Author: Moshe Taub

  • AI, Robots, Minyan, & Halachic Sensationalism

    AI, Robots, Minyan, & Halachic Sensationalism

    May a Robot Join a Minyan?!

    What is a Human anyway?

    LENGTHY/DETAILED POST

    What follows is an article (originally published in Ami Magazine in two parts) on the subject of anthropomorphic robots in Jewish law.

    These were written in direct response to an opinion piece written by a researcher from Emory University that was published at CNN.com, as well as an interview that writer did with the JTA.

    Following the article below:

    -This researcher’s letter to the editor in defense of his positions and corrections to my reading of them,

    –My published rebuttal to his points.

    Eugene Gootsman is strange. He himself asserts that he’s the “weirdest creature in the world”.

    Who is Eugene? Well, he claims to be a thirteen-year-old boy living in Odessa, Ukraine.

    He may say this, but I happen to know he is lying.

    In fact, I will go on the record as saying that Eugene Gootsman is not even alive…or human! I can state this with certainty – even though over 30% of the scientists and professors who spent time with him thought he was a real, live person.

    Eugene Gootsman, you see, is a computer program.

    His story begins in 1950, when Allen Turing, the father of modern computing, proclaimed that by the turn of the century a computer program would be built so advanced that the average person will have no more than a 70% chance in adducing if he is talking to a man or machine. His goal was to reach a day when computers can ‘think’ like us.

    In pursuit of this goal, each year various ‘Turing Tests’ and contests are held all over the world.  With some variation, here is how they work:

    There are four judges in a room, each with a computer screen in front of them. They each communicate via instant text messaging with a different subject –one of whom is not real but a computer. After each of the judges alternate – giving each one a chance to talk to all three humans and the one computer – they must vote as to which of the three were humans and which one was artificial.

    This year, for the first time, a computer –claiming to be Eugene Gootsman, a thirteen year old boy from Odessa, Ukraine – fooled more than 30% of the judges. 

    While many respected news outlets questioned if this Turing victory was legitimate (for varied technical reasons), some could not resist running with the story and, some, even sought to tether this moment to matters of Jewish Law (halacha) in general, and the law of minyan in particuler (requiring ten adult Jewish males {and sometimes females, e.g. megilla, shul menorah, horog v’lo yaaver} to make up a quorum).

    Reporting for CNN and in an interview with JTA, R. Mark (Moshe) Goldfeder, a professor at Emory University, makes a bizarre and misguided – although sensational – claim:

    “[JTA] Theoretically speaking, say a robot walked into your office and said, “Rabbi, I want to count in the minyan.” Would that be enough evidence for you to count him?

    “[Goldfeder] Not necessarily. For the purposes of this discussion, I would accept the position of the Jerusalem Talmud in the third chapter of Tractate Niddah that when you are dealing with a creature that does not conform to the simple definition of “humanness” — i.e. born from a human mother or at least possessing human DNA, but it appears to have human characteristics and is doing human things — one examines the context to determine if it is human. When something looks human, and acts human, to the point that I think it might be human, then halachah might consider the threshold to have been crossed…. If I see something that for all intents and purposes looks human…I have a responsibility to treat all that seem human as humans, and it is better to err on the side of caution from an ethical perspective.”

    Wow!

    He is suggesting that it is within the realm of possibility that a computer/robot one day could be considered (a) a human (b) a male and (c) a Jew (and bar mitzvah, and a baar daas, and a bar chiyuva, etc.)!

    I imagine most readers would intuitively reject this; I certainly do.

    Although ‘Gootsman’ would make a fine Jewish last name that is as close as he will ever come to being a Jew.

    According to R. Goldfeder, would turning such a robot off be tantamount to killing?! That would give new meaning to ‘pulling the plug’!

    Would one fulfill the mtzvah of pru u’revu (‘be fruitful and multiply’) by creating such a robot? If one wishes to be consistent with the ideas of R. Goldfeder the answer would have to be ‘yes’ (see Sanhedrin 19b).

    There are many other tangents that his idea touches upon.

    For instance, what of free will?

    Or, how does R. Goldfeder account for the robot’s lack of a soul?

     Or, of it not being born to a woman (yulad isha)?[1]

    Even accepting his arguments for a moment, would such a robot be obligated in mitzvos? And, could one not obligated in mitzvos even count for a minyan?[2]

    However injudicious his publicly made assertion may be, didn’t he quote a gemara as proof, a Talmud Yerushalmi (Jerusalem Talmud) that said a creature not from a human mother or even possessing human D.N.A. would be, could be, a halachic human?

    Here is how he records/translates that same paragraph of the Yerushalmi in a forthcoming article he is working on (emphasis is mine):

    “ The Jerusalem Talmud in tractate Niddah has a fascinating discussion:

    (…)

    ‘Yet suppose it is entirely human, but its face is animal like, and it is learning Torah? Can one say to it “come and be slaughtered”? [Rather one cannot]. Or consider if it is entirely animal like, but its face human, and it is plowing the field [acting like an animal] do we come and say to it, “come and perform levirate marriage [yibum] and divorce [chalitza]”? [Rather, one cannot.]’

             “…According to the Talmud, when we cannot apply the usual biological definition of a human— which may in fact still be the general default definition for the status of personhood—then we apply the contextual definition of a human, if it fits.”

    A wonderful proof! Right?

    Well, it would be, if only that is what the Talmud says.

    This is all begins as a mishnah, and a corresponding stich found as well in the Babylonian Talmud.

    Here is the background: The rule is that when a woman gives birth to a child she becomes impure for 7/14 days and then is pure 33/66 days, depending on if the child is a boy or a girl.

    This law is explicit in the Torah.

    We will refer to this as the laws of leida.[3]

    The Torah laws of a leida apply to miscarriages, l’a, as well.

    In the third perek of Nidda, the mishna wants to know about a woman who miscarries at some point after 40 days of gestation, wondering at what point can we be certain, or assume, that what was issued from her was a-once viable fetus; specifically regarding an abnormally looking issue/fetus.

    No one is debating that the issue is human, rather, and based off of verses in the Torah, there is a requirement that in order to activate the leida laws at such a stage the issued fetus would have to also represent the human form, and not be in a from unrelated to any earthly creature.

    How distant from human form may it be to still activate leida laws?

    It is relating to this question that the mishnah records a debate between R. Meir and the Chachamim, focusing on a case where the miscarried issue doesn’t look like a human yet does look like an animal. No one is suggesting that it may actually be an animal or a hybrid creature!

    Indeed, chazal have stated elsewhere that a human and animal cannot possibly crossbreed a child (Cf. Bechoros 8a).

    The gemara goes on to suggest/seek to prove that when something is issued that does not take human form yet does have the form of an entity for which the term ‘vayitzar’ (‘and He formed’) is used in the Torah, then such an entity would be enough to activate the laws of leida.

    Right off the bat we notice that R. Goldfeder’s assertion that this is a discussion of an entity not from a human mother is wholly inaccurate.

    The gemara goes on to redefine the debate of the mishna, where everyone is in agreement that should the issue have the form of a human-looking head but with deformed animal-like body it would activate the laws of leida; but a deformed animal-like head with a human-like body would not.

    The gemara then explains that the debate in the mishna is only when the head otslef is given mixed-forms, e.g. one deformed animal-like eye and one human-like eye.

    So, all the gemara is teaching is that for the mother to become tammei (impure) she must issue something that represents some natural being.

    So uncontroversial is this gemara that it is recorded in the Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh Deah 194:3)!

    Humoring R’ Goldfeder for a moment, even if the gemara was discussing what he thought it was, such an allowance of viewing the issue as human would still only be true because of a presumption within a doubt. Meaning, even in his (wrong) reading of the gemara one could not then call an issue human when we know otherwise, for instance if R. Goldfeder walks by refuse in the street that is in the form of a human fetus. To relate even his mistaken reading of this Talmudic discussion to a robot counting in a minyan would be like saying that one is allowed to buy meat from a Kosher supermarket based on a presumption of innocence (chezkas kashrus) even if one saw them place treif in their packages!

    The gemara under discussion was only speaking about when we know that the entity under discussion came from a human; one can’t learn from here to a case when we don’t even know from where it came –and certainly not to a case where we know it came from a computer lab and not from a woman!

    Furthermore, the gemara was not referring to this entity actually surviving and living on, like a centaur! Rather only seeking to discover how it would activate a leida, a once halachik fetus (See shu’t Teshuvah M’Ahavah 1:530).

    It is when the Yerushalmi (7b in Slovita ed.; see also Bavli, Nidda 23b) makes this very point that R. Goldfeder misses the rhetorical, even sarcastic, nature and instead takes it at face value.

    Here is the reading of the very same paragraph he quoted above, in context:

     “Says Rav Mana (even according the chachamim who teach that an issue that looks like an animal with the head of a human is considered a fetus, and the other way around is not) this would mean that this human with an animal head can (in the future) be found learning Torah and then be told, ‘Come to your slaughter’!? And one with an animal body and a human head can one day be found to be working the field all day (like an animal) and then be told, ‘Come perform a chalitza or a yibum’?!”

    The Pnei Moshe (s.v. kulo) explains that Rav Mana’s point is that the discussion until now could not have been about a viable fetus that could live on as half man/half beast, and, chazal deliberated these issues as they relate to the laws of leida only, and nothing further.

    Yet, it is from this statement of limiting its discussion that R. Goldfeder –very publicly –seeks to expand it…to robots…and orach chaim!

    There are also more serious matters – matters of life and death – that result from R. Goldfeder’s assertion that such robots may one day count in a minyan. Halacha dictates that a minyan of Jews witnessing a performance of a sin would require one to accept martyrdom rather than to commit such an act (sanhedrin 74b; Shulchan Aruch, siman 157; Rambam hil. Yesodei Hatorah ch. 5, inter alia).

    There is no such thing as a pure leniency in halacha, and a ‘leniency’ regarding who/what one accepts in a minyan in shul may lead to a stringency in the laws of martyrdom.

    Indeed, (see megilla 23 and sanhedrin ibid.) the same verses are used to prove a minyan in shul and that for martyrdom.

    I contacted R. Goldfeder, who clearly spent a significant amount of time researching this issue, and while I disagree with him on even the remote possibility of such a future creation ever having a human or Jewish status, the issue of human-created entities and anthropoids has been discussed in classic sources.

    Over the next few paragraphs we will source from across our halachic history, quoting from the likes of Rav Chaim Soleveitchik, the Chazon Ish, and other poskim who touch upon these and related issues, showing that we already have precedent and stare decisis from poskim relating to these matters.

    Let us begin with the case of a Golem.

    Most famous of which, as it relates to our discussion, is a teshuvah written by Rav Tzvi Ashkenazi (d. 1718). In his work shu’t Chacham Tzvi (siman 93) he wonders if a Golem would count in a minyan.

    A Golem is a humanoid-like entity created through the Sefer Yetzira (the Sefer Yetzira is one of the oldest works of kabbala, mentioned in the gemara, and often attributed to Avraham avinu).

    [See Sefer Yetzira, Levin-Epstein ed. P. 84 where R’S Gaon comments that the Ibn Ezra once made a Golem. Also, see Ibn Ezra to sefer Yehoshua and Tehillim.]

    When the Chacham Tzvi asks this question, he shares how he heard from his father that Rav Eliyahu Baal Shem (d. 1583) once made a Golem and became so frightened that he destroyed it, but not before he was scarred!

    Rav Chaim Volozion reported (in his introduction to the Vilna Gaon’s commentary to Sifra D’Tzinusa) that the Vilna Gaon desired to make a Golem but stopped himself for reasons stated there.

    One argument for a Golem counting for a minyan (and as a Jew!), the Chacham Tzvi writes, is based on the gemara in sanhedrin (19b) that teaches that if someone teaches the son of his friend Torah, or if someone raised an orphan in their house, it is as if they gave birth to them.

    However, he brings another gemara (ibid. 65b) to prove otherwise. There the gemara tells us that the great amara Rava once created a person, which Rashi explains as an entity, i.e. Golem, fashioned through the Sefer Yetzira. Upon completion, Rava sent this creation to his friend Rav Zeira. When Rav Zeira tried to converse with the Golem it was unable to respond. Upon seeing the Golem’s inability to talk, Rav Zeira said, “You are a creation of my colleagues, return to dust (Rav Zeira ‘killed’ the Golem).

    The Chacham Tzvi explains that Rav Zeira was allowed to ‘kill’ this android being because it did not come from a mother. Based on a pasuk (Berieshis 9:6) only someone born from a mother has the full status of a human (see however Gilyonei Hashas [Rav Engle] Sanhedrin 57b).

    Even those who argue with the logic of the Chacham Tzvi, like Rav Tzadok of Lublin, agree that when it comes to a minyan in shul such creations can not be counted.

    Rav Tzadok Hakohen, Divrei Chalomos, records a dream from Wednesday night the 2nd of Shevat regarding the status of such creations…only to then argue with his dream! He ends by differing with some of the logic of the Chacham Tzvi, yet stating:

    “…But how can they be counted in a minyan for a davar sh’b’kedusha? Nevertheless, perhaps for a zimun (for benchting) [they can be counted] as we see we can count a child, this needs further clarification”.

    Sdrei Tahoros (Ohalos, p. 9) also questions the Chacham Tzvi, yet he too admits that when it comes to a minyan such entities may not be counted.

    It is interesting to note (see R. Aryeh Kaplan’s Sefer Yetzira p. xxi) that the expression used in the gemara when Rava created this entity was, “Rava Bara Gavra”. ‘Rava’ and ‘Bara’ are made up of the same letters, with just the beis and reish switched; and gavra as well is just the word bara with a gimmel added to it. These ten letters, together, equal exactly 612. This is significant, for when Man was created (see Bereishis 1:27) the targum known as Targum Yonasan [see Shaarie Ahron, Bereishis, ‘Introduction and Biographies’, ‘Targum Yonasan’; Toras Sheliema volume on Targumei Torah] teaches that the number of all the limbs in a human equals 248 and all the blood vessels equal 365, for a total of 613.

    [Compare Makkos 23b where the comparison is made between the 248 positive mitzvos and the same number of limbs in the human body, yet for the 365 negative mitzvos they compare it to the (rounded) days in the solar year. See however, Shlah in Toldos Adam, beis chama, tanyana, #30 and Zohar 1:170b where they conclude similarly to Targum Yonasan.]

    It could be that the gemara here is alluding to the fact that a Golem is almost a human but not quite (612 compared to the full value of 613).

    Fascinatingly, some even suggest that the term “Abracadabra” comes from abra k’adabara – I will create as I speak, the term one may use when creating through the powers contained in the Sefer Yetzira.

