When peace comes, we will perhaps in time be able to forgive the Arabs for killing our sons, but it will be harder for us to forgive them for having forced us to kill their sons. – Golda Meir
The questions of the ethics of war may seem oxymoronic. Isn’t the purpose of war to kill people and destroy things?
However, halachah is replete with guidelines for ethical conduct in war, to the point of warning us not to cut down fruit trees in the heat of battle. Indeed, after the Iraq invasion of 2003, the American administration was reproached for not defending landmarks and artifacts more carefully. It would seem that as Jews, we should relate to such a charge.
Recently The Jerusalem Post covered issues of halachah and war, in particular the treatment of captured killers and terrorists. While there are many issues that fall under this rubric, we will focus here on the issue of whether a subdued terrorist may be killed. What follows is a discussion of Talmudic law and not of practice.
From the article:
“Several senior rabbis have raised a heated debate in the last few days over the approach in Jewish law toward a terrorist who has committed a terror attack but is subsequently wounded and incapacitated. …
“Rabbi David Stav said that the nation was facing trying and difficult times but insisted that a terrorist who has committed an attack but has been wounded and therefore no longer represents a threat should not be further harmed.
“‘In these days in which the blood is boiling…it is important to preserve our moral superiority: [We must] not harm those who are not involved in murderous acts, and we must not harm those who have already been neutralized and do not represent a threat,’ the rabbi ruled.
“Rabbi Shmuel Eliyahu, municipal chief rabbi of Safed, reacted to Stav’s comments and said a terrorist who had committed murder should himself be killed.
“’It is forbidden to leave a murderer alive,’ Eliyahu told the Galei Yisrael radio station on Wednesday. He accused Tzohar rabbis of ‘forgetting Jewish law’ and said ‘they are only interested in looking good to non-Jews.’”
This is a most serious issue, one best left to our greatest poskim and those who live in Eretz Yisrael. Following is a review of some of the factors involved in making such a decision.
First, Rav Moshe Feinstein, zt”l, recognized that not all cases are equal when it comes to imposing the death penalty for a criminal act. In a famous teshuvah to the governor of New York,1 he outlined how halachah views the death penalty. Rav Moshe sought to dissuade the governor from using the death penalty, explaining that one of the reasons the Torah prescribes it is to impress upon us the egregiousness of certain acts and that the halachic bar is set too high to allow regular use of such punishment.
Nevertheless, he ends with the following message: “The above is true regarding crimes of passion…but if people are killing because of cruelty and because the lives of others are meaningless to them…or if there appear to be many murderers,” a country must do what is in its best interest.
It would seem that a country that is under constant attack and is therefore in a perpetual state of war has every right at least to consider whether such terrorists deserve to be put to death by the state.
The Ramban and Rambam famously debate the general question of war as it pertains to ostensibly innocent civilians. The debate, which is based on Shimon and Levi’s battle over their sister Dina’s abduction, is germane to the question of captured terrorists.
The Ramban believed that Shimon and Levi’s decision to kill all the males of Shechem was an error, one for which Yaakov reprimanded them. After all, why should the city’s ordinary citizens have been held accountable for the action of their leaders? How could they have stopped it?
Rambam, however, believes that the citizens were not powerless; in fact, they had failed to fulfill the universal obligation to establish justice systems. Because setting up courts is one of the seven Noachide laws, those who fail to do so are equally liable to death.
In Gur Aryeh, the Maharal seeks to combine these two views. He suggests that although, on one hand, the civilians of Shechem cannot be held responsible, the rules in a time of war are different. A nation must respond to threat with force so as to end present and future danger, and this means that civilians may be affected. While this position is not an argument for the capricious killing of civilians, the Maharal does seem to support strategic strikes even if noncombatants will be harmed.
A quick look at modern warfare would support a silent secular agreement with the Maharal’s view. From the United States’ recent bombing of a hospital (purported to be an accident) to the more than 100,000 victims of the bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, which brought World War II to an end, it seems that world powers are resigned to such carnage when it is absolutely necessary.
In the case of a captured terrorist, therefore, it seems there may be support for a country under attack to carry out unceremonious executions of captured killers, since this is a means of deterring the enemy.
Rodef
Even when in a situation involving two Jews, the Torah makes it very clear that one is allowed to kill a pursuer (rodef) in self-defense. We should also point out parenthetically that the Bach and the Shach discuss the issur of retzichah and whether it is suspended during a time of war for the zayin amim.2
Although a terrorist is clearly a rodef, a halachicpursuer whom we are permitted to kill, we can only do so if there is no other way of stopping him. As Chazal point out, if one can stop a pursuer by shooting him in a limb, for example, that is all that would be allowed. Someone in captivity is already immobilized, so what allowance would there be to kill him based on the principle of rodef?
