Category: Halacha

This section of Shul Chronicles focuses on practical and historical issues in Halacha, including family law, minhag, contemporary halachic debate, and communal practice.

  • Navigating Cholov Yisroel During Aseres Yimei Teshuva

    Navigating Cholov Yisroel During Aseres Yimei Teshuva

    The Sources For Chumros/Being Machmir/Strict During The Ten Days of Repentance…and Its Possible Limitations

    Rabbi Moshe Taub – September, 2026

    1. A Minhag’s Many Shailos
    • “I’m not using the eruv during aseres yimei teshuva. May I still ask my wife to carry for me?”
    • “I’m going on a business trip during aseres yimei teshuva. They usually feed me from a local cholov stam shop. What do I do now?”
    • “Must I be mattir neder after assuming these aseres yimei teshuva chumros?
    • “If this is the appropriate path, why are we told only to take them on only for these ten days?”
    • “Is this not ‘arama’, playing tricks/games, with teshuva?”

    These are a good sample of the common questions rabbanim receive relating to the following minhag recorded in the Shulchan Aruch:

    “Even one who’s not careful regarding pas palter [during the year], during the aseres yimei teshuva he should be careful”

    Shulchan Aruch, oh”ch 603:1

    To best understand this halacha, we must first disentangle a misconception.

    II. A Minhag Defined

    Many mistakenly define a ‘minhag’ as any action/abstention untethered to either Torah or Rabbinical halacha; the unique familial/communal customs relating to Jewish life that are source-less in our legal cannon.

    However, nothing could be further from the truth. Rather, all minhagim must have a real-although minority- halachic viewpoint that is being followed or be grounded in chazal (see, e.g. shu”t Noda B’Yehudah, 2, evh’a, #79; see also Tzava Rav Yehudah Hachasid, Otzar HaPoskim edition).

    This does not mean that we must first discover each-and-every minhag’s source before acting on them. Rather, that our reverence for our true minhagim allows to be confident that such sources already exist, known to their creators.

    A helpful illustration would be a 1969 letter from Rav Yechezkel Grubner, famed rav of Detroit (d. 2009) to Rav Moshe Feinstein (shu”t Igros Moshe oh’c 3:3) regarding the minhag to fast for a fallen sefer Torah, R”l. Now, one may think that such a minhag is self-evidently appropriate, requiring no source. But as explained, this would be an error. Because Rav Moshe did not often research most achronim, Rav Grubner sent Rav Moshe the many distinctive sources that admorim and roshei yeshiva had marshalled over the years to back-up this minhag. Rav Moshe dissects each potential source and shows how it would affect the halacha of this minhag, finally settling on one chazal he felt was the most likely source (based on taanis 16a).

    All this is not to chalila dimmish minhagim – on the contrary!

    With this in mind we can briefly discuss the above famous minhag of aseres yimei teshuva, its source and possible limitations.

    III. The Source

    The Tur is the first to bring this minhag, in the name of his father, the Rosh. He bases it on a chazal found in the Yerushalmi (shabbos 1:3):

    “Rav Chiya explicitly told Rav: “If you are able to eat ordinary food b’tahara (in a state of ritual purity) all year long, do so. But if you cannot, at least make sure to do so for seven days out of the year.”

    What ‘seven days’ was he referring to? The Ravya (Avi HaEzri; d. circa 1220) interrupted this to refer to the seven days in-between Rosh Hashana and Yom Kippur.

    Based on this, the Tur concludes:

    “…the minhag developed in ashkanaz that those not careful regarding pas goyim should be careful during the aseres yimei teshuva”.

    The Beis Yosef (Rav Yosef Karo, the author of the Shulchan Aruch) notes how Rav Chiya did not make a suggestion to Rav relating to a halachic matter, rather one of minhag. After all, there is no obligation for one to eat food b’tahara! Rather, he recommended an extra holy step for these seven days of the year.  

    Based on this, the Beis Yosef rejects the Tashbeitz’s concern for either hataras nedarim following Yom Kippur, or being forced to abide by these ten-day chumros for the rest of the year.

    How does the Beis Yosef answer this? We will now explain…

    IV. Why Bread?

    The Beis Yosef goes on to explain that this is why the Tur chose, out of all chumros, to be machmir during aseres yimei teshuva regarding, specifically, pas akum.

    Without getting too in the weeds, although the mishneh teaches us that such bread was banned (avoda zara 35b), when it comes to non-Jewish bakeries/stores it is not so clear if this decree was ever rescinded (see Tosfos s.v. bklal). The Rosh (2:23) explains that since bread is fundamental for life, we were not able to abide by such a decree, at least fully (see Yerushalmi, avoda zara, 2:8).

    To what extent has it been nullified?

    While pas akum (privately baked goods/not for sale) are almost never allowed (y”d 112:8), pas palter (sold baked goods) is based on minhag. While the Rema allows buying from a non-Jewish baker, the Shulchan Aruch only allows it if there’s no Jewish alternative and also, according to some, when the pas palter options are better (112:2-5).

    This stringent minhag of the Shulchan Aruch is not active if one needs to travel a great distance to attain the pas yisroel (112:8).

    Now we understand the Beis Yosef’s response to the Tashbeitz:

    “The concern for now having to keep this chumra the rest of the year is not a tayna (argument) as pas palter’s prohibited status is not at all clear, rather it’s only a minhag, and therefore when he abstains his mind is not to continue in this practice…”.

    V. Application

    Based on this the Mishneh Berrura, the Magen Avarham and others limit the aseres yimei teshuva minhag to be machmir not to surpass the actual halachos of pas palter. Meaning, if one is stuck somewhere without access to pas yisroel, he may eat pas palter. This is because the chumrah can’t go beyond the minhag as recorded by its laws where even the stringent view allows pas palter in such a case!

    The Aruch Hashulchan takes this all one step further (603:2), stating that the aseres yimei teshuva chumros are only regarding minhagim, but not actual halachic debates of interpretation among the poskim. Based onhis view, such ten-day chumros would not relate to issues like cholov yisroel when one is following their posek. Whereas the avoidance of using any city eiruv during these days would be an acceptable temporary chumra, as poskim indeed record a minhag of being machmir on all eiruvin.

    Rav Shmuel Kamanetzky goes one step further, arguing that this chumra minhag of aseres yimei teshuva is limited only to the halachos of pas yisroel (Kovetz Halachos, p.268, note #3).

    Based on the Chayay Adam (Chachmas Adam 25:2), bread is essential to life and is therefore used as a tool of awakening toward general -and more longstanding- growth and change.

    While I have always paskened to only be machmir during these days on ‘minhag halachos’, others disagree. Minchas Yaakov (klal 75:1) as well as the Piskei Teshuvos imply that one can apply these temporary chumros to any halacha (the latter states that hataras nedarim would still not be needed. His proof, however, is difficult to fathom, as he derives it from the same Beis Yosef above who stressed that this is unique to minhagim).

    VI. Trickery?

    There are many explanations of this minhag and how it is not a contradiction if we know we will not continue.

    Due to space, bl”n we will save this question for next year. However, Iwill leave the reader with one approach to take into this holy week. The Alef L’Magen brings from the Ramak: “…this is appropriate even if we do not continue with this middas chassidus afterward. This is because if Hashem is acting toward us during this time with chassidus, is it not appropriate if do the same…”.

        May we take advantage of Hashem’s extra rachamaim during this time, while being halachtav bdrachav -mirroring His actions. Both toqard halacha and toward eachother.

    Wishing You All A Kesiva V’Chasima Tova!

  • Backing Out Of The Deal

    Backing Out Of The Deal

    The Complex Halacha of Reneging On An Agreement Or Purchase

    Rabbi Moshe Taub

    March, 2026, Ami Magazine

    Part I

    Imagine a choleh who calls his frum pharmacist and says, “I have a horrible case of strep. Do you have antibiotic X?… You do? Great! I will be sending over my chavrusa to pick it up.”

    After the choleh hangs up, his doctor calls. “Good news! It was a false positive! It’s just a bad flu—no need for antibiotics.”

    Would the choleh be violating any halachic or ethical boundary by canceling the prescription—an agreed-upon business transaction?

    Here’s another scenario:

    Say someone negotiates a price of $10,000 for a new dining-room set and agrees to pick it up and pay for it the next day. That night, a long-lost cousin dies, leaving the shopper a stunning…dining-room table!

    Must he nevertheless pay for the set he agreed to purchase?

    Category One: Giving One’s Word and ‘Mechusar Emunah‘

    Chazal state that someone who reneges on a verbal business agreement—whether the buyer or the seller—is called a mechusar emunah (literally, one who lacks complete faith in G-d).

    Many sources and allusions to this law are cited by Chazal and poskim.

    These include, but are not limited to:

    • the vitality of honesty (Shemos 23:7);
    • the demand that we speak only the truth (Devarim 23:24, with Chida in Pnei David);
    • the need to be true to ourselves—echad b’lev v’echad b’peh (Tehillim 15:2);
    • and admonishment against words of deceit (Tzefaniah 3:13).

    Chazal also find reference to this halachah in the pasuk mandating that we have correct weights and measures (Vayikra 19:36). The Torah uses the examples of two weights, the eiphah and the hin. Why both? Chazal remind us that “hin” can also mean “yes.” The Torah is telling us that one’s “yes” and one’s “no” must be solid and reliable, just like weights (Bava Metziah 48-49).

    This same halachah is taught in another mishnah from a more positive perspective, in that our chachamim are pleased with those who keep their word when they conduct sales (Sheviis, 10).

    Although a minority opinion interpret these sources as establishing a Torah law (Sema, 204:12), the vast majority see this demand as rabbinic (which can affect the final halachah in some cases, see, for example, shu”t Shevet Halevi, 4:206).

    Importantly, most poskim extend this injunction to matters other than money, such as promising someone a gift, a job, or a ride. Some poskim posit further that this prohibition even covers backing out from what one said to a third party—for example, “I will take Yankel to the airport” (see shu”t B’tzel Hachachmah 5:160).

    There are also unique cases where this halachah may not apply. An example of this is when the person asserting the fact does not have the power, or sole power, to give the promised item. An example of this may be a school board member assuring a teacher that he will be hired, or a shul board member promising to hire a rav (see Piskei Hamishpat, p. 163, note 25).

    Another example would be the assurance of a very large matanah (see Shulchan Aruch with meforshim, Choshen Mishpat, siman 204:7-9; see further in shu”t B’tzel Hachachmah, ibid.).

    Of course, any promise regarding a mitzvah may involve separate concerns. For instance, although a minority of poskim contend that a gemach that needs to backtrack on a promise may not always be in violation of mechusar emunah (since the items aren’t gifts per se, but loans; cf. shu”t Shevet Halevi 4:207), nevertheless, because the promise entails a mitzvah, it may constitute a neder (see Piskei Hamishpat, ibid., #19; see also the Rema, yoreh de’ah, siman 264:1, about reneging on the hiring of a mohel).