    The Chacham Tzvi’s two sons came to defend their father’s position.

    One son, Rav Avraham Meshulam Zalman (shu’t Divrei Rav Meshulam #10) brings from the holy mekubal the Ramak (Rav Moshe Codovero, d. 1570) who comments that Rava was allowed to ‘kill’ the Golem because it had no neshama, no nefesh, no ruach; it was just a ‘living thing’ (‘chiyus ba’alma’).

    (See Amudehe Shiva page 6b)

    In fact the shu’t Yehuda Ya’aleh (1:26) furthers this proof with the words of many poskim who teach that a sleeping person too can’t be counted in a minyan precisely because parts of the soul leave the body while asleep. THis would be all the more so true regarding an entity that never had, or will have, a soul!

    The Chacham Tzvi’s other, more famous son, Rav Yaakov Emden (Sh’ilas Yaavetz 2:82) demonstrates that the question does not even begin, and that certainly a Golem is not given any halachik status.

    He points out that a minyan has nothing to do with life; as a woman is not kosher for a minyan for davining yet is deemed alive!

    Further, teaching a dog to fetch does not make the dog a human, even though you gave it powers!

    Chazal share other things created with the Sefer Yetzira (a calf for Shabbos, see sanhedrin 65b), so that if a Golem is considered a human simply because it was created by a human, why not all other things created by miracles?! (See Shalal Rav, Bamidbar, p. 50)

    {The general question regarding if miracle entities take on that which they are coming to represent -e.g. manna that one wishes to taste like pork, a menorah lit with miracle olive oil, etc. -is deep and complex and well beyond our scope here.}

    Rav Yosef Engle (see Tiferes Yosef, Bereishis, p. 53ff footnote 180) seems to find a middle ground: a Golem may be human, but it is neither a Jew of a Gentile.

    From what we have seen, the fantastical view that a robot of today or tomorrow can/will/may fulfill the tripod of conditions necessary for it to count as part of a minyan  – A) human, B) male, C) Jewish –has no known source in Jewish scholarship.

    ____________________________________________

    R. Goldfeder composed a letter – that was published in Ami Magazine – in response to these columns:

    I am writing to clarify a position of mine that was unfortunately misrepresented in this magazine.

    I recently gave an interview with the JTA in which I discussed the idea of robots in halacha. The entire interview had a disclaimer, which appeared in print, that it was not to be taken l’maaseh, and was only a theoretical conversation.

    In that interview I referenced a famous Gemara in Sanhedrin, where the Talmud discusses the idea of a golem, a humanoid automaton, interacting with human beings. While Rashi writes that the golem here was made by ‘Sefer Yetzirah,’ which usually refers to a mystical text, medieval kabbalists such as Rav Moshe Cordovero explain that the sefer yetzirah referred to here was actually a book of natural science, and that the golem was not spiritual, just ‘a form, made out of dust, and by natural means it was made to appear like a man.’  This gives us our clear analogue to the idea of a robot.

    Halakhists throughout the centuries have been fascinated with this story. Famously, the Chacham Tzvi, and his grandson, Rabbi Yaakov Emden, both address the possibility of this golem counting in a minyan. They conclude that this golem could not, as it lacked any ‘intelligence whatsoever…he is no more than an animal in a human shape.” They did, however, leave open the possibility of a different golem actually passing that threshold. Interestingly, the Medrash tells us that Yirmiyahu HaNavi actually did it, he created a full human being, and he only destroyed it out of fear that people would begin to treat him like a god.

    The reason I am writing though is not to argue about whether or not these aggadas are true, or worth thinking about; people are free to agree or disagree that they are interesting. My point is that it is irresponsible and potentially harmful when a writer takes a quote from a piece like this out of context, and neglects to include the original disclaimer. I wish to make three points:

    1)  Obviously I am not of the opinion that a robot can actually count in a minyan, as I reiterated to the Ami author over the phone before the article was even written. I reiterate again that the entire discussion about robots in minyanim was only theoretical as stated in the original interview.

    2) Even regarding the rhetorical strawman that the author builds to tear down, unfortunately he got it wrong. After I had mentioned the discussion in poskim about golems in a minyan, the JTA interviewer asked me if, theoretically speaking, a human-like robot (which does not yet exist) would count. My response was “not necessarily,” even in this theoretical plane. I then made a related ethical point, based on a gemara in the Yerushalmi (the Gemara discusses the concept of treating something that looks human-like as a human, even when we are not sure,) because as ethical actors we should be machmir. The author of the Ami article ignored the earlier discussion about Sanhedrin, took that Yerushalmi, and wrote that ‘based on this discussion Rabbi Goldfeder reported to the world that it is possible for a robot to be counted in a minyan.” That is in no way true; I never made such a claim (explicitly stating that even in a theoretical world such a claim would not necessarily fly), and certainly any discussion of even theoretical minyanim was based on the gemara and poskim I had mentioned, not that Yerushalmi.

    3) While it is fine to disagree, even in theory, putting claims in another person’s mouth has no place in a Torah conversation.

    Rabbi Dr. Moshe Goldfeder, Esq.

    Senior Lecturer, Emory Law School

    Senior Fellow, Center for the Study of Law and Religion

    Director, Law and Religion Students Programs

    Adjunct Professor, Emory University Department of Religion

    Adjunct Professor of Law, Georgia State University College of Law

    Phone: Office- (404) 712-0213 Cell- (917) 301-8746   

    Email: mark.aaron.goldfeder@emory.edu

    ___________________________________________

    My published response to R. Goldfeder:

     I am certainly not the vanguard of halacha. My [weekly] column, while often touching upon halacha, does not make it a habit of zeroing in on what this-or-that rabbi said.

    However, what was published and publicly said [by R. Goldfeder] was, in my opinion, so over the top, and done so publicly, that it earned a response.

    R. Goldfeder wrote a piece for CNN,[4] and then gave an interview with JTA [5], and available for any reader to read and judge for themselves, where he expressed the strong possibility of one day –“probally 30 years” – a robot counting as a Jew and in a minyan.

    It was that last focus of his from which I quoted verbatim: JTA’s direct question about a robot joining a minyan and his direct response and source chosen.

    While I do not recall being told, and having it reiterated, that he ‘obviously’ does not believe a robot could ever count for a minyan -and I can certainly marshal evidence to the contrar -I do not doubt that the writer is sincere in that complaint.

    A public charge like this will have to await the yom hadin hagodol.

    I kindly remind the writer that as a courtesy he was sent an early draft of my article, which he heartily approved.

    Due to events in Israel the robot column was suddenly delayed, and while the final draft was different in many ways, what he’s complaining about here was already in the draft he approved, including the same one and only quote from JTA, my characterization of his belief that a robot could potentially be a Jew, and that I and the readers would intuitively reject this as even being a remote possibility.

    In the final published article, not one further quote of his was taken out, nor was any added, save for his translation of the Yerushalmi for which I requested (via email) permission (and received).

    If he feels that these points are not accurate, with his permission I would share that first draft, his response to it, and all our email exchanges.

    In addition, had he said to me what he is claiming here (that he would obviously never claim a robot could ever be accepted for a minyan), then, and with all due respect, I would have looked at it not so much as a clarification, but as a retraction. Nor would I have been the only one with such a take-away.

    The JTA reported: “From the practical legal perspective, robots could and should be people,’ Rabbi Mark Goldfeder wrote in an article published on CNN’s…“

    And this:

    “(Goldfeder) -In halachic terminology we would consider him [the robot] “nolad mahul” (i.e. born circumcised).” (!)

    And it goes on (also see the quote brought in the initial column).

    Should his beliefs be as expressed here in his letter to Ami, then I would think his grouse would be with CNN and JTA for initially misquoting him-both deeply respected news outlets-and not with me or Ami. Has he contacted them yet?

    It is noteworthy that his arguments here focus on many things other than the actual halachik arguments I made; nor does he even try to defend his proof from the Yerushalmi, the only error I had actually focused on.

    To his other points, in no particular order:

    1) I never claimed he was issuing a psak, and the words ‘potentially’, ‘maybe’, etc., always appeared when discussing his views.

    At the same time, this is not “nisht oif Shabbos geret” and one does not have carteblanche to say anything, nor is one granted immunity from criticism when expressing a stunning halachic view to the lay press, simply by saying, “It was theoretical.“

    Certainly no malice is intended when a publicly made wild claim is tested, and a source is shown to be in error.

    There was nothing in my column that one would not find in letters to the RJJ Journal of Halacha, and, indeed, in what I have received in response to my own errors.

    While my column never attacked this writer personally, I fear he took it that way, which was never my intention in critiquing his public Torah statements.

    2) He mentions a disclaimer, in print, that the entire article had, that this was not l’maaseh.

    I checked again, and there is no banner or warning, or even the word “disclaimer” in the articles I quoted.

    What I can only guess he is referring to is the following. In the midst of his exchange he says:

    “I should of course clarify that this entire discussion is “l’halacha v’lo l’maaseh,” a theoretical outlaying of views.”

    All bnei Torah know what is meant by l’halacha v’lo l’maaseh.

    Why, in his letter here, did he expunge this one crucial word from his quote?

    His were serious halachic arguments in defense of something he thinks/thought is/was a real possibility.

    Besides, most sefarim are expressly shlo k’halacha, and even those are tested for their logic and sources. Perhaps academia has other standers, but I think his colleagues would side with me and argue that a source given in support of even a theory, and certainly when published, is open to fair criticism, especially if it is a source that was so demonstrably misread.

    Besides, and humbly, even if he had JTA publish a clear disclaimer, I would still be in my right to challenge his very public assertions and connections. I am surprised that a professor, instead of explaining how my critique of his proof was wrong, would rather argue against my right to dare argue in the first place.

    3. He points us to his other sources.

    But I used his chosen response/source to the direct question of minyan!

    One should not expect salutations for quoting another gemara or source correctly, but should expect, and even desire, to be corrected for those taken out of context or in error.

    Besides, now that he explained that he would never believe that a robot could count for a minyan, I fail to understand what these are even sources for.

    For the edification of the reader, and in my opinion, none his other sources brought here or in his article/interview are any more relevant to robots. Should Ami allow I would gladly write a another column explaining why that is so.

    (Also, and for the benefit of the reader, the Chacham Tzvi was the father of the Yaavetz, not grandfather.)

    4. He writes here: “My response [in the JTA] was ‘not necessarily’ even in this theoretical plane.”

    I agree, and that is why “Not necessarily” was included in the published article in Ami.

    5. As the saying goes, ‘Extraordinary claims require extraordinary proofs.        ’

    Perhaps one day a chachom will make the case for a robot minyan being a theoretical possibility. Maybe it will be this same writer.

    Thus far, I contend, he has failed to do so, as well as failed to convince us that he didn’t try.

    I do not know this writer, whom I have every reason to believe is a fine Jew and yorei shomyaim. Surely he was aware why the JTA chose to call him, that his words were sensational, and what the response would be.

    At best, he made public remarks to international lay news outlets that could be easily misunderstood as suggesting that something he now says is obviously not possible is possible.

    While I stand by my reading of his words, bl”n from this point forward, if I ever mention this subject again–short of a correction from JTA –I will include all his statements, why I disagree with them, as well as his very clear statement here that robots could never, obviously, join a minyan.

    Moshe Taub

    [1] See Rashi to Berieshis 2:7, 2:25 where it would seem that refined speech, shame, and/or bechira are all possible candidates for what separates us from animals. Although, a robot would likely not even have a status of an animal, in the classic sense. Imagine taking your robot to the store to get fixed and having to, according to R. Goldfeder, warn the programmer about tzaar baalei chaim!

    [2] See Shulchan Aruch orach chaim, siman 55 regarding those not obligated in mitzvos counting for a minyan. See also Rav Tzadok of Lublin that we will reference below.

    [3] This is all found in Leviticus ch. 12, and does not come up nowadays for reasons beyond the scope of this chapter

    [4] As they appeared on the day of this writing: http://www.cnn.com/2014/06/10/opinion/goldfeder-age-of-robots-turing-test/

    [5] http://www.jta.org/2014/06/12/life-religion/should-robots-count-in-a-minyan-rabbi-talks-turing-test.

  • Common Shailos: Egg Checking

    Common Shailos: Egg Checking

    QUICK/SHORT POST

    April 2012

    Why do we need to check eggs for blood spots? And, if we are obligated to do so, how can we eat hard boiled eggs without checking?!

    M.G. -Cleveland, OH

    What an egg-cellent question! (Sorry, I couldn’t resist!)

    When we eat eggs we are relying on many halachic factors. We are trusting that these eggs come from a kosher bird, and that the eggs are not ‘ova’ eggs, which are eggs taken from slaughtered chickens (which would be cause the eggs to be considered either meat or treif, depending on how the fowl was slaughtered).

    Being that halacha has worked out the above, what remains is the concern of blood spots.

    Fertilized Eggs

    Eating a chick embryo is forbidden, as is eating any blood found in eggs. This is not due to the issur of eating blood proper, rather because the blood may be due to the beginning stages of the egg’s embryo (Chullin 64).

    In Vietnam there is even a delicacy called Balut, which is a seasoned egg where the embryo is partially developed –yuk!

    Because of the complexity of this halacha –and debates as to when and where it applies –some had a minhag of cooking three eggs at once (see shu’t Vayiverech Dovid 1:92, bottom of p. 317), this was likely due to balla bustas wanting an assumption of the majority being non-blood eggs, and so that if a blood spot is indeed found in one of them the other two would be ok to eat due to their majority standing (this minhag may also be based on a literal translation of the Rama 66:4).

     Nevertheless, it may surprise some to learn that even checking such eggs for blood was but a minhag, since the majority of even such eggs do not have blood spots (refer to Shulchan Aruch Y’D siman 66:6).

    The Shulchan Aruch states that they would therefore eat roasted eggs even though they could not first be checked.

    Nevertheless, the Rama records the minhag of checking such eggs, although allowing one to eat a mixture that contains an egg that had blood in it, bdieved (66:4,6).

    Battery Eggs

    Today’s eggs are laid by hens alone, without roosters. Meaning, they are not fertilized and the egg can’t ever turn into an embryo! Blood found in today’s eggs (which is rare since Grade A and Grade AA eggs are checked for blood before sale) is caused by fissures in the ‘mother’ hen that gets transferred into the egg.

    Due to maaras ayin we hold that such blood should still not be eaten (cf. Shach). However, by the letter of the law, only the blood spot need be thrown out, and the rest of the egg may be consumed. However, the minhag seems to be to throw out the the entire egg (Igros Moshe YD 1:36).