One may argue that a subdued terrorist should be seen as a passive pursuer. This means there are times when the mere presence of an innocent person is dangerous3—for example, a case where a baby’s crying will alert the enemy to one’s presence, or when the enemy orders a community to hand over an innocent person on the threat that they will all be killed otherwise. In such a case, halachah will sometimes view the innocent person as a rodef.4
Based on this idea of a “passive rodef,”perhaps one can argue that the fact that we choose to keep enemy prisoners alive and in relatively good health during a time of war only emboldens the enemy to continue killing us. Astonishingly, the average weight gain among al-Qaeda detainees in American hands is about twenty pounds!5
However, all of this is academic as many poskim contend that the halachah of dina d’malchusa (adhering to modern secular law) outweighs the halachos of redifah. This means that even if a cogent halachic argument can be made for putting to death a captured killer, there would be little an IDF soldier could do about it legally.
Sofek Rodef: A Possible Future Rodef
The issue of prisoner exchanges is a related—and volatile—issue that we have discussed in the past (see issue 43, “Gilad Shalit: Sundry Matters”). According to those poskim who favor such exchanges, killing the terrorist may mean eliminating a real negotiating tool. This is not to support such an argument, of course, but simply to raise awareness of it.
Indeed, strong disapproval of such exchanges based on the argument that they may result in Jewish deaths may actually be an argument in favor of execution, because it prevents dangerous terrorists from being returned to the street. Yet at most, such an argument would only make the captured terrorist a safek rodef (possible rodef).
Aside from the fact that the principle of dina d’malchusa dina eclipses such arguments, Rav Chaim Ozer and many others6 argue that a possible rodef is not the same as a rodef.
GenevaConventions
Even if we could resolve all of the dilemmas raised thus far, perhaps the most critical issue is how the state of Israel and halachah should view the rules of war established at the Geneva Convention, as well as various United Nations agreements.
Rav Chaim Jachter, after a lengthy treatment of the issue of killing innocents in wartime, cites the following passage from The Case for Israel by famed professor Allen Dershowitz, in support of the argument that not all international laws, or countries following them, are created equal:
“Although collective punishment is prohibited by international law, it is widely practiced throughout the world, including the most democratic and liberty-minded countries. Indeed, no system of international deterrence can be effective without some reliance on collective punishment. Every time one nation retaliates against another, it collectively punishes citizens of that country. The American and British bombings of German cities punished the residents of those cities. The atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki killed thousands of innocent Japanese for the crimes of their leaders. The bombing of military targets inevitably kills civilians.”
In other words while there are certainly agreements like the Geneva Conventions, there seems to be surreptitiously accepted understandings, practices and immunities in a time of war. This is without even addressing the latest United States targeted drone killings, which some argue are questionable according to a strict reading of codified international law.
Chillul Hashem
Above all, we must be mindful of chillul Hashem.
Let us conclude with the words of Rav Yehudah Henkin, grandson of Rav Yosef Eliyahu Henkin, one of the great poskim of the last generation, and the father of Eitam Henkin, who was murdered along with his wife, Naama, during Sukkos in what is now viewed as the beginning of the current wave of attacks.
In his halachicwork Bnai Banim7 he focuses on questions similar to the ones we have raised here. He writes that even in war, regardless of what halachah permits, we also must be concerned about chillul Hashem.
He points to Sefer Yehoshua (ch. 9), in which the Givonim fool Bnei Yisrael into entering into an alliance with them and allowing them to remain alive. The Gemara8wonders why this treaty was not voided as soon as the ruse was discovered. The Gemaraanswers, “In order to sanctify Hashem’s Name”; Rashiexplains that Yehoshua was concerned about the Jewish army’s reputation among the nations if it did not honor its treaties.
It is of interest, I believe, that while the Gemara uses a positive expression (“due to a kiddush Hashem”), the Rambam, in codifying as law the story of the Givonim,9 uses the negative (“due to a chillul Hashem”). The indication is that even during a war, when defending ourselves is a top priority, we must find ways to prevent a chillul Hashem—as well as going out of our way (if it won’t put lives at risk) to create an active kiddushHashem.
May we achieve both of these ideals, maintaining our achdus as we debate these serious matters. And may these attacks end quickly, leaving all such questions academic in nature as we herald Moshiach Tzidkeinu.
NOTES
IgrosMosheChoshen Mishpat 2:68.
See Shulchan AruchYoreh Deah, siman 158:1. Regarding the application of this concept today, see, for example, Rambam Hilchos Melachim 5:4, and Tashbeitz 93.
See RamaYoreh Deah 157:1 et al.
See note 20 in Rabbi Bleich’s “Torture and the Ticking Time Bomb” for further details on this type of rodef.
USAToday, 10/3/06. See also the thorough study conducted by Seton Hall’s Center for Research and Development, which reports that 50.67% of the detainees housed there are overweight!
