban. This halachah is in the Shulchan Aruch (siman 560:3).

    The Rema and others point out, however, that not all music is considered equal, and not at all times. Indeed, many follow a lenient approach in regard to music (cf. Igros Moshe Orach Chaim 1:166, 2:137, 3:87; shu”t Yechaveh Daas 1:45). The Meiri explains (Gittin 7a) that the ban was enacted not only because of the Churban but because of the loss of the central focus that the Beis Hamikdash provided. Without a Sanhedrin and other crucial elements of our national base, Chazal feared that we would become lost—and that music might become a force to sway some people toward evil.

    However, so long as one is singing or listening to songs of dveikus, he does not violate this injunction (see also shu”t Shevet HaLevi 6:69). 

    The Mateh Yehudah explains that since music is played at weddings and during the week of sheva brachos, people might come to do the same during other more mundane celebratory events. Therefore, we begin bentching with a reminder of the Churban and the other securities we have lost in galus so that we do not take the unique gift of music outside the realm of divrei mitzvah (see also Taamei Haminhagim #986).

    This explanation fits nicely with the opening of Dvei Haser: “Remove pain and also wrath, and then the mute will revel in song…” 

    Other suggestions for the purpose of this piyut abound.

    The sixteenth-century Mizbei’ach Hazahav suggests that Dvei Haser is simply a brachah for the new couple that they should not know any pain. This fits nicely with the words “Sh’ei birchas bnei Yeshurun”; Yeshurun refers to Aharon, who loved and pursued peace, and it advises the couple to follow the path of shalom

    The plea to “remove distress” also blends well with the theory of some that Rav Donesh initially composed these words when his daughter suddenly passed away before her marriage to the son of Rav Nissim Gaon.

    Others suggest that this is a tefillah for peace everywhere. It is unrelated to the music that is played, or even to the chasan and kallah. Rather, we wish to take advantage of the simchah, which is an eis ratzon, by offering extra bakashos (see Kitzur Nachalas Shivah, 447, note 745 at length).

    Still others suggest that Dvei Haser was never intended for sheva brachos at all. Rather, it was supposed to be a stanza at the end of “Dror Yikra”! 

    Others posit that these lines were written as a piyut for Birchas Kohanim (Tarbitz, 1970, p. 38, “chikrei piyut v’shirah”; see also the article “Pirkei Donesh” by Dr. Ezra Fleischer). This would also explain the mention of birchas Aharon at the end.

    Some of those who argue that the entire piyut was created especially for bentching are of the opinion that the last line should only be recited if there are kohanim in the room. Otherwise, it should be replaced with the words “bnei Yeshurun”!

    If this piyut was indeed composed for the chasan and kallah, why is it said at the beginning of bentching and not with the sheva brachos

    There are some who do place it after bentching (see Taz, Yoreh Dei’ah 62:7), but that is not the custom. 

    But for this reason (among others), there are those who do not recite this piyut at a sheva brachos because it seems to be a hefsek, a break between mayim acharonim and bentching, when talking is generally not sanctioned.

    Let’s conclude with Shabbos. At our recent Shabbos sheva brachos, Dvei Haser was recited at one of the meals—another example of a common public mishap that can take place during a simchah

    However, in this case, there was no need for shame! Many say that this piyut is recited on Shabbos as well. In fact, the Maharil writes, “I do not know where this mistake of the people comes from not to say it [on Shabbos]” (see ibid. #1008; this was also the view of Rav Moshe Feinstein; see Rav Felder, Ohalei Yeshurun).

    Others urge us to omit the piyut on Shabbos (Rav Shlomo Zalman Auerbach et al.), either because it speaks of sadness or because we generally do not add extra tefillos and bakashos on Shabbos that are not a standard part of the siddur. (The weekday Shemoneh Esrei is not recited for a different reason, and indeed, the requests of Sim Shalom and Elokai Netzor remain.)

    As you can see, the answers to the many sh’eilos that arise in regard to this beautiful piyut depend on its history and purpose.