    Even though we should not need to check our eggs today –as even when we ate fertilized eggs, checking was but a minhag –many poskim hold that we should not abandon this minhag.

    The customer should be warned however that it is still possible to purchase fertilized eggs, and if such an egg were to have a blood spot then, by basic halacha, the entire egg must be thrown out.

    Conclusion:

    1 – Unless one has a specific minhag, there is no need to cook today’s eggs in pairs of three

    2 –If one finds blood in today’s eggs, one need not kasher the pot according to most poskim (cf. Taamei D’Krah, minhagei Chazon Ish) (Some have the minhag of leaving such a pot idle for 24 hours before using it next)

  • No Talking After Shul: Rabbis and Confidentiality

    No Talking After Shul: Rabbis and Confidentiality

    In January of 1973 a young political philosophy professor at the University of Toronto named George Will (PhD) began to write for National Review magazine. While he would eventually go on to win a Pulitzer Prize and to become a staple of American intellectual punditry, he, then, was having trouble coming up with new columns week after week; he approached the magazine’s founder, legendary writer, and father of modern conservatism William F. Buckley. “I asked Bill Buckley what I now know is the question most frequently asked of a columnist: How do you come up with things to write about. Bill’s answer was: “The world irritates me three times a week and sometimes a little more often. I don’t have any problem coming up with ideas.”

    Several weeks ago fellow contributor to Ami, Rabbi Mordechai Kamentzky, bemoaned the difficulty inherent in coming up with a relatively lengthy weekly column.

    While this is a common concern, and one that I share, somehow it works itself out for him, myself and others, and thousands of magazines are published weekly around the globe with tens of thousands of writers composing new and hopefully informative and interesting content.

    Writing a column on the rabbinate, sometimes, brings with it a related but somewhat reverse concern. Because rabbis, like lawyers, maintain the privilege of confidentiality – and may even be sued should they breach that trust – according to NY State law C.P.L.R. 4505, “…a clergyman… shall not be allowed to disclose a confession or confidence made to him…” – the most fascinating experiences that I have been fortunate enough to have been involved in can not be disclosed in these pages. In addition, the more interesting shailos, political quandaries, and counseling issues must never be even alluded to should the people involved become revealed. In fact, soon after I began to write this weekly column some members –and even friends- approached me to share their concern that I can easily reveal too much. Some have been hesitant to share sensitive matters with me. Of course, while an understandable concern, it is has been shown to have been unfounded as I would never disclose sensitive matters.

    In fact rabbis learn early on how to keep secrets, even if it harms them. Allow me to give an example: One weekday morning there was an avel in shul. This person was from Eretz Yisroel and came to Buffalo to bury his father. Because there was no minyan in his mother’s home he was planning on davening by us each morning, this day being the first. So the natural question was Do we say tachanun? In other words does a shul take on the status of a bais avel (shiva-house) in which tachanun is omitted, or, do we view it as a beis haknesses that an avel is simply visiting. What is more, many people did not even know that this guest was in the midst of shiva – as he was not acting as the shliach tzibbur, and the tear in his clothing went unnoticed.

    To be sure, this question is discussed by the classic sources (e.g. Mishnah Berrura 130:20). Generally a shul will not take on the status of a beis avel and tachanun would therefore be recited. But this halachah is not a zero-sum organism, as certain undisclosed facts can change entirely the final law, as there can be circumstances in which a shul would have a quasi-status of a beis avel and tachanun would then not be said.

    Because of certain facts that I could not reveal to my balla battim, gabbaim, and certainly not in these pages I decided that tachanun should not be said. This was based on certain facts as well as a precedent set by Reb Shlomo Zalman Aurbach (See for example Ishei Yisroel, page 266, footnote 75-77 for a comparable ruling).

    So when I announced to the gabbai not to say tachunun he had no choice but to follow, although he did not even know an avel was in shul. One guest came over to me and asked the reason behind my ruling. I explained to him that there was an avel davening with us. “So what? The Mishnah Berrura says…” I tried to stop him short by quoting the very same Mishnah Berrura hopeful that informing him of my knowledge in this area would foster some trust and calm him down. This did not work, and this man made a point of putting down his head for tachanun in front of me.

    Rabbi Yisroel Reisman is quoted as once remarking “A non-Jew will never know the thrill of not having to say tachanun on Mondays and Thursdays”; apparently this man never got that memo.

    Now, I do not completely fault this individual; he did not know me and based on the information he was given, in his mind, I had made a huge blunder. While it would have been freeing to simply explain the facts not known to him, I could not do that and I, although momentary, looked like a fool.

    More stressful than the above example is the fact that I cannot reveal things to my wife.

    There is a married member in my shul who is –remotely, through Yeshiva University – working on attaining his semicha. A part of the YU semicha process is a wonderful shimush program. So, using me as his ‘mentor’ he is allowed to sit in during meetings and counseling sessions –should the relevant parties consent. (As an aside: what a wonderful image of achdus (unity) to have a musmach from Lakewood work with a candidate musmach from Yeshiva University!)

     Some weeks ago he had sat in on a passionate and intense session. It lasted deep into the night and when it was time to go home he asked if he could talk to his wife about what had transpired. After all, he explained, she sacrificed the evening so that he could attend. I explained that this too is part of rabbanus and its training; that however painful it is, one’s wife must not only be kept out of the loop but, and this takes real strength, be convinced that there is nothing even going on.

    Much has been written of late of the pressures of the rabbinate, but none hold a candle to this one: the most natural thing to be shared between spouses is work frustrations, yet, for a Rav this must not happen.

    We see the idea of confidentiality in many of the events in Sefer Bereishis.

    Sarah, so shocked at the suggestion of a future child, laughed. But was not Avraham, at the end of Lech Lcha, already informed about this joyous future event? Would he not have told Sarah already?

    According to the meforshim who explain that Yitzchak was ignorant to Eisav’s evil ways: was not Rivka told through a navi at the beginning of the parsha regarding the true nature of her sons? Indeed, that is how she knew to make sure the Yaakov receive the berachos! Why then did she leave Yitzchak in the dark?

    The Ramban (18:15 and 27:4) asks these questions. It is beyond this column to go into the reasons that the Ramban offers (see also Netziv as it relates to Rivka), but it suffices for us to make the following remarks: how easily could have Rivka vindicated herself and her subterfuge-like actions! How delighted would have Avraham been to be the one to reveal to Sarah –as soon as he heard –that her dream of bearing a child would soon come true! But, for whatever holy reason, they had to keep quiet and leave their respective spouses in the dark.

    What a nisayon!

    Many years ago, Rebbitzen Pam z’l was sitting by a wedding when some ladies asked her how she was managing with all that was “going on” in Torah V’Daas during a famously, and public, trying period. Bewildered, Rebbetzin Pam looked at them and said sincerely, “What is going on in the yeshiva?” The whole world was talking about it at their kitchen tables, but Rav Pam – who worked there! – knew to keep quiet, and his wife may have been the one person left who was oblivious to the shameful talking. So, this column shall continue, the best stories concealed, and proper order preserved.

  • Keys, Kiddush and Memories

    To everyone on the outside, someone else’s job almost always seems like a mystery.

    “What do they do all day”, “How does it work”, etc. are common questions we think but dare not ask.

    Perhaps this is why certain professions, like doctors, teachers, lawyers and accountants –aside for the obvious reasons, always garner respect. We know how theyspend their day, we have their job figured out.

    My oldest and youngest daughter were heard talking on the way home from shul last Shabbos.

    “So, Hadassah, you know we are moving soon, right?”

    “Of course I know that!” replied the five year old.

    Wondering how far she has thought this move through, she proceeded to ask her younger sister about the move, and in particular, why another shul wants me to be their rabbi.

    The five year-old looked up and said, “Everyone knows why! Because they need someone to make kiddush after davening”!

    There it is; my job distilled down to allowing people to begin to eat!

    But the truth of the matter is that she touched upon something very real. There is no job description for a rav and indeed there may be some people (hopefully just a few) who only want to encounter the rav when its time for him to make kiddush.

    Others are looking for a posek. Still others are looking for an entertainer, or a master sermonizer. Others may be inspired by someone who is down to earth – in fact, recently a ben Torah told me, in all sincerity, that a rav who does not follow sports can’t be a rav in America! Yet others are looking for dry academics, someone who can get into the minutia of Tanach, dikduk and Jewish history. The list continues: the counselor, the writer, the peacemaker, and yes, the kiddush-maker.

    Over the next few months I will discuss, on and off, the job of rabbanus proper. In particular, we will discuss the probah process, and how a shul and a rav choose, and how one approaches a shul that is new for the rav but is already home to its balla battim. This is both because – after my announcement Pesach time in these pages that I would be leaving my current position for another – it was requested by a few that we delve into in to this ‘secretive’ subject, and, because there is little else on my mind these days other than rabbanus, my choices, challenges and changes.

    Asked once if was ever nostalgic for his youth, Yogi Berra is said to have replied with a sigh. “Ah, Nostalgia…”, now looking into the distance, “…it ain’t what it used to be”

    Sometime our past confronts us, forcing its way onto our hearts and minds, demanding that we pay it heed.

    I am told that I am ‘moving on’ –a term that is a misnomer if there ever was one, as one never moves on from a place that retains a piece of one’s heart and soul.

    As I begin to pack up my sefarim I can’t help but feel nostalgic, wistful.

    Each sefer I grab reminds me of a shailah, a shiur or a drasha for which I mined its contents.

    `

    As I clean out my shul office drawer I find old letters and notes. The family picture that once stood on my desk of a young married couple and their, then, one daughter. The correspondence sent from a prisoner who was slowly becoming frum with the help of his weekly Ami. The note left on my desk from a visitor who questioned a psak I once made during davening and had told me he would ask his own rav upon his return to Israel- he did, his rav to my surprise was Rav Shmuel Vosner zt’l, and he, thankfully, concurred (his exact words were, “For Buffalo it was correct”). The letter I received from a member who was deeply hurt, understandably and regrettably, by something I had mentioned in a drasha; the note left on the door of the shul one day last year from a member of the New York State Highway Dept. letting us know that they accidently knocked down a lechi of our eruv, explaining further that they were fearful of fixing it themselves out of concern of making an error (amazing!!); the phone message note from a women who called one erev Rosh Hashanah just to let me know that she was visited by Elijah the night before and that she would be appointed as moshiach in a month or so (she still calls the office every several weeks).

    My mind raced back in time twelve years, just a few weeks before I moved here. I was walking through the aisles of ShopRite on Highway 9 in Lakewood when I bumped into an old friend I had learnt with in Rav Dovid Soleveitchik. When I mentioned I would be moving, and to Buffalo of all places, he told me the following story about Rav Mordechai Weinberg, rosh yeshivah of Yeshiva Gedoleh of Montreal, and my father in law’s rebbe. I have never verified this story, but its lesson is spot-on and has never left me.

    As a yungerman in Yeshivas Rabbeinu Chaim Berlin, Rav Weinberg was known as one of the premier yungeleit. He had a gift of dealing with younger bochurim and talking to them in learning. One day he is called into Rav Hutner’s office. The rosh yeshiva explains that his excelling has not gone unnoticed and that, as all excepted, they want to give him a position in the yeshivah.

    At that, Rav Hutner reached into his drawer and pulled out a key to the dorms. “Here” he said as he handed Rav Weinberg the key “I want you to be the dorm counselor”.

    Mystified, Rav Weinberg took the key. Rav Hutner noticed Rav Weinberg’s surprise, and understood that he was likely expecting a more ‘prestigious’ position in the yeshiva like shoel umeishiv or even giving a shiur of some kind.

    Rav Hutner held the key in Rav Weinberg’s hand and said, “I am giving you a shlissel (key)! With this shlissel you can just be a dorm counselor or use it to begin something special. Only you can decide which door to open with it. A shlissel is a powerful thing”

    There in the cereal section of the Lakewood ShopRight my friend concluded that Rav Weinberg used his shlissel to perfect his methods of dealing with young men, eventually opening up his own yeshiva in Montreal.

    This is an invaluable lesson. As with any occupation or performance we can either be a seat-filler, a paycheck receiver, or a man with a shlissel that can open any and all doors. While I certainly have regrets, projects not yet finished or never started, this story has often galvanized me throughout my tenure, and I hope its lesson will never fade as I embark on a new journey.

  • Vaccines: A Selection of Its Halachic History

    Vaccines: A Selection of Its Halachic History

    May, 2015

    For A More In-Depth Discussion, As Well As For The Full History Behind Each Of The People The Tiferess Yisroel Mentions, See My Handouts On This Topic. Go To: https://www.sefaria.org/sheets/177158?lang=bi

    With the recent outbreak of measles (last year there were about 400 deaths per day), the subject and controversy surrounding vaccinations, while never quite dormant, once again resurfaced into the mainstream.

    Potential contenders for the 2016 presidential race are being asked their views on the matter, and rabbanim are being asked by schools what, if anything, they need to or must do.

    In this week’s column I will go through some of the halacha and history relating to vaccines. While a short column cannot do justice to this important subject, I hope it will at the very least serve to whet the readers’ appetitive and encourage the reader to research the matter in greater detail by perusing the source material provided at the end of this column.

    I am keenly aware that many are quite passionate about this subject. Let me state that I am not a doctor. While I made the choice to vaccinate all my children right away, this column is simply to give a brief overview of some of the halachic matters this subject touches upon.

    The debate regarding immunization and vaccines go back hundreds of years. One of the founding fathers of the United States, Benjamin Franklin, writing in his autobiography states:

     “In 1736 I lost one of my sons, a fine boy of four years old, by the smallpox taken in the common way. I long regretted bitterly and still regret that I had not given it to him by inoculation. This I mention for the sake of the parents who omit that operation, on the supposition that they should never forgive themselves if a child died under it; my example showing that the regret may be the same either way, and that, therefore, the safer should be chosen.”

    About eight years before the death of Mr. Franklin, in the city of Hazdeutsch, Rav Yisroel Lipshutz, was born. He would become the great Rav of Danzig (d.1861) but would be most famous for his magnum opus, the Tiferess Yisroel commentary to all of mishanyos. Virtually every Jewish home owns at least one set of mishnayos that contains this masterful work.

    Aside from his commentary to the mishnayos themselves, this work is also celebrated for its careful and encyclopedic reviews and introductions to a number of complicated halachic themes and topics. As well, Rav Lipshitz would often give us a glimpse into matters pertaining to the science and medicine of his day. From the discovery of dinosaurs, the age of the universe and the dateline, the Tiferess Yisroel was unique in the subjects he tackled.