See the strong words of Rav Moshe in Choshen Mishpat 2:69:4.
Rabbi Moshe Taub is the rabbi of Young Israel of Holliswood and rabbinic editor and weekly contributor for Ami Magazine. He is the author of Jews in the World (Mosaica Press) and writes on Jewish law, history, and thought at ShulChronicles.com.
The act of purchasing mezuzos or tefillin (“sta”m”) can sometimes seem time consuming, expensive and confusing. However, as a recent controversy demonstrates, it is much worse: it is an act strewn with landmines.
Unlike our careful purchase of food—which comes with kosher certification, thus giving the consumer real agency over what he chooses to eat—how does one even begin to know who wrote the mezuzos and other sta”m he buys, and with what method?
Several weeks ago, a socher (seller and middleman) of sta”m was on his way to America with merchandise to sell to American middlemen and sofrim. Such socherim will often book these flights in advance in the expectation that they will have an adequate supply of items to make the business trip worthwhile.
As the date of his flight inched closer, this socher recognized that he was still a little short of goods. He needed about 50 more ksav Arizal mezuzos to better assure a fruitful trip.
On an email group for sta”m brokers, middlemen and “shadchanim,” someone shared with this anxious American-bound socher that he could supply him with what he needed, adding that he had seen the ksav of these mezuzos and it was magnificent. Even better, although a reliable mezuzah retails for about $200, these were somehow 10% cheaper and could be had for around $180 apiece. This “shadchan” was able to deliver these mezuzos to the socher just as he was making his way to his flight through Ben-Gurion Airport!
Upon arrival in the US, one of his first stops was in Williamsburg, where he displayed the items he had brought to sell, but first, and wisely, brought the precious sechorah to Rabbi Shimon Zeide, an accomplished and experienced sofer, to be checked.
Rabbi Shmiel Aharon Traube, the owner ofBeis Hastam in Boro Park, fills in the details of the events that followed.
“Rav Zeide right away spotted that something was wrong,” Rabbi Traube said. “These mezuzos looked too similar to each other; too uniform.” In other words, they seemed as if they had been printed rather than written. He contacted Rav Avraham Tzvi Wosner, the acting rabbi and bochen of the Vaad Mishmeres Stam, and also sent out copies to some fellow sofrim and talmidim of the Vaad Mishmeres Stam.
As will be explained in the course of this article, unless one purchases directly from the sofer, trying to figure who wrote any mezuzah or other sta”m is an extremely painstaking process. To borrow a term from law enforcement, it is unfortunate that a “universal chain of custody” doesn’t (yet) exit for sta”m before it reaches your Judaica shop.
After establishing that these mezuzos had passed through four to five hands before their arrival in America, it was finally confirmed from whom they were first purchased. The “sofer”had been found!
As Rabbi Traube shared, “Rav Shimon Zeide called this man him up and said, ‘Why are you selling some type of printed mezuzos?’ The man responded, ‘They’re not printed. I have a new method of writing mezuzos so that they all come out the same.’” Rabbi Zeide wanted to know how he could be sure that this new method was kosher. He didn’t receive a satisfactory answer. It was later revealed that this man was not a sofer at all (rather, he hired others to produce mezuzos using his new method); henceforth, we will refer to this person as the “innovator.” In response to this phone call from Rabbi Zeide, the innovator sent out a letter written by the renowned dayan Rav Seriel Rosenberg, the av beis din Rav Nissim Karelitz’s beis din in Bnei Brak, dated Motzaei Shabbos Parshas Vayeira 5783 stating that this writing, as described, would be considered kesivah.
But the sofrim investigating these mezuzos still had doubts, and after examining them closely made a startling discovery: They looked as if they had been written using a stencil!
Rabbi Traube then headed to Eretz Yisrael, bringing some of these questionable mezuzos along with him, and went to talk to the innovator himself. “I went to his house, and he wouldn’t let me in,” he recalled. “But he did come outside, and we spoke for about a half-hour.” During this conversation, the man refused to explain what his exact method of writing was.
However, two weeks later, and after much confusion among sofrim, Rav Rosenberg wrote a second letter (dated the first day of Rosh Chodesh Kislev 5783)explaining that his first letter wasn’t intended to confer approval of any mezuzos; it merely commented on the method that had been described to him by this fellow. In fact, as this second letter concluded, he had subsequently learned of the possibility that the innovator wasn’t telling him the whole truth.
Five days later, Rav Rosenberg’s son-in-law, Rav Posen of Ramat David, wrote a letter clarifying that both letters were in response to information his father-in-law had been given by this innovator. He reiterates that no hashagachah was ever given nor implied, nor was there any way of knowing how these particular mezuzos were even created—only that some type of stenciling method was used.
