Category: Halacha

This section of Shul Chronicles focuses on practical and historical issues in Halacha, including family law, minhag, contemporary halachic debate, and communal practice.

  • Why Do We Light the Menorah In Shul?

    Why Do We Light the Menorah In Shul?

    Secember, 2020

    I.

    The Question

    Over the years, we have, b’chasdei Hashem, dedicated this space during Chanukah to share and uncover secrets, mysteries and enigmas relating to these days.

    These have varied from the complex – e.g. why there is no mention of Chanukah in al hamichya; the historical –e.g. sourcing the story of Yehudis; and even the mystical –e.g. is there really an issur of blowing out candles?

    This year, I wish to share the background to another puzzling element of Chanukah, one that speaks directly to the purpose, and name, of this column.

    Every yom tov has a ‘Shul’, or communal, element peculiar to it alone. For example, the first days’ nightly hallel’s recital –reserved for the hagada – is said by many in Shul as well as a part of, or following, maariv; only on Sukkos do we find a yom tov’s special mitzvah (the daled minim) carry an element that can only be done in a shul (the hakafos; on Shavous our batei midrashim are filled with the sound of, and the morning’s re-acceptance in, Hashem’s Torah.

    Chanukah is no exception to this pattern.

    Imagine if on Pesach night, after davening, the rav announces that the shul will say the hagada together first, before we all go home and perform it as a family.

    How odd this would be! The mitzvah on Pesach night is hagadita l’bincha –to say over the story at home, with one’s children – not in shul to ourselves!

    Why then on Chanukah –whose lighting requirement is ner ish u’beiso, davka on the home – do we light the menorah in shul?

    There is an important corollary to our question. Chazal state (Sukkah 44b) that although we can make a beracha on a mitzvah/chiyuv derabanan (Shabbos 23a) we do not –and can not –make a beracha on a minhag.

    This minhag of lighting in shul in not even found in the gemara. While the rishonim make clear that lighting in shul is a “minhag vasikin –a devout/precious custom” (shu’t Rivash 111, see below) – would not its beracha be a beracha l’vatala?!

    Let us explore the background to this unusual minhag, and the numerous explanations for it that have been given through the centuries.

    II.

    The History

    While I do not know precisely when this minhag began, I can surmise that it first became universal at some point after the mid 1300’s. In the late 14th century, the rav of Granada, Spain, Rav Amram, wrote to Rav Yitzchak ben Sheshes (d.1408) with eighteen questions. These shalios ran the gamut from queries relating to serious matters of marriage, money and death (shu’t Rivah 102-119).

    His tenth question was this rav’s concern over the minhag of lighting the menorah in shul, and with a beracha. We will quote the Rivash’s response below.

    It is then likely that this minhag, although peformed by some some time before this, was just then becoming popular.

    III.

    The Reasons and their Complications

    Rav Yosef Karo, in his Beis Yosef (siman 671), bring several ways to explain this minhag of lighting the menorah in shul –and with a beracha – including the answer the Rivash provided to Rav Amram.

    We will list each of his reasons –as well as further suggestions brought by other poskim –below, along with some of the difficulties in each:

    1. – Two years before Rav Yosef Karo was born in 1488, a likut of halacha, titled Kol Bo was published, whose author is today unknown. Rav Karo brings from here (siman 44) that there is nothing so novel about this minhag. Similar to how chazal instruct us to make kiddush Friday night in shul (Pesachim 100b) for the orchim (guests) and the aniyim (poor), we do the same for them in shul on Chanukah. The Levush (ibid.), Tanya Rabasi (35) and the Shiblei Haleket (185) also give this reason.

    There are many difficulties with this approach. First, when it comes to the comparison to kiddush in shul Friday night, Rav Karo himself rules (siman 407:2) that on Pesach night we do not make kiddush in shul because the community is required to provide every poor person with wine to perform this mitzvah at home. The same would apply to Chanukah whose mitzvah is at home! In fact, Rav Amram and the Rivash –although living before the Shulchan Aruch – both make this argument so as to dismiss this first approach!

    However, if one looks at some of the sources who offer this approach to the minhag the they add the fact that these poor people are sleeping in the shul, making it their guest-house for the nights of Chanukah. This explains not just why we light, but why a beracha is would be required.

    But this begs the question: today, when there are no guests in shul, why do we still light?

    This same question is asked by many regarding kiddush in shul Friday night: since there are no longer poor people or guests staying in the shul, how is this Kiddush -with no seudah to follow –still being performed?

    However, the poskim (see, e.g. Mishna Berrura 269:5, inter alia) offer a number of rationales for this practice. Amazingly, the 13th century shu’t Min Hashamoyim (siman 25) compares our ability to still make kiddush in shul with our ability to also light Chanukah lights with a beracha even though, in both cases there are no guests who need it!

    2- Next, Rav Yosef Karo brings another answer from the Kol Bo. We light in shul, and with berachos, to lay before the congregation the way to light and the order of the berachos.

    The fact that we would be allowed to recite a Beracha for such a need would make sense, similar to teaching a child to make a Beracha where Hashem’s name may be used (see, e.g. Shulchan Aruch 196:19).

    3-Finally, he brings the answer that the Rivash gave to Rav Amram: the reader may recall that last year we dedicated this space to discuss the minhag to still light indoors even though the danger seems to have passed. The Rivash suggests, that whatever the reason we no longer light outside, we still need a public display, a true pirsum haness, and shul provides this.

    This explanation brings with it many questions that are beyond the scope of this column (see, e.g. Igros Moshe oh’c 1:107 and Minchas Shlomo 2:51), but the most salient issue with this response is why make a Beracha? It is still but a minhag –even if to be mefarsem haness! To make matters even more confounding, the Shulchan Aruch itself rules (siman 422:2) –as is the minhag sefardim – that on Rosh Chodesh one does not make a Beracha on hallel as it is but a minhag!

    Rav Yaakov Emdin (Mor U’Ketzia siman 672) answers that on Chanukah the berachos themselves are a part of the mitzvah of pirsum haness!

    The rosh yeshiva of Lakewood, Rav Yerushum Olshin (Yerach l’Moadim, p. 194-195) gives an additional explanation how according to the view that we light in shuls simply because of the extra minhag of pirssum haness we can then also make a beracha. Based on the words of the Brisker Rav, he demonstrates that only a stand-alone minhag (like aravah) do we not a beracha on; however, a minhag that is represented by the action of a pre-existing mitzvah (such as lighting the menorah), we can!

    This explanation would seem to fit with the words of the Vilna Gaon. He explains our lighting with a beracha in shul on Chanukah as being similar to ur making a Beracha on hallel on Pesach night in shul. We may explain this connection as both hallel and hadlakos neros chanukah as being a cheftza shel mitzvah –a pre-existing commandment, even if now we are doing that same action/recital as a minhag.

    • –Finally -but by no means exhaustive! – Rav Moshe Shternbuch (Moadim U’Zmanim 8:89) suggests a novel understanding of this minhag of lighting in shul. Originally, the gezeira for Chanukah was just to hodos u’l’hallel. Indeed, in maoz tzur there is no mention of our lighting. Only later, when the beis hamikdosh was destroyed did chazal then institute a public lighting outside our homes. However, due to danger, we had to move that lighting inside. And so, as to retain a semblance of a public lighting –as chazal first established after the churban –did we then also choose to light in shul so as to retain a veneer of the original, public, mitzvah.

    There is much more to say on this topic –many more explanations to the minhag, and many more ramifications to each approach.

    But for now, let us end as we always end the Chanukah column –there are so many secrets in even the minhagim of klal yisreol!

    Wishing everyone a frelichin Chanukah!

  • May One Make Whipped Coffee on Shabbos?

    May One Make Whipped Coffee on Shabbos?

    November, 2020

    Whipped Coffe & Shabbos Naps

    The holy Tchebiner Rav, Rav Dov Beresh Weidenfeld (d. in Yerushalim, 1961) was a rav in Trzebinia, Poland, just outside of Auschwitz. The great historian of Galiztieneh gedolim, R’ Meir Vunder records that when the famous Nazi propaganda newspaper, ‘Der Sturmer’, published the caption ‘The Three Greatest Talmudic Scholars’, Rav Weidenfeld was one of the three pictures – along with the rebbes of Belz and Gur. Due to this underside ‘publicity’ he was in grave danger, and escaped with his family to Lvov/Lemberg. He was soon taken by the Russians and sent to a labor camp in Siberia. While many made efforts to save him, he always refused, exclaiming that how can he save just his own family while his brethren were left behind!? (To read more about this amazing gadol, read the wonderful biography, ‘Sar HaTorah: The Life and Times of Hagaon Harav Dov Berish Weidenfeld’, Israel Press)

     Since the story I will share in a moment involves sleep, let me share one last anecdote about his life. Rabbi Paysach Krohn records (ATMT, p. 160) that when he was older and needed surgery, the doctors feared that he may not wake up from the anesthesia.

    What did he do? Well, he had the surgery, but put his teffilin on first. Since halacha forbids sleeping with teffilin (siman 44), his yiras shomayim was able to able to keep him from sleeping during the entire procedure!

    A true gadol in Torah, yirah and in middos.

    Now to our story. By 1946 he settled in Yerushalaim and was viewed as one of the gedolim and poskim of that city and the world.

    One Shabbos afternoon there was a knock on his door. The Tchebiner Rav was laying down for a brief rest at the time and so at first did not hear it. Then another knock, and then another.

    Thinking that perhaps there is an urgent shailah or concern, he quickly got up from his rest to answer the door.

    Standing there was a young boy. “I have just finished a mesechta in yeshiva” exclaimed the child with innocent pride. “I was wondering of the rav can farher (test) me on it”.

    This was and still is common practice, but to do so unprompted, and by the rav’s house no less, is unusual.

    The Rav smiled, and responded to the request, “My sweet child. First, mazal tov! I would be delighted to farher you. But let me first ask you a question: If you knock on someone’s door Shabbos afternoon and there is no answer, and you knock again and there is still no answer, do you maybe consider that the person is laying down for a Shabbos nap?”

    The boy responded, “Of course! I would never knock more than once if it was not urgent. However, this time, I was knocking on the Rav’s door –and it never even entered my mind that the holy Tchebener Rav would waste even a moment of his Shabbos afternoon napping”!

    From that moment on, the Tchebener Rav never again napped on Shabbos!

    Many rabbanim can relate to this story for a myriad of reasons. For one, many times the innocence of children puts the rav center stage. A child in the shul may be stuck on a Rashi somewhere in the middle of Tanach and will just assume that by telling me the pasuk I will be able to tell him what Rashi says.

    But more, a knock on Shabbos afternoon is one of the most common features of the Rabbinate. Indeed, it is the last remnant of what it was like to be a rav in Europe. Before telephones and secretaries and email, knocking on the rav’s door was a daily part of the job.

    However, like the Tcheibener Rav alluded, most people hesitate to knock on the rav’s door at this time, out of fear he is resting, so when they choose to do so it is usually an interesting question that they have.

    This past Shabbos I received one of these knocks…and I was reminded for yet another reason of the holy Tchibener Rav.

    Allow me to explain…

    When I opened the door I saw two brothers standing there and still arguing –politely.

    They explained that their meal went on longer than usual and they each wanted a coffee so that they could avoid a nap before Mincha.

    The older brother went into the kitchen to make the two coffees, and yelled into the dining hall that he will be making each of them a ‘Whipped Coffee’.