    It is amazing, as always, to discover the history of why we do and say the things we do and say! ●

  • Copyright in Halacha: A Historical Review

    Copyright in Halacha: A Historical Review

    – A Tale in Four Parts –

    Rabbi Moshe Taub

    Spring 2012

    Part I

    The halachos of copyright begin with England’s current Prime Minister, David Cameron, a matter we shall return to at the end of this section.

    The lack of clarity on the subject of copyrighting in halachah became obvious to me one day in shul. “What are you listening to?” I asked a bachur in the beis midresh one day.

    Showing me his device, he demonstrated to me that virtually every song by every major Jewish singer in the past 30 years was contained on an object about the size of a credit card.

    I wondered, “How long did it take you to put this together, and at what cost?”

    He laughed. “I copied them straight from a friend’s device,” he explained nonchalantly.

    This has become a common practice. One person uploads from his own CD collection, say, all of his Mordechai Ben David albums. So far so good (according to almost all poskim). He then passes them on to a friend. The friend adds his own favorite tracks and passes them on, until this young man in the beis midrash possessed—for free!—the entire repository of Jewish music, no doubt valued in the thousands of dollars.

    Is this practice halachically sanctioned?

    The challenge for rabbanim in seeking to convince the masses of this problem—which has only grown with the widespread use of the Internet—boils down to this: “Burning” music does not feel like theft. No one is pulling a mask over his face and holding up Eichler’s, chalilah. All he is doing is pressing a button.

    “How bad could it be?” he may think to himself.

    So why all the controversy? Is this not obviously theft?

    While we will show that it is theft, or that it falls into other categories of issurim, it is by no means a simple matter.

    The writers of the United States Constitution (1:8), l’havdil, were very careful in choosing their words when it came to this matter: “To promote the progress of science and useful arts, by securing for limited times to authors and inventors the exclusive right to their respective writings and discoveries.” Beginning in 1978, copyright law became a federal statute that the states could augment if they wished.

    While the United States has every right to create its own set of laws—thereby fulfilling one of the Sheva Mitzvos Bnei Noachposkim cannot arbitrarily create laws. Short of a new takanah,they can’t decide on their own what is considered right and wrong; they must find a precedent in halachah, sources and/or comparisons, in order to say that something is forbidden.

    Until the 1500s, issues such as copyrighting were not relevant for obvious reasons. Before the printing press, although one could steal an actual item—say, a book—there was no way to reproduce it except to copy it by hand. With the invention of the printing press, it suddenly became possible for someone to rip off years of hard work by selling the exact same product, with no time invested. Today, we all have a veritable printing press at our disposal.

    Still, you may be wondering, wouldn’t that be a clear case of theft too?

    Well, consider this: If one purchases a CD, a tangible item, fairly, how could anything he does with it be considered stealing? True, a great deal of work went into composing and recording the songs, which indeed gives it its value and is the reason the person purchased it in the first place. But once the CD is sold, doesn’t the purchaser retain the full right to do with it as he pleases?

    The underlying question is this: While a person can sell an idea or a concept, does he actually own it? And if so, does he retain it even after selling a tangible item that contains that idea?

    Rav Nathenson, the great gaon and rav of Lemberg, deals with this justification in his Shu”t Shoel U’meishiv. A case was brought to him by Person A, who expended great effort to compile a new edition of the Shulchan Aruch, adding commentaries like the Pischei Teshuvah to the page. Then another person bought this new Shulchan Aruch—andstarted publishing it himself.

    Seeking to defend his actions, Person B explained to the Shoel U’meishiv that when he purchased these volumes, he purchased a tangible item, with which he then had the right to do whatever he wished…even copying them for sale!

    Person B argued further that whereas the original publisher had only printed small editions of his work, he printed large volumes. Now, most people had large editions of the Shulchan Aruch in any case and were not about to buy a second set just for the added commentaries. Therefore, he argued, Person A had suffered no proven loss. (Oy, everybody turns into a groisse lamdan when defending themselves!)