In the interim, Rav Brach of Bnei Brak, a Satmar rav who is known to be an expert in sta”m, had issued his own letter stating in no uncertain terms that these mezuzos should be considered passul, quoting the Shevet Halevi(Rav Wosner) who paskened that any form of stenciling or silk screening is invalid.
Rav Brach then shared that after forcing a meeting with this innovator (which took much prodding), he could now assert that while this person was claiming that a kolmus (quill) is used, the mezuzos he had put on the market were actually created with a brush! This was no different from a previous controversy some 20 years earlier that had ended with all major poskim forbidding that practice. (In a letter written to Rav Posen dated 13 Kislev 5783, Rav Brach detailed his interactions with this innovator and explained why such mezuzos were passul.)
While all of this was happening, mezuzos from this innovator were being sold in Flatbush! And the ambiguous letter from the beis din—which in fact cast doubt on his method—was being used to show Judaica shops that his mezuzos were fine!
In the meantime, the American sofrim, especially Rav Leizerson in Lakewood, continued to investigate and share vital information with Rav Rosenberg and his beis din.
The fact that Rav Zeide was the person who first opened these mezuzos was very fortunate, as what he discovered might not have been otherwise discerned. In fact, when they were shown to a number of extremely well-regarded sofrim, they all said that they would have never been suspicious.
(See Next Page For Some Selected Images Of The Recent Letters Thus Far Mentioned)
The basic idea is similar to the children’s arts and crafts projects we all enjoyed when we were young. For kids, however, the letters or pictures are cut out of a hard substance like plastic, which is then placed on a piece of paper and filled in. Classic silkscreen printing is different. It requires the use of a taut material that can be perfectly aligned with the paper so the words will be clear when the ink is applied.
A couple of decades ago, someone developed a quicker and cheaper way to use this method to write sifrei Torah. As you can imagine, this caused quite an uproar. It worked as follows:
The sofer would lay a sheet over the klaf. This sheet had “windows” cut out to form each letter. (Indecently, the letters were shaped by a computer.) Ink was then poured onto the sheet, squeegeed down, the sheet was removed—and voila! Absolutely beautiful kesivah! An entire column of Torah could be created literally in seconds!
The response from the gedolei haposkim was unanimous, unequivocal and harsh. Among others, Rav Elyashiv, Rav Ovadia Yosef, Rav Nissin Karelitz and Rav Scheinberg all expressed astonishment that such a process was being used. (Unfortunately, by the time it was discovered, many sta”m items created that way were already on the market.) Rav Elyashiv wrote that not only were those who used such methods wrong to do, but even those who sold them were “machti es harabbim”(causing the public to sin).
New But Different?
The “innovator,” however, insisted that his method was different from the technique described above, thereby—in his opinion—eliminating the concerns of the poskim. Instead of the poured ink/squeegee process, the sofer used his own quill to fill in the windows.
Would this make a difference in the halachah? Let us examine some but not all the issues raised 20 years ago and see if they can be applied here:
Chazal explain that safrus must be written and not spilled (Yerushalmi, Shabbos 4; Gittin 2-3). Regular silk screening seems to be in direct violation of this requirement.
We are required to verbally sanctify each of Hashem’s names as they are being written (Orach Chaimsiman 32:19 and Yoreh Dei’ahsiman 276:2). Classic silk screening would not seem to allow for this.
The issue of dyo, the ink that is used for sta”m, is well beyond the scope of this article. But there would seem to be a need for special ink when utilizing such a process.
The obligation for sirtut (etched lines)may become compromised, as according to some poskim, such perfect “writing” would remove the prerequisite for sirtut, which we cannot do (Rav Moshe Feinstein).
Interestingly, the Chasam Sofer writes that if a sofer utilizes the power of nistar to suddenly be able to write with his less dominant hand, this would not be considered natural and hence kosher kesav (shu”t Chasam Sofer 6:29)!
In centuries past, the poskim issued similar concerns when it came to writing sta”m with a printing press (see shu”t Zereh Emes, Yoreh Dei’ah, 117, et al).
But there is yet another, and perhaps most serious, concern with standard silk screening. This relates to the issue of “chak tochos” (scraping and erasing). There is a clear halachah that letters in safrus must be formed through addition and not subtraction. In other words, one cannot scrape ink away, thereby leaving behind the shape of a letter.
This halachah has far-reaching implications. For example, if a blob of ink drips from a sofer’s quill and makes a splotch on a letter, he isn’t allowed to scrape it away to reveal the letter underneath (Gittin 20a; Orach Chaim siman 32:17). Many rishonim explain that the reason is that in such a scenario, the letters wouldn’t be formed by “regular” writing. (See Meiri in Kiryas Sefer, maamar 2; Rashi on Gittin ad loc and Tosfos on Sanhedrin 21b.)
Would these concerns extend to filling in a stencil with a kulmos?
