Modern-day Deafness in Halacha: A Reappraisal
Rabbi Moshe Taub
2013, RJJ Journal of Contemporary Halacha
The mass institutionalization of deaf-education[1] and the relatively newly developed pedagogic skills of their instructors began to develop in the early half of the 17th century, and has revolutionized how the deaf and hard-of-hearing interrelate with the world.
It may shock some to discover that up until the mid 17th century deaf children were often institutionalized r’l (Encyclopedia Ivrit vol. 18, as quoted in Encyclopidia Rufuit, by Dr. Steinberg, vol. 2, column 535 ff # [22]).
It was at this time that the sudden change in how deaf people interacted with the world began to challenge many rabbanim. Would their status in halacha have to be modified?
In fact it did not take long until askanim began to open up chedarim specifically geared to the Jewish Deaf: in London[2], Vienna[3], Hungary[4]. In 1864 Rav Yehudah Leibish Broch published the above-mentioned 12 page sefer, Maaseh Cheresh, on this issue.
He explains the purpose for his work in his introduction:
“Although I have not published, as of yet, my writings… now is not the time to be silent, for this is a matter of importance, and indeed those who are asking these questions are from the chachmei yisroel [Here he inserts a wicked pun changing “askers” to “foxes” because some he felt –not the chochamim, of course – had an agenda. M.T.], all of whom wish to know if there is some change regarding the deaf people of our times who learn in special schools and who learn how to talk among people….even the Sanzer Rebbe congratulated me on this project….and aside for this my eyes have witnessed and my ears have heard regarding the ‘TaubStummerSchuall’ in Vienna which is run by Rav Yoel Deitch and who places his students on the wings of eagles…”
Rabbi Brach was not alone. The Shevet Sofer (eh’e 21) quotes from his father the Ksav Sofer who also felt that this matter needed to be addressed, and went to visit the special school in Vienna.
Although, of course, chochma b’goyim taamin, we should note that we find earlier indications of sign language and lip reading within yiddeshkeit and the Talmud: Gittin 59a in the mishneh and Yevamus 112b where we are taught regarding some form of hand signaling [“remiza”] by and to deaf individuals ; Chagiga 3a[5] we are taught regarding some form of lip reading. See also Tosephta Terumos 1:2 where it is taught that the deaf sons of the second generation tanna R. Yochanan Ben Gudgada were charged with all the taharos of Yerushalaim. Such responsibility could have only come about through some sort of communication and special education[6]. It should be of little surprise then that their father, R. Yochanan, is quoted as the disseminator of some of the laws of deafness (eg. mishneh Gitten 5:5; Chulin 55b). Famously, the gemera (Sota 13a) teaches us that Chushim the son of Dan was deaf (or “of heavy ears”), and yet, in that same gemera, we are taught he was able to talk to others and that the shevatim were able to convey to him the events that were unfolding.
We should note that in researching material for this article this writer observed that although there are sefarim available today on virtually every subject and focus imaginable in halacha[7], this writer has yet to find one dedicated specifically to this topic (save for the above brief Maaseh Cheresh and the pesicha to Pri Megadim). I hope that what is written here, while certainly not meant to be relied upon for final rulings, can galvanize someone to put together a much needed and more thorough sefer on this topic.
Indeed the Minchas Chinuch (21:10) says such a kuntrus is needed.
___________________________________
About one in one thousand babies are born deaf. Infants and adults can also become deaf due to illness (e.g. mumps, meningitis, etc.). There is no halachic distinction between conductive deafness (where the inner ear works, yet, for a host of possible reasons, the sound is not able to travel through the ear canal) and sensorineural hearing loss (where the inner ear, the cochlea, is unable to perform its function of discerning sounds by sending messaging to the brain).
As for the role that genetics can play regarding deafness, and why it is crucial for rabbanim to understand it, see footnote[8].
The gemera (Chagiga 3a; Yevamus 113a) rules that a cheresh –which there, and almost everywhere else in the Talmud, refers to one who both cannot hear nor speak (Chagiga 2b) – is exempt from all mitzvos[9].
While the source for this ruling is unclear, the Chasam Sofer eh’e 2:2 posits that it is a halacha l’Moshe M’Sinai; see Minchas Shlomo 1:34 who also discusses what possible source chazal had for this law[10], and where he also seeks to explain how a halacha (that a deaf-mute is exempt from Mitzvos) could today go through such a radical change and if chazal were aware of our ability to train a deaf-mute so that they would be considered a baar-daas.
Deafness and muteness are not two separate maladies that have coincidently struck the same individual rather, at least in past generations, it is precisely because one is (born) deaf that he would never learn how to talk[11].
In fact the biblical term for deafness is the root CH’R’SH, and is often used to connote silence as well (e.g. Shmos 14:14, inter alia). The Radak (Sefer HaShrashim, column 239) explains that this word’s true meaning is in fact deaf(ness), rather one who is silent is acting as a deaf person would since, typically, they cannot speak.
According to a large consensus, this halacha applies equally to one born deaf (congenital) and one who devolved deafness and muteness later in life (Maseh Cheresh); others disagree[12] and are therefore more lenient regarding one who was at one time able to hear or speak[13].
From the straightforward reading of the gemera (Chagiga ad loc. Yevamus 113-114; Shavuos 42a) one can infer that this exemptive status of the archetypal deaf-mute is causative in nature and not intrinsic[14].
Meaning that it is precisely due to one’s deafness and their lack of communicational aptitude that causes their development to become arrested which then leads to a deficiency in the rational agility and mental maturity that would be necessary to bind one to the Torah’s many obligations (even its negative laws; see Yevamus 114b). Rabbi Moshe Feinstein[15] explains communication as being the key to intellectual growth and development, and a deaf/mute who, perforce, cannot communicate has to be viewed as unique within the confines of Halacha proper.
Having only the skill of writing would not transform one who is deaf into a medaber (Tur e’hez, siman 120:5, 121:6; see Gittin 71a with Rashash[16]). This is certainly true regarding one who was born deaf[17].
One modern expert on issues of medical halacha argues that the above laws not withstanding, one cannot feed a true cheresh non-kosher food or assist him in performing other sins[18] [19].
A non-Jewish cheresh would be exempt from the sheva mitzvos bnei noach[20].
It is vital to point out that such a cheresh –which rarely, if at all, exists today- is still an equal member of klal yisroel – e.g. one desecrates Shabbos to save them,[21] – and the Torah[22] warns us to not curse them. Other such examples include the ruling by some[23] that a kohen who is a true cheresh is still privy to the special honors due to Kohanim; we do not stop a cheresh from donning teffilin[24].