    The younger brother felt this was assur on Shabbos.

    As I listened to the shailah, I realized we had a bigger problem – – -I didn’t know what a Whipped Coffee even was!

    My wife quickly came to my rescue and described what it is. In fact, most readers likely know what this is, as it is all the rage now, along with other whipped beverages. Whipped Coffee, also known as Dalgona Coffee, exploded in popularity during the Covid lockdown.

    Basically, one takes some instant coffee, sugar and hot water and beats it until it becomes a thick, foamy ‘drink’. It is so thick in fact, that many eat it with a spoon.

    It is Shabbos afternoon, I am at home –while most of my sifrei halacha are at my shul office –and this was a complicated shailah.

    Can one make this on Shabbos?

    What follows is halacha v’lo l’maaseh, and everyone is urged to speak to their own rav.

    The first thing that came to my mind was… the Tchibener Rav!

     In his shu’t Dovev Meisharim (1:55) he writes a tremendous chiddush (novel ruling), stating the just like one may not actively turn ice into water on Shabbos (by, say, crushing it; ice letting in a cup of soda on its own is fine), so too one may not turn water into ice on Shabbos. This is due to nolad, the rabbinical prohibition of creating ‘new’ items on Shabbos.

    Based on this alone, it would seem that such Whipped Coffee would be forbidden to make on Shabbos, as one is changing the structure of an item.

    However, most disagree with this opinion (see Piskei Teshuvos, Shabbos, chelek 2, p. 554 footnote 170 at great length for sources). 

    Nevertheless, when it comes to, say, making Jell-O on Shabbos, Rav Vosner (shu’t Shevet Halevi 7:41) argues that one should be strict. Once again, this would seem to apply to Whipped Coffee where, like Jell-O, the structure of the food item is modified.

    Finally, there seems to be another concern with this Whipped Coffee on Shabbos: the Shulchan Aruch rules (321:17) that one may not create mixtures on Shabbos that are of great effort and create a new entity. While it may be unclear how and when to apply this halacha, Whipped Coffee on Shabbos would take much time to create, making it certainly an effort. Further, it would seem to be a ‘new entity’; as the Pri Megadim (ad loc. #24) explains, any item that is manipulated in texture would seem to similar to the melacha of lush (kneading).

    So, what did I tell the two arguing brothers? “I am not the Tchibener! I need my nap. Avoid the coffee for now. Let’s talk Mincha”!

  • Smart Cars and the Trolly Dilemma

    The Trolly Dilemma & Jewish Law

    December, 2017

    On July 26, 2013, The Wall Street Journal published a story about the ethical dilemmas facing Google and other companies working on “driverless cars.” It is only a matter of time before these cars, which are already being tested, are on the road. The cars have computers with built-in algorithms that are designed to respond to any scenario—a speeding car, oncoming traffic, yellow lights, bikers.

    But how should they be programmed to respond when faced with a choice that has no clear moral outcome? What if a driverless car needs to choose between swerving so as to avoid a crowd and plowing into a smaller group of people?

    Several years ago I came across a book by Harvard professor Michael J. Sandel, who has invested a great deal of time and effort exploring the subject of justice as it pertains to these intriguing, often disturbing, ethical dilemmas. His bestselling book Justice: What’s the Right Thing to Do? is a fascinating study of our moral compass and how we might handle the many situations he paints on the canvas of “What if?” His thinking has inspired many, which is evident from the fact that a video of one of his lectures pulled in over five million viewers.

    As I read parts of his book, I thought not so much about how I would deal with these situations but about what halachah would say.

    One of his dilemmas mirrors the problem Google is now facing. Let us briefly review it, consider his students’ response, and discover an inherent contradiction that it presents. We will then review the halachic key to both the dilemma and the contradiction.

    A writer for The Atlantic Monthly discusses a lecture given by Sandel, who presented this scenario: “Suppose you’re the driver of a trolley car, and your trolley car is hurtling down the track at 60 miles an hour. You notice five workers working on the track. You try to stop but you can’t because your brakes don’t work. You know that if you crash into these five workers, they will all die. You feel helpless until you notice that off to the side, there’s a side track. And there’s one worker on the side track.

    “The question: Do you send the trolley onto the side track, thus killing the one worker but sparing the five, or do you let events unfold as they will and allow the deaths of all five?”

    Then Sandel asked about a popular variation of the problem. “The same trolley is careening toward unsuspecting innocents, but this time you’re an onlooker on a footbridge, and you notice that standing next to you, leaning over the bridge, is a very heavy man.

    “You could give him a shove. He would fall over onto the track, right in the way of the trolley car. He would die, but he would spare the five. How many would push the [heavy] man over the bridge?”

    A few hands went up.

    “And that’s exactly why,” Sandel concluded, “some scientists argue that this well-known ‘trolley dilemma’ shouldn’t be used for psychology experiments as much as it is.”

    How could it be, many scientists wonder, that while most people would cause the trolley to veer, only 11 percent would push the man to save the many? Don’t they both involve the very same moral dilemma?

    Many explanations have been offered, none of which satisfied me. However, halachic history may hold the key to this inconsistency.

    Shmuel II (20) tells us that Serach bas Asher, who was 684 years old, made a deal with Dovid Hamelech’s general that instead of killing many of the inhabitants of her town, they would kill the one man who was guilty of rebelling against the king—Sheva ben Bichri—and deliver his head. From here it is derived that one may hand over one (guilty) person to the authorities to be killed in order to save many (innocents). The Gemara2 debates whether this principle would apply in a case where handing over an innocent person would save the lives of many.3

    The Rambam rules famously4 that one may hand over only a guilty person in order to save the many. Many disagree with Rambam, and indeed, Rama5 mentions both views.

    The Tzitz Eliezer cites a discussion found in the writings of the Chazon Ish,6 who wonders about a case strikingly similar to the trolley scenario. If an arrow is heading toward a group of people and will certainly kill them, and one has the opportunity to divert it so that it will kill only one person, what should he do?

    Much of the halachic discussion hinges upon how action is defined. As we know from hilchos Shabbos, not all actions are equal. There are gramas, koach sheni, psik reisha, and others—various forms of indirect or noncommittal action, not all of which are actually deemed actions by Torah law.

    The Chazon Ish suggests that one who diverts the arrow can consider this not as the killing of one but as the saving of many. In other words, it is not comparable to handing a person over to be killed because the diversion of the trolley/arrow can be viewed as a unique manipulation of the laws of physics in order to save people. The ultimate result of this act of salvation may not be our concern.

    Yet the Chazon Ish was hesitant; after all, the case of the trolley/arrow may be worse in that we are causing death by our action, as opposed to simply handing someone over to death. There is no precedent to allow actually killing someone!7

    The Tzitz Eliezer is more certain. He proves that inaction, the principle of “Shev v’al taaseh (sit and do nothing),” is better, implying that in such a case, an “error” of omission is always safer than one of commission.

    Returning to Dr. Sandel’s trolley paradox presented in The Atlantic Monthly, perhaps inherent in our moral compass is the sense that flicking a switch—similar to handing someone over—is much less of a concern than actually murdering someone with our own hands in order to save others.  One is an act of murder, while the other is closer to an indirect result.

    It would seem that the Chazon Ish would agree that pushing the man over the bridge to stop the trolley would be forbidden, and that it is certainly different from the original scenario, in which the choice would be to divert the path of the trolley.8

    Based on halachic compartmentalization, then, it appears that there is really no inconsistency in this moral dilemma and that the students at Harvard were on to something when they differentiated between hitting a switch and pushing a man.

    (According to some,9 non-Jews must look to halachah as their guide in determining how to observe the sheva mitzvos bnei Noach. Perhaps, then, Hashem implanted in their psyches a moral sense that enables them to inherently feel what may take us years of study.)

    Sadly, in Dr. Sandel’s brilliant book on ethical dilemmas, I saw not one mention of the Talmud. It is my hope that Dr. Sandel, who is a Jew, will someday discover the beauty and realism that is halachah—and the heritage that no doubt imbued him with the exquisite sensitivity with which he has been marveling at the world.

    As for driverless cars, perhaps, like many modern ovens, they will one day come with a “halachah mode”!

    NOTES

    1. Shu”t Tzitz Eliezer 15:70.
    2. Yerushalmi, Temurah, ch. 8; see also Tosefta there, 7:23.
    3. The Gemara only discusses handing over the one to save the many but not killing him with one’s own hands. Perhaps, as the Chazon Ish posits, this is due to Sheva’s rebellion against the king, which was a unique case and for which crime the townspeople could even have killed him themselves.
    4. Yesodei HaTorah 5:5.
    5. Yoreh Deah, siman 157.
    6. Choshen Mishpat, Sanhedrin 25.
    7. Unless that someone is the very person trying to save the many himself. See Taanis 18b with Rashi regarding the story of Paypus and Lolnus.
    8. See also Shu”t Teshuvos V’hanhagos 3:358. See Ramban
    9. Ramban to Parshas Vayeishlach and Shu”t Rama 10. When Yaakov’s sons go out to return Dina they kill every male in the city (ibid. verse 20). Ramban wonders how such righteous men like Shimon and Levi could kill what would appear as innocents. He first quotes Rambam (hilchos melachaim 4:9) who states that non-Jews who transgress or fail to fulfill any of their seven mitzvos deserve the death penalty (sayeph). Ramban disagrees, challenging Rambam that if he is correct wouldn’t Yaakov –not only not later reprimand Shimon and Levi (ibid. 30) –but would have, indeed, been the first one there to kill members of the city?! Ramban then posits a different reading of the Rambam’s source for his view (Sanhadrin 57a) and says: “…They (non-Jews) are commanded in the laws of geneiva, v’ona’ah, v’oshek, v’shcar sechir, v’dinei hashomirim, v’oness, umephateh, v’avos nezikin, v’chovel b’chaveiro, v’dinei malveh v’loveh, v’dinei mekech u’memchar, and similar matters, ‘k’inyan’ the laws of the Jewish people.”

    Now, many of the laws that Ramban brought as examples would seem to be unique to Jews, and are certainly not mentioned as any of the Seven Mitzvos. Therefore many understand that Ramban is asserting that the mitzvah demanded upon non-Jews of, say, not stealing, is not a generic term up to them to categorize, rather it must confer with our laws. Meaning, just as Jews have clear definitions of these categories based on the Chazal and the Shulchan Aruch non-Jews too must search these very sources for their definitions, categories, and fines. I would suggest, lulei d’sitapineh, that Ramban may not be saying that at all; rather he is simply stating that their mitzvah of not stealing should not be seen by them as Pollyannaish or pro-forma, instead they must, like us, take these seriously and apply them to the real world, real cases and possibilities. They too need laws of shomrim, workers’ rights, loans and securities, etc. So that he is not suggesting that they must use are categories, per se, and certainly not our very rules, rather they simply need to model themselves after a system of jurisprudence based in the real world.

  • Visiting Israel & The Second Day of Yom Tov

    Must one visiting Israel keep one day of Yom Tov or two? Why are there varying Minhagim and what you should do.

    Explaining the Debate

    September, 2014

    For those interested in the history and logic behind the Second Day of Yom Tov, see linked post.

    Three bochurim visiting eretz yisroel – one from Lakewood, one from Yeshiva University and from Morristown (Chabad) – walk in to the Jerusalem Plaza Hotel on the second day of Sukkos.

    “Gut Yom Tov!” the Lakewood bochur says.

    “You mean, a gutta moad” the Chabad student responds.