(A Sofer Demonstrating What This Innovation May/Would Look Like)
Even if one could prove that these mezuzos are being written the way the innovator claims – and so far, this seems doubtful to me and almost everyone involved; some assert that he is really using a brush, either in the initial creation of the letters, or, after using his quill, and so as to fill in any gaps and to make it more clear – the question he posed to Rav Rosenberg was only about the kesivah. There are still many other matters involved.
What about the sirtut (these are the etched lines that all sta”m must have)? Using the above method would easily—and almost always—lead to sirtut misaligned with the kesivah, a potentially very serious issue! And what about the dyo/ink? The ink used for the process he described would most likely need to be different, for reasons beyond our scope.
There are many additional problems with such mezuzos, such as how the final mem and samech could possibly be made al pi halachah with such a stencil (think about a children’s stencil, in which the letter “O” or the number “0” is divided into parts), or the fact that Shulchan Aruch Harav (siman 32:32) requires that the sofer have kavanah while forming the letters (no “spacing out” or writing by rote).
However, all the above is just the halacha.
In order to truly understand why so many dismissed this innovation out-of-hand, irrespective of the halachic shailos involved, we must now shine a spotlight on the contemporary world of sta”m.
Statistics
While there are many amazing sofrim in our midst, there are also some whose work is less than stellar. And then there are those who have no business writing at all. Concerns relating to sta”m are not unique to our generation.The Chasam Sofer lamented the state of sta”m in his day as well (shu”t 205). Here are some examples of gedolim throughout the ages expressing similar frustration:
The Rivash (d. 1408) writes, “What can we do about those sofrim who aren’t proficient and forsake halachah for their own benefit” (shu”t Rivash146).
The Radvaz (d. 1573) testifies that he once checked 300 pairs of tefillin and they were all passul (shu”t Radvaz 8:6)
The Devar Shmuel (d. 1694) complains that most people look for cheaper prices and that almost all such tefillin are likely passul (Sefer Zichronos 9:3)
The Levush (d. 1612) blames all the above on those who write sta”m who either don’t know what they are doing or are simply looking to make money: “Asidin litein es hadin ulekabel onshum harbeh me’od—Hashem is going to punish them very harshly” (Levush, siman 32:20).
The Sho’eil Umeishiv (d. 1875) writes that “many of those who call themselves sofrim in our day have no clue about hilchos sta”m” (in his haskamah to Keses Hasofer).
Rav Chaim Palagi (d. 1858) once passuled every single sefer Torah in Izmir (shu”t Lev Chaim, Orach Chaim 174). He also writes, “The length of this galus is aided and abetted by the fact that so many people aren’t curious consumers and end up wearing tefillin that are passul, created by sofrim who aren’t proficient (Tenufah Chaimsiman 432)
The Ben Ish Chai (d. 1909) once passuled all the retzuos tefillin in Bagdad! And his grandfather once passuled everyone’s tefillin (Rav Pealim, Orach Chaim 4:2)
The Chasam Sofer writes that that people who believe all those who write our tefillin are knowledgeable about sta”m “lo hayah v’lo nivra”(no such thing is even remotely true)! In fact, some are public stumbling blocks! (Likkutei Shu”t Chasam Sofer 83)
The Aruch Hashulchan writes, “In our generation, those who think they can write sta”m have increased like locusts. There is one city with hundreds of ‘sofrim,’ but the majority lack yiras shamayim”(Yoreh Dei’ah 182:9).
More recently, the Klausenberger Rebbe (shu”t Divrei Yatziv, Orach Chaim 38:2) and Rav Moshe Feisntein (his haskamah to Yalkut Tzuras Ha’osios) bemoan the fact that people are purchasing sta”m with zero information as to who wrote them. In many cases, and certainly if the writer isn’t knowledgeable enough, one can almost guarantee that they are all passul. Amazingly, the Rebbewrites that until he commissioned a new sefer Torah, he challenged those in his own beis midresh to find even a single kosher sefer Torah among the ten in the aron! (B’veis Yatziv, p.130).
This list is incomplete (see Sefer Sta”m, p. 303-317 for even more historical sources).
Several years ago, Rav Eli Gutnick, a renowned sofer in Australia, published some statistics that would stop any ben Torah cold:
Only about 20% of sofrim have a ksav kabbalah and are frum (Rav Gutnick contacted me to explain that this term means that they, e.g. “…dress in heimishe levushim, are serious about learning Torah, aren’t known to be batlanim, etc”. It would also include a Lakewood or YU musmuch who may not have ‘levush’ yet who went on to receive a real ksav hakaballa, and who is known to be a serious Jew)
An additional 15% are frum but lack a ksav kabbalah.(This is like semichah, butfor safrus.) Without a ksav kabbalah, it is impossible to ascertain if the sofer is even aware of the myriad halachos of sta”m or is up to date about the latest concerns. Numerous knowledgeable sofrim have told me that any sta”m from such individuals should be assumed to be passul.