    Rav Nathenson was less than impressed. He states that a work’s original author maintains full rights over his original ideas or work even after the sale of that item. To treat his work otherwise would be at minimum hasagas gvul (encroachment). At most, the original author maintains ownership to the extent that he need not even claim damages in order to stop another from using his concept, just as I could tell someone not to use my jacket even though I can’t prove that he may damage it in the future.

    Rav Nathenson goes on to explain that even though we find some sefarim limiting their own rights for ten or 20 years, this is not due to the halachah sanctioning “theft” after a particular date. It is because the author of such a work has decided voluntarily to forgo his rights so that his work will live on after he has earned his money back. He has chosen limited ownership in order to make sure his work will continue to be published after his death. If he held on to his rights indefinitely, who would publish his sefarim again, especially if he did not have children who were interested in undertaking the project?

    This logic that Rav Nathenson brings to the decisions of past rabbanim in choosing to allow their works to be copied at some future point, is bolstered by a recent article in the New Yorker (October 24; ‘Are Copyright Laws Too Strict’). There they explain that nowadays many secular books and songs have languished, never to be reissued due to the fact that no one can figure out who the heirs are to these works. Fearing a lawsuit, publishing houses dare not risk reintroducing these sometimes-celebrated works to the public. Our chachamim, as Rav Nathenson explained, had the foresight to solve this problem by limiting their copyright.

    The Chofetz Chaim’s wife, Rebbetzin Freida Kagan, wrote in her Yiddishintroduction to her husband sefer Ahavas Chesed that even after his death, only she and the family would retain the right to publish his sefarim in any country. (It should be noted that the Chofetz Chaim did state in his tzavaah that the Mishnah Berurah could be published by others if they followed certain conditions, but this allowance seems to have been unique to that work; see Rav Weifish’s Mishnas Zechuyos Hayotzer.)

    The Shoel U’Meishiv is far from the only person to discuss this issue. Many have tackled this subject as it has always been a matter of controversy.

    It is likely that the practice of giving a haskamah (rabbinical approbation) to a sefer, which began in the fifteenth century, arose due to the fact that rival publishing houses often put out a first edition of a sefer only to reprint it and sell it themselves. (Others point out that the use of haskamos became a widespread practice because—due again to the printing press—it was now easy for anyone, even the unworthy, to publish works.)

    Some assert that the first time the word “haskamah”was used in the context of copyright protection was around 1600, a few decades after the death of Harav Yosef Karo, in a letter written by rabbanim on his posthumously published Bedek Habayis. In the letter, they forbade others to publish his works.

     However, the first known copyright warning– then titled as a “ksav das” – on a sefer that expressly placed a cherem on any individual who unfairly reproduced it came some 80 years earlier to a sefer written by Rav Eliyahu Bachur for his dikduk trilogy. Signed by three rabbanim, it declares a “cherem against one who extends his hand into the expenditures and hard work of his fellow man…”

    And in case the reader thinks I have forgotten the opening line, or ‘hook’, of this section…David Cameron is the great, great, great grandson of Rav Bachur.

    All this is just the tip of the iceberg.

    Part II

    The halachos of copyrighting begin with Bill Gates, a matter we shall return to at the end of this section.

    One of the most important works on the Gemara written in the past century was the Kehillas Yaakov, authored by the Steipler Gaon, zt”l. So clear were his methods of questioning and answering and so enjoyable his approach that some people used his work to prepare shiurim—not always making proper attribution.

    A close talmid of the Steipler was visiting another city when he heard a local maggid shiur deliver a wonderful shiur on a certain Talmudic passage. Everyone marveled at this maggid shiur’sbrilliance. Well, everyone except this student, who knew that every word had been taken directly from the Steipler’s work. The student was incensed. How could someone blatantly steal and use the Torah insights of others?

    The student approached the Steipler and told him what he had heard. The Steipler smiled and said, “I don’t mind if he takes what I write and says it in his name, so long as he doesn’t take what he writes and say it in my name!”