    “No, he meant both gut yom tov and a gut moad!” the Yeshiva University bocher suggests.

    Sound like the setup for a punch line, right? Perhaps, but it is also a great illustration of the complications, confusion and differing opinions regarding yom tov sheni shel golyos.

    As we shall see, each one of these bochurim would be right, as each may simply be following the view of their respective poskim.

    How such disparity is possible, as well as other complications involving traveling and yom tov sheni will be discussed below and explained.

    Say one goes to Israel to learn in yeshiva or to go to seminary for one year, how many days do they keep? What about a person visiting for yom tov? For one month? For a job program?

    And, what about the other way around, a visitor to America or Britain from Israel?

     Before I moved to Buffalo the last set of halachos I learned were hilchos yom tov. After having gone through tractate Beitza from a halachik perspective I thought I knew the halachos of yom tov fairly well.

    But then reality hit.

    My first Sukkos as a rabbi a guest from Israel approached me with a list of questions: when should he make havdala? Should he join duchanim (he was a kohein)? Should he daven in shul or at home with his teffilin on?

    The, before Sukkos, a family from my shul was about to depart to Israel and needed to know the exact protocol to follow. May they ask an Israeli to do melachai for them on the second day? Should they even keep a second day? If so, should they make or join a minyan of bnei chutz l’aratz?

    Last year I received a phone call from a prominent milemed in eretz yisroel, a talmud chacham of note.

    A member of my shul was in his yeshivah for the year and was told by me to keep both days of Pesach. Most of the class, however, would be keeping one day, based on this teacher’s ruling.

    The rebbe wanted to know if I could help him find meals for the second day…or better yet, if I would perhaps consider this student taking his (the rebbe’s) view of observing but one day. He went on to explain the efficacy of his position (discussed below).

    I softly argued that both issues are codependent. If he does indeed have the status of a ben chutz l’aratz in the eyes of halacha then the ruling that he received from his rav from chutz l’aratz should not be trifled with; if, however, he is to be considered a ben eretz yisroel then, by all means, try to convince him to also take upon himself a new rav there as well.

    Close to thirty years ago the rosh kollel of Dallas, Texas, HaRav Yerachmiel Dovid Fried shlit’a, composed an entire sefer dedicated to these issues. Every rav and talmud chacham is indebted to his tireless efforts in researching these difficult matters. His work, Yom Tov Sheni K’hilchasah became an instant classic, reprinted more than six times!

    While we cannot here cover everything related to these issues, we can try to give the reader a cursory background to the essential material and debates.

    We should mention in passing that other issues arise when visiting Israel, for example, at times, they are reading a different parsha on Shabbos.

    A Brief Primer

    Already in the sifrei ezra (Nechemia 8:12) we find reference to a two day RoshHashanah, and some of the geonim place the idea of a second day of yom tov all the way back to Yehoshua!

    This is important so as to correct the common misconception for some that our present Second Day of yom tov is merely a necessary annoyance of exile; rather it is something that has been observed since our early days as a nation.

    Although the necessity of a two-day Rosh Hashanah –when the declaration of beis din of the new month and yom tov happen in tangent – is the most obvious of them all

    (FOOTNOTE see Meiri to Beitza 5a; Rashi and Ritva to Rosh Hashana; Rav Zevin, Moadim B’Halacha p. 26 s.v. b’rishonah; Chazon Ish, oh’c 141:6), all yomim tovim would also find need for it.  Already in the early days of our settlement in Israel it was difficult to get the word out to all Jews if the last month was 29 or 30 days. When a new month would begin that contained a yom tov people living far from the declaration would have no choice but to keep two days out of doubt.  (There was a brief period that) We were able to circumvent this doubt through a torch warning system [Rosh Hashana 22], however this project was soon sullied by some who wanted to sabotage the system, and it had to be abandoned. See Enclopidia Talmudis, erech Yom Tov Sheni, column 2 where it would seem that they understand that the torch system was in affect for some time, even before beis sheni. However according to the views of some of the Geonim, and as the history as clarified in the appendix [#1] to the Artscroll, Rosh Hashana, it would appear to have taken place for a brief time. See also Yom Tov Sheni p. 8 note 7)

    all yomim tovim would, and various times, necessitate two days.

    In fact some even suggest that the concept of Jews who lived far from beis din’s declaration observing two days on each yom tov is a halacha Moshe m’sinai!

    (FOOTNOTE Rav Sadia Gaon. See Chasam Sofer, Beitza 4b)

    However, once Hillel established his calendar it would seem that its need vanished. After all, now we know when rosh chodesh is, could there be any doubt, any need to keep two days!?

    The Gemara (Beitza 4b) explains that because this has been the minhag and because the calendar is so complex that havoc or decrees can cause us to forget even the system we have now, we must continue in what we had been doing –keeping two days of yom tov outside of eretz yisroel.

    (FOOTENOTE: That these are two separate reasons is a matter of debate. This that yom tov sheni is based on ‘minhag’ does not mean necessarily that it is a minhag alone without the additional weight of a takana. See Ritvah, Rosh Hashanah, 18a. Cf. Tosfos, Sukkah, 44b. The Brisker Rav as well many others go into this at great length. See Yom Tov Sheni, miluim 3)

    What may surprise many is that although from the simple understanding of history it may be that the term ‘yom tov sheni shel golyos’ may itself be a misnomer, as many living in the far reaches of even eretz yisroel itself, perhaps, would also have difficulty receiving the beis din’s calendarial information. Because of this there have been some gedolim living within the boundaries of eretz yisorel who have been strict regarding the second day, to some degree.

    (FOOTENOTE See Minchas Chinuch 301; Chazon Ish oh’c siman 132; Sheilas Yaavetz siman 168; Yom Tov Sheni, miluim, siman 4. It was the minhag of the Brisker Rav to be strict on the second day of yom tov even in Yerushalaim! Much of this debate hinges upon the ambiguousness language found in Rambam, kidush hachodesh ch. 5. The halacha follows the view that the current yom tov sheni is unique to chutz l’aretz, see shu’t Avnei Nezer oh’c 392. See also Mikroei Kodesh, pesach vol. 2, siman 57. The status of new cities in eretz yisroel, and of places that might not be within its halachic boundaries, such as the city of Eilat, is beyond the scope of this chapter.)

    So those I vhutz l’aratz not feel burdened, we find a stunning teaching from the Ramah M’Pano: since the Torah was given in chutz l’aratz Hashem allowed it to be gifted with the potential of a yom tov day all its own.

    (FOOTNENOTE Although this was specific to Shavous, see the words of Rav Yitzchak Hutner found in Sefer Zichronos, pp. 164-165 and in Pachad Yitzchak, shavous 15)

    Travelers

    The modern era has caused a veritable explosion of new questions relating to the halacha of yom tov sheni, specifically as they pertain to travelers.

    This has led to confusion and debate not only among the layperson, but even talmidei chachamim as well. Rav Shlomo Zalman Aurbach once remarked that precisely because many of these issues are more recent, there is a paucity of mesorah on how to pasken on many of them, leading to much debate.

     (FOOTNOTE Yom Tov Sheni K’Hilchasa, hakdama, p. 12).

    Why is this? What changed?

    From the Ramban to Avraham Avinu, the pure sacrifice that one had to endure just to breathe-in the avira d’arah (the air of eretz yisroel) was staggering. This was not a journey taken, rather an odyssey endured. Indeed, over the centuries, many died on their way there. Others, who made it there safely, often had to live out the rest of their lives separated from their family, dying physically alone, yet close to the Riboneh Shel Olam.

    Yet, today, someone in Brooklyn can become inspired from one shemoneh esreh by shachris, decide to go to eretz yisroel and be by the kosel by netz the next morning…and be well rested too!

    Our ease of travel has taken a rarity (i.e. a ben chutz l’arutz visiting Yerushalaim for succos) and turned into one of the most common shailos of the yomim tovim!

    Visiting Israel from Chutz L’Aratz

    Let us go back to the three bochurim. What are they arguing about?

    Amazingly, the Shulchan Aruch does not mention the case of a visitor to eretz yisroel from chutz l’aretz, making these questions even more perplexing! (Although, as mentioned below, Rav Yosef Karo does mention it in his teshuvos)

    The Chofetz Chaim writes in his Mishnah Berrura (496:13) that the majority of poskim rule that one who is visiting eretz yisroel from chutz l’aratz “should keep both days of yom tov. Nevertheless he should daven yom tov prayers privately. However, if he does not plan on returning…or even if he travels for business (not knowing for certain when or if he shall return) but brings his wife and family with him, then… he would have the status of one who does plan on returning”

    Based on the simple meaning of his words, bachurim and seminary girls who only go to Israel for a year or so, with most of their belongings and support back home, should keep both days.

    However, as anyone who has visited eretz yisroel on yom tov is keenly aware, the ruling of the Mishnah Berura regarding davening alone does not seem to be followed; rather minyanim forvisiting bnei chutz l’aretz abound!

    Some explain that today, when travel is so easy, the bnei eretz yisroel do not see such minyanim as a breach to their own yom tov practice. Others suggest that such minyanim usually take place in private homes or halls, but not public shuls. Rav Elyashiv, however, is quoted as allowing even bnei eretz yisroel to help complete such a minyan if there is at least six visitors.

    As for such a ben chiutz l’aratz asking a ben eretz yisroel to perform melacha for the on the second day, while this is a longstanding debate where Rav Moshe Feinstein warns one to try to be stringent and Rav Elyashiv allows it only for a mitzvah, Rav Shlomo Zalman Aurbach gives an ingenious reasoning to accept what has become this prevalent practice.

    The Shulchan Aruch rules that one who accepts Shabbos early may ask another Jew who did not to do melacha on their behalf. The Magen Avraham explains the calculus of this ruling to be because the Jew who accepted Shabbos early did it by choice; should he have desired oherwise, then, for him too it would not be Shabbos yet.

    Explains Rav Shlomo Zalman that this same logic should apply to our case. Should a ben chutz l’aretz simply decide to stay in Israel then that day would become chol (a weekday). Since the decision is up to the visitor, he/she may ask another Jew to perform melacha on their behalf!

    (FOOTNOTE: It is interesting to wonder what would happen should  a visitor suddenly decide, on the second day, to live in Israel. While Shemiras Shabbos K’Hilchasah quotes Rav Shlomo Zalman to be in doubt on the matter, in his teshuvos [1:19;3], and those of others [Minchas Yitzchak 7:34] there seems to be a ruling that one can then immideatly treat the day as chol! Yom Tov Sheni quotes Rav Elyashiv as agreeing with this ruling only if this hachlata was made before halachik midday.)

    Nevertheless, a ben chutz l’aretz should not do anything that would lead to a zilzul yom tov (such as getting into an Israeli driven cab or bus).

    While the Chofetz Chaim’s ruling that a visitor must keep both days is clear, in his Shaarei Tzion (#18) he refers to another view that is found in the Shulchan Aruch HaRav. The latter rules that even a visitor to Israel only keeps one day. While there is some debate (even in some Chabad circles) if the baal HaTanya meant this as a final ruling, if he did, he would not have been alone. The Chacham Tzvi (shu’t 167) and others agree. The Zohar too would seem to imply this as well (Reya Mihemane, Emor).

    The reason for these two divergent ways of viewing a visitor to Israel is due to the two ways we can view the second day of yom tov and the original minhag/takana: is it an obligation on the individual –if so then one who is defined as still living in chutz l’aretz must abide by the stringencies of the place from which he stems –or, if the creation of this halacha based upon  makom/space –if so then regardless from where one comes from they must abide by the set laws of that makom.