Furthermore, one fulfils the mitzvah of procreation through a deaf child[25].
Sign Language
Regarding a deaf person who cannot be assisted with hearing aids and who never learned how to talk yet has the ability to converse in sign language, there is significant debate as to their status.
Rabbi Feinstein[26] in a teshuva first published in the back of the first volume of Rabbi Eider’s English work on the laws of nidda[27], rules that one who was born deaf and also cannot speak yet can converse in sign language still has the status of true cheresh[28]. He draws a comparison to writing, which as stated above in not a skill that transforms a born cheresh into a medaber[29]. Nevertheless, he rules in a later teshuva[30] that if a cheresh is unable to recite any words then it is better he daven in sign language that not to daven at all. This last point is consistent with his view stated above that even a true cheresh who is exempt from all mitzvos should still not abandon Torah.
Others disagree[31] and rule that a cheresh who has the ability to converse in sign language has the status of a pikeach.
A competent rav should be consulted, as each case must be judged independently[32].
As for using sign language during davening at times when talking would not be allowed a logical distinction must be made between the arbitrary motions we all make at times in order to communicate specific things (i.e. for silence, or for a pen) and an official, agreed upon, language of signs and gestures. The Shulchan Aruch rules (siman 63:6) that one can not even motion during the first chapter of krias shma. The Mishne Berura (siman 104:1) rules the same for shemoneh esreh)[33].Regarding birchas hamazon, the Shulchan Aruch rules (siman 183:8) that some say all the laws regarding tefilla apply to benching, which the Aruch Hashulchan teaches would mean that one cannot communicate through motion, like by teffila. These laws would all the more so apply to sign language. Regarding other points in davening where talking is not allowed, or is frowned upon,sign language, while certainly not viewed as talking[34], and certainly such communicating does not disturb others when compared to talking, nevertheless there is little doubt that it goes against the reverence we are to have toward tefilla and the synagogue (see Shulchan Aruch siman 150; zohar, parshas Teruma) and will certainly weaken the atmosphere in shul and even cause the other misspalelim witnessing such open communication to view actual talking lightly.
Shomea, Medaber, and Grey Areas
A mute who is not deaf (shomea), or one who is deaf but can speak (medaber), is halachikly viewed as a pikayach (Shulchan Aruch 55:8) and therefore obligated in all mitzvos (mitzvos that are dependent on shmiah/listening, e.g. megilla, will be discussed below).
Communication being the reason for a cheresh’s unique status in halacha, one can make the cogent argument that in modern times when even the most severely deaf is taught some from of communiqué their status would be that of a medaber and they should then be viewed no different than the average Jew and be obligated in virtually all mitzvos[35]. This may be true whether or not their hearing devices give them perfect hearing, and even if they do not have perfect speech. Additionally, many questions arise regarding the hearing devices themselves and if they are viewed as affecting true shmia.
The major poskim of the late 20th century all discuss this issue: Rav Moshe Feinstein (ad loc.); Rav Shlomo Zalman Aurbach (Minchas Shlomo 1:34); Rav Eliezer Waldenberg (shu’t Tzitz Eliezer, 15:46); Rav Yitzchak Yaakov Weiss (Minchas Yitzchak 2:113). We shall first marshal their views and later seek to apply them to common cases.
____________________________________
Hearing Aids vs. Choclear Implants
It is crucial for the reader to first note that the term “hearing aid” that will be perennially referenced when discussing the various responsa literature to follow is only a reflection of the words spoken by the above poskim. In this writers view Cochlear Implants (known in deaf culture, and referred to in this article as CI) would be no different from a Halachik standpoint than standard hearing aids.
Some do argue[36] that CI should be viewed more leniently than a standard hearing aid in two areas. 1) As we shall see below, because a standard hearing aid acts similar to a microphone (indeed it is in essence a mini-microphone) the same Shabbos concerns regarding the latter should also affect the former and therefore argue that at least concerning the issue of mashmia kol lrabim (see tractate Shabbos 18) which is one of the concerns regarding microphones (and hearing aids) on Shabbos, CI should not be effected, for CI works through sending audible pulses to the brain and not through a microphone 2) Regarding fulfilling a mitzvah dependent on shmiah (e.g. megilla) where, as we will discuss below, there is significant debate as to its value when heard through a microphone (and hearing aids), CI “might” be a non-issue due, again, to the fact that CI is not a microphone (see ad loc. footnote 25; he writes there that he will further explore this in another kuntrus).
It would seem, humbly, to this writer that both of these points are moot. As for his point regarding mashmia kol l’rabim, Rabbi Moshe Feinstein (oh’c Igros Moshe 2:85 s.v. vhenay hataam) already cogently argued that this is of no concern even for hearing aids because, although essentially a microphone, the sound produced by a hearing aid is not meant lrabim (public); furthermore, regarding both points 1 and 2, which seeks to differentiate between standard hearing aids and CI because the latter works without a microphone – this is a non-starter due to the fact that CI does work through a microphone! While it is true that hearing aids simply amplify sounds so as to be audible in a damaged ear, CI also begins its process with a microphone. It is only after the sound is first picked up by a microphone that the speech processor organizes the sounds, the transmitter and stimulator transforms these sounds to impulses, and finally the electric array gathers these and sends them to the various areas of the auditory nerve[37].
If anything, one could argue, CI would be a greater concern than hearing aids regarding mitzvos that rely on shmiah for while both begin as microphones (that convert sound into electric signals, see Minchas Shlomo 1:9[38]) only CI reverse engineers these signals and then rearranges them, which means that a CI takes sound one step further away than the original speaker when compared to a standard hearing aid.
Nevertheless, based on the leniency of the Har Tzvi regarding using microphones to fulfill a mitzvah of shmia (quoted below) that “all sounds are kosher” it would seem that all hearing devices be treated equally. Further study is required regarding this last point.
__________________________________
With the above in mind, let us look to some of the responsa literature that discuss modern day deafness, both regarding in generalities and specific cases. We will further seek to apply them in the section that follows it.
Igros Moshe
Rabbi Moshe Feinstein[39] rules that someone who was born a cheresh but later had a hearing aid attached which permits him to hear and which allows him to communicate with others, would have the status of a pikeach and be obligated in mitzvos like any other Jew.