    When we began the subject of copyrighting in halachah in the first section, we mentioned that Chazal do not openly discuss the issue. However, when it comes to the discussion of Torah ideas, we have a braisa at the end of Pirkei Avos1 that urges us to state Torah thoughts in the name of the originator.

    While the Tosefta2 seems to allow the surreptitious discovery, e.g. hiding behind someone who speaking privately in learning, of another’s Torah thoughts and ideas for the benefit of the multitude, it never sanctioned false attribution.3 Nevertheless, many poskim argue that when it comes to the copyrighting of divrei Torah, we must take a more lenient approach.

    For instance, the Chasam Sofer,4 who generally took a strong position on copyrighting, argues that since one mustn’t charge for a mitzvah, once he has recouped his original investment for the publication of his Torah thoughts, he should not be strict about enforcing his proprietary rights. As the Gemara notes, “Just as I was taught the Torah for free, so shall you teach it for free.”5

    This is a great illustration of just how confusing this issue can be. For while the Chasam Sofer was generally strict about copyrighting—due either to a special takanah or to encroachment—he was quite lenient about the use of original Torah material.

    At the opposite end, the Beis Yitzchak, the Netziv and others were more hesitant when it came to establishing guidelines for copyrighting in halachah; their understanding of the treatment of spiritual material such as chiddushei Torah was more stringentwhich they felt should have special protection.6

    The general concept of copyrighting in halachah is no less confounding; with various works once again offering opposing views. One of the outstanding works on this topic is a sefer titled Mishnas Zechuyos Hayotzer (“The Laws of Intellectual Property Rights”) by Rav Nachum MenashaWeifish, who urges a strict policy on copyrighting. Then there is another work, playfully titled Lo Kol Hazechuyos Shemuros (“All Rights Not Reserved”), which presents a more lenient position. In fact, in a fitting tribute to the latter author’s views, I found his entire sefer online for free!

    The confusion doesn’t stop there. Even the classic modern-day works on Choshen Mishpat (monetary law) have different takes on this subject—for example, Pischei Hachoshen (Vol. 5, ch. 9) and Emek Hamishpat (Vol. 4).

    Rashi7 tells us that there is virtually no topic in halachah withoutmachlokes, and the issue of copyrighting is a classic example of this truth. As we explained in the last section, until the invention of the printing press, copyright issues were apparently not discussed, either in the Gemara or in the Rishonim. The creation of the printing press opened the door for the many halachicopinions, suggestions and proofs that followed.

    Secular law had a similar struggle. It was not until 1710 that England issued what is known as the Statute of Anne, the first official governmental copyright law. Until that time there were only agreements made between publishers, a laissez-faire free-market solution to the problem.

    While even some poskim found the free-market solution a viable one,8 in the case of England, the policy protected publishers at the expense of authors. It was for this reason that the English Parliament intervened.

    All this makes copyrighting, and copyright infringement, a most interesting historical study, where we can actually follow the development of secular law along with, l’havdil, halachah. For example, right now there is a debate developing in both the secular legal world and the halachicworld regarding digital and Internet copyright.

    In fact, using the term “l’havdil” may be inapt in this instance, for, as we shall see, many poskim9 argue that there is no concept of copyrighting and intellectual property in halachah and that the only avenue of enforcement available from a halachicperspective is dina d’malchusa dina, the principle that we follow the law of the land. This means, in effect, that England’s 1709 Statute of Anne and America’s Copyright Act of 1976 would both be halachicdevelopments, or at least have an impact on halachah.

    This concept is not lost on frum lawyers who have a vested interest in this topic from the perspectives of both secular law and halachah. The journal Intellectual Property Quarterly (Issue 1, 2011) had a wonderful article by Daniel Unger titled “Copyright Enforcement by Praise and Curse: The Colourful Development of Jewish Intellectual Property.” And the bi-annual Theoretical Inquiries in Law published a fascinating discussion of this topic, “Is Copyright Property? The Debate in Jewish Law,” by Neil W. Netanel and David Nimmer. The authors reference a forthcoming book about the history of copyright in halachah, whose working title is From Maimonides to Microsoft.