    In addition, the Chacham Tzvi points out that when the bnei yisroel would visit Yerushalaim on yom tov in the days of the beis hamkidosh they certainly followed local custom, and we should not be more stringent than they were then!

    (FOOTNENOTE: Perhaps we can suggest, however, that today with the advent of easy travel the Chacham Tzvi, inter alia, may have considered treating modern visitors differently than in the turn of the century)

    Because of this, while in our opening case the Lakewood bochur would follow the majority opinion of keeping a second day in Israel (which goes all the way back to Rav Yosef Karo in his teshuvos), the Chabad bochur in our story would consider it chol.

    What about the boy from Yeshiva University? Rav Shmuel rules that visitors follow the Chacham Tzvi and the Baal HaTanya’s one-day approach, while at the same time keeping the stringencies of the other views. How does one accomplish this? They simply treat the second day in Israel as a weekday in terms of teffilin and liturgy, while at the same time abstaining from all melacha.

    Three bochurim, three opinions, and all toras emes!

  • Waffles, Crepes, Triscuits and Biscuits Hilchos Berachos & Rav Gissinger tz”l

    November, 2020

    Parts 1 & 2

    Part 1

    Last week I shared several stories about food and kashrus; specifically relating to Ice Cream and Frozen Yogurt stores.

    We ended with my  assisting of a former assistant of mine –now a rav on his own of a community within the New York City area. His name is Rabbi Daniel Rosenfelt, and his shul is the Fleetwood Shul in Mount Vernon, NY, a beautiful tree-lined community just outside New Rochelle.  

    We explained how his area of the city has few kosher options –outside of the supermarket –so when the Indian owner of the local frozen yogurt shop approached him to see what it would take to make his store kosher he was ecstatic.

    “How complicated would this be for me as the shtut rav to offer my certification to this store?” he asked.

    Last week we explained how we discovered and got around an issue of tummas meis (of all things!) so to allow entrance inside this frozen yogurt store.

    I concluded the column by stating: “As I entered the yogurt shop I saw something; something else that would throw a monkey-wrench into this rav’s ability to certify this store”.

    Just what did I see?

    Well, let me first start at the beginning.

    When a rav hamchshir –in this case the local rav –first walks into a store he should view it as a riddle to be solved.

    I remarked to Rabbi Rosenfelt, “Always imagine that there is a major issue, and you have to find it”.

    The first question I asked the kind proprietor was, “Where do you store the food and your bulk ingredients”. Knowing the storing location is vital, for an owner shows the customer only that which he wishes them to see.

    A storage area leaves little to the imagination. 

    Before going to a storeroom area, always bring a menu from said store. Everything on the menu should have a match, if it can’t be found this means it is stored somewhere else; or worse bought in small packages and put away from the rabbi’s view.

    Once that is complete, one must discover when and from whome deliveries are. This is important information for a number of reasons. First, and just one example, knowing who a supplier is can tell the rav hamachshir if an ingredient under a generic label must always be checked. Certain restaurant supply chains change their manufactures frequently, so, say, a parve whip cream one month could be dairy (not cholov yisroel) the next, or not kosher at all –and all with very similar packaging.

    The above is strongly suggested when it comes to factories a great tool; a mashgiach should collect all the ingredient panels from their packaging labels before checking the ingredients. This way he can then make sure that he has accounted for every single item listed on their own packaging as being in their product.

    When I once made a bakery in a supermarket kosher and pas yisroel, I didn’t bother to check if they changed their computerized ingredient panel to reflect the new suppliers. 

    The first week they went kosher I had knocks on my door throughout Shabbos. It turned out that their bilkilach had on their ingredient panel ‘milk’ – as that was indeed in their old product! Of course, now they were parve –as was their oven –but I was impressed with carefulness of these consumers!

    Once a rav hamachshir feels that all all ingredients have been accounted for, he can move on to various other issues.

    It was at this latter stage when I saw the concern with which we opened this column.

     Coming up from the basement to the main area I saw a large flattop cooking area.

    It was here –we were informed – that they made crepes –a huge seller.

    “Oh boy” I thought to myself, “this is not good”.

    To understand my worry, a short halachik background is crucial.

    The Shulchan Aruch rules (beginning of siman 112 in yoreh deah) that while some only eat pas yisroel, others are not as careful, especially in a place where no pas yisroel is available. The Rema adds that this lenient view is even activated in a place with freely available pas yisroel product – or even if one already has a pas yisroel product but would prefer the pas palter (see Badei Hashulchan ibid biurim for a discussion refarding the last statement).

    The above lenient minhag –we should point out –is only true by bakers or stores, whereas a privately baked bread or bread-item by a non-Jew reminds forbidden for all (how to define these two catergories is beyond the scope of this week’s column).

    Based on the above, many vaadim certify non pas yisroel products for the who eat them. (The issue of certifying something that the rav hamachshir himself would not eat for others–and if this is lfnei iver –will be bl’n returned to in a future column –see this writer’s article in Yarchon Ha’emek, Toronto, 5768).

    Both the Shulchan Aruch and the Rema recognize an important distinction that now must be made.

    Whereas some may allow the eating –and the giving hashgacha –of pas palter, no one would sanction eating or giving a hechasher to bishul akum.

    It is therefore essential to establish which foods are considered baked –and therefore pas, and consequently have the potential to receive a hashgacha -, and which are considered halachikly as cooked –and therefore forbidden to be given a hashagacha (unless a frum person turned on the cooking devices). 

    In the examples given of which foods are considered baked and which food are cooked, the Rema even mentions ‘kichilach’!

    The reader can pause reading for a moment, put down the magazine and try to create in their own minds how they would define these two terms.

    Now, with this introduction to the issue, we can return to crepes.

    Waffles, for example, are according to many poskim a baked item. 

    Therefore, a store that wishes to be certified can make and serve waffles even if cooked –or should I say baked –by a goy. While it will be labeled as pas palter, it still will be kosher (some poskim may disagree, and the reader is remnded that just because a store has a reliable hashgacha does not mean that his own rav will necessarily agree with all decisions).

    But what about crepes? Would one consider those baked or cooked?

    This is not a small question. This owner spent thousands on this flat top, and a not insignificant part of his business comes from the sale of crepes. 

    There was also another issue to figure out. Let us assume for a moment that a crepe is not considered a pas item but rather a cooked item. There are still options to allow the proprietor to serve it. A frum jew could come in every morning to turn it on –which is, of course, not so simple.

    Next week I will continue this story with how these issues were resolved.

    For now, let me end with the following.

    I told this rav that the issue of the crepes is a serious one, and he should speak to a major posek. He should do so both for hadracha, and so he has a name he can quote should anyone question him.

    I suggested a posek.

    That week he called to inform me that while he spoke to the suggested posek –and had a wonderful first conversation –the posek said he wanted to think about the crepe issue a little more and that he would get back to him in a day or so.

    “It has been three days, and now he is not returning my calls” he explained to me.

    This seemed odd.

    This posek understood that time was of the essence in this case. 

    We are always told to judge everyone l’zechus, sometimes we forget that our leaders are included in the above rule.

    Ten minutes after that phone call, my wife texted me. 

    You see the posek recommended was none other than Rav Gissinger from Lakewood, who had advised many kashrus agencies –especially the Kof-K.

    The text said he was just niftar.

    Instead of wondering why he didn’t call back, we were both now amazed that in his last days of his illness he took a call from a small –town rav. More, he hoped to have the time to think more about the issue.

    Next week I will share what Rav Gissinger was able to share on that first phone call and how this issue here –and in other similar establishments –was resolved.

    To Be Continued iy’H…

    Part 2

    This week, like last week, I will begin with a perhaps apocryphal story. 

    Rav Chaim Ozer Grodzinski (d. 1940) was known as a unique iloy among gedolim. While we have all heard stories of genius about our leaders, Rav Chaim Ozer was in a league of his own. I recall as a child hearing that he was able to write two teshuvos in halacha, at the same time and with two different hands, while on the phone and also answering a shailah being asked in person. Of course this is an exaggeration (as he also did not have a phone on his office!) but they do not say such stories about anyone but him.

    During one of the first Agudah conventions Rav Chaim Ozer was staying in a hotel under a pseudonym. He was understandably exhausted after a long journey and needed the time and space to consider the many decisions that were facing the klal.

    However, a determined young yeshiva bachur did not wish to allow an opportunity to meet this gadol b’torah slip by him, and was able to discover where he was staying.

    The young man knocked on his door. Rav Chaim Ozer knew that he could not simply send this young man away, and asked him to be brief. 

    “I just wish to discuss a sugya” said the young man. 

    “On what topic?” asked the gadol hador.

    “Hilchos berachos” the bachur replied.

    Rav Chaim Ozer responded, “I just came from a very long journey. Please, choose another sugya other than hilchos berachos”.

    I always share this story with the balla battim in my shul, as it best illustrates how complex these particuler laws are, even to a great iloy like Rav Chaim Ozer.

    All the more complicated when writing a brief article that touches on many of these issues –the reader is now warned!

    Several years ago I had to take a trip for the vaad to Bangor, Main. There was a company that we certify who had purchased several blueberry farms as well as a manufacturing facility. They wanted to pick, wash, and freeze the blueberries and then sell them to companies with our certification. Although this was pretty much an innocuous enterprise in terms of kashrus, we needed to make an initial inspection at this facility to make sure that what they had described was in fact what they were doing. In addition, there is a minor bug issue with blueberries and I wanted to make sure that before our imprimatur went on any packaging that I was confident that their ‘quality control’ had a system to seek, find and eliminate any infestation. Lastly, we had to verify that the equipment they were using, if bought already used, was cleared from any cross-contamination.

    While the above reasons were enough to justify this trip, I did have another, personal, reason for wanting to go. For a number of generations there has been some debate as to what the proper beracha is for blueberries, as the issue of what is considered a pri etz and what is a pri adamai brings one into a thicket of opinions.

    There are many indicators that could help determine the appropriate beracha of a fruit or vegetable (for a complete list of criteria, as well as the many differing views regarding them, see V’sen Beracha by Rabbi Bodner pages 422-423). The most critical information needed for this determination in the eyes of halacha is to know if its tree or bushel –roots and trunk (or shoot) – remain alive from year to year. The strawberry plant and the banana tree whose roots remain alive during the winter whereas its visible portion dies off during the winter would then require a haodama (cf. the opinion of Rosh and Rabeinu Tam who believe that the fact that the underground roots stay alive would suffice and would therefore actually require that a haeitz be made. Due to their opinion if one accidently made a haeitz on a banana he fulfills his obligation). 

    Now, the custom (see Igros Moshe, orach chaim 1:85; Mishna Berrura siman 203:3) is to make a hadamo on all berries, regardless if its roots and stems last from year to year, so long as they grow under three tefachim in height (between 9-11 inches) so the next step was to determine the height of the bushels on which blueberries grow.

    To my surprise, in every one of the blueberry fields I inspected the bushels were very low-lying; meaning their beracha would be a hadoma. Interestingly most modern sefarim (see the wonderful The Laws Of Berachos, Rabbi Forst, page 282) assume that the blueberries we eat today grow on tall tree-like bushes. While it may be true that most commercially sold blueberries is of the “high-bush” variety (haeitz), as just demonstrated this is not always the case and one should check with their rav as to the final halacha.