What makes this particular responsum so fascinating is that although he advances such a pragmatic halachik view when discussing modern-day cherashim, he nevertheless writes there that the ability to hear through an electrical device does not transform one into a shomea (one who can hear), rather one would be transformed into a medaber (one who can speak). Rabbi Feinstein draws a distinction between electronic hearing aids and the mechanical, crude hearing aid that the Pri Chodesh[40] rules would in fact transform a cheresh into a shomea, for the latter still allows one to hear the original voice or sound.
It would appear then that Rabbi Feinstein is suggesting a somewhat complicated Halachik structure: modern electrical devices allows one to ‘hear’ – although it will still not be viewed as “halachik hearing” – through which a cheresh would learn how to converse with others – the lack of which being at the heart of a cheresh’s Halachik disability – which, in turn, would make him a medaber.
This ruling applies even if his speech can be difficult, but not impossible, to understand[41].
Either way, such an individual would be viewed as no different than the average Jew[42].
This ruling of Rabbi Feinstein where he states that electrically amplified sounds are not viewed as shmia would seem to contradict an earlier teshuva of his[43] where Rabbi Feinstein was asked regarding hearing the megilla, or another obligation dependent on shmiah, through a microphone. There he argues that since even regarding regular speech the vibrating waves/air that enters the listeners’ ear is in fact different and unique than the vibrating waves/air than what was used when the words were first spoken, a microphone, like sound waves themselves, would be no different halachikly, and one can, then, fulfill such mitzvos through it.
Although he ends there by stating that while one should not protest those who follow this, he is reluctant to have this leniency acted upon. Why then years later[44] (in the teshuva we first mentioned)would he maintain an opposite approach, arguing strongly against a hearing aid being seen as halachik shmia with not even a hint of an allowance or mention of his previous lenient approach?
Stunningly, in 1980, Rabbi Feinstein was asked again[45] about hearing the megilla through a microphone and he reiterates his inclination to be lenient –although he is slightly more hesitant –and warns that it nevertheless should be avoided, even b’shas hadchak. He makes no reference to his earlier responsa regarding hearing aids where he completely rejected such manipulated sounds as true shmia.
While is tempting to suggest some dissimilarity between a microphone and hearing aids, such a distinction fails to come to mind, especially when we consider the virtually all scholars who discuss hearing aids connect it to their, or others’, view(s) regarding a microphone[46]. In fact Rabbi Feinstein himself draws such a comparison[47]!
When assessing Rabbi Feinstein’s view on the issue of microphones/hearing aids and mitzvos shmia some scholars look only to his microphone teshuvos[48] and therefore quote him as being lenient; while others[49] quote the hearing aid teshuva only and therefore cite him as being stringent in this matter[50].
Even the sefer Shmaitza D’Moshe, which seeks to gather all of Rabbi Feinstein’s rulings as a flowing commentary to the Shulchan Aruch, states in his name[51]: “One should not hear the megilla through a microphone, even in a shas hadchak…” In their commentary they seem to only focus on the latter two teshovos mentioned in this article (yet they still quote him as forbidding it under any circumstances).
Rav Frank and Chazon Ish
Relating specifically to the issue of hearing devices, Rabbi Tzvi Pesach Frank writing to Rabbi Yitzchak Yaakov Weiss[52] rules[53] differently. He argues that – with the exception of mitzvas shofar where the gemera explicitly rules (Rosh Hashana 27b) that one must hear the sound proper and not an echo (or a reverb) – a microphone is in fact viewed as halachik hearing[54]. The Chazon Ish also suggested such an approach verbally to Rabbi Shlomo Zalman Aurbach (Minchas Shlomo 1:9)[55]. As we will see in the next section, this debate between Rabbi Shlomo Zalman Aurbach and the Rabbi Frank (and possibly Rabbi Feinstein) colors how one approaches a slew of issues in halacha.[56]
Minchas Shlomo
Rabbi Shlomo Zalman Aurbach (Minchas Shlomo 1:34), writing to Rabbi Chaim Pinchas Sheinberg shlit’a, recalls a case where both he and Rabbi Elyashiv shlit’a were asked regarding a deaf boy who was taught to talk and even had a chavrusah, where they both ruled that this boy had the status of a pikeach and was obligated in mitzvos with the possible exception of an aliya l’Torah because of the fear that some will not understand his brachos (this last point will be explored further in a later section).
This seems to be in contrast to the view of the Igros Moshe (ad loc. s.v ‘V’hanochon’) who only speaks of a medaber who also has a functioning hearing aid or, if not, once had modest hearing whereas Rabbi Aurbach clearly rules that even one with no hearing can be viewed as a medaber.
Rabbi Aurbach ends with some discomfort toward disagreeing with earlier poskim[57] who had ruled that a cheresh who learns to talk is still considered a true cheresh and is simply viewed as if repeating words blindly. We all clearly see, Rabbi Aurbach asserts, that today this no longer holds true.
In a separate teshuva (1:9) Rabbi Aurbach discusses the issue of hearing mitzvos shel shmia through a microphone. He rules that one does not fulfill their obligation in such a manner. He then writes in parentheses: “In pains me that now deaf people, who can only hear by using a microphone-like device, would not be able to fulfill mitzvas shofar, megilla…at the very least they should not make a beracha on these mitzvos.”
Tzitz Eliezer
The Tzitz Eliezer (15:46:5) also rules that deaf people today, who go to special schools or can converse with others, have the status of pikchim and are obligated in all mitzvos. He also suggests that there is no difference between one who can only hear when spoken to in a loud voice[58] and one who can only hear through a hearing device, both of whom would be obligated in all mitzvos[59]. He therefore rules unlike Rabbi Aurbach and views such hearing as “halachik hearing”.
However, at the same time, in three other responsa[60] he argues against the possibility of fulfilling a mitzvah through a microphone, because a) he views such devices as not producing the original sound[61] and b) it takes away from the reverence we are to have in the synagogue and for davening[62]. He therefore, in the latter teshuvos mentioned, approaches the issue of mitzvos shel shmia through a hearing aid similar to the Minchas Shlomo and the more stringent teshuva from the Igros Moshe[63].
From the above we see that while there is much these poskim disagree about, in particular regarding how to view a hearing device, we nevertheless have a clear consensus[64] that obligates virtually all of today’s cherashim to mitzvos, and that rules that their status has (in most cases) changed to either that of a shomea or of a medaber, or both; any of which would be enough to take them out of the status of a true cheresh. There is, however, some disagreement regarding the peripherals, the application of which will be discussed in the penultimate section below.
_______________________________________________
All of the above creates a most unique category of halachik status, for although such a class was discussed in the gemera, and at times in the Shulchan Aruch (e.g. siman 199:10 in rama with mishneh berrurah 28), the plausibility of such people who were deaf yet could talk or visa versa were at one time too rare[65] to be commonly discussed every time a true cheresh is mentioned in the codes.