    Microsoft?! Not too long ago Microsoft petitioned a beis din in Bnei Brak, requesting a ruling on how halachah views copyrighting. The information was needed for a case before an Israeli court; Israel presently enforces copyright laws based on an amalgam of British and American laws.

    Why did Bill Gates’ company care what a beis din had to say, and why is this matter at the crux of copyrighting in halachah? The answer will have to wait until the next section, when we will go back to the sixteenth and nineteenth centuries and recount two fascinating stories that helped form copyright halachah today: the printing of the Maharam Padua’s Rambam, and the Slavuta Shas vs. the Vilna Shas, respectively. We will, iy”H, return to the Microsoft case at the end of this monograph,.

    NOTES

    1. The sixth chapter of Pirkei Avos is not part of the masechta proper but is a later addition taken from chapter 6 of Kallah and chapter 17 of Tanna d’Bei Eliyahu.
    2. Bava Kama, ch. 7.
    3. Rabbi Bleich, Contemporary Halachic Problems vol. II, p. 122.
    4. Shu”t choshen mishpat 79.
    5. Bechoros 29.
    6. See Emek Hamishpat, Vol. 4, simanim 17-23.
    7.  Shabbos 139b.
    8. See Parshas Mordechai and Bava Basra 22; cf. Chasam Sofer,who rejects the idea that the invisible hand of the market will solve the issue of copyrighting.
    9. The Netziv, Beis Yitzchak, Rav Mordechai Benet in various haskamos and in his Parashas Mordechai.

    Part III

    The halachos of copyrighting begin with a Christian man named Marc Antonio Giustiniani, a matter we shall return to at the end of this section.

    Before we get into that story, it would be helpful to take a chronological look at how copyrighting has been dealt with through the ages, as our vast halachic history will play a critical role even in how secular jurists may view these questions.

    A. The Gemara

    Many seek to prove that copyright protection exists naturally and implicitly within halachah based on preexisting halachic categories into which it fits, like gezel or hasagas gevul.1 Yet all point out that an explicit case of copyrighting per se is not discussed anywhere in Chazal.

    To my mind, however, there is one incident that comes awfully close. The Gemara in Yoma 84 tells us of a disease that strikes one in the teeth and ends, sometimes fatally, in the stomach.2 Rav Yochanan was struck with this malady and went to a non-Jewish noblewoman who knew how to effect a cure. After paying for and receiving her tonic one Erev Shabbos, he asked her for the ingredients so that he could make it on Shabbos himself. She explained that she would not reveal this information because she would risk losing business if the secret became known to others. Rav Yochanan swore that he would safeguard the secret, and so she consented and revealed it to him.

    Rav Yochanan then explained to her (for reasons we will not go into here) why he was not bound by his vow, and he immediately announced the formula for this secret concoction to his entire yeshivah.

    Now, as it relates to copyright infringement (if it exists), it is worthwhile to consider that while the Gemarahere, and in the Yerushalmi version, questions Rav Yochanan’s course of action in terms of his apparent false oath, it never mentions the fact that he stole, meaning that he stole the income she would have earned had her secret not been revealed money—which is essentially a violation of copyright!

    While in modern parlance this was a (possibly permissible?) breach of “trade secret” protection and not a breach of copyright,6 in terms of a halachicbasis they both share the same root (this may be true in secular law as well; see Duke Law Review,“Protecting Trade Secrets Through Copyright”).

    The Gemara’ssilence on this issue3 may support the many poskim who contend that halachah does not recognize copyright law (to be discussed, iy”H, in the next section). In fact, the Yerushalmi4 suggests that the noblewoman was inspired by what Rav Yochanan did with her secret formula and converted!

    Now, one may say that little can be proven by this episode as far as copyrighting is concerned because, in the first place, a life was at risk; and in the second place, we are seeking a source for copyright guidelines between Jews, and this case involved Rav Yochanan, who was bound by halachah, and a noblewoman who was bound by other laws. Perhaps copyrighting, should it exist in halachah, would not affect our dealings with gentiles, in which case secular law would be the binding force.