    Over the last few weeks I shared a story of one frozen yogurt shop that I rav friend of mine wished to certify. We shared all the complexities involved –from, of all things, tumas meis, to strange and questionable toppings.

    Last week we ended with a shaila that he posed to Rav Gissinger the week of his pertira about crêpes –and if these items are considered pas akum (allowing the rav to certify them without turning on the stovetop) or bishul akum (which would demand that they turn on the ovens each and every day!).

    Let us continue from there.

    I often share in shiurim that there is no such thing as a pure chumra or a kula, rather, and only, consistency.

    Crêpes is a great example of this.

    In one of the most confounding simanin in Shulchan Aruch (orach chaim, 168) we are explained what makes an item hamotzi, mezonos and all points in-between. The popular questions of croutons, pizza, and washing for a shul kiddush are all to be found here. 

    So imagine you go to your rav and explain that you wish to eat several delicious crêpes for breakfast. The halacha is that for most mezonos items, should one be koveah seudah (have it as their meal) they would need to wash and bentch (ibid sif 6). When it comes to crêpes one would like to be told by their rav that they need not worry because crêpes are to be considered a cooked item. 

    Most ‘cooked’ items that are mezonos do not require hamotzi and benthcing even when eaten as a meal (e.g. pasta). Even though it may be cooked through heat, depending on the thinness of the batter, or how it was or was not kneaded could impact this halacha greatly.

    Ah, but here is the catch. Should a rav pasken that bentching is never required for crêpes may cause the petitioner to think that  they received a kula; but it is in reality also a chumra –because now a restaurant that wishes to serve crêpes needs to worry about bishul akum –as it is no longer considered a pas palter product! (See Magen Avraham ad loc, 40 and 41; and from a conversation with Rav Binyamin Cohen of Yeshivas Rabbeinu Chaim Berlin and the author of the famed Chelkas Binyamin on these halachos who shared with this writer that indeed the poskim tie these two halachos –berachos and bishul/pas akum – together).

    Indeed, many hold that thing blintzes, and likely crêpes are indeed mezonos always, even if one is koveah seuda on them (see Magen Avraham ibid, Be’er Heitiv 34, and Mishneh Berrura 38, et al). 

    The above would then mean that this frozen yogurt shop would need to have their oven turned on daily by a shomer Shabbos!

    In fact, when Triscuits became certified by the OU the question was posed if such items would require washing and bentching if enough were eaten. Furthermore, would the OU need to turn on the oven each day? Now we understand how both of these questions are related to each other!

    Rav Belsky and, lhb’ch’lch Rav Shachter disagreed on the matter, however, and for differing reasons, agreed that whether due to it not being kneaded or to it being considered a mere ‘biscuit’ one would never bentch on it (the OU website also directs the reader to see Shu’t Shoel U’meishiv, telisa 230 to understand why they do not demand a mashgiach turn on their ovens).

    There is a lot more we can talk about – like if a vaad hakashrus should allow ‘glow lights’ in cases such as these when it may be a question of bishul akum.

    But for now, I hope, the reader has a headache, and better understands the complexities of the world of kashrus and halacha.

  • A Convert’s Cooked Pre-Gerus Cooked Food: My Favorite Shailah!

    A Ger’s Conflicting Shailah

    May, 2018

    Post lag b’omer, leading up to Shavous, is a season for many simchos. Such events, be they weddings, bar mitzvos, etc., afford me a wonderful opportunity. As we know, rabbanim are segregated to their own table –although I was once accidently placed at the children’s table, and, while a story for a different time, we actually had great conversations!

    Often it is too noisy to have lengthy exchanges with such lofty colleagues, but when there are lulls in the music I like to discuss interesting recent shailos. Often other rabbanim would have already dealt with such an issue, or, will have fascinating insight into the question.

    By a recent event, I was speaking to a rav about a shabbos bris we had over sefira and the shailah if, as with a typical Shabbos bris, av harachamim should be omitted from mussaf. Because this teffilah for kedoshim was composed after the first crusades of 1096 –events that were born during the days of sefira – we general recite it during these days, even on rosh chodesh. Would we say it even by a Shabbos bris?

    After discussing the various sources who speak of the matter, he shared a separate interesting shailah he received. I responded in kind. We went back and forth until we found ourselves discussing some of our more fascinating shailos.

    While some of these questions are not for print –either due to complexity, privacy or other reasons –I did share with him the one shailah I think about most often this time of year. It may even be my most favorite shailah –as it relates to nesinas hatorah.

    The process of conversion today is, seemingly, far more rigorous and far lengthier than in years past. There is a reason for this. On the one hand a rav wants the process to be painless, although rigorous. Chazal have often described the dangers of pushing potential converts away – in one instance even blaming the birth of Amalek on that very misconduct (Shabbos 88). Indeed, the basic halacha teaches that one need only teach them a ‘few mitzvos’, some light and some more serious ones. Hillel famously converted someone after he simply requested to learn more about the kohein gadol (Tosphos, Yevamus 24b with shu’t Rav Akiva Eiger # 41. Cf. Maharsha to Shabbos 31a).

    Most prominently, we learn from Rus and her conversation with Naomi that a minimal amount of Torah knowledge is all that is necessary. Indeed, chazal further teach that one of the positive goals in our being so spread out in galus is to bring many converts into the fold (Pesachim 87b).

    Yet, on the other hand we are taught the dangers of accepting those who are unworthy, the fear of those who come with ulterior motives, and the ills caused by a beis din that accepts a ger too quickly (see Yevamus 109b with Meiri). Some even recommend waiting a full year from the day one expresses their wish to convert in order to assure all parties that this is the right thing to do (See Mishnas Rebbe Eliezar that this has been the longstanding custom of batei dinnim). And, most famously, we are commanded to inform the potential convert of the difficulty of abiding by the Torah (Yevamus 47b) and the hardships of the Jewish nation (Shulchan Aruch 268).

    So, and for a number of reasons, many rabbanim today not only teach a tremendous amount of halacha and hashkafa to potential converts, but they also administer a test. While many argue that teaching Torah in such detail to an –at present – non-Jew is problematic, others argue that in our times it is the only way to investigate their seriousness (See Igros Moshe 3:90).

    With this in mind, several years ago a man walked into shul. He was from Cuba, raised in a fundamentalist Christian family. Having studied the bible since his youth, he came to the conclusion that yiddeshkeit is the only truth.

    Long story short, over the course of a few years we learned everything together, from the aleph-bais to hilchos shabbos. Throughout, we were in touch with a beis din in Cleveland with whom I kept abreast of his growth.

    A few years into his studies and living with the community, I felt it was time to complete his gerus. He made an apartment with the beis din, and took off to Cleveland.

    After all the sacrifice, the learning, the day finally came. I was sitting in my office when his text came through “Geyur geyarti!!”, I became a ger.

    More amazing than this text was a phone call I received from him just several hours later.

    It was close to midnight when my phone lit up. Nervous that something serious happened on his trip back, I anxiously picked up the pone. “Are you ok?”

    Everything was fine, baruch Hashem, but he had a shailah, his first as a Jew.

    “Rabbi, I arrived back about an hour ago. I was so hungry, but all the stores are closed. So, I opened my freezer and took out some leftovers. I placed them in the microwave to defrost and reheat.

    “I am now sitting in front of the food about to eat when I realized that I have a serious issue.

    “All this food was cooked when I was a gentile, making it bishul akum!”

    This was a fascinating shailah, and it demonstrated his level of knowledge even on his first day as a yid!

     Can it be that one’s own food becomes forbidden after gerus?

    There is logic both ways. Indeed, two likkutim that I own on gerus come to opposite conclusions. Gerus K’Hilchasah (p. 69) rules that such food is forbidden –after all, was not this food cooked by a non Jew?

    However, Mishnas HaGer by Rav Moshe Klein (son of Rav Menahse Klein, p. 175) disagrees.

    He points out that the two main reasons for the prohibition of bishul akum do not seem to apply here. Rashi (Avodah Zara 38a) focuses on the concern with eating from non-Jews becoming common, thus leading to a great risk of something non-Kosher being eaten. Tosfos (37b) explains the chief concern as being to prevent intermarriage.

    According to either view, the concern here is non existent. Indeed, we find in other cases (like a choleh on Shabbos who has a non-Jew cook for him) where many rishonim allow such food for others once cooked b’heter (e.g. Bedek HaBayis 3:7).

    It was only later that I realized the connection to Shavuos.

    One of the minhagim on this yom tov is to eat dairy (see Rema 494). Any number of reasons are given for this minhag. One sefer I own (Otzar HaYidios, Eisenberger, Shavuos ed. p. 69-71) brings twenty-six reasons found in sefarim!

    One of the famous explanations is brought in the Mishneh Berrura (ad loc. sif kattan 12). There the Chofetz Chaim explains that after nesinas hatorah we went back to our tents to eat. However, since we just received hilchos shechita we were not yet proficient in these laws to have meat right away, so we simply ate dairy.

    However, this approach to the minhag is challenged. The Chofetz Chaim later in life pointed out (Likutei Halachos, end of Chullin) that if we follow the view that the Torah was given on Shabbos then they could not schecht even if they wanted to and knew how!

    To explain the first approach, the sefer Geulas Yisroel (a collection of Torah from the Baal Shem Tov and early rebbes –its authorship is disputed and unclear) brings a fascinating approach: already by marah the tzivuy of Shabbos was given, so indeed they were not surprised by their inability to shecht, and perhaps they prepared food before Shabbos. Rather, they could not eat their prepared food because it was slaughtered and cooked while they were non Jews!

    This may have been the very first instance of the shailah I brought above!

    But it gets more complicated. The Shelal Rav (Shavous, p. 211) is not satisfied with the above approach.

    For, how could their solution have been to eat dairy at har Sinai –it was milked when they were non-Jews, making it choluv akum?!

    Perhaps then, we can say that 1-they could not shecht fresh meat due either to it being Shabbos or because they were not yet proficient in the halachos of shechita, and, 2 -they could eat their dairy products for, as the Mishnas HaGer suggested above, when the reasons for a gezeira are so clearly not present, and when it was made b’heter, it becomes permissible to eat.

    From the first moments of mattan Torah the beauty and complexity of Torah was present!

    Ah Gutt Yom Tov!

  • Grapes of Wrath! A Kashrus Story

    Grapes of Wrath! A Kashrus Story

    A Factory, a Broken Thermostat, & an Igros Moshe

    April, 2019


    In 2001, a professor at the University of Bordeaux performed a study that is
    considered either famous or infamous, depending on who is talking. He brought together 54 oenologists (a fancy word for
    wine experts) for a wine-tasting.
    The results of his experiment were later published in the prestigious journal Brain and Language.
    First, he gave them expensive bottles of both red and white wines. As might be expected, these experts described the reds with words like “chicory,” “cedar,” “raspberry,” and “cherry.” And they described the white wines as “floral,” “lemony,” and “peachy.”
    Soon after, he invited these experts back
    for a similar tasting of red and white wines.
    Once again, they described the whites with
    flowery terms and the reds with words
    denoting harsher tones and flavors.