What follows in an attempt to gather in one place the most common Halachik questions relating to deaf or hard-of-hearing pikchim today, specifically, the regarding commandments that rely on hearing (e.g. Shofar). Due to the vastness of this topic we will focus in particular regarding one who is a shomea-medaber or who has the ability to hear only through an electric hearing aid. Beyond this, some of the peripheral questions that relate to hearing aids (e.g. shabbos use) will be breifly discussed. It should be noted that many of these laws relate to more common issues such as fulfilling a mitzvah or beracha through a microphone. The reader is directed to Rabbi Chaim Jachter’s article on those issues in his ‘Grey Matter’ volume 1.
Tekias Shofar – Even according to the lenient opinions cited above that view assisted hearing through a hearing aid or CI as halachik hearing, tekias shofar would be different as the gemera (Rosh Hashana 27b) has already ruled that an echoed sound is not enough to fulfill this mitzvah as one must hear the original blast. Nevertheless a deaf person who hears through such a device should blow Shofar for themselves. If they have even faint hearing without a hearing aid they should take their hearing aid out before the blasts[66]. In any case, such a person may certainly not blow shofar for others.
However Rabbi Shturnbach[67] marshals the view of the early Rishon, Rabbi Yonasan M’Lunel (b. Provence 1135) who rules[68] that a cheresh who can talk is obligated in shofar. Rabbi Shturnbach therefore suggests that someone who could talk but cannot hear (or one with a hearing device, according to Rabbi Aurbach et al.), should learn to blow Shofar for themselves. This also seems to be the ruling of the Aruch HaShulchan[69].
Berachos, Krias Shma, Tephilla, Krias HaTorah – The Shulchan Aruch rules (62:3; 206:6) that although tephilla and berachos must be heard by the reciter, bdieved, if one says the words but did not say them loudly so as to hear them he stills fulfils his obligation (see Berachos 15a). A deaf person without a hearing device who can talk would then be obligated in all such Mitzvos and fulfills them although he cannot hear what he is saying, and certainly if he can hear with his hearing aid[70]. Although for a person with healthy hearing this would only be bdieved, for such a cheresh it would be his l’chatchila[71]. Another argument offered is based on the rule of “kol haroy lbila”, meaning since this cheresh-medaber is in fact speaking in a sound loud enough to be audible, it is irrelevant if he hears himself or not. Of course, according to the lenient views of the Har Tzvi and Chazon Ish one who hears is prayers through a hearing device is no different than anyone else.
The consensus is that a deaf person may recite the blessing “Hanosen L’Sechvy Bina” (…Who gives insight to the heart/rooster”). This is true even regarding a true cheresh[72].
Regarding a kohen who is a cheresh-medaber, the Mishne Berura (siman 128:49) rules that he obligated in birchas kohanim even though he cannot hear the chazzan’s call.
The general consensus, and minhag haolam, is to allows a cheresh-medaber to be called for an aliya[73]. Rabbi Feinstein also allows a true cheresh to receive an aliya for his bar-mitzvah or aufrof –so that he should not feel downgraded – and he should try to say the words as best he could; although it is best if such an aliya not be from the main seven aliyos.
Having a cheresh–medaber act as the shliach tzibbur is a subject of debate[74]. Therefore regarding saying kaddish, while it would seem that a cherash-medaber may certainly say it along with others, saying it alone, however, would be subject to the above dispute. However, according to both the Chazon Ish and the Har Tzvi (and perhaps Rabbi Feinstein) this dispute would not apply to one with a working hearing aid or CI who can, without equivocation, lead a tzibbur.
As for a cheresh-medaber acting as the baal koreh, this should be avoided yet can be done for cases of need[75], such as the bar-mitzvah of a cheresh-medaber[76]. Certainly regarding biblical readings (e.g. parshas Zachor) we should not rely on the lenient views. As we will point out below, there is a distinction between the reading of the Torah and the reading of Megillas Esther, the latter being more stringent regarding a cheresh-medaber.
As for hearing krias haTorah, Rabbi Moshe Shturnbach suggests[77] that even according to the views that rule that microphones/hearing devices are not considered true shmia, krias hatorah would be different. This is because krias hatorah may not be an obligation to hear a person read the Torah rather simply to hear words of Torah[78].
A cheresh-medaber is counted for a Minyan according to all views (Shulchan Aruch siman 55:8). Regarding a minyan made up solely of such individuals, or even when they make up four or more of the ten, they must be informed or aware as to when to answer amen to chazaras hashatz, kedusha, and kaddish[79]. Again, according to both the Chazon Ish and the Har Tzvi (and perhaps Rabbi Feinstein) there would be no restrictions should they be equipped with a hearing device, even if they make up the entire Minyan (of course they too they must, like all of us, make sure to answer amen).
A cheresh-medaber is counted toward a zimun (Rama siman 199:8) of both three and ten. According to some (see Shulchan Aruch Harav) he cannot be counted in a Zimun of three, only of ten. If there is more than one such individual they must make sure to know when to answer. As for leading the zimun, see Biur Halacha ad loc. s.v. “meztarfin”who relates this question to the issue of a cheresh-medaber acting as the shliach tzibbur. He ends by suggesting that we could be more lenient by him leading a Zimun. Here too, the Har Tzvi and the Chazon Ish would view one equipped with a hearing device like anyone else.
Krias HaMegilla – A cheresh-medaber who can hear through the help of a hearing aid, according to the view of Rav Shlomo Zalman Aurbach (1:9), may have no way (see below) of fulfilling this mitzvah and is therefore is exempt from it (ones rachmana patrei –Gd does not hold us culpable for impossible actions[80]). As stated in a previous section, Rabbi Aurbach does imply that they should still listen to the reading while making sure not to say the berachos.
See Shulchan Aruch siman 689:2 with Mishne Berrura (5) regarding one that is completely deaf (Shaarei Teshuva) yet can speak that he cannot even read it for himself. Even though we mentioned above that regarding blessings and prayer which requires one to hear the words that they uttering that, nevertheless, a cheresh-medaber fulfills their obligation, krias ha’megilla is different. This is due to the special concept of pirsumei nissa that is activated on Purim and that obligates the reader to hear the words that he is saying (Beis Yoseph). Many achronim disagree with this ruling of the Shulchan Aruch (Gra, Shaages Aryeh, et al.) and allow for a cheresh-medaber (with no hearing aid) to read the megilla, even for others[81].