    This brings us to the common refrain “bli neder.” Although many people say this habitually and often needlessly— e.g., “I will take my suit to the cleaners today, bli neder”—regarding tzedakah and other mitzvah matters we should accustom ourselves to saying it .

    When Circumstances Change

    What if circumstances change? Is it ever permissible to default on a promise or business arrangement?

    There are certain situations termed trei tar’i, an open, changing, or mixed market where defaulting on a verbal agreement would fall into the category of normal business conduct and therefore be allowed.

    For example, let’s say Reuven did his due diligence in his search for a contractor. Finally, he makes a verbal agreement to hire Dovid’s company for a given sum. The next day, a young kid knocks on his door, explains that he’s just starting out, and offers a half-off deal. According to many poskim, reneging on the initial verbal agreement would be permissible.

    The same principle is true even when money is not the issue. For example, if someone agrees verbally to hire a certain moving company and then discovers another one that can do the job in half the time, he may back out of his original agreement. 

    To gauge these subjective changes, the Sema offers us the following guideline. In any case where you never would have agreed to the original deal if you had known about the second offer, a rav should be consulted, and you may be able to backtrack on your word (Sema, siman 333:1; for trei tar’i to be considered a possibility, the person’s initial research must have been thorough enough that he would not have missed an obvious second option—see Piskei Hamishpat, note 30).

    These cases can become complex when one is searching for a chasunah hall, a band, a summer rental, or another such need, and a rav must be consulted (see Shulchan Aruch 333:8 and 334:1, Pis’chei Hachoshen, kinyanim, especially shu”t Chasam Sofer in several places).

    In the cases of the pharmacist and the dining-room table, one may, perhaps, be able to rely on trei tar’i. Nevertheless, a rav should be consulted.

    Part 2

    Before further exploring these complex halachos of mechusar emunah—Chazal’s harsh designation for a buyer or seller who backs out of a deal -let us quickly review what we have learned thus far:

    • According to many poskim, the demand that we stand by our verbal agreements applies equally to non-monetary commitments—for example, making a pledge to clean up one’s office by a certain time.
    • Above we discussed the common situation called trei tar’a, where a verbal agreement is made regarding an open, changing, or mixed market—a situation where defaulting on a verbal agreement would be considered normal business conduct, and would often be permitted.

    For example, one may make a verbal agreement to hire a builder, only to discover another builder who can do the work for half the price or in half the time. In such a case, he may be able to back out of the original agreement.

    A more common example of this nowadays would be reserving several flights, Airbnbs, or rental cars until one settles on the cheapest or most convenient option (when not actually purchased or a down-payment given).

    • We ended above with the Sema’s simple gauge for testing such a change. In any case where one can honestly and fairly claim that if he had been aware of the second offer earlier, he would never have agreed to the initial offer, he should call a rav as he may be able to back out of the deal (Sema, siman 333:1).

    An important caveat to the Sema’s rule: even in a case where the Sema would otherwise allow one to back out, it would not apply if he did not do thorough-enough research that would have led him to the second option before committing to the first one (see Piskei Hamishpat note 30).

    Now let us move on:

    Mi Sheparah

    So far, we have been discussing verbal agreements, where no money has changed hands. A much more severe category of these halachos is called “mi sheparah.”

    This is a case that has extended past a verbal agreement, where either money has been exchanged or some other accepted form of transaction has taken place. In such a case, even though the buyer has not yet taken possession of the item, the Mishnah teaches that if either the buyer or the seller backs out, he is subject to a klalah (curse): “Mi sheparah… He Who exacted recompense from the dor haflagah shall also exact retribution from those who do not abide by their word.”

    The Gemara cites a debate in which Rava opines that we do not simply inform the person of this curse; instead, beis din actually pronounces it against him (Bava Metzia 48b)!

    Although it is not commonly practiced in this manner today, the Maharam Mintz (d. 1480) quotes the Mordechai who describes the procedure of giving just such a curse.

    “He [perhaps the rav] stands on the migdal [tower or highest stage] in front of the tzibbur and announces, ‘Mi sheparah… He who exacted…shall similarly exact from Ploni ben Ploni’” (see shu”t Maharam Mintz, 101, bottom of second column in the 1851 edition).

    The Rema alludes to this opinion in stating that some add the word “mimcha, from you” at the end of the curse, as opposed to “from one who.”

    More frightening is the fact that the Gemara adds to the curse, and it is this lengthier version that is codified in the Shulchan Aruch (Choshen Mishpat, siman 204:4):

    “He Who exacted recompense from the people of the generation of the flood, from the citizens of Sedom and Amorah, from the men of the dor haflagah, and from the Egyptians who were drowned in the sea shall also exact retribution from those who do not abide by their word.”

    Many seek connections among these examples.

    For some time, I suggested an approach that I recently learned was for alluded to in the writings of the Avnei Nezer, who says  that he heard it directly from the Chiddushei HaRim (shu”t, chelek 7, end of teshuvah #32).

    Each of the situations mentioned in this curse occurred before Matan Torah. The Jewish people were not Jewish yet, and the wrongs committed by the members of these generations involved breaches of basic morality that would be commonly understood to be wrong even without a Divine command.

    Furthermore, these people had a rationale for their behavior. For example, they abided by the letter of the law, stealing items that were worth less than a perutah. In the case of the Egyptians, they could have claimed that enslaving the Jews was simply a fulfillment of the decree at the bris bein habesarim. But the fact is that they breached human decency and committed injustices that make it impossible for a society to function normally.

    (Indeed, Ramban says that although the Egyptians were fulfilling the will of Hashem, they could have refused to be the vehicle, and, they also went much too far in their brutality.)

    Here, too, a beis din may not be able to enforce retribution—but Hashem is aware and will make sure justice is carried out.

    • When it comes to a case of mi sheparah, where money has already changed hands—as opposed to the category of mechusar emunah—the principle of trei tar’a would not be enough to enable one to back out of the deal. But what if something occurs that is beyond his control?

    For example, say a person gives a down payment on a new dining-room table. On the way to pick it up, he discovers that a long-lost cousin has died and bequeathed him a beautiful dining-room table! Must he still go through with his purchase?

    Although there is a minority opinion that would permit a person—in an extreme case and in a situation of trei tar’a— to back out of a deal even after money was paid, most disagree (see shu”t Chasam Sofer, Choshen Mishpat, 120, discussing a case of yerushah; see also Tosfos on Bava Metzia 47b, s.v. v’iy).

    Nevertheless, each case is different, and a competent posek must be consulted.

    • According to many, mi sheparah applies to a seller who accepts payment but does not have the item in stock. Should he fail to retrieve it, he will have fallen into the category of mi sheparah (Rambam, mechirah, 22).
    • What about a case where one writes his name down as a commitment to purchase an item, or one who says, “I will buy it; take the money out of what I owe you”? Would these cases constitute mi sheparah if he reneges? And what about land purchases, which also fall into this halachic category (see Beis Yosef)?

    The goal of this post is to remind ourselves of these two critical halachos, and to emphasize the need to consult a rav when such an issue arises.

    The Vilna Gaon shares a secret that is contained in this curse (Sefer Yehoshua, perek 4). He writes that speech is made up of saliva (water), ruach (air), and heat (fire). In fact, the letters in the word “amar” (to speak) stand for eish, mayim, and ruach. Each of the first three incidents mentioned in the curse represent one of these: the dor hamabul was destroyed by water; the dor haflagah was destroyed by wind in the sense that the people were scattered; and Sedom and Amorah were destroyed by fire.

    In other words, what mi sheparah has in common with these events is the misuse of speech.

    May we all succeed in our business dealings and in our speech. May we speak only  divrei emes and utter tefillos that will be immediately accepted! ●

     

  • Missed Elul Shofar

    Missed Elul Shofar

    -Blowing Shofar With No Minyan-

    -Making-Up A Missed Shofar-

    -Offseting A Shul’s Missed Shofar By Mincha-

    September, 2025

    Rabbi Moshe Taub

    The minhag of tekios elul -blowing the shofar after shachris throughout the month of elul -leads to commonly asked questions.

    • How far must one go -in time, distance, or loss – to hear this shofar?
    • If one is not davening with a minyan, or if he stepped out during its blast, should he make up this shofar himself? Must he?
    • Is there a need for a shul to make-up for a missed/forgotten shofar?

       In the 1970’s, a rabbi by the name of Rav Tzvi Pesach Frank shared with Rav Eliezer Yehuda Waldenberg (d. 2006) his views relating to these questions (shu”t Tzitz Eliezar, 12:48).

    This rav is not to be confused with the more famous posek and chief rav of Yerushalaim of the same name -as the latter was niftar thirteen years prior to this teshuva’s composition! Nevertheless, this unrelated and younger Rav Frank was a talmud chacham himself, and his sefarim bear haskamos from Rav Abramsky and Rav Shlomo Zalman Aurbach.

    This Rav Frank argued that one must privately make-up any missed elul tekios. He then sought Rav Waldenberg’s approval to this psak.

    Rav Waldenberg , however, dismissed this ruling out of hand, writing:

    “Never have we heard, even among the most precise and pious of individuals, that – should they have needed to daven alone during the month of elul – to then [need to bring] them a shofar from which to blow…”

        While this testimonial/mesorah may be enough to dissuade people from privately making up missed tekios, he goes on to independently prove why such make-ups have no basis in minhag.

    To explain, let’s first review the provenance of our elul tekios.

           The standard source for this minhag comes from the Tur, quoting a midresh:

    On  rosh chodesh elul, Moshe went up to har sinai to receive luchos shniyos. Before he went up, a shofar blast was sounded throughout the entire machaneh, demarcating the date and time. The purpose of this was so the date of his departure be made clear so that a repeat of the last miscalculation error -which led to the chet haegel –be avoided.

    Pirkei D’Rav Elezar, perek 46

       The Tzitz Elizar explains that a minhag can never fully depart from its original source, and since the tekios performed the day Moshe went up were blasted/heard throughout the machaneh -i.e., in a public setting – so too our minhag is only for a public setting, i.e. in shul with a minyan.

      He further posits that this holds true even according to those rishonim who offer another source for this minhag, pointing to the following pasuk:

    “Would not a shofar blast in the city cause people to shake?…”

    -Amos (3:6)

        Even there, it references the unique inspiration and drive drawn from a public setting (“…a city...”).

    Rav Waldenberg concludes with one final – and fantastic! – proof to his ‘shul only’ verdict:

    As most are aware, halacha demands that we cease these elul tekios on erev rosh hashanah to create a clear separation between the minhag blasts of elul and the biblically mandated ones of rosh hashana.

    Interestingly, the Magen Avraham and others are lenient on erev rosh hashanah when done for practice and in one’s private home.