    Both of these points, however, are easily refuted. As for the first, the Shulchan Aruch5 rules that while one may steal to save a life, he must have in mind that he is obligated to pay the person back at a later time. Once again, in our gemara,while Rav Yochanan’s action is challenged for other reasons, the fact that he stole proprietary information, as well as the noblewoman’s future potential business—if indeed a halachic concern—was ignored!

    As for the second point, if violating a copyright is, as some say, gezel,7 then why would the fact that this woman was not Jewish make any difference? Halachah is clear that stealing from a non-Jew is forbidden.8

    B. Rav Yitzchak Alfasi (Rif)

    The early rishon Rav Yitzchak Alfasi (d. 1033) tells the story of a man who stole his friend’s Torah notes, assuring him that he would return them as soon as he copied all of them!9 This sh’eilah is often cited as the first teshuvah relating to copyright law. While the Rif sides with the writer of the notes, there are any number of reasons to see this teshuvah as outside the purview of copyright.

    As noted in Part 1, stealing a CD is different from copying one that one already owns. In this case, Person B actually stole a notebook belonging to Person A.

    In addition, Rav Moshe Feinstein10 posits that when it comes to words of Torah, one has the right to say that his words—in this case notes—were not meant for public consumption since they might contain errors, or that they were meant for a particular audience. Rav Moshe himself did not allow his teshuvos to be translated out of concern that they would become accessible to those who would misinterpret them.

    C. The Maharam Padua, Alvise Bragadiniand Marc Antonio Giustiniani

    Rav Meir ben Isaac Katzenellenbogen (d. 1565), known as the Maharam Padua,was one of the geonim of his time. Seeking to take advantage of the newly invented printing press, he decided to publish a new edition of the Rambam’s Yad Hachazakah that would include, among other additions, his own notes.

    Most of the major publishers at that time were Christians11 who had served the Jews well with their publishing houses. Initially, the Maharam wanted the major publishing house of Marc Antonio Giustiniani to put out his Rambam. Before a deal was finalized, the Maharamdecided that another non-Jewish publishing house, that of Alvise Bragadini, offered a better deal.

    Giustiniani was none too pleased and responded by publishing his own edition of the Rambam, at a cheaper price…including the Maharam’s commentary!

    Rav Moshe Isserles, the Rama,was asked to decide the case.12 In a much-celebrated teshuvah that discusses issues ranging from the relationship between the prohibition against stealing as one of the sheva mitzvos Bnei Noach’sand its prohibition in halachah,as well as halachicrulings that may result in animosity toward the Jewish nation, the Rama sides with the Maharam. He explains that even as a non-Jew, Giustiniani violated halachic fair business practices.

    The suggestion that, say, hasagas gevul can be applied to non-Jews was challenged by the Rama’s contemporary the Maharshal.13

    Eventually this famous protest of the Maharam led to the proliferation of haskamos and cheramim found in many sefarim that were published over the next few hundred years. Indeed, the Maharamled the charge for these haskamos, although it is unclear if this was before or after his Rambam went to print.

    But all of the above pales in comparison to the painful battle over copyrighting that was to come—the nineteenth-century dispute over halachiccopyright, a mêlée that hit the frum world like a storm.

    This story will be shared in the next, and final, section.

    NOTES

    1. Chasam Sofer, Rav Zalman Nechemia Goldberg in Techumin Vol. 6, Noda B’Yehudah, et al.
    2. See Shulchan Aruch, Orach Chaim, siman 328.
    3. A common tool among poskim in deciding halachah; see, for example, Igros Moshe, Chosen Mishpat 2:66.
    4. Shabbos, Shemoneh Sheratzim.
    5. (Siman 359.
    6. As pointed out to me by Professor Nimmer of UCLA.
    7. See Igros Moshe 4:44:19, end.
    8. See Bava Kama 113.
    9. In his Shu”t HaRif,133.
    10. Ibid.
    11. See my feature on the history of the chapter divisions in the Torah in Ami’s Shavuos 5774 issue.
    12. shu”t Rama, siman 10.
    13. Shu”t 36.