    But there was a catch. In the second tast-
    ing, they were given the same white wine

    twice! This professor simply added some
    red food coloring to the second batch of the
    same white wine.
    This study shocked the insular world of
    wine tasting. But it was just the beginning.
    Many other experiments were conducted to
    demonstrate how our senses often fool us.
    Perhaps my favorite was the one conducted
    by Cal-Tech.
    Instead of the typical switching of the
    wine bottles, the researchers went one step
    further. After placing all of the $10 wine
    in $100 wine bottles and vice versa, they
    attached brain scanners to the subjects.
    There was no fooling anybody. With this set-up, if they claimed that the wine in the
    expensive bottle was better quality, it would
    be clear whether they really meant it.
    And…they did! The part of the brain that
    responds to greater pleasure lit up when
    they drank the cheap wine that they thought

    was of higher quality. Their perception actu-
    ally affected them biologically!

    This does not mean that red wine is not
    unique; indeed, Chazal say clearly that red
    wine is superior to white (Bava Basra 97,

    based on Mishlei 23:31), and this is codi-
    fied as a halachah in 472:11. It means that

    our perceptions can create distortions in
    objective reality. This study may give new
    dimension to the view of some poskim that
    simply adding red wine to white puts it

    in the category of red wine! (Needless to
    say, this is not based on the premise in the
    research studies.)
    I am sharing this because of an incident
    that happened to me several years ago. But
    first, a little more background.
    Chazal discuss various levels of wine.
    The Gemara records that Shmuel was once
    drinking wine in front of a non-Jew of great
    repute (Avodah Zarah 30a). The gentile
    explained to Shmuel that he was careful
    not to touch the wine so as not to make
    it yayin nesech. Shmuel responded that he
    need not worry as this wine was cooked,
    and as Rambam explains (Hilchos Maachalos
    Assuros, ch. 11), no idolater would offer
    such poor wine to his deity.

    How does this relate to the wine-tasting
    experiments?
    There are many people I know, both
    family members and friends, who consider
    themselves wine connoisseurs. They often
    bring me wine, exclaiming, “This wine is
    non-mevushal and therefore truly delicious.”
    However, they may be affected by their
    own perceptions. This is because many

    poskim are of the opinion that today’s pas-
    teurization does not affect the taste or

    quality of the wine.
    Both Rav Elyashiv (Even Yisrael 5757
    and Kovetz Teshuvos 1:75) and Rav Shlomo
    Zalman Auerbach (Minchas Shlomo 25)

    make just such a case. The Rosh, seem-
    ingly disagreeing with the Rambam, states

    that the reason cooked wine is not an issue
    is because of its rarity. Since pasteurization
    is no longer rare, it would not be enough
    to render the wine acceptable. Rav Shlomo
    Zalman posits that in order for the mevushal
    leniency to apply, the wine would have to
    taste substandard. This, he says, does not
    happen with simple pasteurization.
    However, Rav Moshe disagreed. He felt
    that simple pasteurization is enough to
    deem wine or grape juice mevushal.
    As I was reviewing these halachos the
    other week, a memory came to mind. About
    ten years ago, a company I certified wanted
    to make a grape product created from pure
    grape juice. The customer to whom he was
    selling demanded that the grape juice come
    from a certain grape juice facility.
    This facility was not under certification.
    However, and amazingly, he arranged with
    this major manufacture to allow me to come
    in on a Monday to kasher the entire facility
    just so he could take a small percentage of
    the grape juice for his own product.
    It was a fascinating learning experience
    since the production of grape juice and
    wine involves so many unique halachos.
    The details of that kashering are beyond the
    scope of this article, but I want to mention
    one element. Keep in mind that this was in
    an era before smartphones.

    Although this was a state-of-the-art facil-
    ity, there was one piece of equipment that

    was ancient and crude—the temperature
    gauge for the pasteurizer.
    It only registered up to 169 degrees. This
    meant that if the grape juice was cooked at a
    higher temperature, I would never know; all
    I could guarantee was that it reached 169. I
    could not recall offhand what Rav Moshe’s
    temperature criterion was for considering
    the juice mevushal.
    I was not expecting a broken thermostat,
    and the grape juice was already flowing into
    the tank. Time was not on my side, and a lot
    of money was hanging in the balance.
    I quickly called my predecessor, Rav
    Yirmiyahu Milevsky. “Quick, can you look
    up Rav Moshe’s teshuvah on pasteurization?
    I need to know how high a temperature I

    have to get this grape juice up to!”
    He responded, understandably, by asking
    for a few minutes to find the answer. I hung
    up, but I was still impatient and called my
    shver, a kashrus veteran, pleading for the
    same information.
    He was in the middle of telling me that he
    would look it up and call me back when Rav
    Milevsky clicked in.
    “I have to go,” I said. “I have another call
    coming through.” Rude, I know.
    “I found the teshuvah,” said Rav Milevsky.
    “Rav Moshe says it has to reach at least 165
    degrees.”
    I breathed a sigh of relief. So long as we
    got it to 169 (and perhaps it would go much
    higher), I would know that at least it had
    passed 165. The juice was saved!
    As I was thanking him for his help, my

    shver called in.
    “I found the teshuvah,” he said. “It’s 175
    degrees.”
    “What did you just say—175?! Are you
    sure?”
    “Yes,” he responded and went on to read
    me Rav Moshe’s words.
    “What volume is this in?”
    “The second volume of Yoreh Dei’ah #52.”
    I quickly went back to Rav Milevsky, who
    was on hold.
    “Where is the teshuvah you gave me?” I
    asked, hoping to determine which was the
    later ruling.
    Rav Milevsky said that the teshuvah was in
    Yoreh Dei’ah, Volume 3, #31.
    You might think this would prove that the
    Volume 3 answer was the correct one, but as
    I went back and forth between the calls, we
    discovered that the later published teshuvah
    allowing for 165 degrees was from 1965,
    while the earlier published teshuvah, with a
    ruling of 175 degrees, was from 1972!
    And when I returned home that day, I
    found a third teshuvah (Even Ha’ezer 4:108,
    written in 1973) in which Rav Moshe
    repeated his ruling of 175 degrees; and
    indeed, this was what his student reported
    as well.
    As for the factory, we were able to locate
    a brand-new temperature gauge just in time
    and got the grape juice heated to a very high

    temperature, thereby preventing the prob-
    lem.

    It just goes to show the complexity of pro-
    ducing kosher wine and grape juice, how

    complicated a visit to a factory can be, and
    how extensively one needs to review the
    halachos before arriving.

    It wouldn’t be long before I began trav-
    eling with a veritable otzar hasefarim in my

    trunk!

  • How to Die Al Kiddush Hashem

    Is dying because one is a Jew enough to make one a kodosh in the halachic sense?

    May, 2019

    The old humorous tale had been told a thousand times.

    The young, sincere and very frum yungerbucher is on his way home from yeshiva late one night.

    As he makes his way through the darkness is he attacked by a gang if ruffians.

    They pull out a gun.

    He thinks this is it, the end; he will have the zechus to die al Kiddush Hashem.

    So he begins to prepare for his final mitzvah:

    He closes his eyes and begins to recite, “Baruch atah Hashem…asher kidishanu b’mitzvosuv…mikadesh shimcha brabim (to sanctify His name publicly).”

    The gang, frightened by this strange incantation in a foreign tongue, quickly runs off.

    The bochur gives chase, fearful of a hefsek, he run to catch up to them with his finger to his lips screaming “Nu!, nu!…”!

    There is a lot of truth to be found in this oft-repeated anecdote. The Shlah Hakadosh (d.1630) writes (Shaar Ha’Osios, aleph, Emes V’Emunah) that there is a special beracha to be said in such an instance. Indeed, I used his version of the beracha (said by many each morning after birchas hashachar) in the ‘story’ above. (See Metzuvah V’Oseh by Hagaon Rav Shmuel Dovid Friedman vol. 1 p. 123 for a wonderful discussion of this Shlah and beracha).

    Over the past several days many stories are being told about Lori Kaye hy’d, the congregant in the Palway Chabad who was killed by nineteen-year diseased human being.

    In many frum publications the term ‘died al kiddush Hashem’ is used. Recently, I was giving a shiur and began, “May this be in memory of Lori Kaye and all kedoshim”.

    “Rabbi” someone interrupted (which I encourage during my shiurim), “You don’t mean that literally, do you? Sure, her zechus is enormous, but halachickly, dying al kiddush Hashem is a sugya in the gemara (Sanhedrin 76) and reserved for certain cases where one chooses death over, say, an aveira. Is dying because one is a Jew enough to make one a kodosh in the halachic sense?” (See Rambam hilchos yesodei hatorah 5:1ff).

    The answer of course, is ‘YES!’, she most certainly died al kiddush Hashem.

    Nevertheless, while some may bristle at the question, in truth it’s a fascinating one, and one that he was not the first to ask.

    Much of this column will borrow heavily from Rebbetzin Farbstein’s ‘Hidden in Thunder’, vol. 2, ch. 10, which speaks in great detail about this issue.  English translations are largely based on Deborah Stern. The reader who wishes to delve into this and other topics that relate to the churban Europe in both halacha and hashkafa are greatly encouraged to see Rebbetzin Farbstein’s stupendous works on the subject.

    Before the war, Rav Yehoshua Moshe Aronson was a rav in Sanniki (near Warsaw). He was deported to the Konin labor camp and later to Auschwitz.

    He wrote a secret diary, now published under the name Alei Meroros (Bitter Leaves) about his time during the war.

    He initially laments:

     “Is there a Kiddush Hashem dying at the hands of the Germans? There is no offer to save one’s life by accepting another religion… Although the Nazis were fighting…not only against the Jews but everything Jewish, they did not order us to transgress our religion. They chose a policy of systematic liquidation. The question is whether a Jew killed for being Jewish sanctifies Gd’s name through his death.” (see Alei Maroros p. 305)

    Rav Dessler echoes this question (Michtav M’Eliyahu 3:348) in a letter to his son:

     “Many people have asked in amazement: What is gained by these deaths? If they had died because of an edict of apostasy and given their lives in the sanctity of Gd’s name, it would be something. (But) These murderers did not insist on faith…”

    The Slonimer Rebbe (d. 2000) also once wondered aloud in one of his annual derashos about churban Europe (1984 and 1989 discourses, published in Ha–Arugah Elecha), seeing the question a little differently:

    “On the hand, it is the greatest spectacle: six million holy Jews attained an exalted level of performing Kiddush Hashem. But on the other hand, it is distressing…that in fact that most of the people being killed had no idea that they were performing Kiddush Hashem, and did not have the privilege of offering themselves for the sanctity of His name. After all, all Jews were killed (meaning, even non-believers)… nor was there always peace of mind when they were killed. How could this be called death al Kiddush Hashem?”

    Of course, all three answer the question, and all explain how indeed all deaths at the hands of our enemies, all who pay the ultimate sacrifice simply for being a Jew is automatically a kodosh in the strongest sense of the word.

    As Rav Aronson explains, “But when the Gentile has trouble with the word Jew and with the very idea of Judaism as well, the Jew’s death is (always) a kiddush Hashem. Since the nations of the world know that these are Gd’s chosen people and that their harassment comes solely based on this…their death are automatically a kiddush Hashem.”

    The holy Piasecner Rebbe, Rav Kalonymos Kalmish Shapiro hy’d, saw how many learned Jews believed that while their death would be seen as holy they may not be considered to have died al Kiddush Hashem.

    To combat their feelings, he shared the following:

    “The akeida was not only a test of Yitzchak, but also the commencement of a form of worship that requires total sacrifice for Hashem and the Jewish People. The akeida was a test of the desire and intent of Avraham and Yitzchak. It was never accomplished in reality because the malach told Avraham “Do not harm the lad” (Bereishis 22:2).