    One of his most fascinating tangents of his is to be found to his commentary to Avos (chapter 3, first entry to Boaz). There he discusses the difference, in his view, between Jew and Gentile. Being that chazal make clear that, unlike other systems of faith, we believe that one need not be a member of our nation to enter olam habah (Sanhedrin 105, Rambam Hil. Melachim ch.8), he seeks to understand why, then, chazal in other places seem to describe Jews, and Jews alone, in certain positive categories.

    Before he goes on to offer a beautiful explanation, and further theorize as to how indeed we are to view wonderful and law-abiding gentiles, he lists for us the many gentiles to whom we owe so much, sometimes even our lives, and how unfortunate it would be if we have a misguided sense of their standing in this world and the next.

    Two examples he brings that stick out are Gutenberg, of the Gutenberg Press, without whom so much Torah could have been lost, and Edward Jenner, the creator of the first modernized Smallpox vaccine through which “tens upon tens of thousands were saved”.

    I would even surmise that many of us would not be here reading this if not for Jenner’s vaccine.

    The one ‘error’ here is that it was not ‘tens upon tens of thousands’ who were saved, rather, until this inoculation was created and used close to a half-a-million Europeans in the 18th century alone died due to Smallpox. In the first half of the 20th, due to many not having access to the vaccine, it had wiped out not a half-a-million people, but close to a half-billion people!

    By the late 1970’s the World Health Organization was able to announce that the disease had been eradicated.

    This was an amazing feat, considering the blight that had always been Smallpox – why, even one of the early Pharaohs (Ramses V, whose tomb was discovered about 100 years ago) was found to have traces of smallpox!

    Although Smallpox no longer poses a threat in the classic sense, it is still a threat in warfare, and indeed the Israeli army immunized tens of thousands of its members in case, R’l, such a chemical attack take place.

    Then as now there are risks related to vaccines. Flu vaccines carry a one or two in two million Guillain-Barré syndrome (GBS) risk. Some vaccines carry risk of allergic reaction. The measles, mumps and rubella vaccine, popularly known as MMR, has long been anecdotally tied to autism (the medical world, wit large strongly dismisses this last assertion).

    Would halacha still sanction such inoculations?

    For example, while the Salk polio vaccine carries no risk of contacting polio, it does not protect from giving small trace amounts to others; the Sabin polio vaccine however protects others as well, but indeed carries a small risk of infection in the one being immunized (about one in two million).

    May one take such a risk?

    Once again, we turn to the Tiferess Yisroel. In his commentary to Yoma (8:3 Boaz 3) that regarding ‘inoculation’ (a word he transliterates into Hebrew) where there is a one in one thousand chance of even death, it would be permitted as the risk of an outbreak is even worse.

    While Rav Neurwirth did not feel that this was enough to obligate parents to inoculate their children (although it was certainly cause to urge them), Rav Elyashiv, at least regarding certain vaccinations, seemed to feel that parents have an obligation to do so (quoted by Rabbi Akiva Tatz in his Dangerous Diseases, Dangerous Therapies, p. 48 ff).

    It is questionable if one can ever ignore a government law requiring vaccinations, as indicating by the last line in a published letter from a beis din in Lakewood to a school principle on this topic, and from shu’t Tzitz Eliezar 15:40.

    Yet, many states have allowed an out through a religious exemption.

    I have heard some claim that the rule of shomer pesaim Hashem ‘Hashem guards the simpletons’ -which teaches that certain accepted practices, even if they carry some risk, are allowed – should allow them to take on the risk of not inoculating their children.

    This, in my view, is a specious argument.

    For, even if they are correctly applying this rule (which alone seems fallacious as it pertains to vaccines, not to mention that it also puts others at risk) this does not mean that they must avoid it! For example, it is one thing to suggest that shomer pesaim allows one to smoke cigarettes, but quite another to assert that this rule, and ergo their religion, tells them that they must smoke!

    In other words, even assuming their application of this rule is correct, it does not seem to fall under a religious exemption, in the sense that their religion demands that they refrain.

    Further, if they are asking the state to go against their values (the state’s) because of their (the parents’) understanding of the Torah, then might I ask these parents to do the same? Challenge your own beliefs by reading the copious Torah halachic material on the subject, found listed below.

    The greatest non-medical inoculation against disease, the most profound health security, is to surrender to an objective Torah view, no matter which side one stands on.

    (I have only included the below the English articles on this subject, so that all the readers could have access to them)

    1 – ‘Compelled to Inoculate: May Parents Refuse Vaccinations for Their Children?’ By: Rabbi Aaron E. Glatt, Dr. Fred Rosner, Rabbi Yitzchok Breitowitz, and Rabbi Zev Schostak

    RJJ Journal of Contemporary Halacha

    2 – ‘Vaacination In Jewish Law’ By: Rabbi Alfred Cohen

    RJJ Journal of Contemporary Halacha

    3 – ‘Vaccination in Halakhah and in Practice in the Orthodox Jewish Community’ By: Rabbi Asher Bush

    Hakira: The Flatbush Journal of Jewish Law and Thought

    ‘Halachic Attitudes Toward Immunization’ By: Rabbi Yigal Shafran

    Tradition Journal

    4 –’Dangerous Disease and Dangerous Therapy in Jewish Medical Ethics: Principles and Practice’ By: Rabbi Dr. Akiva Tatz

    Targum Press

    5 –‘Vaccines In Halacha’ By: Rabbi Tzvi Hirch Haber

    TorahLab

    6 – ‘Halachic Aspects of Vaccinations’ By: Dr. Edward Reichman

     Jewish Action

    7 – ‘Vaccinations: An Exploration of their History, Development, and Halachic Ramifications’ By: Deborah Zharnest Journal of Torah and Science

  • Making-Up (On Shabbos) Is Hard To Do

    Making-Up (On Shabbos) Is Hard To Do

    March, 2022

    1. Preamble

     Over the years I have met some extraordinary individuals and often cannot remember how we first came into contact, or worse, the details of our conversations.

     Some years ago, I had the zechus to have a phone conversation with Rav (Dr.) Yaakov Greenwald (d. 2019). Rav Yaakov was an American original. A true tzadik and osek b’tzorchei tzibbur. He used his knowledge in mental health -of which he was a frum pioneer – to counsel many thousands. Famously (and reported by his son in an article published one year after his father’s passing) the Satmar Rebbe once was discussing the phycological needs of one of his chassidim. At the end of the conversation, the rebbe humbly asked “What about me? What would the doctor be concerned about? What issues should a rebbe look out for?” Without hesitation, he answered the rebbe’s request. He shared the famous mesorah that to understand the true essence of a term, word or concept one should find its first occurrence in chumash. The initial time the Torah shares the concept of something not being good is when Hashem states, ‘lo tov heyos ha’adam lavado-it is not good for man to be alone’. He explained that a gadol b’yisroel, especially a rebbe, must always be concerned about loneliness. The Satmar rebbe was astounded at this swift wisdom.

     There are two things I recall from my phone conversation with him. The first is discussing his letters to the Steipler. He would often write to him, asking how to deal with certain patients, especially those whose mental suffering or anguish were affecting their avodas Hashem. OCD, for example, may be difficult to differentiate from one simply being overly machmir. Many of these letters have been published.

     And then, there was the story he shared. When Rav Yaakov Kamanetzky moved to Monsey, he would be called for any number of communal matters. He shared that the many began to become concerned regarding a laxity of tznius in town. The question was how to deal with it. The rabbanim decided that they will invite all the women of the-then-smaller town to a communal event where they would speak to them about the importance of this mitzvah as well as to teach many of the pertinent halachos. They also decided that it would be best of the rosh yeshiva would be the one to open this event with divrei beracha and a shiur on the topic. However, when he was asked, Rav Yaakov gave an atypical negative response, turning them down. When asked why he would not speak at such a gathering for women about tznius, Rav Yaakov responded, “Because…its not tznius”!

     As a halacha teacher in a Beis Yaakov, I have always refused to answer any question that centers around tznius. This is not only because of the above story, but for an additional reason as well: every bas yisroel needs to find a female role model in this area. It could be a mother, an older sister or student, or a rebbitzen. Issues of nashim should be brought to her. Of course, should a serious matter arise, her personal rav should be called, and I would never negate that.

     In addition to the above two reasons, is a third: effectiveness. A lesson would be more enhanced and taken to heart if it comes from someone who better understands the sensitivities and challenges involved. I also say this as a afather of four daughters, kn’ah.

    1. The Issue

     Nevertheless, a few weeks ago, when I sat at my desk to begin my hilchos Shabbos class a student raised her hand and -speaking for the class -asked if we could discuss makeup on Shabbos. This was not pat of the curriculum for the year. It soon became clear that the issues involved were greatly misunderstood by the class -and perhaps the reader as well. I therefore spent that morning explaining its backround, and became convnvced that a short article on this same subject could also be useful.

     What I share below is only meant so as to take these facts to your rav or to a frum female mentor.

     There are certain miktzoas, subjects, that the classic pulpit rabbi wisely avoids. Halacha demands that under certain conditions, and at times, it is better not to go out of one’s way to teach halachos when there is a real fear that it would then be ignored by some in attendance.

     In our day, however, I find that, within reason, these subjects could -and should-be taught. It must be done with sensitivity, of course.

     The classic example is hilchos chol hamoed. Those without a classic yeshiva backround (and some with) are often unaware of the severity of these days, and that their ability to go to work may be contravened. I have found that if done in the right setting, and with pikchus, those attending are only gratful…and have many, many shailos.

     However, the one topic that I nevertheless have been tempted to avoid (unless asked a shaliah, of course) is the issue of makeup on Shabbos. There are any number of reasons for this, hameivin yavin, and in addition it could lead to shalom bayis issues in a multitude of ways.

     However, since the start of Covid I began a Zoom shiur where we have been reviewing hilchos Shabbos in their totality. We are up to shiur number ninety and yet have yet to even touch upon the thirty-nine melachos -as Shabbos is so chock-full of Torah and halacha aside for just these (e.g. kiddush, seudos, neros, amira l’akum, muktzah, psik reisha etc.). This weekly shiur took a brief hiatus over tishrei due to the yom tov season. Upon our return last week, I decided to open with something that would get people animated therby helping to regain our momentum. I further explained to the group that slthough the topic I chose related to a melacha, we would return to havdala (where we are holding) the next week.

     “This is not a derasha, you are not a captive audience and you came because you desire to learn about Shabbos. And so, let us discuss the ‘third rail’ -makeup on Shabbos”.

     This wasn’t my first time. In Buffalo, I gave a similar hilchos Shabbos shiur. The office sent out an email for that week’s shiur and its topic, “Shabbos Halacha: Makeup Shiur”, it said in the subject line. No one showed up! I thought it was due to the topic, and only later learnt is was because the title confused them -they thought it was a Shabbos makeup/review shiur!

     Several years ago, a sincere couple from Brooklyn asked to meet with me. They were earnest yorei shomayim, and wished to find a haskama for their new product. It was a blush or rouge that was fashioned in a way, they felt, to be used on Shabbos itself. I am not one -nor am I worthy -to write haskamos. But even if I was, this would not be a product on which I wished to be an official part. Instread, I shared with them why they were having a hard time finding a rav who would give his imprimatur. They had done extensive research into the sugya, and much of hwta I shared was likely nnot new to them.

     There are two types of Shabbos makeup. The first, is a series of different and typical makeup products that are long lasting. These are made to be used on Friday afternoon, as they will last till after Shabbos. Sadly, because some of these are marketed as ‘Shabbos Makeup’ some mistakenly assume that its meant to be used on Shabbos itself, leading to much confusion of these forthcoming halachos. This is simaler to the ‘Shabbos Mode’ oven. There too, I have seen where, some, assume that when this mode is on it allows one to place pre-cooked food inside the actual oven or warming drawer. Of course, this is in no way the case (it serves only to avoid light issues, as well as to circumvent automatic twelve-hour shut off, and other smaller issues of inconveince).  Why would such long lasting makeup be an issue?

    The mishneh and gemara offer the example of a woman who puts
    on certain types of makeup as being assur on Shabbos (perhaps not a Shabbos concern for men; see Mishneh Berurra 303:79). The only debate found there is if this is a Torah or rabbinic violation (see Shabbos 94b-95a). The issue at hand is the melacha of tzoveah/coloring. The Shulchan Aruch codifies this ruling, as well as Rashi’s view that even the act of placing (sticky) dough on her face so that its removal causes rosy cheeks would also be forbidden on Shabbos (siman 303:25). While most take the view that makeup is a rabbinic violation, this may be due to the coloring taking place on one’s skin (see Mishneh Berrura, ibid.); meaning, nail polish application may be a biblical violation (its removal
    may also be an issue; other makeup removal is often allowed on
    Shabbos).
    In addition, when it comes to lipsticks, creams, packed powders and brushes there may be a variety of other melachos involved, aside for tzoveah.
    The reader may now be wondering, ‘Based on the above, how could there possibly be erev Shabbos makeup?’. In a very brief teshuva, Rav Moshe Feinstein writes, “…and so too it is forbidden for a woman to color her face, due to tzoveah, but to throw white powder (he would later [5:27] identify that he was referring to ‘talc’) on her face, which is short lasting, would not be tzoveah”.
    Although, many disagree even with this allowance (Rav Shlomo
    Zalman Aurbach quoted in Shemiras Shabbos K’Hhilchasa
    14:note#148).
    In a later teshuvah (ibid.), Rav Moshe mentions the possibility of
    allowing even colored powders if they should fit the talc criteria (no oils, loose, short-lasting, etc.). Yet he concludes that it would still be hard to give a general allowance.
    Nevertheless, there are some poskim who would certain makeups,
    and under certain conditions (Rav Ovadia Yosef, Rav Chaim Noeh, et al.).

    It is also critical for the reader be aware that in cases of need (such
    as scaring, burns, deformities, and even, at times, shalom
    bayis/shidduchim reasons, etc.) a rav should be consulted (see Piskei Teshuvos, 303:14, note #74).
    When that couple left my office after letting me test their samples, it took days until I cleaned the powder up -it was that loose and oil free!
    So, what should a woman do? Speak to a rav; or do as my wife did:
    she spoke to the wife of a prominent posek, who was both familiar with her husband’s psak as well as able to explain his criteria to another woman with ease and makeup expertise.
    While a sensitive topic, it must be reviewed from time-to-time. And, we must never use the above information to embarrass anyone. Torah should never be a weapon, only a darchei noam.

  • Is Snow Muktzah on Shabbos & other Sundry Snow Halacha

    Is Snow Muktzah on Shabbos & other Sundry Snow Halacha

    Let’s First Share Some Quick and Basic Rules

    1 – While it’s best to salt snow and ice before Shabbos, one may salt snow and ice on Shabbos if needed.