The Meiri (Megilla 19b)explicitly compares megilla to the case of being a shliach tzibbur and rules that by megilla too a cheresh-medaber can be motzi others.
The Shaarei Teshuva (ad loc. 2) posits that when dealing with one who could hear through a hearing aid even the Shulchan Aruch would agree that he could read the megilla (cf. shu’t Tzemech Tzedek eh’e 323). This last point, however, is difficult to rely upon due to the fact that the Shaarei Teshuva was speaking of non-electric, crude, hearing aids, which as pointed out by Rav Moshe Feinstein (oh’c 4:33) can be viewed more leniently than modern ones. The Har Tzvi and Chazon Ish would, again, see one equipped with a hearing device like anyone else regarding krias hamegilla.
Shabbos– Due to all that has been discussed thus far, a cheresh-medaber should make kiddush and havdala for themselves and should also not be motzi others. It would seem that a father of a household should be lenient in this matter and be motzi his wife and children. This is due to the many lenient approaches we have seen regarding modern day hearing devices, and, based on the many opinions mentioned in the biur Halacha (siman 55) that allow a cheresh who can speak (even without a hearing device) to be motzi others. While we would not typically rely on these views, in cases of need we would, and a father being seen as the head of the household is crucial for children, especially in our day. It is related[82] that Rav Yaakov Kamanetzky, when visiting his married children, would never sit at the head of the table, explaining that the role of the father, and his being seen as unimpeachable in his position as head of the house, is sacrosanct and should never be infringed upon when their children are present, even though he was thereby usurping his own children’s biblical obligation of kibud av (for him).
Hearing Aids on Shabbos –A week after Rabbi Feinstein received a query (Igros Moshe oh’c 4:84) regarding the use of microphones on Shabbos –which he forbids for four separate reasons –he received a query (ad loc. 85) relating to hearing aids on Shabbos, essentially a mini-microphone. In his brilliance he rules that while a hearing aid is indeed a mini-microphone and he had recently ruled that microphones are forbidden to be used on shabbos, one can still wear a hearing aid on shabbos. He goes on to lucidly demonstrate how all four of his reasons forbidding a microphone on Shabbos would not apply to hearing aids[83].
While Rabbi Feinstein suggests that it is better not for others to speak directly to the wearer on shabbos, according to Rav Shlomo Zalman Aurbach (Minchas Shlomo 1:9), this too is of no concern.
As for raising or lowering the volume of hearing aids on Shabbos, there are a number of views. Some, like Rav Shlomo Zalman Aurbach (Minchas Shlomo 1:9 anaf beis 1; shmerias Shabbos K’hilchasa 34:28; shu’t Beur Moshe 1:17) felt that the adjusting of the volume on electrical devices –so long as no new current is created, rather an existing one is being raised or lowered –is allowed. One’s personal rav should be consulted before acting on this last paragraph.
As far as going into a reshus harabim with a hearing aid or CI, in this writer’s humble view, because of issues of danger (going out in the street, etc.) this matter should not be publicly addressed only to say, “It is allowed”. The reader is directed to Rabbi Elysha Sandler’s excellent article in Journal of Halacha & Contemporary Society, XLI; Spring 2001 – Pesach 5761, “The Use of Hearing Aids on Shabbat”, as well as Toras HaCheresh, by Rabbi Shuchatowitz (NCSY, 2002) where this last issue, as well as several others that relate to Shabbos, are discussed in greater detail.
In this last section we covered only issues that relate to orach chaim that effect either a cheresh-medaber or a medaber with a working hearing device. There are as well a host of other concerns relating to marriage, gittin, and monetary law as they relate to today’s cheresh-medaber.
Conclusion: As can be seen by this short monograph the laws of a cheresh, cheresh-medaber, eleim-sh’shomea and all the cases in-between are vast, highly confounding, and touch upon virtually every siman in the Shulchan Aruch. Precisely because of developments in the field of deaf education and the advancement, b’chasdei Hashem, of the deaf and hard-of-hearing in daily life, we must work to discover greater tools to include them under the common wings of halacha whenever possible.
I would like to end this monograph with a most exquisite idea from Rav Chaim Shmuelevitz (Sichos Mussar 5731 #32). Although a disability, deafness does have advantages. The gemera (Sota 13a) teaches that when Eisav came to the maaros hamachpela during the burial of his brother Yaakov he claimed the right of the firstborn as still belonging to him. A quarrel ensued until Chushim Ben Dan beheaded his uncle Eisav. Rabbi Chaim Shmuelevitz asks: Where were the rest of the shevatim and their children? Why did only Chushim act? Rav Chaim explains that we all have a natural and surreptitious ability to slowly adapt to any situation; the ‘normative power of the actual’. Eisav came, the conversation progressed, and in time they found themselves arguing about something that was agreed upon decades ago. It became their new normal. But Chushim was deaf. He was therefore not privy to the goings on that led up to the heated argument. When he asked what was transpiring he was able to receive all the information in one fell swoop, with no time to slowly adapt to it. This is why only he had the moral clarity to do something.
Everyone in klal yisroel has their role and their deficiencies. Let us all come to terms with our own and use them to benefit others. May we soon be zocheh soon to the promise of Yishayahu (35:5-6): “The eyes of the blind shall be clear-sighted, and the ears of the deaf shall be opened…the lame shall leap as the hart, and the tongue of the dumb shall sing.”
This article is humbly dedicated to the bachurim and rebbeim of Yeshivas Nefesh Dovid – a yeshiva for the deaf and hard-of-hearing.
NOTES:
[1] Yeshivas Nefesh Dovid in Toronto is the first yeshiva geared solely to deaf and hard-of-hearing male students from around the globe. It was my shabbos spent with one their students that inspired this article. My wife told me that she witnessed our guest utilizing Skype (the teleconference program) by having an intense study session with his Rosh Yeshiva, Rabbi Kakon, in only sign language (the sound was broken on our computer). “There was no sound but the Kol Torah shook the house”, she said.
[2] “The Jews’ Deaf and Dumb Home” in London; opened in 1865.
[3] Maaseh Cheresh, hakdama.
[4] “Israel Deaf & Mute Institute”; opened in Budapest in 1876. Some 65% percent of their students were killed at the hands of the Nazis y’s (jdcc.org).
[5] See below for how this gemera relates to genetics and deafness.
[6] However, it can be argued (based on Gittin 71a) that in all these cases these deaf individuals once had the ability to hear, which allowed them to learn skills of writing and reading, and only subsequently became deaf.