    “For this reason, the murder of a Jew…consummates the akeida! (In other words) The akeida was just the beginning –the expression of intent and desire –while a murder of a Jew is the akeida’s conclusion. Thus, the akeida and the murder of all Jews (because they are Jews) are componants of one event”!

    But in the case of Lori Kaye it is even clearer; her death even more remarkable.

    The Maharam M’Rutenberg (d. 1292) witnessed many Jews being killed simply for being Jews; he himself died while being held in captivity.

    He writes (Teshuvos #517):

    “When someone resolves to die for the sake of kiddush Hashem (referring, it would seem, even if one is resolved to die for the ‘crime’ of being a Jew alone), from that point on, no matter how they are killed, he shall feel no pain at all…”

    Someone like Lori who acted, who jumped in front of her rav has not just died al kiddush Hashem, for the ‘sin’ of being a Jew, but in her final moments taught the world how to live and to act al kiddush Hashem!

    Writing just a few years before his passing, the Ohr HaChaim Hakodosh (d. 1743), interprets a series of pasukim relating to the korbanos (Vayikra 6:1-3) in a stunning manner.

    What follows is a truncated version of his words, hameivin yavin (translation follows Rav Munk):

    “We may consider this whole paragraph as an allusion to our present and final exile, designed to console us about the depressing conditions we find ourselves in. Inasmuch as the soul of every Israelite refuses to be comforted seeing our exile appears to be interminable, we are certainly in need of some comfort. At the time of this writing the exile has already lasted far longer than our previous exiles combined, …already 1672 years have passed since the destruction of the Temple… The afflictions the Jewish people suffer in exile achieve for us what the sacrifices achieved on the altar, i.e. atonement for our sins… ‘burnt…all night’ means enduring the whole ‘night’ of exile… The Torah informs us that when the dawn of that ‘morning’ (of redemption) finally looms, Hashem’s anger will burn and consume all those who have tortured us during the many years of our exile and especially the Western nations…The words “and the fire of the altar” allude to the many afflictions we have endured…The word also recalls the self-sacrifice exhibited by Isaac when he lay bound on the altar. …By ‘linen tunic’ the Torah means that when that time arrives even rachamim will consent to Hashem avenging the wrong done to the Jewish people and that Hashem makes a visible mark of the blood of any Jew who was killed because he was Jewish.. On the day when Gd goes out to exact retribution from our enemies He will wear that garment on His heart…Martyrs are the most beloved by Hashem; nothing separates them from Hashem at all. The Torah alludes to the absolute affinity which exists between the martyrs for the Jewish faith and Gd Himself… ״ In referencing the burnt fats of the shlemim offering, he states, “these allude to the tzadikim and wholesome ones, choice members of klal yisroel (who Hashem chooses as sacrifices)”

    This majestic Ohr Hachaim can offer us some comfort in galus.

    While martyrs may feel no pain, their surviving families do.

    May Hakadosh Baruch Hu bring the Kaye’s a nechama, may she be a powerful melitzah yeshara, and may we all be zocheh to hear the derashos of the Rav Aronson and the Piasecner Rebbe –together with Lori and the six million kedoshim in attendance –in the era of the great reunification, that of techias hameisim, the age of bilah hamaves lanetzach.

    May the ‘morning’ of the Ohr Hachaim arrive soon!

    While our mesorah teaches that she felt no pain, we know that those around her feel tremendous agony.

    May Hakadosh Baruch Hu bring them a nechama, may she be a powerful melitzah yeshara, and may we all be zocheh to hear the derashos of the Rav Aronson and the Piasecner Rebbe –together with Lori and the six million kedoshim in attendance –in the era of the great reunification, that of techias hameisim, the ageof bilah hamaves lanetzach.

    May it come soon!

  • Kitniyos Kuriosities

    Kitniyos Kuriosities

    Oils, Peanuts, & History

    March, 2019

    Snapshot History Overview

    Kitniyos is one of the most unique halachos. The gemara (Pesachim 35b) makes it clear that only that which is potentially acceptable for matzah –namely, the five grains –can, in turn, ever become chometz.

    The Rambam codifies this as such (hil. Chometz u’matzah 5:1):

    “The prohibition against chametz applies only to the five species of grain…However, kitniyot – e.g., rice, millet, beans, lentils and the like – do not become leavened. Even if one kneads rice flour or the like with boiling water and covers it with fabric until it rises like dough that has become leavened, it is permitted to be eaten. This is not leavening, but rather the decay [of the rice flour].

    Nevertheless, beginning with French and German communities of well over 800-years ago, a minhag developed of avoiding all kitniyos items on Pesach. The Semak (siman 222); Rabeinu Manoach (to Rambam, ibid.) suggests that this minhag is due to the fact that we call the process of making dough with kitniyos ‘leavening’, or ‘chimutz’; others famously suggest that it due to the fields of both kitniyos and true grains found often in close proximity to each other, thereby causing mixing, and, due to the mere fact that flours are made out of both; Rabeinu Manoch (ibid.) allows for one more fascinating explanation behind this minhag –since on yom tov we are obligated to be b’simchah, these types of legumes are not foods utilized during celebratory occasions, rather bread (or matzah) is!

    1. ‘Mixed’ Marriages

    Several years ago in this space we talked about the concept of a wife following the customs of her husband. We explained thenn that there is no clear source for this rule in chazal, and that indeed the poskim debate exactly how to apply it.

    Indeed, and as it relates to kitniyos, Rav Elyashiv held that certain customs are more stringent than typical minhagim and carry the status of kabbalos or gezeiros. He holds that an Ashkenazi girl who marries a Sefardi must continue to abstain from kitniyos on Pesach! (See Halacha Shel Pesach, Rav Avraham Mordechai Feldman, volume 1, p. 105, footnote 75 at length. Most poskim disagree with this, like Rav Ovadia Yosef [Hagadas Chazon Ovadia p. 50], Rav Duran [shu’t Tashbeitz 3;179], and Rav Moshe Feinstein [Igros Moshe 3:158]).

    1. Here To Stay

    No reader, I’m sure, is surprised that every year, virtually every rav is approached by members wondering if it would be technically possible to remove this gezeira (see Mor U’Ketzia from Rav Yaakov Emden, volume two, Altuna ed., page 47).

    The answer is simple: No!

    While there is a debate if the ban on kitniyos is a full-on gezeiras chachamim (Chasam Sofer, shu’t siman 122, inter alia) or purely a minhag (Igros Moshe,ih’c 3:63,inter alia), either way its halachic purchase is beyond reproach.

    For, even if it is just something that we simply accepted upon ourselves -as the ashkanazi tzibbur – we would still be bound to it, as is clear in an entire siman Shulchan Aruch dedicated to the topic of accepted minhagim (y’d 214:2; see Pri Chodosh oh’c 496:8 who discusses the arduous task –if even possible! –of nullifying such a custom).

    And, if it is seen as a gezeira instituted by the rabbanim, then it could certainly never be abolished (see Chayay Adam 127:1, with Nishmas Adam).

    In fact, the Shaarie Teshuva (ad loc.) quotes the Maharil that anyone who violates this minhag has in fact violated the biblical halacha of lo sassur, and anyone who goes against such a rule is chayav missah!

    Indeed -and it should not be surprising – the desire to overrule this minhag goes back some time. In the 1800’s when some wished to abolish this minhag, the Chasam Sofer (ibid.) writes, “they have nothing to rely on and we should pay them no heed…”

    It is therefore worth our while to investigate some of the little known facts surrounding our present observance of kitniyos, in particular how these laws relate to the oils we use on Pesach.

    1. Kitniyos Oils

    Professor Michael Eskin has served as a chazzan for a number of years in Winnipeg. But that is not his main occupation. In fact, a few years ago he was indicted into the Order of Canada. This was for his work on Canola Oil.

    Oil it a mystery to many. In fact, most processed foods are a mystery as to how they get made.

    If I asked the reader to put down this magazine and to now tell me how they think Canola Oil is created, they will no doubt respond with something like: “One presses the Canola plant/seed until oil is extracted. It is then filtered and packaged”.

    However, to the surprise of most readers, there is not even such thing as a ‘Canola’, per se.

    Rather, the ‘Can’ in Canola is for…Canada!

    For thousands of years, rapeseed was used for its oil. During World War Two there was a shortage of this oil. In addition, many did not like to use it in their food as it often had an acidic taste and a greenish color.

    The University of Manitoba, led by two professors, was able to create a breed of rapeseed that was far more appealing. They named it Canola after Canada, and ‘Ola’ after other brands of oils on the market, like Mazola.

    Today, this breed of rapeseed is produced as Canola oil across the world.

    With this brief history in mind, we can better tackle the issue of Canola Oil – and oils in general – for Pesach.

    My predecessor in Buffalo, Rav Yimiyahu Milevsky, rav of Bnei Torah of Toronto, comes from a long line of rabbanim. His saintly grandfather, Rav Aaron Milevsky, was the chief rabbi of Uruguay. He once wrote to the rav of Yerushalim, Rav Tzvi Pesach Frank, asking his view regarding peanuts on Pesach. In addition, he wished to know about its oil, as well as oils from other questionably kiyniyos products.

    Rav Franks’s response was later published in Mikroey Kodesh, Pesach vol. 2 p. 203ff.

    While Rav Moshe Feinstein (ibid.) allowed eating peanuts on Pesach (in a place where there is no contradicting minhag), Rav Frank splits the issue. So, while he suggests one avoid eating actual peanuts on Pesach, he allows one to consume its oil on Pesach!

    When it comes to other oils, in particular Cottonseed Oil, he quotes from Rav Chaim Soleiveitchik and allows it.

    What would be the difference in eating an actual peanut, which he forbids, and eating it oil, which he allows?

    Well, this brings us back to rapeseed oil.

    The Avnei Nezer (siman 373, cf. 533) paskens that rapeseed itself is kitniyos, and, critically, that oil produced from kitniyos also has the status of kitniyos.

    However, not all agree. The Maharsham (1:183) makes a point (among many others) that is alluded to in many earlier works: Kitniyos can’t be more strict than the halacha it is coming to protect (see Chayay Adam 123).

    In other words, if we are allowed to eat products (like matzah!) made from the actual five grains so long that we protect it from water etc., then certainly by kitniyos one should be allowed to consume it on Pesach if it was guarded in the same way. While we don’t utilize this heter by, say, producing shmurah Rice Krispies, when it comes to oils produced in a dry manner –through pure extraction as opposed to a solvent bath before they are baked – some are permissive.

    While a minority view, due to the above, some do consume certain types of Canola oil on Pesach (see also shu’t Be’er Yitzchak 11 and Maharcheshes #3 for other reasons to allow kitniyos oils).

    We can now understand Rav Frank’s thinking in regard to Peanut Oil: because there is a question as to their status one should avoid eating them, but this doubt should not be seen strong enough to ban its oil, which anyway some would allow even if they are kitniyos.

    On these points, Rav Milevsky shared with me a fascinating incident that has been largely lost to history.

    In 1909, near Jaffa, a one Bentzion Breslov wished that his sesame factory produce sesame oil for Pesach. Sesame, of course, is kitniyos, however he felt that oil from kitniyos should be fine, and that anyway, the sesames would not ever come in to any contact with water. He approached the rav of Jaffa at that time, Rav Kook, who wrote him a letter of certification for kosher l’pesach sesame oil!

    The Badatz Kolleles Chasidim B’Yerushalim publicly came out against this heter, leading to a public dispute, with pashkivilim produced for each side.