    2 – Shoveling soft snow is permitted for areas needed on which to walk. 

    3 – Shoveling hard and packed snow should be avoided if possible. 

    4 – Either way, one should seek to avoid any strenuous shoveling.

    5 – It is better to be safe and at home than in shul and putting oneself in any danger. 

    6 – Please check on neighbors and friends to see if they are in need of any aid and Stay Safe!

    …. And now, for the interesting background!

    (The Following Was Written In 2015 for Ami Magazine by Rabbi Moshe Taub)

    “Chateichem kashanim kasheleg yalmbinu…your sins shall become white as snow” (Yeshayahu 1:18; see Tehhilim 51:9)

    Everyone complains about the weather, but nobody does anything about it!

    Attributed to Mark Twain

    Just as Nachshon ben Aminadav (see sota 37) had to ‘take the plunge’ into the yam suf with the faith that Hashem would protect and save him from its elements, so too many of us must brave the storm to make it to shul -while others should rather stay home.

    During such weather events, anyone who is ill, has a medical condition, or is otherwise not confident in their walking mustn’t try to be a hero.

    Let us discuss snow in Talmudic lore, leading us to its many fascinating shailos.

    The gemara (yoma 35b) famously tells us of the time two great leaders, Shamayah and Avtalyon, were learning until the morning. When the beis hamedresh was not becoming lit at daybreak, they looked up at the skylight expecting to see a cloudy morning. Instead they saw the image of a man! Hillel, after moving to Yerushalaim at the age of forty, famously had climbed to the roof so as to hear their Torah, for he could not afford to enter that day.

    As Hillel lay there, a sudden storm arrived during the night and buried him!

    Already in mishanyos (e.g. Mikveos ch. 7) we find discussion of a mikveh made out of snow.

    Rav Zevin zt’l, in his celebrated sefer ‘L’Ohr Halacha’, dedicates a whole chapter on snow in halacha. In fact, there is an entire sefer dedicated to snow in halacha, titled ‘Hanosein Sheleg’ (by Rabbi Yishai Mazlomyan)!

    This sefer includes over one hundred questions posed to Rav Chaim Kinievsky regarding snow.

    I recall as child wondering if a beracha would need to be recited on snow.

    It may surprise some readers to learn that there is no beracha on snow! (Please do not try it for yourself!)

    Rav Chaim Kinievsky was further asked why it needs no beracha of special praise, whereas other natural phenomena has unique berachos. He responded, “Because it is just hardened water!” (Hanosen Sheleg p. 194).

    Nevertheless, there still may be another, special, beracha. The Shulchan Aruch (siman 227:1) rules:

    “…on lightning and on thunder and upon winds that blast mightily one makes an oseh maaseh Bereishis (beracha). If one wishes they may make shekecho u’gevuroso maleh olam”

    { -see Mishnah Berrura regarding our present minhag of making only ‘maaseh bereshis’ upon lightning and only ‘shekocho’ upon thunder}

    So while snow would not, in-and-of itself, require a special beracha to be recited, major storms may. Each rav, during each storm, would need to decide if that bar had been reached.

    Perhaps one could argue that this is not considered a food and as such would require no beracha. In fact the gemara(Nidda 17) says just that –snow is neither a food or a drink!However, even that gemara points out that intent matters.

    Some point to a midrash (Eichah Rabba4:10) where it discusses those who drank snow, giving it a food status, neccesitating a shehakol(for other views, see Kol Tzvi, vol.11).

    As for a borei nefashos according to this view, likely one would not make any beracha achronah as one does not eat/drink a shiur within a single halachik eating session (I hope!).

    See also shu’t Btzel Hachachma 3:114.

    More questions abound regarding snow, some often coming from children.

    Let us briefly discuss the most common shailos:

    May one make snowballs on Shabbos?

    Shemiras Shabbos K’Hilchosah says it is forbidden, being similar to boneh. Others are lenient. Rav Chaim Kinievsky writes that it is worthy to refrain.

    My own youngest children –being loyal Buffalonians – were so excited when they saw the snow one Shabbos morning that they asked to play with it in the backyard –making ‘snow-angels’ and the like.

    Is this allowed? The truth is that this question in not merely ‘child’s play’, as it brings up the allowance of even walking in the snow on Shabbos!

    It would seem the answer depends on which of two views one holds by. Allow me to briefly explain.

    The gemara (Shabbos 51) teaches us that one may not ‘crush snow’ on Shabbos for its water that will come out (the rishonim debate the reason for this law, which is beyond the scope of our purposes here).

    This prohibition is called ‘risuk’.

    However one is allowed to cause ice to melt by, say, placing it into a cup of soda.

    Furthermore, the Shulchan Aruch (320:13) rules that one may walk upon snow on Shabbos even though this will certainly crush/melt it.

    The Mishneh Berrura offers two reasons for this last leniency:

    • Either this is allowed because there is no intent to melt the snow, or
    • (quoting others) it is because since the prohibition of risuk is merely m’derebanan, and since not allowing us to walk outside would be impossible for many to observe, chazal purposefully limited this injunction to exclude walking on snow.

    So, as for kids playing upon the snow in the backyard, if we accept that chazal were only not gozer regarding walking on snow – then playing may be forbidden. However, if the reason that walking is allowed is because the intent is not to melt the snow then for kids playing too it would be allowed.

    Often with storms there is an assumption –based on an estimate made by the rav –that the eruv is down.

    Is, then, the snow gathered on clothing and shoes on the way to shul a problem if there is no erev? So long as one does not draw the snow purposefully on oneself this would not be an issue.

    Is Snow Muktzah? May One Shovel It?

    The status of snow on Shabbos begins, in a sense, with the great Rav Tzvi Pesach Frank.

    Rav Frank was one of the leading poskim of the last generation. Arriving in eretz yisroel in 1892, he had already studied under the greatest minds in Europe, including being zocheh to once attending a shmuez given by non other than the venerated Rav Yisroel Salanter.

    Eventually he became the rav of Yerushalim. Rav Frank’s biography as a posek and a rav-to-be-emulated deserves its own entry, but for the purposes of ‘snow’ we will look at but one incident with which he had to wrestle.

    It was February 2, 1957.

    The United Nations, on this date, called for all Israeli troops to leave Egypt after ‘Operation Kadesh’ (yes, named after the same Sinai peninsula, ‘Kadesh’, found throughout the Torah)

    It was also Rosh Chodesh Adar.

    It was also Shabbos.

    It also snowed heavily in Jerusalem.

    This was not your average Jerusalem sprinkling of snow; this was a real storm, a blizzard perhaps.

    In fact, I found The Associated Press’ archive footage and pictures of the day after this storm: cars stuck in snow banks, kids making large snowmen, and makeshift tools being used to clear the roads.

    This was an event.

    The morning of Shabbos rosh chodesh Rav Frank was besieged with one question more than all others: “Is snow muktzeh?”

    In particular, as he writes in his Shu’t Har Tzvi page 288, after this “sheleg gadol“, many wanted to know ascertain if they may shovel on Shabbos, specifically their roofs that were not built to handle the weight of such snow.

    At first this may seem like a simple question –one that must have been discussed numerous of times throughout the generations, and to which there is an accepted practice.

    But this would be incorrect, as there’s a paucity of early sources discussing the issue.

    Rav Frank begins his response by proving from numerous sources that snow –even freshly fallen on Shabbos –is not deemed muktzeh or nolad (a previously ‘non-existing’ item).

    For one, he points to the gemara, quoted above, discussing the prohibition of risuk – crushing ice and snow on Shabbos.

    After disallowing that act, the gemara goes on to say that one may however place snow or ice into a beverage – even though this will cause it to melt.

    Clearly, then, the gemara was not concerned abut handling snow so long as one is not crushing it for its liquid.

    The Chofetz Chaim comes to the same conclusion regarding rain, even fresh rain that fell on Shabbos.

    But, as we already alluded to, although few discuss this issue, not all agree.

    While this may confuse rabbanim, what is worse is that this debate bleeds into another debate; one that is between two of the greatest research tools of our time…Artscroll and Feldheim.

    These two acclaimed publishers each have a wonderful sefer–written in English for the layman and rabbi alike –on the laws of muktzeh.

    Imagine you are stuck in your house on Shabbos due to a storm. Unable to contact a rav, you may look to your English lukuttei halacha.

    So, you open Artscroll’s ‘Hilchos Mukzteh’ by Rav Simcha Bunim Cohen where he writes, “Snow is not muktzeh even if it fell on Shabbos” adding the caveat “so long as it has some use”.

    To be double check if there are any other views, you then open Feldheim’s  “Tiltulei Shabbos’ by Rav Pinchas Bodner. Although he brings two opinions, he spends much of the space focusing on the view that snow is indeed muktzeh, supporting this strict view by quoting HaRav Moshe Feinstein, who paskened (to him) that snow is muktzeh. In fact, this was later published in his teshuvos (5:22:37).

    So, to end your confusion, so you take out Feldheim’s Hilchos Shabbos by Rav Eider z’l -so to be ‘machriah beineihem’. He writes (emphasis mine), “Although rain or snow that fell on Shabbos is not muktzeh…” bringing this psak from none other than Rav Moshe Feinstein himself!!

    (How to explain this seeming contradiction in Rav Moshe’s rulings is beyond our purposed here)

    At the end of the day, most rabbanim I have spoken to seem to rule that snow is not mukzteh. This is supported by Rav Frank, Rav Elyashiv and most who discuss this issue.

    Yet the question remains: Even if not muktzeh, would shoveling be allowed?

    For one, there is this from the BBC:

    “A study looking at data from 1990 to 2006 by researchers at the US Nationwide Children’s Hospital recorded 1,647 fatalities from cardiac-related injuries associated with shoveling snow.”

    I always believed that the reason why shoveling poses such a health risk is due to sweating. The chochmas hobrai olam made it so that our bodies will inform us when we are overworking ourselves. The most obvious sign is sweating. 

    Hence the risk, as shoveling is done in the cold and one’s body does not react as it would if this activity was done indoors, thus potentially causing people to overlook their limitations.

    Based on this study it would seem that shoveling is indeed a strenuous activity, and perhaps the type of which one can’t perform on Shabbos. For this reason one who does shovel on Shabbos would have to limit it to a basic, simple path. If this path is long, and the snow deep, then help should be delegated out so that one person does not do such work.

    Speaking of sweat, there is a prohibition of exercising on Shabbos. As brought in Shulchan Aruch, one cannot work his body in a way that produces sweat. Shoveling will likely not fall under this law because the person who is shoveling is not doing it for his health, rather for his peace of mind. The exercise prohibition is only activated when it is the intent.

    Rav Tzvi Pesach Frank does have a caveat to his allowance: He explains that one may only shovel if the snow is soft. Once it hardens it may be deemed as part of the ground, resulting in the prohibition of soseir (destroying), according to some views.

    There are many more questions: May one ski to shul? What about sledding? If the roads are icy, may one skate on Shabbos?

    These too are discussed and debated, and will be left, perhaps, for another time.

    Let me end with an amazing story about shoveling snow, as told by the Brisker Rav, who would cry each time he said it:

    In Volozion, each time there was a heavy snowfall –even if all the roads were closed, the path to Yeshiva was always clear.

    The bachurim were perplexed and set out to investigate the matter. The next time there was a snowstorm they would wait out and see how this comes to be.

    Sometime later a blizzard hit. The boys set out and waited. Suddenly, before dawn, an image appears…it was their holyrosh yeshiva Harav Chaim Volozion with shovel in hand!

    The navi tells us “chateichem kashanim kasheleg yalmbinu…your sins shall become white as snow” (Yeshayahu 1:18; see Tehhilim 51:9).

    It is interesting that snow is used as a reference to purity but also as a symbol of sin (by tzaaras). Perhaps it is because even something that is to be pure, if used in the wrong way, can be a path to sin.

    Through our observance of halacha during such a challenging Shabbos may we be zocheh to the whiteness of purity, and, if we experience snowfall again, may it be with all of us together in Yerushalaim habenuyah.

  • Killing the Captured Terrorist & Ethics of War

    When peace comes, we will perhaps in time be able to forgive the Arabs for killing our sons, but it will be harder for us to forgive them for having forced us to kill their sons. – Golda Meir

    The questions of the ethics of war may seem oxymoronic. Isn’t the purpose of war to kill people and destroy things?

    However, halachah is replete with guidelines for ethical conduct in war, to the point of warning us not to cut down fruit trees in the heat of battle. Indeed, after the Iraq invasion of 2003, the American administration was reproached for not defending landmarks and artifacts more carefully. It would seem that as Jews, we should relate to such a charge.

    Recently The Jerusalem Post covered issues of halachah and war, in particular the treatment of captured killers and terrorists. While there are many issues that fall under this rubric, we will focus here on the issue of whether a subdued terrorist may be killed. What follows is a discussion of Talmudic law and not of practice.

    From the article:

    “Several senior rabbis have raised a heated debate in the last few days over the approach in Jewish law toward a terrorist who has committed a terror attack but is subsequently wounded and incapacitated. …

    “Rabbi David Stav said that the nation was facing trying and difficult times but insisted that a terrorist who has committed an attack but has been wounded and therefore no longer represents a threat should not be further harmed.

    “‘In these days in which the blood is boiling…it is important to preserve our moral superiority: [We must] not harm those who are not involved in murderous acts, and we must not harm those who have already been neutralized and do not represent a threat,’ the rabbi ruled.

    “Rabbi Shmuel Eliyahu, municipal chief rabbi of Safed, reacted to Stav’s comments and said a terrorist who had committed murder should himself be killed.

    “’It is forbidden to leave a murderer alive,’ Eliyahu told the Galei Yisrael radio station on Wednesday. He accused Tzohar rabbis of ‘forgetting Jewish law’ and said ‘they are only interested in looking good to non-Jews.’”

    This is a most serious issue, one best left to our greatest poskim and those who live in Eretz Yisrael. Following is a review of some of the factors involved in making such a decision.

    First, Rav Moshe Feinstein, zt”l, recognized that not all cases are equal when it comes to imposing the death penalty for a criminal act. In a famous teshuvah to the governor of New York,1 he outlined how halachah views the death penalty. Rav Moshe sought to dissuade the governor from using the death penalty, explaining that one of the reasons the Torah prescribes it is to impress upon us the egregiousness of certain acts and that the halachic bar is set too high to allow regular use of such punishment.