[7] I was recently given a gift of a sefer dedicated to left-handedness in Halacha, Dinei Itur, a sefer which I very much enjoyed.
[8] I have heard from deaf parents that their non-deaf children are having a difficult time finding marriage partners due to the fear that their parents’ deafness is indicative of some familial genetic marker for deafness. This although, in many cases, the family has letters signed by doctors that the deafness of the parent(s) is not due to an underlying genetic factor. It is estimated that genetics plays a role in about 30%-50% of childhood deaf cases and it can be determined if one’s deafness is due to a genetic marker or not (“Understanding the Genetics of Deafness” by Harvard Medical School of Hereditary Deafness. Available online at: http://hearing.harvard.edu/info/GeneticDeafnessBookletV2.pdf.). Chazal allude to the role genetics can play in causing deafness in Chagiga 3a: “Two mutes living in Rebbe’s area who were either the sons of the daughter of Rabbi Yochanan Ben Gudgada (his grandchildren) or the sons of his sister (his nephews) would make sure to sit in front of Rebbe when he would enter the study-hall to lecture…”. This is the same Rabbi Yochanan Ben Gugada mentioned above (Tosephta Terumos, 1) whose sons were deaf, suggesting either remarkable coincidence or an allusion to genetics playing a role by deafness and muteness. Even more, it would seem that his nephews’ muteness was likely related to severe cases of hardness-of-hearing as the gemera itself seems to indicate when it informs us that his nephews would make sure to sit in from ofRebbewhen he would teach, which if they were simply mute would not be an understandable action, and certainly would not warrant being a detail mentioned in the gemera (cf. Ein Yaakov and B’Einei Yitzchak ad loc. and Maharsha to Eruvin 13a who offer different solutions to this problem). Indeed, many commentators wonder (e.g. Iyun Yaakov, see Schottensntein Talmud ad loc footnote 7) why the lineage of these two mutes had to have been mentioned at all, as it seems to add nothing to the events and the lesson to be derived from it. However, it can be suggested that the gemera went out of its way to mention their pedigree to allude to this issue of genetics and deafness. See also Yevamus 64b regarding Hemophilia and genetics. See as well the article, “Judaism, Genetic Screening and Genetic Therapy”, by Dr. Fred Rosner.
[9] See Igros Moshe y’d 4:49:2 where he briefly states that such a cheresh should nevertheless see to fulfill mtzvos for “it is not appropriate for one to permit action for themselves with the excuse that the Torah allows it”.
[10] That this law is a direct mesorah would be challenged by the views of R. Eliezer, and more so R. Yehudah, who argue on it, see Tosephta Terumos 1:1, 1:2.
[11] Rav Bartenurah; Rambam, peirush hamishnoyos, Terumos 1:2, something that today is possible through the relatively new, and still evolving field of ‘Oralism’.
[12] Pri Megadim, kolleles 2:4-7; shu’t Mimamakim 3:2; Sdei Chemed #103.
[13] See also Nishmat Avraham, Artscroll, volume 1 pages 27, 28 with footnotes.
[14] See rashi ad loc. s.v ‘cheresh’, that such a cheresh is not a baar-daas; see Igros Moshe eh’e 3:33).
[15] Ad loc.
[16] As quoted by Dr. Steinberg, ad loc. footnote [58].
[17] Based on Gittin 71a. See Encyclopidia Talmudis, erach Cheresh, column 496 and footnotes 30-37.
[18] Dr. Steinberg, ad loc. column 540 in the name of the Pri Megadim, Kolleles 2:1. See also Magid Mishneh, Hilchos Shabbos 20:7. It has been difficult for this writer to understand these arguments for the proofs brought (e.g. Shabbos 153a with Tosphos s.v. ‘Mi’) seem to either relate specifically to hilchos shabbos where there is a unique obligation of rest even for one’s animals (l’havdil), or, to a katan (see Rambam end of hilchos meachelos assuros as mentioned in Maggis Mishneh ad loc.) where there is a specific obligation of chinuch. The latter would seem to apply little to a cheresh. Indeed the Minchas Chinuch rules (5:2 s.v. V’henay) that there is no obligation of chinuch for a cheresh. It would then seem that the Beis Yoseph and the Pri Megadim, who rule that one cannot feed a cheresh treif would, perforce, need to disagree with the Minchas Chinuch and indeed obligate a father to be michanech a child who is a cheresh. I have since found that the Pri Megadim does in fact explicitly state that there is a chinuch obligation for a cheresh (ad loc 2:9). However while Dr. Steinberg brings both views regarding the chinuch of a cheresh (ad loc. column 542 with footnotes # [70], [71]), he brings only the negative view regarding feeding a cheresh prohibited matter, while as explained, these two issues should be seen as necessarily tied to one another.
[19] See also Igros Moshe 4:41:2 who writes that a true cheresh must still seek to abide by the Torah.
[20] Minchas Shlomo ad loc. based on the Rambam hilchos melachim 10:2.
[21] Minchas Chinuch, 39.
[22] Vayikra 19:14.
[23] Minchas Chinuch 269:3.
[24] Misheneh Berrura, siman 37:12. See also shu’t Tzitz Eliezer 15:32:2.Cf. Magen Avraham, siman 282:6 and Hagoas Rav Akiva Eiger ad loc.
[25] Rama eh’e 1:6. In fact, One the purposes of this monograph is to allow modern-day cherashim to no longer be viewed (by some) – as one deaf person put it to me – like “specimens”, and instead as common members of the klal who happen to have, at times, unique halachos applied to them, just like we find by an onnein or a doctor.
(EDITORS, I CAN’T SEE TO REMOVE THIS THICK LINE UNDERNEATH, I Apologize)
[26] Igros Moshe y’d 4:1:25 and reiterated in 4:49:1.
[27] ‘Halachos of Nidda’, Page 25.
[28] The question was in regard to the nidda inspections of a cheresh and if she is trusted to do it herself. On page 71 of the English section Rabbi Eider writes, quoting Rabbi Feinstein as his source, “There is a view that holds that a deaf-mute, although she is capable of communicating intelligently, may not perform her own examinations”. He could only be referring to sign language as indicated by his question posed to Rabbi Feinstein printed along with his response.
[29] Amazingly, in a later Teshuva (y’d 4:49:5) to his grandson, Rabbi Feinstein allows such a cherashah to do her own examinations so long as her husband trusts her; suggesting a pragmatic approach even to true cherashim.