      Meaning, in the Magen Avraham’s view, elul tekios in one’s home are not even at the level of minhag! For if they were, separating minhag from obligation would apply at home as well!

    Accroding to the Tzitz Eliezar, this alone demonstrates that there is no significance to such tekios.

        I would humbly offer another proof to the Tzitz Eliezar:

    The Maharam M’Ruttenberg explains the minhag of elul tekios as based on practical concerns: So that the baal tokeah has a chance to train and prepare for rosh hashana!

    In fact, this goes beyond mere basic practice. For him to blow in a shul setting also allows him to train in an environment of eimsah d’tziburra (stage fright; with an audience).

    So that, according to this approach to the minhag as well, the Tzitz Eleizar remains sound, as blowing at home would be illogical for anyone other than the baal tokea! And, perhaps even for the baal tokeah himself too there may have no reason to make these up – as such home-practice would be weakened by the lack of a kehilla present!

    (On this concept of ‘nerves’ and the chazan/baal tokea, see, e.g. Rambam, hil. tefilla, 10:3 w/ mishneh, berachos 34a and Yerushalmi, berachos, 5:4)

    Based on the Tzitz Eliezar: A person alone need not blow; A shul need not make up missed elul tekios

    This would be true whether the source for elul tekios is the A) midresh by Moshe, B) the pesuk in Amos, or C) for the baal tokea’s practice.

    Some poskim, however, slightly differ or add caveats.

    While agreeing that tekios elul is not an obligation, some praise those who privately, at home, make these up. They explain that, in the final analyses, the goal of the these tekios is to awaken us to teshuva. While perhaps of no minhag consequence, such action may still offer aid in inspiration (see Siach Yitzchak, et al.)

       Relating to this last idea, Rav Moshe Feinstein explains that the reason why we choose the very end of our first teffila of the day for these blasts:

    “…so as to cause awakenings of teshuva in order that one perform their business b’derech haTorah“

    – shu”t Igros Moshe, oh”c, 4:21;5

    Rav Moshe then writes:

    “…in any event, if the shul did not to blow shofar in the morning, they should do so by mincha”

    -Ibid.

       Of course, this too would be a public setting and wouldn’t be proof regarding a private individual’s need for a make-up.

     At this point, some may be wondering: “What difference does it make? After all, there is no harm in making up such a missed shofar blast privately!”

         However, such an assertion is not as simple as it may seem. Poskim will always defend historical practice and be suspect toward a personal practice of ‘minhag invention’.

    (For a deeper dive, see Igros Moshe who questions even the minhag of fasting for a fallen sefer Torah – unless, of course, a clear proof from chazal can be found. See ‘Fasting For A Fallen Sefer Torah where this is explored in detail).

        There is much more to discuss, such as which blasts do we make during elul, why before l’dovid, as well as why we start this practice only on the second day of rosh chodesh, etc. Perhaps another time, iy”H.

     For now, we will conclude with the following thought:

    How does the one-day shofar blast in the desert lead to our month-long shofar blowing?!

         I would suggest that the solution comes from the end of that source (Pirkei D’Rav Elezar, ad loc.), which concludes:

    “and Hashem lifted Moshe up along with the sound of that shofar blast…”.

       Perhaps, then, our minhag is to recall not that one day they blasted the shofar in the midbar, rather to remind oursleves how that one simple blast lifted Moshe higher – how on each of day of elul, with just one tekiah, one push to grow, Hashem can lift us the rest of the way.

    B’Sikum:

    An Individual: one who missed davening or who is davening alone during elul need not blow shofar nor make it up. Indeed, the custom was only to blow shofar in a shul and with a minyan. If one chooses to anyway make it up, he has what to rely on – so long as he is aware he is not accomplishing a minhag yisroel, per se. A Shul/Minyan: a shul or minyan that missed/forgot a morning tekiah during elul should make it up by next mincha, if possible.

  • “Mixed” Marriage: Who Keeps Whose Minhag?

    “Mixed” Marriage: Who Keeps Whose Minhag?

    Wives & Husbands, Sefard, Ashkanaz, Chassidesh, Kitniyos, Cholov Yisroel, and more.

    Every year as Pesach approaches, my sister-in-law asks, “Is there any way I can get out of adopting my husband’s minhag not to eat gebrokts?”

    She is not the only one frustrated by this problem. Some even take it to ridiculous levels; several years ago a group was formed called the Kitniyos Liberation Front (really). Unfortunately, much of their activity demonstrates an embarrassingly low tolerance for critical thinking and yedios haTorah.

    It goes without saying that there are many wonderful Pesach minhagim, and it is important that they be kept. Pesach observance is a serious matter; we know the Arizal’s statement that one who is careful to get rid of even a tiny amount of chametz will be protected from sin all year. Our intent is not to trivialize minhagim—on the contrary—but to determine whose minhagim get the ‘right of way’.

    It is safe to assume that for hundreds of years it was quite rare for two people from divergent backgrounds to marry. Travel was a luxury most could not afford, and many people died never having gone very far from their place of birth.

    Husbands and wives generally shared, if not the same rav ha’ir, the same basic communal or provincial minhagim. It was certainly rare for a Sefardi and an Ashkenazi to meet, let alone marry. For this reason, discussion of these halachos began in earnest only about a hundred years ago.

    The very first to discuss this issue1 was the Tashbeitz, Rabbi Shimon ben Tzemach Duran (d. 1444). In a brief discussion,2 he makes it clear that there cannot be two customs under one roof. The example he gives seems to be an allusion to Pesach: “It is obvious, and there is no doubt, that we cannot have two people feasting at the same table separated by their doughs.”

    There remain two questions: Who assumes whose minhagim? And in the event of death or separation, R”l, would a spouse revert to his or her former minhagim?

    As for the first question, the Tashbeitz cites the principle of ishto k’gufo—literally, “his wife is one with him”3—which would indicate that a wife must assume the husband’s practices. We find this concept as well in the case of a bas Yisrael who marries a kohen and thereby gains the right to eat terumah. And if the husband should pass away first, as long as they had children together, she may continue to eat terumah until she remarries.

    All this, says the Tashbeitz, would apply to minhagim as well.

    While this conclusion was affirmed in later sefarim,4 it wasn’t until the modern era, when many free countries became cultural “melting pots,” that almost all major poskim discussed the issue.

    Rav Moshe Feinstein stated as much when he was asked this question: “For here in New York people retained their distinct city minhagim from across Europe, whether lenient or stringent…”5

    Interestingly, in this teshuvah Rav Moshe does not mention the Tashbeitz’s opinion at all, but based on a separate precedent, he comes to the same conclusion.

    He explains that just as it is an established halachah that if one moves to a new city he must adopt its minhagim, so too a wife “moves” into her husband’s home. It is irrelevant whether they move to the husband’s city or to hers, or whether her family purchased a house for them; the Torah’s concept of marriage, either physically or metaphysically, involves the woman moving into the abode of the man (especially when we consider the chuppah; see Ran in Kesubos).

    Is this rule set in stone?, Are there exceptions?

    There would have to be! Consider that there are numerous minhagim, and even halachos, that exist only because of women.6 How would these practices have been perpetuated if each woman had to yield to her husband’s customs? If that were the case, these minhagim and halachos would already have been lost.

    Indeed, we do find several exceptions to this rule in the poskim:

    • A spouse may not force the other to abide by his or her personal chumros.7 Rav Chaim Jachter 8 cites Rav Ovadia Yosef, who says that this principle would also pertain to the issue of a wife following her husband’s minhagim; all matters of chumrah are not included (for example, if a husband does not rely on any eiruvim, the wife may still choose to carry on Shabbos inside an eiruv).

    In fact, Rav Jachter (ad loc) quotes Rav Moshe Snow, who testified that while Rav Moshe abstained from eating chalav stam, he did not interfere when his wife chose to do so.9

    • Another exception to the rule is that a husband can be mochel in the matter of minhagim and allow his wife to retain her family customs. However, should she first accept her husband’s minhag and only laterdecide to revert to her own, a rav should be consulted and hataras nedarim should probably be performed.10
    • A third exception is that mitzvos that are incumbent only or mainly upon women may follow the practice of the wife’s family. This would explain how minhagim originated by women were able to survive over the centuries. Rabbi Neustadt argues for this principle at least in the case of lighting candles, where a woman may follow the minhagim of her mother.11
    • Rav Elyashiv held that certain customs are more stringent than minhagim and carry the status of kabbalos or gezeiros. He argues that eating kitniyos on Pesach falls into the latter category, and therefore holds that an Ashkenazi girl who marries a Sefardi must continue to abstain from kitniyos on Pesach. Based on the position of the Tashbeitz that we don’t want a husband and wife with separate dishes at the same table, this is difficult to understand. Perhaps in such a case, the Sefardi man would adopt the chumrah of abstaining from kitniyos!

    When Yosef and Binyamin were reunited in Mitzrayim, they both wept. Most understand that this was because they had a vision of troubles and destruction that would befall klal Yisrael in the future. The Maharal, however, understands that these were tears of joy; the brothers were relieved to foresee a future in which all the tribes would be reunited.12

    May the current period, when we see Jews from so many lands coming together in communities and in marriage, herald a greater future of unity and peace.

    NOTES

    1. Noam, Vol. 23, p. 155.

    2. Shu”t 3:179.

    3. Based on Vayikra 18:14; see Sanhedrin 28b.

    4. See Rav Chaim Pelagi, Moed Kol Chai 2:23, for a very strong ruling on the matter.

    5. Igros Moshe Orach Chaim 1:158, see also Even Ha’ezer 1:59; O”C 3:158.

    6. See shu”t haRashba 2:228; hakdamah perishah to Tur Yoreh Deah 2 in the name of his mother as to the order of lighting candles for Yom Tov; Niddah 66a; et al.

    7. For example, Igros Moshe Even Ha’ezer 2:22 near the end, inter alia.

    8. Grey Matter, Vol. 3, p. 132.
    9. This example would not apply for those who reject the concept of chalav stam as a matter of halachah. 10. Rav Shlmo Zalman Aurbach, as quoted in Halichos Baysa; Yom Tov Sheni K’Hilchasa; Shalmei Moed. 11. Weekly Halachah, Vayera.
    12. As told to Yechezkel, ch. 37.

  • Shabbos Erev Pesach

    Shabbos Erev Pesach

    Taanis

    Bedika

    Lechem Mishneh

    & Much More

    The Whats, Whens and Hows Of A Pesach That Falls On Motzai Shabbos (Saturday Night).

    If you are overwhelmed and confused about this coming Shabbos, which is Erev Pesach, you are not alone. Even the Shulchan Aruch remarks on the confusing nature of these halachos. To help you out, I will review the most common issues, starting with a more detailed discussion of the uniqueness of this year’s taanis bechorim.