This poll (while using the best methods available was still, admittedly, unscientific) was taken in 2014. Rabbi Gutnick now admits that the number of sofrim with ksav kaballah is even lower, and that these days the majority of even heimishe and bnei Torah sofrimdo not have one. All in all, only 35% of sta”m is being written by sofrim who those who frumJews of any background would label as bnei Torah! This begs the obvious question: Who is writing the rest?
A full 50% (!) are not proficient in any way, and would run the gamut of character and observance. There are many “shababnikim”—yeshivah dropouts in need of parnasah who can now exploit their background to make money. While some of these are still frum, many are unfortunatelynot.
It gets worse; much worse.
Fifteen percent of the people who are creating mezuzos, etc., are Arabs, Chinese or women. Some sta”m in this category are printed.
Of late, there have been several Chinese sta”m “companies” whose skilled laborers can produce some pretty realistic sta”m. When I shared this with a ben Torah friend, his sincere but naïve response was, “I didn’t know there were so many Yidden in China!”! There are also clubs in Israeli universities where Arab students learn to write mezuzos in their spare time to make some money on the side.
What all of this means is that one has the same statistical odds of purchasing sta”m from a ben Torah with true shimush or a ‘degree’ of some type in this field as he does from an Arab or Chinese person!
It should go without saying that none of this information is meant to disparage the many real sofrim, as they have zero control over what an Arab or a non-shomer Shabbos Jew or am haaretz does. Rather, this information is meant as a warning to consumers as to what’s floating around out there and how dire the situation is.
One simply needs to make a cheshbon of how many sofrim he knows or live in his community. Then consider how many shuls there are in the neighborhood, each one with at least five sifrei Torah (of course, some scrolls will be older ones not included in the above statistic). Then continue adding up the number of mezuzos in each house, plus the tefillin and megillos. As one renowned sofer expressed, “Even with the knowledge that the vast majority of sofrim are in Eretz Yisrael, the numbers still don’t add up!” The gedolim are aware of this, and many ideas have been suggested to bring safrus under some type of control.
The reader is likely thinking, “This is all very unfortunate. But I live in city X, with a nice-sized frum population. This doesn’t affect me.” Perhaps. Or perhaps not.
Many Judaica shops operate through brokers, and while these stores are run by honest people who are sincerely G-d-fearing, some have no idea—or even any way of knowing—who wrote the sta”m items that they are selling. In fact, these items often pass through multiple hands before arriving in America, let alone a particular store.
The savvy consumer should therefore always ask, “May I have in writing that whoever wrote these has a ksav kabbalah in sta”m?” This would be a good start, as it is my strong contention that the consumer holds the key to change. Only after a demand is created would the many improvements planned have a chance of implementing some type of reliable ‘chain of custody’.
Organizations such as Vaad Mishmeres Stam(and its sister organization in Eretz Yisrael) have worked closely with both Litvish and Chasidish poskim and sofrim for decades to secure reliable sta”m for people. Although the monitoring and even certification of the raw materials in factory-like settings (retzuos, klaf and battim) is being done by the Eidah HaChareidis and others, they have no control over private sofrim who do the actual writing—again, many of them tzaddikim and geonim who produce stellar work.
In truth, relying on the fact that there are hundreds of reliable sofrim when there are so many more who are not is like saying, “I will eat in any restaurant that claims to be kosher without certification, because there are lots of reliable people who wouldn’t serve treif”!
A Plan for the Future?
Several years ago, in Buffalo, a man started coming to shul every morning for Shacharis. His tefillin were very small, often a sign of problems (this is also true of small mezuzos). I asked him if I could borrow the pair. Well, it turned out that the battim were made out of plastic (!) and the writing inside was a photocopy (!) of a handwritten (!) Shema in regular Israeli script (!)—and all on regular paper!
(He purchased these in his temple’s Judaica shop)
When I showed this to him, he was flabbergasted. His response expressed the naivete that exists among even shomrei Torah. “What kind of Jew would do such a thing?” I looked up from his “tefillin” and said, “Who said anything about a Jew?”
A well-regarded rav and maggid shiur in Queens recently shared that a talmid told him that one boy in his Israeli yeshivah was found to have comic strips in their battim!
I am often asked by parents where they should purchase tefillin for their sons. I fear giving them an honest answer. Naturally, they will compare the price to what their friends are paying (less than half) and either ignore my advice, or I will be in a position where I am compelled to share things that could cause a serious balagan. When I try to be frank, they often think I’m exaggerating, and who could blame them? Everyone else gets tefillin from this-or-that place! How could the Rabbi be right, they understandably wonder, when a pair of mehudar tefillin can be found for about $400?
A renowned sofer recently shared, “The problem is not that rabbanim refuse to wisely suggest that people purchase sta”m only from reputable places – rabbanim indeed do recommend this. Rather, the issue is that everyone believes that their source is reputable!”