    Nevertheless, he ends with the following message: “The above is true regarding crimes of passion…but if people are killing because of cruelty and because the lives of others are meaningless to them…or if there appear to be many murderers,” a country must do what is in its best interest.

    It would seem that a country that is under constant attack and is therefore in a perpetual state of war has every right at least to consider whether such terrorists deserve to be put to death by the state.

    Noncombatants

    It should not suprise the reader that such serious questions have been discussed throughout the generations, beginning with an event early in the Torah itself.

    The Ramban and Rambam famously debate the general question of war as it pertains to ostensibly innocent civilians. The debate, which is based on Shimon and Levi’s battle over their sister Dina’s abduction, is germane to the question of captured terrorists.

    The Ramban believed that Shimon and Levi’s decision to kill all the males of Shechem was an error, one for which Yaakov reprimanded them. After all, why should the city’s ordinary citizens have been held accountable for the action of their leaders? How could they have stopped it?

    Rambam, however, believes that the citizens were not powerless; in fact, they had failed to fulfill the universal obligation to establish justice systems. Because setting up courts is one of the seven Noachide laws, those who fail to do so are equally liable to death.

    In Gur Aryeh, the Maharal seeks to combine these two views. He suggests that although, on one hand, the civilians of Shechem cannot be held responsible, the rules in a time of war are different. A nation must respond to threat with force so as to end present and future danger, and this means that civilians may be affected. While this position is not an argument for the capricious killing of civilians, the Maharal does seem to support strategic strikes even if noncombatants will be harmed.

    A quick look at modern warfare would support a silent secular agreement with the Maharal’s view. From the United States’ recent bombing of a hospital (purported to be an accident) to the more than 100,000 victims of the bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, which brought World War II to an end, it seems that world powers are resigned to such carnage when it is absolutely necessary.

    In the case of a captured terrorist, therefore, it seems there may be support for a country under attack to carry out unceremonious executions of captured killers, since this is a means of deterring the enemy.

    Rodef

    Even when in a situation involving two Jews, the Torah makes it very clear that one is allowed to kill a pursuer (rodef) in self-defense. We should also point out parenthetically that the Bach and the Shach discuss the issur of retzichah and whether it is suspended during a time of war for the zayin amim.2

    Although a terrorist is clearly a rodef, a halachicpursuer whom we are permitted to kill, we can only do so if there is no other way of stopping him. As Chazal point out, if one can stop a pursuer by shooting him in a limb, for example, that is all that would be allowed. Someone in captivity is already immobilized, so what allowance would there be to kill him based on the principle of rodef?

    One may argue that a subdued terrorist should be seen as a passive pursuer. This means there are times when the mere presence of an innocent person is dangerous3—for example, a case where a baby’s crying will alert the enemy to one’s presence, or when the enemy orders a community to hand over an innocent person on the threat that they will all be killed otherwise. In such a case, halachah will sometimes view the innocent person as a rodef.4

    Based on this idea of a “passive rodef,”perhaps one can argue that the fact that we choose to keep enemy prisoners alive and in relatively good health during a time of war only emboldens the enemy to continue killing us. Astonishingly, the average weight gain among al-Qaeda detainees in American hands is about twenty pounds!5

    However, all of this is academic as many poskim contend that the halachah of dina d’malchusa (adhering to modern secular law) outweighs the halachos of redifah. This means that even if a cogent halachic argument can be made for putting to death a captured killer, there would be little an IDF soldier could do about it legally.

    Sofek Rodef: A Possible Future Rodef

    The issue of prisoner exchanges is a related—and volatile—issue that we have discussed in the past (see issue 43, “Gilad Shalit: Sundry Matters”). According to those poskim who favor such exchanges, killing the terrorist may mean eliminating a real negotiating tool. This is not to support such an argument, of course, but simply to raise awareness of it.

    Indeed, strong disapproval of such exchanges based on the argument that they may result in Jewish deaths may actually be an argument in favor of execution, because it prevents dangerous terrorists from being returned to the street. Yet at most, such an argument would only make the captured terrorist a safek rodef (possible rodef).

    Aside from the fact that the principle of dina d’malchusa dina eclipses such arguments, Rav Chaim Ozer and many others6 argue that a possible rodef is not the same as a rodef.

    Geneva Conventions

    Even if we could resolve all of the dilemmas raised thus far, perhaps the most critical issue is how the state of Israel and halachah should view the rules of war established at the Geneva Convention, as well as various United Nations agreements.

    Rav Chaim Jachter, after a lengthy treatment of the issue of killing innocents in wartime, cites the following passage from The Case for Israel by famed professor Allen Dershowitz, in support of the argument that not all international laws, or countries following them, are created equal:

    “Although collective punishment is prohibited by international law, it is widely practiced throughout the world, including the most democratic and liberty-minded countries. Indeed, no system of international deterrence can be effective without some reliance on collective punishment. Every time one nation retaliates against another, it collectively punishes citizens of that country. The American and British bombings of German cities punished the residents of those cities. The atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki killed thousands of innocent Japanese for the crimes of their leaders. The bombing of military targets inevitably kills civilians.”

    In other words while there are certainly agreements like the Geneva Conventions, there seems to be surreptitiously accepted understandings, practices and immunities in a time of war. This is without even addressing the latest United States targeted drone killings, which some argue are questionable according to a strict reading of codified international law.

    Chillul Hashem

    Above all, we must be mindful of chillul Hashem.

    Let us conclude with the words of Rav Yehudah Henkin, grandson of Rav Yosef Eliyahu Henkin, one of the great poskim of the last generation, and the father of Eitam Henkin, who was murdered along with his wife, Naama, during Sukkos in what is now viewed as the beginning of the current wave of attacks.

    In his halachicwork Bnai Banim7 he focuses on questions similar to the ones we have raised here. He writes that even in war, regardless of what halachah permits, we also must be concerned about chillul Hashem.

    He points to Sefer Yehoshua (ch. 9), in which the Givonim fool Bnei Yisrael into entering into an alliance with them and allowing them to remain alive. The Gemara8wonders why this treaty was not voided as soon as the ruse was discovered. The Gemaraanswers, “In order to sanctify Hashem’s Name”; Rashiexplains that Yehoshua was concerned about the Jewish army’s reputation among the nations if it did not honor its treaties.

    It is of interest, I believe, that while the Gemara uses a positive expression (“due to a kiddush Hashem”), the Rambam, in codifying as law the story of the Givonim,9 uses the negative (“due to a chillul Hashem”). The indication is that even during a war, when defending ourselves is a top priority, we must find ways to prevent a chillul Hashem—as well as going out of our way (if it won’t put lives at risk) to create an active kiddushHashem.

    May we achieve both of these ideals, maintaining our achdus as we debate these serious matters. And may these attacks end quickly, leaving all such questions academic in nature as we herald Moshiach Tzidkeinu.

    NOTES

    1. Igros Moshe Choshen Mishpat 2:68.
    2. See Shulchan Aruch Yoreh Deah, siman 158:1. Regarding the application of this concept today, see, for example, Rambam Hilchos Melachim 5:4, and Tashbeitz 93.
    3. See Rama Yoreh Deah 157:1 et al.
    4. See note 20 in Rabbi Bleich’s “Torture and the Ticking Time Bomb” for further details on this type of rodef.
    5. USA Today, 10/3/06. See also the thorough study conducted by Seton Hall’s Center for Research and Development, which reports that 50.67% of the detainees housed there are overweight!
    6. See the strong words of Rav Moshe in Choshen Mishpat 2:69:4.
    7. Vol. 3, maamar 4, page 4, 185-194.
    8. Gittin 46.

    Hilchos Melachim 6:5.

  • Are Our Mezuzos Kosher? A New Debate Highlights an Old Problem

    Are Our Mezuzos Kosher? A New Debate Highlights an Old Problem

    LENGTHY/DETAILED POST

    Rabbi Moshe Taub for Ami Magazine – June, 2023

    The act of purchasing mezuzos or tefillin (“sta”m”) can sometimes seem time consuming, expensive and confusing. However, as a recent controversy demonstrates, it is much worse: it is an act strewn with landmines.

    Unlike our careful purchase of food—which comes with kosher certification, thus giving the consumer real agency over what he chooses to eat—how does one even begin to know who wrote the mezuzos and other sta”m he buys, and with what method?

    Several weeks ago, a socher (seller and middleman) of sta”m was on his way to America with merchandise to sell to American middlemen and sofrim. Such socherim will often book these flights in advance in the expectation that they will have an adequate supply of items to make the business trip worthwhile.

    As the date of his flight inched closer, this socher recognized that he was still a little short of goods. He needed about 50 more ksav Arizal mezuzos to better assure a fruitful trip.

    On an email group for sta”m brokers, middlemen and “shadchanim,” someone shared with this anxious American-bound socher that he could supply him with what he needed, adding that he had seen the ksav of these mezuzos and it was magnificent. Even better, although a reliable mezuzah retails for about $200, these were somehow 10% cheaper and could be had for around $180 apiece. This “shadchan” was able to deliver these mezuzos to the socher just as he was making his way to his flight through Ben-Gurion Airport!

    Upon arrival in the US, one of his first stops was in Williamsburg, where he displayed the items he had brought to sell, but first, and wisely, brought the precious sechorah to Rabbi Shimon Zeide, an accomplished and experienced sofer, to be checked.

    Rabbi Shmiel Aharon Traube, the owner ofBeis Hastam in Boro Park, fills in the details of the events that followed.

    “Rav Zeide right away spotted that something was wrong,” Rabbi Traube said. “These mezuzos looked too similar to each other; too uniform.” In other words, they seemed as if they had been printed rather than written. He contacted Rav Avraham Tzvi Wosner, the acting rabbi and bochen of the Vaad Mishmeres Stam, and also sent out copies to some fellow sofrim and talmidim of the Vaad Mishmeres Stam.

    As will be explained in the course of this article, unless one purchases directly from the sofer, trying to figure who wrote any mezuzah or other sta”m is an extremely painstaking process. To borrow a term from law enforcement, it is unfortunate that a “universal chain of custody” doesn’t (yet) exit for sta”m before it reaches your Judaica shop.

    After establishing that these mezuzos had passed through four to five hands before their arrival in America, it was finally confirmed from whom they were first purchased. The “sofer”had been found!

    As Rabbi Traube shared, “Rav Shimon Zeide called this man him up and said, ‘Why are you selling some type of printed mezuzos?’ The man responded, ‘They’re not printed. I have a new method of writing mezuzos so that they all come out the same.’” Rabbi Zeide wanted to know how he could be sure that this new method was kosher. He didn’t receive a satisfactory answer. It was later revealed that this man was not a sofer at all (rather, he hired others to produce mezuzos using his new method); henceforth, we will refer to this person as the “innovator.” In response to this phone call from Rabbi Zeide, the innovator sent out a letter written by the renowned dayan Rav Seriel Rosenberg, the av beis din Rav Nissim Karelitz’s beis din in Bnei Brak, dated Motzaei Shabbos Parshas Vayeira 5783 stating that this writing, as described, would be considered kesivah.

    But the sofrim investigating these mezuzos still had doubts, and after examining them closely made a startling discovery: They looked as if they had been written using a stencil!

    a stencil mezuza in uestion

    Rabbi Traube then headed to Eretz Yisrael, bringing some of these questionable mezuzos along with him, and went to talk to the innovator himself. “I went to his house, and he wouldn’t let me in,” he recalled. “But he did come outside, and we spoke for about a half-hour.” During this conversation, the man refused to explain what his exact method of writing was.

    However, two weeks later, and after much confusion among sofrim, Rav Rosenberg wrote a second letter (dated the first day of Rosh Chodesh Kislev 5783)explaining that his first letter wasn’t intended to confer approval of any mezuzos; it merely commented on the method that had been described to him by this fellow. In fact, as this second letter concluded, he had subsequently learned of the possibility that the innovator wasn’t telling him the whole truth.

    Five days later, Rav Rosenberg’s son-in-law, Rav Posen of Ramat David, wrote a letter clarifying that both letters were in response to information his father-in-law had been given by this innovator. He reiterates that no hashagachah was ever given nor implied, nor was there any way of knowing how these particular mezuzos were even created—only that some type of stenciling method was used.

    In the interim, Rav Brach of Bnei Brak, a Satmar rav who is known to be an expert in sta”m, had issued his own letter stating in no uncertain terms that these mezuzos should be considered passul, quoting the Shevet Halevi(Rav Wosner) who paskened that any form of stenciling or silk screening is invalid.

    Rav Brach then shared that after forcing a meeting with this innovator (which took much prodding), he could now assert that while this person was claiming that a kolmus (quill) is used, the mezuzos he had put on the market were actually created with a brush! This was no different from a previous controversy some 20 years earlier that had ended with all major poskim forbidding that practice. (In a letter written to Rav Posen dated 13 Kislev 5783, Rav Brach detailed his interactions with this innovator and explained why such mezuzos were passul.)

    While all of this was happening, mezuzos from this innovator were being sold in Flatbush! And the ambiguous letter from the beis din—which in fact cast doubt on his method—was being used to show Judaica shops that his mezuzos were fine!

    In the meantime, the American sofrim, especially Rav Leizerson in Lakewood, continued to investigate and share vital information with Rav Rosenberg and his beis din.

    The fact that Rav Zeide was the person who first opened these mezuzos was very fortunate, as what he discovered might not have been otherwise discerned. In fact, when they were shown to a number of extremely well-regarded sofrim, they all said that they would have never been suspicious.

    (See Next Page For Some Selected Images Of The Recent Letters Thus Far Mentioned)

    What is Silk Screening?

    A few explanatory remarks are in order here. Stencil writing, also known as serigraphy or silkscreen printing, is an ancient craft. In modern Hebrew, it is commonly referred as Schablone or defus reshet/meshi.

    The basic idea is similar to the children’s arts and crafts projects we all enjoyed when we were young. For kids, however, the letters or pictures are cut out of a hard substance like plastic, which is then placed on a piece of paper and filled in. Classic silkscreen printing is different. It requires the use of a taut material that can be perfectly aligned with the paper so the words will be clear when the ink is applied.

    A couple of decades ago, someone developed a quicker and cheaper way to use this method to write sifrei Torah. As you can imagine, this caused quite an uproar. It worked as follows:

    The sofer would lay a sheet over the klaf. This sheet had “windows” cut out to form each letter. (Indecently, the letters were shaped by a computer.) Ink was then poured onto the sheet, squeegeed down, the sheet was removed—and voila! Absolutely beautiful kesivah! An entire column of Torah could be created literally in seconds!