    Taanis Advanced

    Here’s a quick riddle. What are the two occasions where halachah would sanction an Erev Shabbos fast day? Most of you probably know the first one—Asarah B’Teves. But the other one may be more elusive.

    Some of you may be thinking, “It’s a year like this! When the 14th of Nisan falls on Shabbos, we move the fast up to Erev Shabbos.” But this would be incorrect—we actually advance the taanis two days, to Thursday. The confusion is only magnified when we consider the fact that when the 14th of Nisan falls on a Friday, halachah does indeed affirm an Erev Shabbos taanis bechorim. This second case is the correct answer to the riddle.

    Why the distinction? Why not observe this year’s taanis on Friday?

    As mentioned in the Purim issue, not only may one fast on an Erev Shabbos, but the Shulchan Aruch records that some anshei maaseh (conscientious Jews) made it a point to fast every Friday so as to enter Shabbos hungry! However, in our generation we are advised against this practice since fasting all day would cause exhaustion and irritability, diminishing our enjoyment in the seudah and in the overall beauty of Friday night.

    So although we wouldn’t establish a taanis on a Friday to begin with, if either of these two fast days naturally falls on Erev Shabbos, that’s when we observe them.

    As for this year, when the taanis falls on Shabbos, even though we move it up to Thursday, the Shulchan Aruch cites an opinion that bechorim should not fast at all this year! This is because, as opposed to Asarah B’Teves, which is based on a pasuk in Zechariah, taanis bechorim is only a minhag.

    The Rema rules, however, according to the first opinion.

    Nevertheless, certain leniencies are endorsed this year. Some poskim allow reliance on the view that if one attends a siyum on Wednesday night, he is permitted to eat on Thursday; others allow one who can’t attend a siyum to redeem the taanis with tzedakah. Of course, these are for cases where one is otherwise stuck, and they are only for this year. Of course, as always, one should still consult his rav.

    On the other hand, some poskim,such as Rav Shternbuch,urge bechorim to make a second siyum on Friday in addition to Thursday. Other poskim, such as Rav Moshe Feinstein, support this chumrah but without recommending it (4:69).

    Although this chumrah may seem hard to comprehend for a taanis that is only a minhag, it actually has strong support that begs a larger question. In the case of the other taanis that is a minhag—Taanis Esther—the Rema rules that if it falls on a Shabbos, we move it up to the Thursday before. He then adds that if one had a bris that Thursday, in which case he would be allowed to eat, he must make up the fast the next day, Erev Shabbos!

    Consider the similarity to Erev Pesach this year, where one attends a siyum that enables him to eat on Thursday. Wouldn’t he also have to make up the fast on Erev Shabbos?

    Rav Karelitz quotes his uncle, the Chazon Ish, who dismisses the concern about having to make up the taanis bechorim on Friday because this fast is only a minhag. However, can’t one retort that Taanis Esther is also a minhag?

    Nevertheless, as Rav Moshe makes clear, the minhag for a year like this is to attend a siyum on Thursday, without having to make up the fast on Friday. For whatever reason, taanis bechorim is differentiated from a Thursday Taanis Esther.

    Bedikas Chametz

    On Thursday night, the 13th of Nisan, bedikas chametz will be conducted with a brachah at the beginning and Kol Chamira at the end. There are many obvious reasons this cannot be done on Friday night, Erev Pesach—not the least of which is the impossibility of searching with a candle.

    What is unique is the brachah we say before this Thursday-night bedikah. In a regular year, one does not recite a brachah if he makes a bedikah before the 14th of Nisan—for example, if he is going away for Pesach. This year is an exception to that rule, and it comes with the risk of creating a false memory and confusion in future years, a concern of the Shulchan Aruch.

    One may keep chametz that is necessary for the next day’s burning and to eat on Shabbos in a secure location.

    Although many houses become Pesachadik at this point (except for the bedikah bread needed for biur the next day), there is no halachic obligation to refrain from eating chametz until early Shabbos morning (the time to stop depends on your location).

    The one main observance on Friday is biur chametz. However, we do not say Kol Chamira then; instead, we say it before the fifth hour on Shabbos day.

    Obviously, chametz can’t be burned on Shabbos Erev Pesach, but why not do it later in the day on Friday? One can technically eat chametz all day Friday, so it should be permissible to do biur up until Shabbos.

    The Shulchan Aruch explains that this, too, is in order not to create a false memory and confusion in future years.

    What to Do for Lechem Mishneh

    We are confronted with a quagmire about what to do for lechem mishneh on Shabbos Erev Pesach. We must have lechem mishneh for each of our Shabbos meals, but we can’t eat matzah on Erev Pesach. This is a halachah and is not to be confused with the minhag of refraining from eating matzah from Rosh Chodesh Nisan. 

    The poskim offer three options: regular chametz challah, egg matzah, or soaked matzah.

    If your minhag is to use chametz, I would recommend bagels or pita because they don’t have as many crumbs as bread. Make sure to serve it on paper towels, a plastic table cover, or something similar. Each person should eat a kezayis over tissue paper right after washing, and the paper should be flushed down the toilet. If there are too many chametz crumbs to flush, you can pour designated bleach over them in the trash, or you can wrap up the entire tablecloth and place it somewhere hidden and secure, having in mind during Kol Chamira that you will dispose of it properly (by burning, etc.) on Chol Hamoed.

    Some make recite Hamotzi and eat the chametz in a different room. After following the steps above, they eat the rest of their kasher l’Pesach meals in the dining room. If you do this, it is best if the dining room can be seen from the room where you ate the bread. However, it is not recommended that you make the Hamotzi on a porch, a balcony or in the backyard and then return inside to eat the rest of the meal.

    Rav Moshe Feinstein and many others (Ashkenazim only) recommend using kasher l’Pesach egg matzah. Make sure that egg matzah crumbs do not fall on any Pesach utensils or food (even though egg matzah is allowed for the sick and infirm on Pesach).

    According to Rav Moshe Feinstein and others, Ashkenazim must stop eating egg matzah before the time when one can no longer eat chametz. Some (e.g., the Noda B’Yehudah) allow egg matzah to be eaten until chatzos.

    Many Sephardim encourage the use of regular kasher l’Pesach matzah for these Shabbos meals. In order to get around the prohibition of matzah on Erev Pesach, the matzos are soaked—for example, in soup—but not to the point of breaking apart.

    Biur Chametz

    Kol Chamira should be said before the fifth hour on Shabbos moring. Some recommend that one should think but not recite the word “hefker.”

    Shalosh Seudos

    In order to fulfill both the morning meal and shalosh seudos, many people break their early-morning meal into two, waiting several minutes in between.

    Because shalosh seudos should be eaten no earlier than half an hour after midday (according to many), it is recommended that some fruits or other items be eaten after this time as well.

    Others do not split their morning meal into two. Instead, they have shalosh seudos later in the day without washing, making sure not to spoil their appetite for the Seder.

    May Hashem see His nation’s desire to fulfill hilchos Shabbos and hilchos Pesach and send us a shefa tovah!●

  • Purim That Falls Erev Shabbos

    Purim That Falls Erev Shabbos

    When To Eat The Seudah…and More

    What followed was a series of guidelines for the Purim seudah when Purim falls on a Friday.

    But first, some background is in order.

    The Shulchan Aruch forbids one to eat a full meal on Erev Shabbos. Although regular daily meals such as breakfast are fine, once we get to the ninth halachic hour of the day, even those would be forbidden. The purpose, of course, is to make sure we enter Shabbos with anticipation and a healthy appetite.

    Although having a regular lunch, even with bread, is permissible, some poskim posit that in the short winter months, one must be careful not to eat too much even before the ninth hour. The Aruch Hashulchan states that on these very early Shabbosos, one should not have bread at all on Friday and should simply “taste” samplings of food throughout the day. Others are only careful on these early Shabbosos not to wash over bread past midday.

    In fact, the Shulchan Aruch records that some anshei maaseh, very conscientious people, used to fast every Friday in order to enter Shabbos in a state of hunger. Of course, this is not our practice since fasting causes fatigue and irritability (although we do fast when Asarah B’Teves falls on a Friday; all sources above from siman 249).

    But what if there is an occasion for a seudas mitzvah on Friday? The Shulchan Aruch states that one should not even make a wedding feast on Erev Shabbos.

    The poskim explain that the example of a wedding was chosen because it isn’t necessary to get married on a Friday. But if, say, a bris or a pidyon haben—which are mandated by halachah—falls on Erev Shabbos, a seudas mitzvah would be allowed. Even in such cases, however, the poskim lay out many rules and suggestions, such as having the meal as early in the day as possible and not inviting too many guests.

    These concerns are so important that according to some, one must be mindful on the first day of a Yom Tov not to finish the meal so late that he will ruin his appetite for that night’s seudah (Magen Avraham; cf. Biur Halachah 429, but see Mishnah Brurah 471:16).

    With all this in mind, let’s explore best practices for an Erev Shabbos Purim.

    The Rema tells us in Hilchos Purim (695:2) that one may have a morning seudah on Purim even when it doesn’t fall on Erev Shabbos. Although that is not a time most people will choose to enjoy the simchah and achdus of this day, it might be a good idea this year. Indeed, that is the Rema’s opinion. It should be pointed out, however, that when he says “morning,” he does not mean breakfast, but rather, before halachic midday (around 1 p.m. in New York City).

    There is an additional benefit of having an earlier seudah, and that is the fact that too much drinking close to Shabbos risks destroying the Friday-night seudah.

    Along those lines, drinking at kiddush on a regular Shabbos morning has vexed many wives for years. Too often, by the time the husband returns from kiddush, he is tipsy or tired and winds up lying down, ruining the Shabbos meal for the entire family. This concern is mentioned explicitly by the Mishnah Brurah (249:14).

    Some minhagim allow for an Erev Shabbos Purim seudah up to the tenth hour of the day (around 4 p.m. in New York City).

    Of course, everyone should follow the minhag of his parents or rebbi, and in a case of b’di’eved he should speak to a rav.

    There is, however, one more minhag—combining the Purim seudah with the Friday-night seudah. For those who do not have this practice, it is not simple, and one who would like to do so must speak to his rav.

    The way this works is as follows: One has a late seudah before plag haminchah (around 4:30 p.m. NYC time), and at some point between plag and several minutes before sundown (around 6:50 p.m. NYC time) everyone accepts Shabbos—either verbally or by saying all of Kabbalas Shabbos. They would then make Kiddush and continue eating.

    On the one hand, this seems like a marvelous way of enjoying the Purim seudah without ruining the Shabbos meal—and in fact, there is evidence that some Rishonim kept this minhag (Meiri).

    However, there are a number of land mines to contend with.

    It is likely that when you recite Kiddush, will have to omit the brachah of Hagafen because you probably had wine during the Purim seudah.