    Years ago, when Rav Milevsky was a rav in Memphis, he was visiting New York and stopped by a library that held rare sefarim. There he discovered a rare volume. It was a kuntres that Rav Kook wrote in defense of his psak. Unfortunately, the library charged close to $10 to copy each page, so he took notes and left.

    Back in Memphis, he shared with Rav Nota Greenblatt his discovery. “Oh, I know that kuntrus…” Rav Greenblatt responded. He then promptly got up, walked over to one of his shelves and pulled out a hard copy of this one-time published kuntros. “Just return it when you are done”!

    • Coffee and Haggados

    Which edition of the hagadah has sold more than any? I’m not sure of the definitive answer, but up there is the Maxwell House Hagada that has more than fifty million in print!

    Eight years ago, the coffee house came out with a new edition of their hagaddah, and the Washington Post reported: “Maxwell House owes a debt to the Orthodox rabbi it hired back in 1923. The rabbi confirmed that the coffee bean is not a legume but a berry instead, so OK under the dietary rules observed by some Jews during the holiday.

    The haggadah giveaway began about a decade after the rabbi decreed that coffee was kosher for Passover as a way to clear up lingering consumer confusion and end the dip in coffee sales that had been observed each year around the eight-day celebration” (emphasis mine)

    While it may surprise readers to know that some in early America did not purchase coffee on Pesach, the truth is that this is an old debate. The Shaarei Teshuva (453:1) brings down a chumrah not to consume coffee or tea on Pesach, although he leans toward leniency (cf. Minhag Yisroel Torah 3:447, and Piskei Teshuvos 453:7).

    This is just the beginning of the kitniyos journey through history. Perhaps we will return to it some other time.

    A Chag Kosher V’Sameach!!

  • Getting Drunk On Purim: Halacha, History, & Hashkafa

    Getting Drunk On Purim: Halacha, History, & Hashkafa

    March, 2019

    ‘Ad D’lo Yada’ – Understanding A Unique Halacha

    1. A Seder Story

    One Pesach seder several years ago one of the finest members of my shul, and his family, was by our table.

    This individual is a very soft-spoken, kind and serious person. His wife and children are equally full of chein.

    Because we have so many guests for each seder –and not enough kosos to go around–my wife purchased large and beautiful glass goblets that would be used for the arbah kosos. Allow me to repeat the fact that they were very large cups.

    I was using my standard kiddush cup and wasn’t paying much attention to what the guests were using, until after the second kos.

    During Shulchan Aruch this guest was slurring his words and had, well, the giggles.

    It was so odd seeing him like this. He was the straightest shooter I knew.

    His wife explained that his family follows the halacha that one must drink the entire kos of wine for each of the araba kosos, no matter their size (see Bach 472; Shulchan Aruch 472:9, inter alia).

    These glass goblets must have contained half a liter of liquid space!

    Meaning that by the forth cup he drank about two liters of wine –and it showed! By nirtzah me and my kids delighted in watching this usually soft-tempered man gloriously act out all the animals in chad gada.

    We have since purchased smaller kosos for guests, as the chazal teach, “Eight things are harmful in abundance and beneficial in moderation…wine.” (Gittin 70a)

    1. Yiddeshkeit and Alcohol: A History

    The Gemara, on the one hand, teaches (Eruvin 65) that “Wine was created so as to console mourners,” the Midrash in Bereishis Rabba (36:4) teaches that “[Wine] caused exile and will continue [to do so] in future generations.”

    Similarly, “Wine gladdens the heart of man” (Tehillim 104), and “Do not drink, for its end is blood.” (Bamidbar Rabba).

     The Midrash Tanchuma (Shemini 11) relates the story of a son who slowly weaned his drunken father off his dependence on alcohol. When he felt it was safe to let his father out of the house they went for a walk, and came upon an old drinking buddy of his father’s. The friend was lying in his own filth in the road, laughing to himself. Hoping that his father would now see the loss of dignity associated with drunkenness, the son pointed him out to his father. However, the father ran over to his old friend and whispered into his ear, “Where did you find such good wine?”

    Based on the above Tanchuma and Esther Rabba (5:1) the Gra interprets the verse in Mishlei (23:35), “They struck me and I did not become ill” as symbolic of an alcoholic who becomes oblivious to alcohol’s negative effects and even claims that his addiction is virtuous—a sort of Stockholm syndrome. (See Artscroll’s Esther Rabba ad loc., footnote 28 and ‘Insights, A’ for further elaboration)

    For a wonderful treatment of this topic and on addiction in general, see Judaism and Psychology by Moshe HaLevi Spero, Ktav Publishing, Yeshiva University Press, 1980, pages 120-141.

    While it has been argued that frum Jews seem to have a lower rate of alcohol abuse in proportion to its drinkers than many other groups, if true, this is due to our being grounded in alcohol’s reality, not because of our denial of it (see American Sociological Review, 1980, Volume 45, “How Jews Avoid Alcohol Problems,” pages 647-664; Time Magazine “Jews and Alcohol,” March 17, 1958; The Daily Beast, “Pass the Manischewitz, Please,” August 2008; and The New Yorker, “Drinking Games,” by Malcolm Gladwell, February 2010.)

    1. What About Purim?

    Over the years many organizations have begun to crack down on alcohol usage of young people on Purim (See Rambam, hilchos yom tov 6:21 for precedent for such bans and concerns). Some in our communities have met this with a touch of cynicism, as they hold the mistaken belief that yiddishkeit doesn’t subscribe to such a negative view of alcohol. While there are, indeed, many statements in the Torah and Chazal that refer to the positive aspects of alcohol, they pale in comparison to the number of statements against it. This is similar to the current medical view that in the right setting, small but regular alcohol consumption can be beneficial, yet it can also hold great potential for abuse.

    In Talmudic parlance, there is a difference between a shasuy (drinker) and a shikkar (one who is drunk); see Eruvin 64a.

    But what about Purim? Do not chazal teach (Megilla 7b) an obligation to become so intoxicated (with wine, cf. Orchos Rabeinu 3:56) to the point of not knowing the distinction between the blessing of Mordechai and the curse of Haman?

    How do we understand this obligation in light of the above?

    The Chofetz Chaim (Biur Halacha, 695) asks these questions, and they are asked in even more detail by the Avuderahm.

    1. Many Explanations

    We must first mention that many poskim understand the mitzvah of drinking on Purim in its simple meaning (see Shaarei Teshuvah in the name of Yaavetz and Chacham Tzvi). This should not, challila, be seen a contradiction to the above sources that show a negative attitude toward heavy drinking. Rather, precisely because it is rare to ever allow for such drinking did chazal need to come and permit it. The fact that it is once a year clearly is not running against moderation.

    Indeed, the Maharsha to the above gemara states, “…this is not to become silly in drunkenness and to run after and/or act in foolishness and untoward language, for this is not joy, rather foolishness…”. The Shelah gives the same warning (Megillah, ner mitzvah 14-15).

    In other words, and as the Biur Halacha ibid. alludes, it is not an obligation per se, rather a once a year allowance, should one want to and if they can trust their judgment (see Chayay Adam).

    However, there are many other serious views as to how to read this Halacha.

    • The Rema (695:2) famously rules that one need only drink more than usual, and then take a nap due to tiredness onset-ed by the wine. For, when one is sleeping he is ad d’lo yada! This is also alluded to in Rambam (hil. Megillah 2:15). The Pri Chadash and the Pri Megadim advise one to follow this approach, as our generation is weaker than in the past. (See also Yesod V’Shoresh HaAvodah 12:7)
    • The Yad Ephraim on the margins of the Shulchan Aruch (ad loc.), as well as the Sefas Emes  (Megillah 7b), reads the gemara as saying that one should drink ‘ad’, meaning until and no further that he gets so drunk that he does not know such a distinction. In other words, the gemara was setting a limit how much one can drink! (See also Kol Bo #45; Divrei Shaul to Megillah; Emek Beracha in the name of Rav Yisroel Salanter)
    • In fact, the Maharsha (Bava Metzia 24a) explains that when chazal teach that there are three things regarding which a chacham may lie, one of those items is ‘puria’. As opposed to the simple meaning of this word, Marharsha suggests it refers to Purim –in that a talmud chacham may pretend and fool others into thinking that they are drunk when in truth they are not!
    • The Brisker Rav explains this strange obligation based upon a technical matter (Emek Beracha, seudas purim). Typically, the yomim tovim have an obligation of simcha, and our requirement to eat meat and drink is only but a heicha timtza –a means –to get there. Not so on Purim. The pasuk states that Purim was established for‘misheth v’simchah’, meaning we were obligated to drink not as a means to attain simcha alone but for drinking itself.
    • The Biur Halacha (ibid.; see also in more detail the Avudrahm) suggests that since the various events in the Purim story happened through wine and intoxication, the same is obliged on us. Thus, we find seudas Achashveirosh and the death/exile of Vashti, as well as

    the downfall of Haman all happening at festive and drink-filled events. The Megilas Setarim (Rav Vidal HaTzarafti, hakdama; not to be confused with another sefer on Esther by Rav Yaakov of Lissa under the same name) points out that this is usual for yomim tovim; we always celebrate through the consumption of the very means that the miracle happened, be it choressees/mortar on Pesach or cheese (story of Devorah/Chanah) on Chanukah. Purim should be no different. See also Nachal Eshkol who states the same but adds that when Achashveirosh and Haman finalized their evil plan they celebrated over drink (Esther 3:15), and chazal (Esther Rabbah 7:25) teach that this was a punishment for the sale of Yosef which was also caused due to drinking. On Purim we do a ‘turnabout’ and drink, but this time l’shem mitzvah.

    • Some suggest (see, e.g. Avuderahm, et al.) that since ‘arrur haman’ and ‘baruch mordechai’ equal the same numerical value, all chazal were saying is that one should drink until the point that figuring out each gematria, and that they are indeed the same, would become a burden.
    • The Mishneh Berrura (ibid. sif kattan 4) in the name of the Taz and the Gra suggests that one should simply drink to the point that his simchah confuses him as to which is better: the downfall of the wicked or the salvation of the righteous.
    • The Levush (siman 670:2) reminds us that chazal (Megillah 12a) teach that our original aveirah that caused these events was our eating and drinking by seudas Achashveirosh. We redeemed ourselves by fasting for three days (Esther 4:16). Perhaps then we drink on Purim and feast so as to turn this sin into a mitzvah again.
    • The Chasam Sofer (Derashos, p.196) states we are obligated to drink just enough that if we were down about a matter this measure will bring back some joy and tolerance. Minchas Eliyahu reminds us that chazal teach (Eiruvin 65a) that wine was create for aveilim, so as to feel better when one is down. Shushan too became mournful (‘avel’ 4:3) until (9:22) we went “u’mei’avel l’yom tov’.

    While we could go on with further explanations, allow me to end with following: Chazal teach (Midrash Mishlei 9:2) that Purim is the only

    yom tov that will remain in the time of moshiach. Rav Shlomo Zalman Aurbach explained that while Purim will still be active, the mitzvah of ad d’lo yada will vanish (see Rutz K’tzvi 2:p.322; Pardes Yosef, purim, p.410; sefer Meishiv K’Halachah)!

    The navi tells us (Yeshayahu 29:9) “…they were intoxicated but not from wine…” Perhaps when moshiach comes we will finally be able to attain the highest level of joy without any worldly aid.

    May that Day come soon!