    Part IV

    The halachos of copyright begin with the battles of the chassidim and the misnagdim, something we shall return to momentarily.

    It is now time for us to return to and conclude the subject of copyrighting in halachah.

    But first, a brief recap of some of the important material we have covered thus far.

    • While the Torah forbids stealing and certain business practices deemed unfair, once a buyer purchases something, he retains full ownership. This means that he can, for example, lend his purchased sefer to a friend although the friend never paid any money to the author.

    This all seemed simple enough, however after the invention of the printing press it suddenly became possible to copy and mass-produce a purchased sefer in a matter of days, apparently depriving the original author or publisher of untold profits.

    Does one really have the right to do anything he wishes with an item once he has purchased it? Does halachah recognize copyright law?

    In previous sections we gave some background on some of the famous cases surrounding this issue, as well as some of the sources marshaled to address it. We also discussed how the secular world is dealing with these same issues.

    One result of this problem was the practice of giving a haskamah, or rabbinic approbation, for a sefer, which served, among other purposes, to defend the copyright of the author.

    In this final section we will turn to one of the more famous copyright battles, and we will also revisit the story of Microsoft asking a beis din in Bnei Brak for a ruling on how the Torah sees copyright law.

    By the turn of the nineteenth century, the Talmud had been printed several times since the early Bamburg edition, largely unchanged. Most of the changes that did occur from one edition to the next had to do with comparative texts, commentaries and censorship. For example, many were so fearful of arousing the ire of non-Jewish censors that in some editions, every occurrence of the word “goy” or “min” (“nonbeliever”) was changed to “akum”—an acronym for “ovdei kochavim u’mazalos.” This term seemed far less likely to offend the neighbors because it referred to pagan beliefs and worship of the stars, which the gentiles of the time did not practice.

    Remarkably, however, even the term “akum” was not a perfect shield; some Christians believed it stood for “ovdei Yushke u’Miriam” [Mary]!

    Some censorship efforts led to bizarre readings. For instance, the word “min,” in addition to meaning “nonbeliever,” can also mean “type” or “species.” It has been reported that some editions of Shas1 were so imprudent about censorship guidelines that they would change “min kitniyos” (meaning “a type of legume”) to “akum kitniyos”! And sometimes entire sections of the Gemara were removed so as not to offend.2

    At that time, it was forbidden even to own a Talmud in many cities, and when Rav Yonasan Eibishitz received permission to print one, he could not use the title “Gemara” or “Talmud.” Tractate Brachos, for example, was titled Hilchos Brachos. In Akiva Aaronson’s excellent People of the Book (Feldheim), he states that Rav Eibishitz received this permission in 1734, while he was in Prague. We should point out, however, that he did not arrive in Prague until some 20 years later. Indeed, 1734 was the year Rav Eibishitz, then 21 years old, assumed his first role as dayan in Brody, some 500 miles west of Prague. Most likely it was some time later when this edition was published.

    Because of these difficulties in printing newer editions of Shas, there was widespread excitement when the Slavuta publishing house began printing its new editions of Gemara between 1801 and 1817. Although the Slavuta edition was not immune to some strange editorial decisions, the work that went into it was impressive.

    The Slavuta publishing house was founded by the son of the holy Rav Pinchas of Koritz, who was a student of the Baal Shem Tov. His son, Reb Moshe Shapiro, along with his two children, Reb Shmuel and Reb Pinchos, built up a well-respected establishment that published many holy works to great acclaim. However, nothing they worked on was as daunting as printing the entire Shas.

    Because of this, in addition to receiving blessings from some of the great Rebbes, such as the Baal HaTanya and Rav Levi Yitzchak of Berdicthuv, Slavuta also received haskamos that gave it a 25-year copyright protection. This meant that no one could print a newer edition of Shas until the Slavuta Shas had been on the market for 25 years. This was not simply a copyright on the work of Slavuta itself but covered anyone seeking to publish a full Talmud of his own.