    Lechem mishneh also becomes complex. Should the challahs be brought out before Kiddush is made, even though you already washed earlier for the Purim meal? Even if you do put out lechem mishneh, you would have to remember not to make a brachah on it but simply cut the challah after Kiddush (see siman 271 and Mishnah Brurah ad loc. 18). And you would have to make sure to eat a kezayis even if you already did so at the Purim seudah.

    This is not to mention questions about bentching, about the fact that Maariv must wait until after the seudah, and about how to do poress mateh—separating the two meals before Kiddush begins. Some say one can do this just by covering the challahs, but the Shulchan Aruch Harav says one must cover the entire table!

    In the end, here is what I wrote to my shul members.

    “We wish to enter Shabbos, which is holier than Purim, in a state of anticipation. It is best to eat the Purim meal earlier in the day, before midday (1:04 p.m. Queens time), thereby allowing hunger to set in before Shabbos. One can accomplish this by starting the meal and completing the majority of it by 1:04 p.m.

    “If this is not possible, or if one forgot to eat the seudah, then a later meal would be acceptable if it begins before 4:02 p.m. (Queens time). In such a case, one should strive to complete the majority of the meal by that time.

    “A rav should be consulted if a conflict with this 4:02 p.m. time frame is known in advance or arises.

    “There is a rare custom to combine a late-day Purim meal with the Friday-night Shabbos seudah (with a break in between). For those whose parents or rebbeim follow this view, a rav should be consulted about how best to navigate the many issues that arise (e.g., how and when to daven Maariv, when to make Kiddush, and when to bentch).

    “May we soon celebrate Purim in the era of Moshiach. Wishing everyone a freilichen Purim!”

    I am extending that brachah to all of you as well! ●

  • The Many Mysteries – and Dilemmas – of the ‘Weekly Parsha’

    The Many Mysteries – and Dilemmas – of the ‘Weekly Parsha’

    Why Do We Combine Only Certain Parshios?

    Who Invented, Named,& Separated the “Parshios HaShevua“?

    Visiting Eretz Yisroel When They Are A Week Ahead

    Why Do We Wait So Long To Re-Align With Eretz Yisroel?

    Why Is Our Siyum of Our Yearly Cycle On Shemini Atzeres and Not On Shavuos?

    Rabbi Moshe Taub

    A Merger Of Several Articles Published In AMI MAGAZINE in 2016, 2019, & 2026

    I. Parsha vs. Parsha

    A young member of my shul approached me during the simchas torah hakafos one year and asked, “Wouldn’t Shavuos be a more apt time to complete our siyum of the Torah?”

         An adult member overheard the question, and I could only guess he had been overwhelmed with the simcha of the day when he offered: “It’s because today is Simchas Torah! How could we not finish now! Imagine Simchas Torah without a siyum of the Torah!”

        As soon as he completed his ‘answer’, he realized he was in no state to offer teirutzim.

         Indeed, Simchas Torah is often misunderstood.

         The history behind how we came to commemorate the completion of the Torah on (the second day of) shemini atzeres is fascinating, beguiling,  and furnishes us with a unique opportunity to appreciate certain rudimentary arrangements of our Torah lives.

    • How old is this minhag of Simchas Torah?
    • Is not this siyum haTorah interfering with our separate Torah obligation of simchas yom tov (based on the rule, ‘ein ma’arvin simcha b’simcha‘, we don’t intermingle certain simchos)?
    • Why don’t we complete the Torah on a Shabbos, the day we had leined it until now?
    • Most saliently, who divided our parshios of the week into the names and partitions with which we are so familiar, and through which this special siyum was created?

          I once published a lengthy post titled Chapter and Verse, where we explained the halachic and hashkafic the Christian-introduced divisions of the ‘chapters/perakim’, as well as their dividing of sifrei melachim, shmuel, divrei hayamim and ezra, each, into two separate books; even naming the ‘second part’ of Ezra into a newly-named sefer called ‘nechemia’ (Cf. Sanhedrin 93b where chazal explain why Nechemia was not to have a sefer named for him!).

        Our mesorah already gave us divisions of our own, called ‘parshios’. These are not to be confused with what we colloquially call the ‘parshas hashavuah’. Rather, these mesorah ‘parshios’ are breaks/spaces found inside sifrei Torah and come to represent a new subject, event, or simply the pause Moshe was given when being taught by Hashem (see Rashi to Vayikra 1:1 with Toras Kohanim; neviim and kesuvim also have such breaks).  There are two types of such breaks/spaces in Torah: pesuchos (represented in most standard chumashim with a large letter pei), and setumos (represented in chumashim with a large letter samech).

    A Stumah: when the new section continues on the same line as the last, but with a space (of nine-letters);

    A Pesucha: where the new parsha begins on a new line, but with a space of the same size.

        These parshios are significant, and a sefer Torah without them, or where they are placed incorrectly, would be pasul.

         Many are already aware of this, and that our parshios hashavuah have nothing to do with the halachic concept of ‘parshios‘. In another post, I discussed the weeks known as ‘Shovavim’ (from shemos–mishpatim) and shared that the parshios hashavuah became universally adopted – along with a yearly Simchas Torah—only about 800 years ago (see megillah 29b and sofrim 16:10, with Rambam, hilchos tefillah 13:1).

          Furthermore, Rav Shlomo Luria (d. 1573) shares that for those in eretz yisroel who were observing a triennial cycle, Simchas Torah would be celebrated once every three-and-a-half years, and that this siyum would veer from city-to-city! (Yam Shel Shlomo, end of bava kama, kuntrus ‘chilukei denim bein bnei e’y u’vein bnei bavel’. See also Otzar Plios HaTorah, emor, p. 931)

    II. Blunders & Parsha Names

    Here is a ubiquitous example of how confusion regarding the above may even lead to real blunders:

       A well-known Rashi – and a favorite of children’s parsha sheets – is found in the beginning of ‘parshas’ Yisro. Rashi quotes a chazal listing Yisro’s many names and their meanings.

    “Yeser [to add]: as Yisro added a parsha of the Torah” (shemos, 18:1)

       This is often erroneously repeated as meaning that Yisro received the zechus to have this parshas hashavua named for him –parshas ‘Yisro’!

       This is a misconception. Rather, what chazal meant, is that Yisro’s urging of Moshe to set up court systems ‘shaped’ a new parsha/section/inyan/subject inside the Torah -along with its own breaks before and after it (setuma/pesucha), i.e. the ‘parsha’ of courts!

       Rebbeim certainly teach this accurately, yet some misunderstand or misremember their words, when in truth it is unlikely that Rashi even ever heard of ‘Parshas Yisro’ as we know it!

            There are more examples, but I trust that the reader now appreciates that this distinction between parsha and parsha is substantial.

    IIa. Parsha ‘Names’

           Some may now assume the other extreme: the parshios hashavuah, while wisely divided so as to complete the Torah once a year, are capricious in nature.

          Rav Tzadok Hakohen teaches that just as our parents gave us personal names – which form/describe our essence -so too the names we have given and accepted for the weekly parshios carry their essence (Resisei Layla, ois 44).

        In fact, the Chasam Sofer (Drashos, Sukkos, p.52; likuttim Tehillim, p. 157) teaches that one should look at the parshas hashevua to find the answer to personal life-questions. This is especially true of the aliya one may receive (see ‘Melech B’yofiuv’ p. 5). Amazingly, Rav Yair Chayim Bacharach (d. 1702) named his famous sefer ‘Chavos Yair’ based on an aliyah he received (Bamidbar, 32:41)!

            Metzorah, mattos, shemeni and more are not named for their first word (‘v’elah shemos’ is indeed how Rav Saadia Gaon referred to shemos), and these accepted names are to be deemed kodosh.

          While we do find some names of our current weekly parshios already in chazal (e.g. ‘kedoshim’ – see zevachim 28a), most names evolved over centuries, many in the days of the geonim (Rav Chaim Kinievsky, Derech Sicha, p. 3; see Yesodei Yeshurin, 4:363ff).

         In fact, we used to divide parshas mishpatim into two parshios on certain years, the latter half with its own name (see Sefer HaChinuch).

         There are some who posit, that our present-day parshios hashevuah were passed down from Moshe or Ezra, and were always seen as the optimal way to read the Torah (see Ohr Zarua, hilchos shabbos, siman 45, Meiri, Kiryas Sefer, maamer 5 perek 1, and Tanchuma to Ki Sisa 3; see also sefer ‘Toldos Simchas Torah’).

       Some go further, asserting that the triennial completion of the Torah was a temporary aberration (Rav Reuven Melech Schwartz, Yemei Shovavim).

    We will delve further into this in V. below.

    III. Why Sukkos?

    Whatever the history, there is no doubt that great sagacity was applied to our current system. So, we must ask: Why do we choose to finish the Torah at this time of year?

        When I was younger, I would surmise that this was because the luchos rishonos of Shavuos were broken, then we did teshuvah, and on Yom Kippur Hashem forgave us making our kabalas hatorah complete with our receiving the luchos sheniyos. The first ‘available’ day after Yom Kippur to venerate this kabalas hatorah – when all are gathered without additional/special mitzvos of the day – is shemeni atzeres.

        Later, I grasped a far simpler solution and, chasdei Hashem, I now discovered that Rav Gedalya Felder (d. 1991) makes the same point (Yesodei Yeshurin, chelek 4, p. 355-365).

        Chazal share that Ezra obligated us in two specific leinings on two precise Shabbosim of the year -no matter the cycle of Torah reading one may be utilizing. We must read the tochecha found at the end of sefer vayikra (in ‘bechukosei’) before Shavuos, and those found at the end of sefer devarim (in ‘ki savo’) before Rosh Hashana (as to why we today lein these tochechos two Shabbosos before these yomim tovim, see tosfos to megila 31b).

        For those that observed the triennial cycle, then, during these two Shabbosos, they would have likely paused their cycle and instead read these tochechos, returning the next week to their cycle. Or they may have read their regular reading and simply added these special readings as a maftir.

        However, for our current yearly cycle of parshios, it not only works out perfectly with this gezeira of Ezra, but it seems to have been arranged around it! We place bechukosei before Shavous, and ki savo before Rosh Hashana, and everything falls where it falls -including our yearly completion happening right after sukkos.

       There are many questions we have yet to answer, such as why do not why to make this siyum on the Shabbos following shemini atzeres, why this isn’t a concern of ein maavirin, who introduced the positions where we stop for aliyos, who decided which parshios are sometimes combined, and how we developed various fascinating minhagim on simchas torah.

    IV. Misaligned Parshios

    I often share that one of the great maalos of rabbanus is the interesting questions one receives. While we all hear great kashos from time to time, only rabbanus demands one to give at least some effort in finding answers.

    I was recently asked a question which I would venture every reader has had in their back of their minds. Even those who have verbalized it may have not taken the time to search for an answer.