Compounding the problem, some consumers are afraid to ask questions. A purchaser may feel that they are not proficient enough to make inquiries or to even comprehend the answers. But this is an error. A simple request of a guarantee that the sofer has kabbala is a straight, fair, and critical question. Any sofer or seller who gets anxious when asked about the sofer, his shimush, methods, or to whom they bring their own shailos is suspect…perhaps, now, of their own material.
Not long ago, a sofer in Lakewood told me that someone—a benTorah, mind you—brought him 50 mezuzos to help roll and insert in expensive cases for his new, large, house. “Did you get these checked?” the sofer asked.
The balebus gave him the name of the “magiah” who had checked them. The sofer, knowing he would be ignored if he shared that this person’s certification was meaningless, replied instead, “I will help you. But just to be clear, I will not be checking the kashrus at all.” Well, lo and behold, one of the mezuzos slipped open. The sofer immediately saw more than a few things that would render it passul!
Many people also don’t realize that being a sofer anda magiah require two different skill sets, necessitating different studies and bechinos. Not every magiah has shimush or a ksav kabbalah in safrus, and not every sofer knows how to check the work of others.
Is there any hope to rectify these pirztos (breaches) in the future?
B’chasdei Hashem, after many years of leadership by amazing experts who have since passed on or retired, Rav Avraham Tzvi Wosner in Monsey is taking charge of the Vaad Mishmeres Stam in America, with Rabbi Moshe Shaul Klein in Bnei Brak in charge of Eretz Yisrael. Many ideas are in the works to help strengthen this most sacred of mitzvos. Right now, the Israeli branch is in the midst of a massive campaign to get sofrim to either learn or review these halachos so they can receive a ksav kabbalah. Close to 1,000 sofrim have already taken the bechinos this past year, and equally important, renewed their ksav kabbalah.
Similar programs are now being developed in America as well. Rav Wosner in Monsey and Rav Yosef Fund in Lakewood are currently teaching, testing and certifying sofrim and magihim, thereby securing our future.
Some people have urged a system whereby every mezuzah, pair of tefillin or sefer Torah come with a hologramed hashgachah. Another idea is that each item of sta”m have a QR code (or an ID number, for those without Internet). This would then lead the consumer to a page or voicemail that would reveal all pertinent information about the item, including the names of the sofer and magiah, the type of klaf, etc.
Alas, without a robust demand from consumers, such plans are but a pipedream and could never come to fruition.
For now, at the very minimum, rabbanim should instruct their mispallelim to only purchase items for which they are given either the name of the sofer or an assurance of a ksav kabbalah. Such requests alone will cause an awesome ripple effect. This would be a good launchpad off which our leaders could work.
Painfully, even if all the above would be somehow resolved, this would not disentangle the entire issue. Even should all the sta”m on the market be certified, there would still be another hurdle to surmount.
Minhagim and Shittos
Let us for a moment put aside the frightening information shared above. In addition to the arduous challenge of making sure that a reliable sofer wrote one’s sta”m, there are other concerns of which the purchaser needs to be aware.
There are hundreds of shittos, chumros, kulos and minhagim when it comes to writing sta”m. Once we are already so far removed from knowing who wrote our sta”m or made our battim, how would someone even begin to know the standards and methods by which they were produced? And even if we could fix the real reliability concerns, the consumer is often unaware that there are certain shittos that should be avoided by “his” mesorah, even if they are perfectly kosher for someone else.
For example, a sofer told me that a certain oocher sta”m was recently called out for selling battim to Ashkenazim that were made in a way that is clearly not kosher according to how Ashkenazim have paskened for centuries (relating to how the shin on the shel rosh is made)!
Allow me to bring the interested reader a little deeper into the world of shittos so as to better appreciate their complexity.
There’s a famous written exchange between the Lubavitcher Rebbe and Rav Moshe Feinstein. In Rav Moshe’s lengthy response (Orach Chaim 4:9) he shares that although his minhag is to wear Rabbeinu Tam tefillin, he reluctantly had to stop and has had hard time commissioning a new pair in America, as they are often written by sofrim who follow their reading of the Shulchan Aruch Harav’s opinion, which differs from how Rav Moshe understood his psak.
The issue Rav Moshe was referring to is the complicated and much-debated subject of how to write the parshiyos of tefillin (i.e. setumos).
This machlokos is unresolved, leading to the following reality:
Most Sefardim follow the view of the Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chaim siman 32:36), while most Ashkenazim follow the Taz(ad loc. se’if kattan 26). There are still other Ashkenazim who follow a divergent way of reading this same Taz, e.g., chasidei Belz and Bobov; see also Igros Moshe, ibid. #12. Minhag Chabad follows the Kuntres Acharon based on the words of the Baal Hatanya.