    So holy were these men that it is said they would dip their tools and the printing press in the mikvah before using them to publish pages of the Talmud!

    But soon this printing, and the rival edition to follow, would reignite the battle between some chasidim and misnagdim, a battle that had largely faded. The new machlokes not only reawakened old conflicts but, as we shall see, served as perhaps the most important catalyst for teshuvos and opinions on copyrighting in halachah, drawing the attention of the greatest poskim of the generation.

    In 1835, a few years before the Slavuta copyright would officially end, the Romm Publishing House (later, Romm Widow and Sons Publishing), headed by Reb Menachem Mann Romm, began printing its own edition of the Talmud in Vilna, which is known to this day as the Vilna Shas. It had even more improvements than the Slavuta Shas—for example, on the pages of the Rif—and began selling fast.

    The Shapiros pointed out to the major poskim of the day that the Slavuta Shas was still protected by its 25-year copyright and that the Romm brothers had no right to publish a competing edition. Scores of teshuvos were written on this issue, which caused great rifts in the community.

    The teshuvos discuss matters such as copyrighting and the right to prevent a publisher from working independently on similar material (Romm, after all, had not copied the Slavuta Shas). One of the Romm brothers’ arguments was that the Slavuta’s 25-year ban was intended only to protect its own first edition, which had already sold out; it was now 1835, and the Slavuta Shas was already in its third printing.

    While the Chasam Sofer and others defended the Romms, it was only after Rav Akiva Eiger agreed that they had the right to publish their own edition of Shas that the initial machlokes was laid to rest.

    Sadly, however, bitterness ensued. The Slavuta publishing house came to a tragic end, and the Vilna Shas, which became the more popular one, is still the standard edition used today.

    And far from solving the complexities of copyright law, the issue only became more ambiguous. Notably, the Chasam Sofer (Shu’t 57 and79, etc.) and Rav Mordechai Benet (d. 1830, Parashas Mordechai 7, 8) were strongly divided on the issue. Rav Benet rejected the theory that certain copyright infringements are in violation of hasagas gvul. He further argued regarding how far copyright protection, if it exists at all, should extend. Rav Benet advocated for a laissez-faire system, such as Ezra Hasofer’s allowance of free trade among merchants (Bava Basra 22), which would allow publishers to work out this issue among themselves. The Chasam Sofer (depending on which of his many teshuvos one reads –compare his teshuvos regarding the Vilna Shas to those regarding the Wolf Heidenheim siddurim; see Daniel Unger in ‘Intellectual Property Quarterly’), is much stricter, arguing that without some type of official protection, no one would invest the time and effort to publish sefarim (or, for that matter, musical albums).

    Several years ago Microsoft wanted to put out Pashkivillim [(posters, often glued to the walls , and found most frequently today in charedi neighborhoods in Israel) forbidding the copying of its computer programs for free, thinking that this would stop what it believed to be mass infringement of its copyright protection among chareidim. The company turned to a beis din in Bnei Brak seeking the Torah view on copyrighting.

    Amazingly, the beis din stated that until Microsoft showed that it represented Jewish interests, it would not issue a ruling. Steve Ballmer, the CEO of Microsoft until this year, and a Jew, was therefore named the disputant so that the beis din would hear the case! It is my understanding that the beis din did not respond as strongly on the matter as Microsoft had hoped. (See the forthcoming work, From Maimonides to Microsoft: The Jewish Law of Copyright Since the Birth of Print, Netanel/Nimmer, Oxford Press)

    This monograph has been intended only to inform but not to give a comprehensive review of copyright law in halachah, about which entire sefarim have been written. One thing is certain, however—no one should think about copying intellectual property without first speaking to a moreh horaah, and without considering how he would feel if he were the producer of the work rather than the consumer.

    NOTES

    1. See ArtScroll/Mesorah publication Avraham Yagel Yitzchak Yeranen.
    2. For example, Bava Kama 113b; see ibid.