    Thankfully, I do not have that ‘luxury’.

    This morning, after shachris, a young member asked”

    “Whenever the 22nd of Nissan fall on Shabbos a strange situation is created. In eretz yisroel it is just a regular Shabbos, although issru chag, and they read the parshas hashavuah. For us in chutz l’aretz, it is acharon shel pesach, which has its own special kriah. Meaning, the next week we read the parsha they had read the Shabbos before.

    “We are out of sync!

    “This continues so that the week you are reading this article, if you are in chutz l’aretz the parsha is Emor, and if you are in eretz yisroel, the parsha is Bahar!”

    This can happen due to Shavuos as well, see Biur HaGr’a and Biur Halacha siman 428 s.v. bamidbar for all the ways the parshios can fall out each year, and why. See also Shaarei Yitzchak end of klal 11. See Magen Avraham ad loc. sif katan 6 and Mishna Berrura 10.

    Before revealing his central concern, we should point out that this observations leads to numerous isues, many of which will be discussed below. For instance, those who were here for Pesach will return to eretz yisroel and suddenly be one parsha behind! What should they do?

    IV. The Visiter

    Let’s pause to discuss this issue. What should a visiter to Israel from America do about his missed parsha should he arrive after such a Pesach or Shavuos?

    • Should they make a minyan of bnei chutz l’aretz?
    • If so, should they lein then both nasso (which chutz l’aretz is reading) and bahaloscha the same week?
    • How would they divide those aliyos?
    • What about the reverse -where over the next few weeks, an Israeli visits America?

    The Strict View

    The Chida discusses a case where people are stuck in a city without a Torah -missing that parsha completely, ruling that they need not make up this missed parsha the next week.

       While a tempting comparison to our case -and the American visitor should just skip nasso -many reject the connection. In the case of the city without a Torah, the next week will not be the time for the missed parsha, while in our case, the missed parsha may be seen as related to that Shabbos since it’s read that week back home!

    This is indeed how many poskim see it. They compare our case, rather, to the shul that read the wrong parsha one week, where we rule that the next week they read the missed parsha plus the parsha of the week (siman 135, Rema based on the Ohr Zaruah).

        In our case, then, a visiting American should read both parshios if when he arrives we are still not aligned (Yesodei Yeshurin, 4, p. 388).

    While the poskim seem to say that in such a case we would read the parshios in order -the missed one and then the regular one -some suggest otherwise (based on the Shu”t Maharsham 1:213).

      Nevertheless, the leining by mincha and Mondays and Thursday will remain like eretz yisroel’s (see shu”t Btzel Chachmah, 1:2-8 where every permutation of these questions are discussed in great detail).

       This is also the view found in Piskei Teshuvos (285:9).

      The Leneint View

      Rav Moshe Feinstein was often quoted agreeing with the above view, obligating Americans to read a make-up leining the first week in Israel.

       However, Rav Fried of Dallas, the author of Yom Tov Sheni K’Hilchoso heard from talmidim of both Rav Shach and Rav Aurbach that they struggled to accept Rav Moshe would ever rule this way.

       He then reached out to Rav Dovid Feinstein who confirmed that this was indeed a false rumor, and that Rav Moshe ruled that there is no need for any leining make-up, as one is to simply to follow the leining of the place one is presently in (as for learning the missed sidreh -a rav should be consulted).

    Rav Sholmo Zalman Aurbach and Rav Elyashiv agreed (see ibid. at length, p. 238-240).

        While Rav Elyashiv looks favorably on such a person hearing a make-up leining of the missed parsha, he says it’s not an obligation.

       For those that are machmir, Rav Elyashiv gives the following procedure – the missed parsha is read first; the first aliya should be for that entire missed parsha; this is followed by the ‘real’ parsha, divided into six aliyos (or with a seventh hosafa).

       As for the Israeli visiting America during these misaligned weeks, he may lein, get an aliyah, and should certainly attend this leining as part of the kehilla.

       These questions are complex, and a rav must be consulted.  For instance, must such a make-up leining only be performed if there’s minyan of Americans, etc.

    V. Why The Long Wait?

    But there is a deeper, non-halachik question that this creates, and it was this that the young man this morning wished to know.

    In some years, we wait until the parshios of matos–massei to catch up! (In that, that Shabbos in eretz yisroel they lein only massei while outside lein both are read).

    There are certainly are earlier candidates! For example, in the year of this writing, chutz l’aretz could have caught up the very first week following yom tov – by merging achrei mos and kedoshim!

    If for whtever reason this was not an option, what about behar–bechukosei -which this year was not merged, but could have been for this purpose!?

    Why then do we wait all the way till the summer? It seems that we are going out of our way to stay out of sync for some time.

    Strange.

    To get an understanding of all of this, we first have to review our unpacking above of the history of the parshios.

    Historically, finishing the Torah once a year was not a universal custom, with some communities completing it only once every three years-three and a half (see Megilla 29b).

    Still in the year 1170 there were two shuls in Egypt –one that leined what we know today as the parshios of the week, and the other that read at a third that pace (Masoas Binyamin M’Toledo, Adler edition, p. 63)!

    Yes, this means that the latter group did not have ‘Simchas Torah’! (See Toldos Simchas Torah, ch. 1)

    At some point, around eight-hundred years ago, everyone began to complete the Torah cycle once every year.

    The system still went through certain revisions, for instance the Avudaram gives us one double parsha that we no longer observe –shelach–korach!

    In fact, the Chida quotes from the Rosh that “The purpose of the divisions of parshios is simply so as to finish the Torah once every year. Each leader of every community separates and combines the parshios as he sees fit, for these are not halachos rather minhag (shu”t Chaim Shaal, Chazah HaTenufa; Kitzur Teshuvos HaRosh 54. See also shu”t Ohr Zarua 2:45 for an interesting communal case where he echoes the same point as the Rosh).

    However, certainly at our point in history we are obliged to follow minhag yisroel.

    With all of this in mind we get an answer as to why we wait so long to be in sync with eretz yisroel.

    [See CHART at the end of article of all possible outcomes]

    The Maharit (d.1639) in a teshuva (2:4) asks this question. He first quotes the above gemara about takanas Ezra, and reminds us that we follow the view of Tosfos (s.v. kelolos) to lein the kelolos two shabbosim before those yomim tovim, so that we have a buffer of one stam parsha in-between.

    Now we can understand why we wait so long to join eretz yisroel. Because of the way Pesach fell this year they will be leining the kelolos with a two week buffer before Shavous. While they have no choice in the matter, we certainly do not wish to join them in being so distant from the takana of Ezra!

    But why this long? We could easily accomplish the above without going through almost all of sefer bamidbar missaligned!

    •  First note that chukas-balak is only read together outside of eretz yisroel, as it’s an invention solely as a means to catch up.

    In a play on ‘yom tov sheni shel golios’, my predecessor in Buffalo, Rav Yirmiyahu Kaganoff, calls that double parsha: ‘parshios shel golios’.

    • Aside for a Friday Shavuos, the other scenario when we become misaligned with eretz yisroel is when acharon shel Pesach falls on Shabbos.
    • However, it is when that occurs during a leap year that we wait until matos-massei to conjoin, even though there seems to be many options to combine prior to matos–massei.

    Why?

    The Maharit explains that we do not wish to alter the norm. Since in most years matos–massei are leined together – and chukas and Balak are leined separately – we seek to maintain this.

               Another approach comes from the Bnei Yissoschor (maamrei chodesh tammuz–av, 2). He wonders why we generally lein chukas and balak separately, while matos and massei are almost always read together.

    He explains that we strive to lein the parshios that speak of chalukas ha’aertz – the division of eretz yisroel – specifically during bein hametzarim, the Three Weeks as a means of hope.

    Since the chalukas ha’aretz is also discussed in parshas pinchas, we separate chukas and balak so that pinchas could also be leined during the Three Weeks.

                This logic of the Bnei Yissoschor may also explain this long wait of conjoining when the last day of Pesach occurs on Shabbos during a leap year. If chukas and balak would be read together -and thus allowing a quicker catch up to eretz yisroel – then pinchas would be read before the Three Weeks.

    In fact, in eretz yisroel, all the parshios during such a year must be read separately to allow for this.

      However, in chutz l’aretz, we avoid this by simply refraining from combining parshios until matos–massei.

      The result is that pinchos, with its topics of chalukas ha’aretz, will be lained during the Three Weeks here and in eretz yisroel, and we will also then catch up.

    Ah, the beauty of halacha and minhag!

    Below:

    While doing research for this topic, my chaver Dr. Shlomo Dalezman, was very helpful. He was also kind enough to prepare the following chart:

    1 –

    Shavuos on Friday1 – Shavuos on Friday

    In Chu”l shabbos is second day Shavuos , in E”Y it is isru chag and they lein naso

    Date – Chul- EY

    7 Sivan – Shavuos – Naso

    14 Sivan – Naso – Behaloscha

    21 Sivan – Behaloscha – Shelach

    28 Sivan – shelach – Korach

    5 Tammuz – Korahc – chukas

    12 Tammuz – Chukas& Balak – Balak – 

    19 Tammuz – Pinchas – 1st of 3 weeks

    (note it doesn’t matter if was a leap year or not)

    2 –

    Pesach on shabbos in a leap year 

    In chu”l acharon shel Pesach is on Shabbos, in E”Y it is acharei mos.

    Date – Chul- EY

    22 Nissan – Acharon shel PEsach – Acharei

    29 Nissan  – Achaeri- Kedoshim 

    6 Iyar – Kedoshim – emor

    13 Iyar – Emor – Behar

    20 Iyar – Behar – Bechukosai

    27 Iyar – Bechukosai – Bamidbar

    5 Sivan – Bamidbar – Naso  (Erev Shavuos)

    12 Sivan – Naso – Behaloscha

    19 sivan Behaloscha – shelach

    26 Sivan – shelach – Korach

    3 Tammuz – Korach – chukas

    10 Tammuz – Chukas – Balak

    17 Tammuz – Balak – Pinchas

    24 Tammuz – Pinchas – Matos (1st 3 weeks) 

    2  Av – Matos + MAsei – MAsei (2nd 3 weeks)

    9 Av- Devarim – (3rd 3 weeks) 

    3 –

    Acharon Shel Pesach falls on Shabbos in non-leap year 

    In chu”l it is acharon shel Pesach, in E”Y they read shemini.

    Date – Chul- EY

    22 Nissan – Acharon shel PEsach – Shemini

    29 Nissan  -Shemini – Tazria+metzora

    6 Iyar –  Tazria+metzora  – Acharei + kedoshim

    13 Iyar –   Acharei + kedoshim  – Emor

    20 Iyar – emor – Behar 

    27 Iyar – Behar+ Bechukosai – Bechukosai 

    5 Sivan – Bamidbar  (Erev Shavuos)

  • May One Activate Thermal Hand Warmers on Shabbos?