    The response from the gedolei haposkim was unanimous, unequivocal and harsh. Among others, Rav Elyashiv, Rav Ovadia Yosef, Rav Nissin Karelitz and Rav Scheinberg all expressed astonishment that such a process was being used. (Unfortunately, by the time it was discovered, many sta”m items created that way were already on the market.) Rav Elyashiv wrote that not only were those who used such methods wrong to do, but even those who sold them were “machti es harabbim”(causing the public to sin).

    New But Different?

    The “innovator,” however, insisted that his method was different from the technique described above, thereby—in his opinion—eliminating the concerns of the poskim. Instead of the poured ink/squeegee process, the sofer used his own quill to fill in the windows.

    Would this make a difference in the halachah? Let us examine some but not all the issues raised 20 years ago and see if they can be applied here:

    • Chazal explain that safrus must be written and not spilled (Yerushalmi, Shabbos 4; Gittin 2-3). Regular silk screening seems to be in direct violation of this requirement.
    • We are required to verbally sanctify each of Hashem’s names as they are being written (Orach Chaim siman 32:19 and Yoreh Dei’ah siman 276:2). Classic silk screening would not seem to allow for this.
    • The issue of dyo, the ink that is used for sta”m, is well beyond the scope of this article. But there would seem to be a need for special ink when utilizing such a process.
    • The obligation for sirtut (etched lines)may become compromised, as according to some poskim, such perfect “writing” would remove the prerequisite for sirtut, which we cannot do (Rav Moshe Feinstein).

    Interestingly, the Chasam Sofer writes that if a sofer utilizes the power of nistar to suddenly be able to write with his less dominant hand, this would not be considered natural and hence kosher kesav (shu”t Chasam Sofer 6:29)!

    In centuries past, the poskim issued similar concerns when it came to writing sta”m with a printing press (see shu”t Zereh Emes, Yoreh Dei’ah, 117, et al).

    But there is yet another, and perhaps most serious, concern with standard silk screening. This relates to the issue of “chak tochos” (scraping and erasing). There is a clear halachah that letters in safrus must be formed through addition and not subtraction. In other words, one cannot scrape ink away, thereby leaving behind the shape of a letter.

    This halachah has far-reaching implications. For example, if a blob of ink drips from a sofer’s quill and makes a splotch on a letter, he isn’t allowed to scrape it away to reveal the letter underneath (Gittin 20a; Orach Chaim siman 32:17). Many rishonim explain that the reason is that in such a scenario, the letters wouldn’t be formed by “regular” writing. (See Meiri in Kiryas Sefer, maamar 2; Rashi on Gittin ad loc and Tosfos on Sanhedrin 21b.)

    Would these concerns extend to filling in a stencil with a kulmos?

    A Sofer Demonstrating What This Innovation May/Would Look Like

    (A Sofer Demonstrating What This Innovation May/Would Look Like)

    Even if one could prove that these mezuzos are being written the way the innovator claims – and so far, this seems doubtful to me and almost everyone involved; some assert that he is really using a brush, either in the initial creation of the letters, or, after using his quill, and so as to fill in any gaps and to make it more clear –  the question he posed to Rav Rosenberg was only about the kesivah. There are still many other matters involved.

    What about the sirtut (these are the etched lines that all sta”m must have)? Using the above method would easily—and almost always—lead to sirtut misaligned with the kesivah, a potentially very serious issue! And what about the dyo/ink? The ink used for the process he described would most likely need to be different, for reasons beyond our scope.

    There are many additional problems with such mezuzos, such as how the final mem and samech could possibly be made al pi halachah with such a stencil (think about a children’s stencil, in which the letter “O” or the number “0” is divided into parts), or the fact that Shulchan Aruch Harav (siman 32:32) requires that the sofer have kavanah while forming the letters (no “spacing out” or writing by rote).

    However, all the above is just the halacha.

     In order to truly understand why so many dismissed this innovation out-of-hand, irrespective of the halachic shailos involved, we must now shine a spotlight on the contemporary world of sta”m.

    Statistics

    While there are many amazing sofrim in our midst, there are also some whose work is less than stellar. And then there are those who have no business writing at all. Concerns relating to sta”m are not unique to our generation. The Chasam Sofer lamented the state of sta”m in his day as well (shu”t 205). Here are some examples of gedolim throughout the ages expressing similar frustration:

    • The Rivash (d. 1408) writes, “What can we do about those sofrim who aren’t proficient and forsake halachah for their own benefit” (shu”t Rivash146).
    • The Radvaz (d. 1573) testifies that he once checked 300 pairs of tefillin and they were all passul (shu”t Radvaz 8:6)
    • The Devar Shmuel (d. 1694) complains that most people look for cheaper prices and that almost all such tefillin are likely passul (Sefer Zichronos 9:3)
    • The Levush (d. 1612) blames all the above on those who write sta”m who either don’t know what they are doing or are simply looking to make money: “Asidin litein es hadin ulekabel onshum harbeh me’od—Hashem is going to punish them very harshly” (Levush, siman 32:20).
    • The Sho’eil Umeishiv (d. 1875) writes that “many of those who call themselves sofrim in our day have no clue about hilchos sta”m” (in his haskamah to Keses Hasofer).
    • Rav Chaim Palagi (d. 1858) once passuled every single sefer Torah in Izmir (shu”t Lev Chaim, Orach Chaim 174). He also writes, “The length of this galus is aided and abetted by the fact that so many people aren’t curious consumers and end up wearing tefillin that are passul, created by sofrim who aren’t proficient (Tenufah Chaim siman 432)
    • The Ben Ish Chai (d. 1909) once passuled all the retzuos tefillin in Bagdad! And his grandfather once passuled everyone’s tefillin (Rav Pealim, Orach Chaim 4:2)
    • The Chasam Sofer writes that that people who believe all those who write our tefillin are knowledgeable about sta”m “lo hayah v’lo nivra”(no such thing is even remotely true)! In fact, some are public stumbling blocks! (Likkutei Shu”t Chasam Sofer 83)
    • The Aruch Hashulchan writes, “In our generation, those who think they can write sta”m have increased like locusts. There is one city with hundreds of ‘sofrim,’ but the majority lack yiras shamayim”(Yoreh Dei’ah 182:9).
    • More recently, the Klausenberger Rebbe (shu”t Divrei Yatziv, Orach Chaim 38:2) and Rav Moshe Feisntein (his haskamah to Yalkut Tzuras Ha’osios) bemoan the fact that people are purchasing sta”m with zero information as to who wrote them. In many cases, and certainly if the writer isn’t knowledgeable enough, one can almost guarantee that they are all passul. Amazingly, the Rebbewrites that until he commissioned a new sefer Torah, he challenged those in his own beis midresh to find even a single kosher sefer Torah among the ten in the aron! (B’veis Yatziv, p.130).
    • This list is incomplete (see Sefer Sta”m, p. 303-317 for even more historical sources).

    Several years ago, Rav Eli Gutnick, a renowned sofer in Australia, published some statistics that would stop any ben Torah cold:

    • Only about 20% of sofrim have a ksav kabbalah and are frum (Rav Gutnick contacted me to explain that this term means that they, e.g. “…dress in heimishe levushim, are serious about learning Torah, aren’t known to be batlanim, etc”. It would also include a Lakewood or YU musmuch who may not have ‘levush’ yet who went on to receive a real ksav hakaballa, and who is known to be a serious Jew)
    • An additional 15% are frum but lack a ksav kabbalah.(This is like semichah, butfor safrus.) Without a ksav kabbalah, it is impossible to ascertain if the sofer is even aware of the myriad halachos of sta”m or is up to date about the latest concerns. Numerous knowledgeable sofrim have told me that any sta”m from such individuals should be assumed to be passul.

    This poll (while using the best methods available was still, admittedly, unscientific) was taken in 2014. Rabbi Gutnick now admits that the number of sofrim with ksav kaballah is even lower, and that these days the majority of even heimishe and bnei Torah sofrimdo not have one. All in all, only 35% of sta”m is being written by sofrim who those who frumJews of any background would label as bnei Torah! This begs the obvious question: Who is writing the rest?

    A full 50% (!) are not proficient in any way, and would run the gamut of character and observance. There are many “shababnikim”—yeshivah dropouts in need of parnasah who can now exploit their background to make money. While some of these are still frum, many are unfortunatelynot.

    It gets worse; much worse.

    Fifteen percent of the people who are creating mezuzos, etc., are Arabs, Chinese or women. Some sta”m in this category are printed.

    Of late, there have been several Chinese sta”m “companies” whose skilled laborers can produce some pretty realistic sta”m. When I shared this with a ben Torah friend, his sincere but naïve response was, “I didn’t know there were so many Yidden in China!”! There are also clubs in Israeli universities where Arab students learn to write mezuzos in their spare time to make some money on the side.

    What all of this means is that one has the same statistical odds of purchasing sta”m from a ben Torah with true shimush or a ‘degree’ of some type in this field as he does from an Arab or Chinese person!

    It should go without saying that none of this information is meant to disparage the many real sofrim, as they have zero control over what an Arab or a non-shomer Shabbos Jew or am haaretz does. Rather, this information is meant as a warning to consumers as to what’s floating around out there and how dire the situation is.

    One simply needs to make a cheshbon of how many sofrim he knows or live in his community. Then consider how many shuls there are in the neighborhood, each one with at least five sifrei Torah (of course, some scrolls will be older ones not included in the above statistic). Then continue adding up the number of mezuzos in each house, plus the tefillin and megillos. As one renowned sofer expressed, “Even with the knowledge that the vast majority of sofrim are in Eretz Yisrael, the numbers still don’t add up!” The gedolim are aware of this, and many ideas have been suggested to bring safrus under some type of control.

    The reader is likely thinking, “This is all very unfortunate. But I live in city X, with a nice-sized frum population. This doesn’t affect me.” Perhaps. Or perhaps not.

    Many Judaica shops operate through brokers, and while these stores are run by honest people who are sincerely G-d-fearing, some have no idea—or even any way of knowing—who wrote the sta”m items that they are selling. In fact, these items often pass through multiple hands before arriving in America, let alone a particular store.

    The savvy consumer should therefore always ask, “May I have in writing that whoever wrote these has a ksav kabbalah in sta”m?” This would be a good start, as it is my strong contention that the consumer holds the key to change. Only after a demand is created would the many improvements planned have a chance of implementing some type of reliable ‘chain of custody’.

    Organizations such as Vaad Mishmeres Stam (and its sister organization in Eretz Yisrael) have worked closely with both Litvish and Chasidish poskim and sofrim for decades to secure reliable sta”m for people. Although the monitoring and even certification of the raw materials in factory-like settings (retzuos, klaf and battim) is being done by the Eidah HaChareidis and others, they have no control over private sofrim who do the actual writing—again, many of them tzaddikim and geonim who produce stellar work.

    In truth, relying on the fact that there are hundreds of reliable sofrim when there are so many more who are not is like saying, “I will eat in any restaurant that claims to be kosher without certification, because there are lots of reliable people who wouldn’t serve treif”!

    A Plan for the Future?

    Several years ago, in Buffalo, a man started coming to shul every morning for Shacharis. His tefillin were very small, often a sign of problems (this is also true of small mezuzos). I asked him if I could borrow the pair. Well, it turned out that the battim were made out of plastic (!) and the writing inside was a photocopy (!) of a handwritten (!) Shema in regular Israeli script (!)—and all on regular paper!

    (He purchased these in his temple’s Judaica shop)

    When I showed this to him, he was flabbergasted. His response expressed the naivete that exists among even shomrei Torah. “What kind of Jew would do such a thing?” I looked up from his “tefillin” and said, “Who said anything about a Jew?”

    A well-regarded rav and maggid shiur in Queens recently shared that a talmid told him that one boy in his Israeli yeshivah was found to have comic strips in their battim!

    I am often asked by parents where they should purchase tefillin for their sons. I fear giving them an honest answer. Naturally, they will compare the price to what their friends are paying (less than half) and either ignore my advice, or I will be in a position where I am compelled to share things that could cause a serious balagan. When I try to be frank, they often think I’m exaggerating, and who could blame them? Everyone else gets tefillin from this-or-that place! How could the Rabbi be right, they understandably wonder, when a pair of mehudar tefillin can be found for about $400?

    A renowned sofer recently shared, “The problem is not that rabbanim refuse to wisely suggest that people purchase sta”m only from reputable places – rabbanim indeed do recommend this. Rather, the issue is that everyone believes that their source is reputable!”

    Compounding the problem, some consumers are afraid to ask questions. A purchaser may feel that they are not proficient enough to make inquiries or to even comprehend the answers. But this is an error. A simple request of a guarantee that the sofer has kabbala is a straight, fair, and critical question. Any sofer or seller who gets anxious when asked about the sofer, his shimush, methods, or to whom they bring their own shailos is suspect…perhaps, now, of their own material.

    Not long ago, a sofer in Lakewood told me that someone—a ben Torah, mind you—brought him 50 mezuzos to help roll and insert in expensive cases for his new, large, house. “Did you get these checked?” the sofer asked.

    The balebus gave him the name of the “magiah” who had checked them. The sofer, knowing he would be ignored if he shared that this person’s certification was meaningless, replied instead, “I will help you. But just to be clear, I will not be checking the kashrus at all.” Well, lo and behold, one of the mezuzos slipped open. The sofer immediately saw more than a few things that would render it passul!

    Many people also don’t realize that being a sofer anda magiah require two different skill sets, necessitating different studies and bechinos. Not every magiah has shimush or a ksav kabbalah in safrus, and not every sofer knows how to check the work of others.

    Is there any hope to rectify these pirztos (breaches) in the future?

    B’chasdei Hashem, after many years of leadership by amazing experts who have since passed on or retired, Rav Avraham Tzvi Wosner in Monsey is taking charge of the Vaad Mishmeres Stam in America, with Rabbi Moshe Shaul Klein in Bnei Brak in charge of Eretz Yisrael. Many ideas are in the works to help strengthen this most sacred of mitzvos. Right now, the Israeli branch is in the midst of a massive campaign to get sofrim to either learn or review these halachos so they can receive a ksav kabbalah. Close to 1,000 sofrim have already taken the bechinos this past year, and equally important, renewed their ksav kabbalah.

    Similar programs are now being developed in America as well. Rav Wosner in Monsey and Rav Yosef Fund in Lakewood are currently teaching, testing and certifying sofrim and magihim, thereby securing our future.

    Some people have urged a system whereby every mezuzah, pair of tefillin or sefer Torah come with a hologramed hashgachah. Another idea is that each item of sta”m have a QR code (or an ID number, for those without Internet). This would then lead the consumer to a page or voicemail that would reveal all pertinent information about the item, including the names of the sofer and magiah, the type of klaf, etc.