[30] Y’d 4:41:3
[31] See Shevet Sefer eh’e 21 s.v. “vroesy” where he begins to say that sign language does not change the status of a cheresh but ends in doubt. His writes that his father too was not sure how to view them. He therefore suggests that they should be stringent in mitzvos. See also shu’t Beis Shlomo oh’c 95; Divrei Malkiel 6:35, both as brought in sefer Hilchos Gerim page 117 footnote 44, where, based on these sources, the author rules that such cherashim may be accepted as geirim. It is unclear if according to these views, as cited, one can lchatchila make a beracha or pray using sign language; or fulfill the obligation of another (who also understands it) through such communicative gestures. One is always advised to look up all such teshuvos brought down in likkutim; in this article as well, nothing should be relied upon until one goes through the material for themselves to see if this writer faithfully explained them.
[32] Rav Yechiel Yaakov Weinberg writing in Shana B’shana 5725 seems reluctant to rely on any scientific standards of assessing pikchus. See also shu’t Tzemech Tzedeck 77 and Nishmat Avraham Volume 1, page 27.However, a logical proof can be brought from chazal that would seem to indicate against both viewing sign language as a language (or talking) and against judging a true cheresh pragmatically: The mishneh (Yevamus 112a) rules that a cheresh may marry through remizah, which Rashi explains as hand motions. The gemera 112b explains that although biblically they are patur from all mitzvos and that in reality such a kinyan should be of no value, for the benefit of society it was allowed. This would mean, it would seem, that generally sign language is insignificant, and one’s ability to ‘understand’ is not judged on a case-by-case basis, otherwise we would not need this special takana for martial matters.
[33] See also Ben Ish Chay, Chukas #8 and the Chida as brought in the Shaarei Teshuva ad loc.
[34] e.g. see the birkei yosef (siman 104:2) who rules that although one cannot motion during shemoneh esreh, if children are disturbing one’s davening it is better to motion than to silence them verbally.See also shu’t Be’er Moshe 3:13.
[35] Lord Jakobowitz writes in his groundbreaking “Jewish Medical Ethics” (page 336, footnote 180): “ The legal disabilities of the deaf and dumb are entirely due to the mental dementia resulting from their inability to communicate audibly with their environment. But in view of the modern advancement in the treatment of such cases, it has been suggested that their religious and legal status may now be modified…”
[36] See Toras HaCheresh [a focus on hearing devices on shabbos], page 5, by R. Mordechai Shuchatowitz, published by NCSY in 2002 for their deaf youth division.
[37] See Tradition, Spring 2009, “Survey of Recent Halachik Literature”, by Rabbi Bleich where he briefly discusses the question of a Halachik distinction between CI and standard hearing aids. He quotes, and then disagrees with, the view of Dr. Israel Brema (found in Techumim 5764) who argues, like Rabbi Shucatowitz above, that because CI works without a microphone it should be more affective halachikly. Neither Dr. Brema in his argument nor Rabbi Bleich in his dissent mention that indeed CI begins its process with amplified sound. Indeed Rabbi Bleich himself writes, “The crucial Halachik difference between a hearing aid and a cochlear implant is that the latter does not transform electrical current into amplified sound waves”.
[38] It should be noted that, today, there are several different types of microphones, some of which, like fiber optic microphones, compare little to the classic devices. Research needs to be done to see if Rav Shlomo Zalman’s analysis is true by these as well.
[39] Eh’e, 3:33; written in 1971, a fact that will become important in the forthcoming paragraph.
[40] Eh’e, 121.
[41] Ad loc., in the beginning where Rabbi Feinstein describes the case that was posed to him.
[42] Rabbi Feinstien however does rule, in accordance with Rambam (hilchos mechira 29:22), that although viewed as a medaber and obligated in mitzvos, he does not have the ability to sell land.
[43] Igros Moshe oh’c 2:108. See also Igros Moshe 4:91:4 where he permits listening to havdala over a telephone in cases of need.
[44] While the Teshuva in chelek 2 does not have a date one can assume, based on it being in an earlier book, and by the dates of the teshuvos before and after, that it was written around 1945. However, there are occasions in the Igros Moshe where earlier teshuvos are printed in later books and visa versa. See for instance his teshuvos on the temperature at which grape juice must be cooked in order to view it as mevushul. This writer was once in a Welch’s grape juice factory for a special kosher run for the Buffalo Vaad HaKashrus (BVK) when it was pointed out that their temperature gage on their pasteurizer was broken and would not go past 168 Fahrenheit. Having to choose between these differing teshuvos, it seemed to make sense to follow that “later” one, until it was determined that the Teshuva printed in the later volume was in fact the earlier one!
[45] Igros Moshe oh’c 4:126.
[46] E.g. Teshuvos Venhagos 1:101; Minchas Shlomo 1:9 brought below.
[47] Igros Moshe 2:85 after forbidding the use of microphones on Shabbos, was asked about hearing aids which he admits are the same thing –although he allows the latter for reasons that are specific to Shabbos law. See however Nishmat Shabbos 3:360, as mentioned in footnote 52 of Rabbi Elysah Sandler’s article in JHCS, where the Satmer Rebbe is quoted as making the distinction between the two by suggesting that the poskim who forbade microphones on shabbos and (to generally fulfill mitzvos through them) was a response, primarily, to the reform movement, therefore hearing aids would not be a concern. However, this would help little to answer the discrepancy in Rabbi Feinstein’s resposna 1) because, as pointed out in the beginning of this footnote, Rabbi Feinstein himself draws a parallel between hearing aids and microphones 2) the Satmer Rebbe’s theory would only be viable should we find one ruling less stringently by hearing aids, not more, which is what Rabbi Feinstein seems to do regarding fulfilling general mitzvos through them.
[48] See Rav Howard Shachter’s wonderful ‘Grey Matter’ and the chapter titled “Fulfilling Mitzvot Through Hearing Devices”; Rabbis Tendler and Rosner in The Journal Of Contemporary Halacha Fall 1991, “The Physically and Mentally Disabled”, footnote 17.
[49] See Encylopidia Refoit ad loc. footnote [386] who quotes the Teshuva regarding hearing aids (eh’e 3:33) as proof that Rabbi Feinstein would not accept them as vehicle through wich to hear the megilla. This although the two other teshuvos speak directly to that issue.
[50] In that footnote, Dr. Steinberg lists Rabbi Feinstein together with Rabbi Shlomo Zalman Aurbach (see next section) as being among those who do not perceive hearing devices as affecting Halachik shmia and that a modern-day cheresh would then not be able to listen to, say, megilla through it.
[51] Siman 689:2.
[52] See Rabbi Frank’s Mikroei Kodesh, purim #27 and Rabbi Weiss’s shu’t Minchas Yitzchak ad loc.