    May One Activate Thermal Hand Warmers on Shabbos?

    Also: are they muktzah if already heating?

    February 2025

    I was recently met with a heated reaction when discussing…a heated reaction.

    During a recent post-Minchah halachah shiur, I was examining the halachos related to hand warmers on Shabbos. A rabbi never knows what topic may provoke a vociferous response, and the crowd grew passionate during this discussion.

    “This has to be assur!” implored one.

    “Well, some do see this as an issur Torah,” I responded.

    “Good,” said another, and then added, “Just because we don’t know what the issur is doesn’t mean it’s muttar! I can’t understand why this is even up for discussion.”

    I told the group that the day before, when I arrived at shul for Shabbos Minchah, I had noticed one of these hand warmers lying on the armrest of my chair.

    “I was unsure how it got there, and then I wondered if I could move it out of the way on Shabbos. This led me to speculate about whether one would be allowed to activate such technology on Shabbos. You might ask, ‘What difference does it make why they’re assur?’ So I will start by showing that it actually does make a big difference.”

    Let’s explore how these warmers work and what is problematic about using them on Shabbos.

    I. First: A Muktzah Primer

    Whether such gloves may be activated on Shabbos will be discused below. That issue came about as simply a byproduct to an initial sh’eilah I had: may I move them//are they muktzah?

    Many mistakenly assume that the central premise behind Nechemia’s decree of muktzah is the concern that moving certain items on Shabbos may lead a person to use them for their forbidden functions. For example, a pen is muktzah in order to prevent one from writing on Shabbos.

    Although the fear that one may do a forbidden melachah sometimes plays a role in muktzah (“muktzah machmas issur“, e.g. a lit candle, see below) this is not the chief concern behind muktzah (see Rambam, Hilchos Shabbos 24:12). Nor would such reasoning explain why, say, an expensive painting would be muktzah (muktzah machmas chesron kis).

    In other words: muktza as an invention of a new category that was birthed together with an injunction against its movement, having nothing to do with melacha or its prevention, per se.

    A Simple Demonstration:

    A PEN

    A pen becomes muktzah not because we fear one will forget and write with it, rather, and simply, because we assume that one is not planning to use it on Shabbos, and all items assumed to not be utilized on Shabbos are deemed muktzah.

    That’s it.

    Muktzah, then, simply means hukatz—to be set aside.

    This means that the many categories of muktzah are, in truth, simply the various reasons for the assumption these items were set aside.

    A pen is muktzah, and falls into the category of a kli shemelachto l’issur, something we assume is not planned for its main function since that act is forbidden on Shabbos.

    Because a pen does have some non-abstract uses that are permitted on Shabbos – e.g. as a pointer, to open nuts, etc. – it may be used for those purposes on Shabbos if they arise, as it was never hukatz from those. Indeed, items like this that are muktzah due to their issur status are the weakest type of muktzah, and may be moved if they are but in one’s way.

    So even if hand warmers are assur on Shabbos, I could have moved the ones on my chair.

    But wait! There may be another type of muktzah to consider.

    As mentioned, there is a special category called muktzah machmas issur. This category of muktzah only shares its name, yet is unrelated to classic muktzah and its special injunction. This is when an item is deemed muktzah not because of an assumption of disuse (painting, pen, a rock, etc.), rather because handling this item may lead to a forbidden activity/result. Some common examples are a lit candle – which is muktzah because moving it may cause it to be extinguished; wet clothes – which are muktzah because one may wring them out; and an iPhone – which is muktzah because its backlight may be activated.

    If it is indeed forbidden to activate hand warmers on Shabbos and if it is true that moving them may activate them, they would not only be muktzah by dint of being a kli issur, but also muktzah machmas issur!

    However, according to many, the fear of violating a rabbinical prohibition would preclude an item from falling into this latter category of muktzah.

    II. How Do They Work?

    We have been working under the assumption that activating such warmers would certainly be forbidden on Shabbos.

    Is this true? How do they work?

    There are two types of hand warmers.

    • The less common type is a reusable pack filled with a supersaturated solution of sodium acetate in water (gel). When the small metal disc inside is agitated, it releases tiny fragments of metal that act as nucleation sites for sodium acetate, changing the gel from a liquid to a near-solid state, which releases stored heat energy in a process called crystallization.
    • The more common type of hand warmer is for one-time use. Inside the pouch are tiny crumbs of iron. When agitated, oxygen is introduced, causing a speedy rust process to begin releasing energy as heat. (Other chemicals such as salt may be added to speed up the process.)

    The halachic issues involved are numerous.

    In regard to the first type, we must first consider bishul, which on the Torah level is only a concern at high temperatures that likely do not apply here. If indeed such temperatures are reached, it still only reheats the gel, which is a rabbinic concern (bishul achar bishul), and only according to some poskim.

    This concern may apply to the second type as well, depending on how we define bishul b’chamah and toldos chamah (cooking with the sun and other odd methods of cooking; famously, this is the problem with microwaving on Shabbos in terms of bishul; see, e.g., shu”t Igros Moshe 3:52).

    Furthermore, many people place empty aluminum pans on top of a hot plate on Shabbos. Would bishul even apply to such metals? (See Chazon Ish 37:11, with Chut Shani 22:4.)

    Beyond bishul, there are other issues such as molid, creating a new entity on Shabbos or Yom Tov. Molid is the reason we are permitted on Yom Tov to light a candle from an existing fire, but we can’t kindle a new flame.

    Finally, there is the biblical concern of makeh b’patish, which involves completing or activating an item by adding the finishing touch.

    III. Other Considerations

    The chemical reactions in hand warmers and their halachic applications go well beyond warm hands. They are an issue, for instance, when it comes to MRE self-heating meals, which soldiers use (and which I used during the time I traveled for kashrus supervision). One activates the pouch, places the sealed food on it, returns it to the box and waits (which means adding hatmanah to the halachic mix).

    May one reheat food this way on Shabbos?

    {For those who are interested, Rav Menachem Shimmel published two brilliant essays delving into this technology and its many halachic applications in Yeshurun, volumes 20 and 21}

    IV. Lessons Learned

    Although people should ask their rav about these many fascinating issues, I am discussing all this for reasons beyond l’hagdil Torah.

    I’d like to share what I told the agitated members of my learning group, who were bewildered by the fact that I would even consider investigating the possibility that hand warmers might be permitted on Shabbos.

    Of course we should trust our instinct, certainly in regard to the question of when to ask a sh’eilah. Although it is also true that issues such as zilzul Shabbos can be defined by the era or by one’s feeling (specifically, the feelings of the leaders of that generation; see Chazon Ish), one must still be able to discuss the halachah dispassionately and not just because it has real-world applications for cholim and soldiers.

    Moshe Rabbeinu understood the danger of making decisions while in an agitated state, even though his anger in that instance was righteous (see Bamidbar 31:22 with Sifri and Rashi).

    Knowing the exact status of items such as hand warmers and MRE meals aids us in understanding muktzah, and it may indeed assist a soldier on the field by preventing him from using a much worse mode of bishul. It can also be useful to a choleh or someone who is alone for Shabbos (see Rav Zalman Nechemia Goldberg, quoted by Rav Schimmel at the end of one of his essays).

    Food for thought. ●

  • A Mistaken Dairy Beracha After a Meat Meal!

    A Mistaken Dairy Beracha After a Meat Meal!

    What to do by a mistaken Beracha

    February, 2025

    Imagine this: You finish a delicious schnitzel dinner and bentch. A few minutes later, you are hankering for something sweet to settle your stomach. You rummage in the fridge and cabinets—and then you notice freshly made cupcakes right next to the oven.

    Excited, you lift one out of the tin and recite a heartfelt Mezonos. As you slowly bring the the hot dessert to your mouth, you hear someone say, “You’re gonna love these cupcakes. They’re made with real heavy cream.”

    Oh, no! They’re milchig! You just ate schnitzel a few minutes ago—but you already made the brachah!

    What do you do now?

    A version of this story happened to a bachur in Cincinnati this week. Rabbi Shmuel Botnick, a well-known writer and a friend of mine, is the boy’s rebbi, and they called together to hear my thoughts.

    I teased Rabbi Botnick, telling him that he was not just an anav (which he is) but that he wanted to share the responsibility for this psak with someone else (see beginning of Maseches Horayos).

    Among the most challenging questions that rabbanim face are those regarding hilchos brachos. Over the years we’ve discussed a number of these sh’eilos, such as the real story behind Pringles and whether a Shehakol is the correct brachah to make on them.

    Before we move on to the latest example, I’d like to share a story demonstrating that it is no exaggeration to describe brachos as one of the most challenging topics in halachah.

    Rav Chaim Ozer Grodzinski (d. 1940) was known as a unique iluy among gedolim. Our rebbeim used to tell us that he was able to write two teshuvos at the same time, one with each hand, while he was on the phone answering a third sh’eilah.

    During one of the first Agudah conventions, Rav Chaim Ozer was staying in a hotel under a pseudonym. He was exhausted after his long journey from Vilna and needed time and space to consider the many decisions facing the klal.

    However, a determined young yeshivah bachur did not want to allow an opportunity to meet this gadol baTorah slip by, and he found out where Rav Chaim Ozer was staying.

    The young man knocked on his door. Rav Chaim Ozer did not want to send him away, so he asked him to be brief.

    “I’d like to discuss a sugya,” said the bachur.

    “On what topic?”.

    “Hilchos brachos.”

    Rav Chaim Ozer paused, thought, and then responded, “I just had a very long journey. Please, choose another sugya...”

    In the case of the milchig cupcake, we have several issues to deal with.

    • What exactly is a brachah l’vatalah?
    • How necessary is kavanah? In other words, may the person who made the Mezonos simply eat another Mezonos item that is pareve?
    • What is the reason for waiting between meat and dairy?
    • We need to compare the prohibitions in such a case so that we will know whether it is preferable to make a brachah l’vatalah or to eat thecupcake.

    Chazal tell us that a brachah l’vatalah is a violation of one of the Aseres Hadibros—“Lo sisa Shem Hashem lashav, you shall not take Hashem’s name in vain” (Shemos 20:7; Brachos 33a). It would seem that this bachur has a simple choice—either eat the cupcake and violate the rabbinic rule to wait between meat and milk, or eat a little and avoid violating a Torah law by making a brachah l’vatalah.

    It follows, therefore, that he should eat a little of the cupcake.

    If only it were that simple!

    The Rambam understands this gemara as affirming that a blessing in vain is a Torah violation (Hilchos Brachos 1:15, with Magen Avraham 215:6; see also Teshuvos HaRambam, Pe’er Hador, 105). However, many poskim disagree.