    Alas, without a robust demand from consumers, such plans are but a pipedream and could never come to fruition.

    For now, at the very minimum, rabbanim should instruct their mispallelim to only purchase items for which they are given either the name of the sofer or an assurance of a ksav kabbalah. Such requests alone will cause an awesome ripple effect. This would be a good launchpad off which our leaders could work.

    Painfully, even if all the above would be somehow resolved, this would not disentangle the entire issue. Even should all the sta”m on the market be certified, there would still be another hurdle to surmount.

    Minhagim and Shittos

    Let us for a moment put aside the frightening information shared above. In addition to the arduous challenge of making sure that a reliable sofer wrote one’s sta”m, there are other concerns of which the purchaser needs to be aware.

    There are hundreds of shittos, chumros, kulos and minhagim when it comes to writing sta”m. Once we are already so far removed from knowing who wrote our sta”m or made our battim, how would someone even begin to know the standards and methods by which they were produced? And even if we could fix the real reliability concerns, the consumer is often unaware that there are certain shittos that should be avoided by “his” mesorah, even if they are perfectly kosher for someone else.

    For example, a sofer told me that a certain oocher sta”m was recently called out for selling battim to Ashkenazim that were made in a way that is clearly not kosher according to how Ashkenazim have paskened for centuries (relating to how the shin on the shel rosh is made)!

    Allow me to bring the interested reader a little deeper into the world of shittos so as to better appreciate their complexity.

    1.  

    There’s a famous written exchange between the Lubavitcher Rebbe and Rav Moshe Feinstein. In Rav Moshe’s lengthy response (Orach Chaim 4:9) he shares that although his minhag is to wear Rabbeinu Tam tefillin, he reluctantly had to stop and has had hard time commissioning a new pair in America, as they are often written by sofrim who follow their reading of the Shulchan Aruch Harav’s opinion, which differs from how Rav Moshe understood his psak.

    The issue Rav Moshe was referring to is the complicated and much-debated subject of how to write the parshiyos of tefillin (i.e. setumos).

    This machlokos is unresolved, leading to the following reality:

    Most Sefardim follow the view of the Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chaim siman 32:36), while most Ashkenazim follow the Taz(ad loc. se’if kattan 26). There are still other Ashkenazim who follow a divergent way of reading this same Taz, e.g., chasidei Belz and Bobov; see also Igros Moshe, ibid. #12. Minhag Chabad follows the Kuntres Acharon based on the words of the Baal Hatanya.

    Rav Moshe concludes his letter by accepting the Rebbe’s offer to send him one of Chabad’s talented sofrim so he can write a pair of Rabbeinu Tam tefillin for him the way he (Rav Moshe) felt that the Baal Hatanya would want them to be written…and even then, on the condition it be written in the Beis Yosef’s script (one of three types of scripts -each one may be deemed pasul depending on one’s minhag).

    The objective in sharing the above is not, chalilah, to convince anyone to abandon his minhagim in exchange for what Rav Moshe argued. Rather, the intent is to demonstrate that even amongst the greatest poskim there are many differing and even opposing views. And even after a sofer assures a customer that those concerns are met, there are also issues relating to the type of klaf, kesivah, ink, battim, etc.

    •  

    Another consideration has to do with geographical areas. Some people may think that in Lakewood or Williamsburg, all of the tefillin being sold will naturally follow shittah X. This is not necessarily the case.

    When my father-in-law headed the Kashruth Council of Canada (the COR), based on a teshuvah he received from Rav Shlomo Miller, he wouldn’t allow Diet Coke to be certified for Pesach due to an ingredient that is derived from kitniyos, namely aspartame. Instead, the COR gave the Pesach rights to that product to the Sephardic rabbanim in Canada.

    Fair enough. But as odd as this may sound, some Torontonians asked their guests coming from the United States for Yom Tov to bring them Diet Coke that had an OU! True, Rav Belsky disagreed with Rav Shlomo Miller, and ruled for the OU that this type of kitniyos shenishtanah, meaning that it has been modified and manipulated to the point of being a new molecule, is of no concern on Pesach. But there was absolutely no difference between the Canadian Diet Coke and the American Diet Coke! Why not buy the Sefardi one in Canada for less trouble?!

    The correlation to sta”m should be clear: A person may be under the false impression that if he purchases sta”m in a certain country or zip code he will be getting something that is aligned with the minhag hamakom. But the truth is that if sta”m isn’t acquired through transparent channels (or directly from a sofer or personal broker), the location where it is bought is of zero relevance.

    •  

    Another concern: Let’s say that a person goes to buy a pair of tefillin and finds that the prices range anywhere from $800 to $4,000. Again, assuming that everything is kosher(which may be a stretch), the consumer must ask with great specificity for the distinction between these costs. The seller, of course, isn’t being deliberately deceitful.But again, if enough people demand more details, the effect could be very positive. The consumer must begin to recognize that he is not really buying a “pair of tefillin.” Rather, he is purchasing battim, retzuos and parshiyos. He should inquire about all three as the separate components they truly are.

    Far too often, sta”m is the last item on an otherwise expensive checklist for a new house or simchah. That is why people should sit with a respected sofer or rav far in advance of the move or celebratory event and request unambiguous guidance in all these matters: halachos, nusach, hiddurim, chumros and hakpados.

    Returning to Stencils

    I would like to share the words of a preeminent chasidishe posek with regard to this supposed kolmus-style form of silkscreen printing:

    “The shailah here is not between kosher and passul;it’s between muttar and assur!”

    In my view, and in this case, these are profound words and demonstrate great pikchus/shrewdness. Meaning, should the focus be on the halacha alone, the average person may fall under the assumption that should we get around those issues we would then be in the clear. In truth, and like all matters – both secular and religious -that we wish to insure for the future, the law is the floor and not the ceiling.

    Several years ago, many frum publications reported on a German university that had created a writing robot. To prove its significance, they taught it how to write Chinese, thinking that this was the most challenging writing style. They soon learned that there was an even more complex system of writing: ksav Ashuris and sta”m!

    And so, several years ago, this robot was put on display in the Museum of Berlin, and observers could watch its robotic arm writing a “Torah scroll” on a piece of klaf.

    That machine, the price of which was likely more than $1 million five years ago, is probably now half the cost. After looking into it, I can posit that it would take this android just three months to write a sefer Torah from start to finish (working day and night, nonstop, which it can do). It would have the most beautiful ksav. One could recoup his initial investment and be making very good money fairly quickly (earning about $200,000 a year, indefinitely)! But of course, it would be a willful michsol rabbim, just another in the long list of obstacles and deception when it comes to sta”m.

    It should now be clear why those involved in sta”m have dismissed this (claimed) new stencil innovation out-of-hand. If unleashed on the market, nothing would stop sta”m that is being printed off a $2000 computer and printer setup from being sold under the guise that it is, as well, this new stencil design! We simply have enough issues to resolve in sta”m before creating new ones.

    It boggles the mind that even if this innovator believed that he discovered a new technique of writing kosher sta”m—a technique that somehow eluded the likes of the Chasam Sofer and so many of our past gedolim, who would have loved nothing more than to discover a simpler and more efficient method of creating sta”m—why he wouldn’t first and immediately approach the gedolei haposkim; certainly before sending such items halfway around the globe to be sold! Why put them on the market without asking? Why sell them to consumers without notifying them as to what they are purchasing?

    {We did not even broach the issue of mekach taus and geneiva –for even if one wishes to believe such stencil mezuzos are kosher, one still would have to inform the buyer that these are made in such a way. I would imagine that very few Jews -of any persuasion-would have purchased them had they known this, even if told forthright that it was allowed}

    Throughout history, those individuals – like Sarah Schenirer – who had a genuine interest in adopting new approaches to modern problems have always first approached our gedolim (see Chofetz Chaim in his Likkutei Halachos to Sotah 11).This alone was proof positive of their sincere motives.

    In Closing

    Thousands and thousands of mezuzos are purchased every day. We have already expressed astonishment at how this is even feasible.

    Alas, there are 27 oisios, but a million ways to write them incorrectly.

    We have explained, if only in brief, that countless shittos exist with regard to the many separate elements that go into sta”m, leading to the potential for an unfathomable factorial of possibilities (see shu”t Min Hashamayim #3 with the notes of Rav Reuven Margolies).

    If the reader walks away from this article concerned about his sta”m and becomes a savvy consumer who asks questions, then it has served its purpose. It is my opinion that only forthright questions and calm inquiries will change the current landscape.

    As always, one’s personal moreh horaah should be consulted for the final psak on any-and-all questions and concerns.

    I wish to thank the many expert sofrim and talmidei chachamim, both Litvish and Chasidish, who patiently aided me in my research.

    All errors are my own.

    Understanding the Connection Between Chanukah and Mezuzah

  • Shabbos Timers and Smart Cars -The Next BIG Halachik Debate?

    Shabbos Timers and Smart Cars -The Next BIG Halachik Debate?

    Technology Forces Challenges Us How To Best Be ‘SHOMREI’ Shabbos -Its ‘Guardians’ For The Future

    November, 2015

    “Will artificial intelligence have unintended consequences?” asked NPR’s MarketWatch.

    Quoting from an official White House report, they went on to answer their own question.

    “Artificial intelligence is coming, and policymakers need to prepare the economy for it, the White House said.

    “The report, ‘Artificial Intelligence, Automation, and the Economy,’ suggests the U.S. should invest in and develop AI, because it has ‘many benefits,’ education and train Americans for the jobs of the future, and aid workers in the transition and empower them to share in future growth.

    “But the authors of the report acknowledge that there are countless unknowns, from what the effects could be, to how quickly they’ll arrive.

    ‘Researchers’ estimates on the scale of threatened jobs over the next decade or two range from 9% to 47%,’ they write, but add that the economy has always proved to be resilient to take existing rates of change and shrinking of industry in stride.”

    They are wise to consider the potential realties that technology will hurl at us in the future, both the good and the bad.

    The olam halacha is concerned with the same.

    In the Shul Chronicles published the week before Chanukah, after I quoted Rav Moshe’s prescient, almost prophetic teshuvah from 1969 on the subject of microwaves, I ended the column with the following tease:

    “After Chanukah we will return to this discussion, and show of another area of technology regarding which Rav Moshe was able to discern the winds of the future, and how rabbanim today need to pay heed, as I believe it will become the hottest button halachik issue of the next fifty years. Stay Tuned!”

    This was not hyperbole; I truly believe this to be true.

    Before I go on to explain, I would be remiss not to state the obvious: this column is never intended for halacha pesuka, and it certainly should never be used to question one’s rav. The subject to which I am referring is already a debated one, but I will be discussing to where it is heading in the not-to-distant future, not how it is viewed today per se.

    To what am I referring? Timers on Shabbos.

    For quite some time this issue has led to many opinions among rabbanim. My balla battim already know not to come to me with questions relating to this subject. On the other hand, many chashuveh rabbanim do allow timers on Shabbos, perhaps even the majority.

    Eilu v’eilu is imperative –and the greatest poskim have debated this issue (some however are often misquoted, in my opinion, e.g. see Chazon Ish, often quoted as allowing timers, in his own words, Chazon Ish, Oh’c 38: 2 and 3).

    I explain to my balla battim that far be it from me to follow the strict view when the minhag yisreol, arguably, is to be lenient. Rather, I am strict for another reason.

    I choose to be strict because of a point Rav Moshe Feinstein makes in the course of discussing the matter. The point was ahead of its time, and one that we will soon all have to contend with.

    I will first bring Rav Moshe’s words, and then will extrapolate from them to modern times.

    It is no secret that Rav Moshe was strongly against all timers on Shabbos (with a few notable exceptions, e.g. light switches).

    On the 20’th of Teves 5737, corresponding to the 10th of January 1977, Rav Moshe responding to an inquiry regarding his opinion as it pertains to timers on Shabbos.

    He writes, “Relating to timers (on ovens)…it is obvious that they are assur. For with these (timers) one can perform all prohibited activity on Shabbos, even in factories. There is therefore no zilzul Shabbos greater than this. And I am certain that had this (invention) been around in the days of the tannaim and amoraim they would have banned it, as they had banned amirah l’akum. Perhaps, it (timers) anyway fall under the rubric of amria l’akum…”

    This last line of Rav Moshe may seem shocking, but it can be easily defended. Rishonim point out that one of the reasons offered for the prohibition of amira l’akum is that virtually every melacha could then be performed using this tool. Shabbos would vanish, and the day will have very little making it distinct from all others.

    Would not then, asks Rav Moshe, timers offer the same challenge?

    While not all poskim agreed with Rav Moshe’s argument, I wonder what they would say today.

    In the not too distant future Google cars will be on the road. Already, many high-end cars offer varying degrees of self-driving features.

    Should we allow those to be programmed to take us to shul before Shabbos?

    If not, why not? For, if we allow people to have fresh coffee Shabbos morning through the use of a timer, why not this?

    There already are ovens on the market that act as a refrigerator. Meaning, one can place seasoned chicken inside at 2pm on Friday, and Shabbos morning, as you are answering kedusha in shul, the cool mode will switch off and the heat mode be turned on. You will then arrive home for Shabbos lunch with fresh roasted chicken!

    It will not be too long that one’s entire home and life is run through the medium of wires, what of Shabbos timers then?

    To be clear, I am not seeking to convince other rabbanim to be as strict as I am, rather I sincerely wish to know the best path forward.

    As our lives become more and more governed by technology, a lenient view on timers will have to come with exceptions, I would at least hope. How would these exceptions be defended? How would we then differentiate between timers’ permissible usage and forbidden?

    In 1977 it may have read as peculiar his words that “all melachos can be performed with timers, even factories”; but they do not sound odd anymore.

    Recently, a famous, young, secular news outlet published an article “A Gentile’s Guide to Cheating the Shabbat”. It begins with a basic primer on the 39 melachos, and delves into the most common issues that arise. After discussing our taping of the lights in our refrigerator, and even amirah l’akum, it begins the subject of timers. They only had seven words to say on that subject: “Using timers seems like flat-out cheating”.

    While Torah Bagoyim Al Taamin (Eicha Rabbah 2; as opposed to wisdom, we do not look outside the fold for Torah opinions), I think the reason this journalist thought the use of timers as odd is because he is young and can easily see where such a policy can soon lead. So, will this indeed become the hot button halachik issue of the next fifty years as I predicted? I hope not. It is my wish that standards be set now by our gedolei haposkim so that we can better protect Shabbos in not just fifty years but -if moshiach has not come ch’vs– in one-hundred and beyond. For, by that time, who knows what technology will offer! Hopefully not a self-programed drasha-giver!