[53] Although assertive in his language, he ends the letter with “tzorech iyun b’zeh” (further study relating to this is required).
[54] However, see shu’t Halachos Ketanos 276 where no distinction is made between Shofar and other mitzvos, all requiring hearing the initial sound. See Tzitz Eliezer 8:11:7 where he explains the intent of this Teshuva of the Halachos Ketanos.
[55] Based on the logic that the sound being heard was generated first by the original speaker.
[56] See Igros Moshe oh’c 2:108, mentioned above, where he too flirts with viewing microphones the same way. See however Igros Moshe quoted above. See Rabbi Howard Jachter’s thorough article on this issue on his ‘Grey Matter’.
[57] Maharam Shik, Divrei Malkiel
[58] Perisha ch’m, siman 235:20; Sma ad loc. 46.
[59] Ad loc. s.v. “Uk’sh’mdabrim”.
[60] 4:26; 5:3; 8:11.
[61] He even goes so far as to compare it to listening to it through a “gramaphone” (!), 4:26:2:8.
[62] 4:26 ad loc.; 5:3
[63] Eh’e 3:33. Like with Rabbi Feinstein, it is possible to solve this contradiction if we can come up with some distinction between hearings aids and microphones. See above footnote 38.
[64] See also shu’t Divrei Chaim eh’e 72 and 73, where the Sanzer rav also views modern-day cherashim as pikchim.
[65] Specifically by one who was born deaf. When the Talmud discussed one who is deaf but could talk Rashi often makes the point that this is due to his becoming deaf later in life. See Rashi, Chagiga 2b.
[66] see Mishne Berura, siman 589:13 that, at least regarding a mechanical hearing aid, one still fulfills this mitzvah; see also the always extraordinary Piskei Teshuvos 489:3).
[67] Moadim L’Zmanim 1:1.
[68] Written in his commentary to the mishneh, Rosh Hashana 29a. His ruling is based on a novel reading of this mishneh which otherwise seems to clearly state that a cheresh has no mitzvah if shofar.
[69] 589:6
[70] Shaagas Aryeh 6,7; shu’t Maharil Diskin 181
[71] See Rama in his introduction to Toras Chatas where he explains that when appropriately following a bdieved it is “Ki Heter Gamur Aliba D’Hilchasa”. The concept of bdieved can be, and often is, easily misunderstood and it might be worthwhile to point out its function: When something is allowed, or deemed mutar in a bdieved situation this does not mean that due to a tzorech godel or monetary loss we allow something that is essentially forbidden, due to its anyway being rabbinic in nature, or the like. Rather, by a rabbinical law (and even a biblical one together with other mitigating factors) if there is already a view that allows a certain action or inaction lchatchila yet, for whatever reason, this view is not seen as normative, then one can rely on this view in certain cases, like monetary loss – this is called bdieved (Marharsham, in Daas Torah, hilchos treifos 38 –see Taz 688:5; Shach y’d 54:9 and 242:5; Pri Megadim seder hanhagos oh’c 1:9 and klallim l’horoas #6; see Chayay Moshe on yoreh deah pages 266-274). The Rama states even further (ad loc.) that any time he writes “b’mokom hephsed” or “lkavod Shabbos” (to allow something bdeived) he means to say a) like we stated above, that such a view must already exist b) that we in fact follow this lenient opinion and are only stringent in most cases like the stricter views. This means that a bdeieved is simply a fallback to normative law. As the Rama writes, in such cases of need “Yesh Lehaamid Davar Al Dino”. Similar views are expressed by the Ralbach in Get Pashut, klallim 6, and the Aruch Hashulchan y’d 242:64. For this reason some (e.g. the Chazon Ish) limit a bdieved and warn not to follow a singular opinion in times of dchak that goes against the Shulchan Aruch (y’d 150:4). Cf. shu’t Chasam Sofer oh’c 59, but see eh’e 2:71 s.v. ‘V’henay’. See also sefer Meishiv K’Halacha page 196 footnote 79 and Sdei Chemed 4:59-61; shu’t Rashba 253.
[72] Inferred from Rama siman 46:8; Magen Avraham ad loc.; Kaf Hachaim uses the same reasoning in the name of the Arizal; Shulchan Aruch HaRav; Mishneh Berura, who suggests, in the name of the Chayay Adam that he wait until sunrise to recite this beracha.
[73] Igros Moshe y’d 4:41:6; Shu’t Teshuvos V’Hanhogos 1:155; Siddur Beis Yaakov; Pri Megadim, siman 139 M.Z. 2; Cf. Minchas Shlomo 1:34, although being that the latter’s concern was about understanding his words, even he would agree that in cases where this is not a fear that there is no concern.
[74] See Biur Halacha siman 55 s.v. cheresh.
[75] Teshuvos VeHanhogos, 1:150.
[76] Shu’t Teshuvos V’Hanhogos 1:150.
[77] Teshuvos Vhanohagos 1:150; 3:79.
[78] See also Shulchan Aruch HaRav hilchos talmud Torah, 2 that one does not even have to understand Torah Sh’bKsav to warrant reward; see Gevura Yitzchak from Rabbi Yitzchak Sorotzkin where he draws a distinction between krias haTorah which one fulfills even if they do not understand it and mitzvos Hakhel where there is an obligation to hear and understand based on the verse (Devarim 31:12) “…so that they will hear and so that they will learn” and therefore excludes a cheresh. This view is strengthened by the view that Moshe Rabbeinu’s takana for thrice weekly Torah readings is not an obligation on each individual, rather on the tzibbur, which would mean that the halachik rules of shomea k’oneh are not activated. For this reason even hearing krias haTorah through a microphone would not be a concern either, see Piskei Teshuvos 135; shu’t Teshuvos V’Hanhagos 1:55.
[79] Pri Chodosh ad loc. 8; Shulchan Aruch HaRAv 11; Cf. Taz siman 124:2; Sukka 58b.
[80] See Avnei Nezer oh’c 439 and Kovetz HaOros 48:14 if an onness can still be viewed as bar-chayuva in order to be motzi others. See Chavtzalus HaShurin, Shmos, page 93-95; Shalmei Toda, Purim page 164.
[81] Although even these opinions do not recommend doing this.
[82] Reb Yaakov, Artscroll, page 324.
[83] Rav Levi Yizchak Halperin of the Institute of Science and Halacha, in a statement issued in 1996 and quoted in Toras Hacheresh footnote #5, posits that cochlear implants are no different than hearing aids as they relate to Shabbos.
Leave a Reply