    Tosfos explain that Chazal are not saying that a brachah l’vatalah actually violates the issur of using Hashem’s name in vain. Rather, it is a rabbinical concern that is simply supported by that pasuk.

    The Chofetz Chaim explains this reasoning by reminding us that a brachah is, after all, a praise of Hashem. If one recites a brachah with Hashem’s name, saying, “Blessed are You, Hashem, for creating the fruits of the tree” without intending to eat any fruit, how can that be considered prohibited mid’Oraisa under Lo Sisa? It is a true statement of praise, perhaps no different from saying the Shem Hashem when singing zemiros on Shabbos, as some do.

    Therefore, he and others explain that although such praise would be allowed on a Torah level, Chazal wanted to prevent other inappropriate uses of Hashem’s name by creating the special prohibition titled “brachah l’vatalah” (see Tosfos, Rosh Hashanah 33a, Mishnah Brurah 215:20, Chazon Ish, siman 137).

    According to these shittos, the bachur had the choice of violating one of two d’Rabbanans—eating dairy after meat, or making a brachah l’vatalah.

    But if these options are of equal weight, how does one decide?

    The best option is not to eat the cupcake but to say, “Baruch shem kevod malchuso l’olam va’ed.” This is based on the rule “Shev v’al taaseh adif—an error of omission is better than an error of commission” (see shu”t Yabia Omer 2:5).

    For example, the Mishnah Brurah rules that if on Yom Tov one makes a brachah on an item and then realizes that it is muktzah, he should not eat it (515:5). It would seem that the same applies here.

    You may think that we have come to a conclusion…but we are not even close, because all of this information was given under the presumption that the halachah of waiting between meat and eating dairy is d’Rabbanan.

    Is that true?

    Chazal teach in the name of Rav Chisda that one must not eat dairy after meat (Chullin 105a). Some understand this to mean that one simply needs to wash out his mouth before eating dairy (Rabbeinu Tam, et al.); others explain that one must bentch and clear away the meat meal first (Rif, Ramban, et al.).

    Chazal then give the view of Mar Ukvah, who required waiting “until the next meal” in order to have dairy after meat, and this is the view we follow. The question, then, is how long one must wait “until the next meal.”

    The Rambam is the first to give us a period of six hours, writing, “One who ate meat should not eat dairy until the length of a meal passes, which is approximately six hours because of the meat between the teeth that cannot be removed by kinuach (literally, wiping, meaning consuming other foods)” (Hilchos Ma’achalos Asuros, 9:28; see Gra and Pleisi 89:3, with Shabbos 10a and Pesachim 12b).

    The Rema disagrees with the Rambam, telling us that this d’Rabbanan guideline means that one may eat dairy only if he bentched and his mouth is clean. “The minhag that has become prevalent in these lands,” he says, “is to wait one hour…and there are those who are careful to wait six hours…and it is fitting to do so.”

    Therefore, for the majority of Ashkenazim, who don’t following the Rambam, the bachur had a choice between violating a d’Rabbanan by making a blessing in vain (according to others, a d’Oraisa) and violating a halachic minhag.

    This would seem to mean that he should have taken a small bite after his mistaken brachah.

    That was my ruling, and I was soon able to find many poskim who agreed (Yabia Omer, ibid.; see Psakim V’teshuvos 89, notes 56-58; other say that this is only at least an hour after eating the meat—see shu”t Be’er Moshe 4:24; shu”t Teshuvos V’hanhagos, 2:289).

    What about kavanah, his intention? Once he discovered his error, couldn’t he simply have eaten another Mezonos item in place of the milchig cupcake? According to many, the other food would have had to be in front of him at the time he made the brachah.

    Others would permit this option even if he simply intended to eat the other Mezonos item or was being served another item or under another’s control (see Shulchan Aruch Harav 206:1 and Mishnah Brurah 206:26).

    And we haven’t even discussed the idea of calling a rav to ask a sh’eilah after making a potentially mistaken brachah!

    I think this case suffices as our yearly reminder that brachos are complex and that we must be as vigilant and mindful about what comes out of our mouths as we are about what goes in. ●

  • May One Shave or Get a Haircut On a Taanis (Fast day)?

    May One Shave or Get a Haircut On a Taanis (Fast day)?

    & Other Fasting Imponderables, such as fasting erev Shabbos, Fridays.

    January 2025

    I. Friday Fasting

    I’m writing this on the morning of Asarah B’Teves.

    It seems that every time this fast falls on Erev Shabbos, people forget that it is even possible…even though it happened just last year (2024)!

    This misconception is based on the halachic myth that one may not fast on an Erev Shabbos.

    This inaccuracy is likely inferred from the fact that when we have a nidcheh, a deferred ta’anis, we don’t observe it on a Friday (see Aruch Hashulchan, siman 470:4).

    However, the Shulchan Aruch informs us that anshei maaseh—very conscientious people—had the custom to fast every Erev Shabbos (Orach Chaim 249:3)!

    The Mishnah Brurah states that although it is no longer appropriate to take on this minhag, a person who will enjoy the Friday-night seudah more if he does not eat on Friday is allowed to adopt this practice.

    In our current calendar, Asarah B’Teves is the only one of the four ta’aneisim listed in Tanach (Zechariah 8:19) that can fall on Friday (siman 550 se’if kattan #10 in Mishnah Brurah; see also Meiri on Megillah 2a, as well as the Bach and the Taz).

    HOWEVER….Fasting on an Erev Shabbos could technically apply to any of the rabbinical fasts listed in Zechariah. Rather, in our calendar cycle they happen to never fall on Friday.

    As for a unique quality found only in Asarah B’Teves, the Avudraham (d. circa 1370) asserts that, for this date only (and Yom Kippur), if were to fall on Shabbos itself, we would not move it (see Beis Yosef, siman 550 at end; see also Aruch Hashulchan 549:2)!

    This view is solely academic since Asarah B’Teves could only fall on a Shabbos if Rosh Chodesh Teves falls on a Thursday, which can never happen in our system (Shulchan Aruch, siman 428:2; nor can Rosh Chodesh Teves fall on a Shabbos).

    II. Shaving/Haircuts on a Fast

    Because I am writing this on Erev Shabbos, I have been receiving many sh’eilos about shaving and haircuts. For example, I was asked whether the fact that we don’t cut our hair on a fast day eclipses the requirement to tidy ourselves up l’kavod Shabbos (see Rema, siman 260).

    A similar question was whether it is permissible to taste the food l’kavod Shabbos and then spit it out even though we don’t do so on a public ta’anis (Mishnah Brurah, siman 567:6).

    This is a popular sh’eilah even on a weekday fast. Others included whether it is permissible to listen to music or buy new clothing.

    The sole reference to cutting one’s hair on a fast day (cf. Tishah B’Av) is a famous gemara relating to Chanukah (Rosh Hashanah 18b). Here is the background.

    In galus, Chazal wished to nullify our observance of the days mentioned in Megillas Taanis. This sefer containsthe earliest recordings of 30-plus post-biblical salvations and their commemorations, and it is the original source for the events and laws of Chanukah. Although the other observances were annulled in time, Chazal made an exemption for Chanukah (see my upcoming sefer on Chanukah, iy”H, which explores this in depth).

    Rav Yehoshua ben Levi held that this sefer’s contents were not nullified, and he was therefore shocked when the town of Lud declared a fast on one of the days of Chanukah. His shock is not surprising since the name “Megillas Taanis” was given precisely because fasting is not allowed on most of the days it records (see the hakdamah to the Oz V’hadar ed.).

    In protest, Rav Yehoshua decided to take action to demonstrate to the populace his displeasure with observing a fast during these celebratory days. He got a haircut!

    Evidently, haircuts were known to be forbidden on a fast. Can we infer from here that it is indeed forbidden to cut one’s hair on a fast day?

    Well, the Shulchan Aruch states that all inuyim—discomforts such as not bathing and not anointing oneself—which are prohibited on Tishah B’Avare permissible on other rabbinical fasts (siman 550).

    The Mishnah Brurah adds that although it is permissible to do these things, “baal nefesh yachmir,” meaning that a conscientious person should be strict about abstaining from them—with the exception of wearing leather shoes, which even a baal nefesh wears on standard fast days.

    The Biur Heitiv states similarly, “Perhaps we should be machmir in these areas on the other fast days as well,” implying a more universal chumrah (siman 551, s.v. mei’rosh chodesh).

    But haircuts are not mentioned specifically, nor is the story about Rav Yehoshua. Wouldn’t this be a clear source, and also demonstrate that haircutting is not simply a chumrah?

    Enter Rav Chaim Pilagi (d. 1868), who ruled that it is forbidden to have one’s hair cut on a taanis, even citing the above gemara as his source! He states further that one should not even get a haircut the night before a taanis.

    He does say, however, that when a taanis falls on Erev Shabbos, a haircut would be allowed (Ruach Chaim, siman 566:4; see also shu”t Lev Chaim).

    But if the gemara is so clear, why do many say it is only a chumrah not to have a haircut on a weekday taanis? And if, for whatever reason, it is allowed, why should we establish a chumrah?(See, e.g., Rav Tuvya Goldstein in shu”t Emek Halachah, pg. 175, where he permits haircuts on a taanis but leans toward acting strictly.)

    The Acharonim point out that the above gemara is actually the source for both the allowance and the chumrah!

    Rav Yehoshua’s decision to have his hair cut on a taanis always seemed curious. If he wanted to protest the taanis, why not just eat and drink?

    The Shaagas Aryeh (d. 1785) lived over a hundred years before Rav Chaim Palagi and was the rav of the Ashkenazic community, as opposed to the revered Lev Chaim, who was a Sephardic leader in Izmir, Turkey. He raises many questions about Rav Yehoshua’s decision (Turei Even on Rosh Hashanah).

    To explain it, he interprets the gemara brilliantly, stating that Lud’s ta’anis must have been institutedby its own rabbanim, binding everyone to it—including rabbanim such as Rav Yehoshua who might have vehemently opposed it. Therefore, the only form of protest available was ceremonious in nature.

    The obvious conclusion, then, would be that this gemara and Rav Yehoshua’s decision are proof that a haircut is perforce allowed on a rabbinic fast, except that it is not in the spirit of the day. (Cf. Ritva, who also asks why Rav Yehoshua didn’t simply eat as a protest. He answers that Rav Yehoshua wanted to do something publicly. Perhaps the Ritva understood that Rav Yehoshua wouldn’t eat in a public domain, which the gemara compares to the behavior of dogs.)

    In summation, there is no clear prohibition against shaving or having one’s hair cut even on a weekday taanis (with the exception of Tishah B’Av). Rav Chaim Palagi’s opinion is a singular one.

    Nevertheless, and although it is not a halachah, we should try to be strict regarding haircuts, music, and other activities that may counter the spirit of mourning on a fast day (Dayan Fisher, shu”t Even Yisrael 7:28). ●