The objective in sharing the above is not, chalilah, to convince anyone to abandon his minhagim in exchange for what Rav Moshe argued. Rather, the intent is to demonstrate that even amongst the greatest poskim there are many differing and even opposing views. And even after a sofer assures a customer that those concerns are met, there are also issues relating to the type of klaf, kesivah, ink, battim, etc.
Another consideration has to do with geographical areas. Some people may think that in Lakewood or Williamsburg, all of the tefillin being sold will naturally follow shittah X. This is not necessarily the case.
When my father-in-law headed the Kashruth Council of Canada (the COR), based on a teshuvah he received from Rav Shlomo Miller, he wouldn’t allow Diet Coke to be certified for Pesach due to an ingredient that is derived from kitniyos, namely aspartame. Instead, the COR gave the Pesach rights to that product to the Sephardic rabbanim in Canada.
Fair enough. But as odd as this may sound, some Torontonians asked their guests coming from the United States for Yom Tov to bring them Diet Coke that had an OU! True, Rav Belsky disagreed with Rav Shlomo Miller, and ruled for the OU that this type of kitniyosshenishtanah, meaning that it has been modified and manipulated to the point of being a new molecule, is of no concern on Pesach. But there was absolutely no difference between the Canadian Diet Coke and the American Diet Coke! Why not buy the Sefardi one in Canada for less trouble?!
The correlation to sta”m should be clear: A person may be under the false impression that if he purchases sta”m in a certain country or zip code he will be getting something that is aligned with the minhag hamakom. But the truth is that if sta”m isn’t acquired through transparent channels (or directly from a sofer or personal broker), the location where it is bought is of zero relevance.
Another concern: Let’s say that a person goes to buy a pair of tefillin and finds that the prices range anywhere from $800 to $4,000. Again, assuming that everything is kosher(which may be a stretch), the consumer must ask with great specificity for the distinction between these costs. The seller, of course, isn’t being deliberately deceitful.But again, if enough people demand more details, the effect could be very positive. The consumer must begin to recognize that he is not really buying a “pair of tefillin.” Rather, he is purchasing battim, retzuos and parshiyos. He should inquire about all three as the separate components they truly are.
Far too often, sta”m is the last item on an otherwise expensive checklist for a new house or simchah. That is why people should sit with a respected sofer or rav far in advance of the move or celebratory event and request unambiguous guidance in all these matters: halachos, nusach, hiddurim, chumros and hakpados.
Returning to Stencils
I would like to share the words of a preeminent chasidishe posek with regard to this supposed kolmus-style form of silkscreen printing:
“The shailah here is not between kosher and passul;it’s between muttar and assur!”
In my view, and in this case, these are profound words and demonstrate great pikchus/shrewdness. Meaning, should the focus be on the halacha alone, the average person may fall under the assumption that should we get around those issues we would then be in the clear. In truth, and like all matters – both secular and religious -that we wish to insure for the future, the law is the floor and not the ceiling.
Several years ago, many frum publications reported on a German university that had created a writing robot. To prove its significance, they taught it how to write Chinese, thinking that this was the most challenging writing style. They soon learned that there was an even more complex system of writing: ksav Ashuris and sta”m!
And so, several years ago, this robot was put on display in the Museum of Berlin, and observers could watch its robotic arm writing a “Torah scroll” on a piece of klaf.
That machine, the price of which was likely more than $1 million five years ago, is probably now half the cost. After looking into it, I can posit that it would take this android just three months to write a sefer Torah from start to finish (working day and night, nonstop, which it can do). It would have the most beautiful ksav. One could recoup his initial investment and be making very good money fairly quickly (earning about $200,000 a year, indefinitely)! But of course, it would be a willful michsol rabbim, just another in the long list of obstacles and deception when it comes to sta”m.
It should now be clear why those involved in sta”m have dismissed this (claimed) new stencil innovation out-of-hand. If unleashed on the market, nothing would stop sta”m that is being printed off a $2000 computer and printer setup from being sold under the guise that it is, as well, this new stencil design! We simply have enough issues to resolve in sta”m before creating new ones.
It boggles the mind that even if this innovator believed that he discovered a new technique of writing kosher sta”m—a technique that somehow eluded the likes of the Chasam Sofer and so many of our past gedolim, who would have loved nothing more than to discover a simpler and more efficient method of creating sta”m—why he wouldn’t first and immediately approach the gedolei haposkim; certainly before sending such items halfway around the globe to be sold! Why put them on the market without asking? Why sell them to consumers without notifying them as to what they are purchasing?
{We did not even broach the issue of mekach taus and geneiva –for even if one wishes to believe such stencil mezuzos are kosher, one still would have to inform the buyer that these are made in such a way. I would imagine that very few Jews -of any persuasion-would have purchased them had they known this, even if told forthright that it was allowed}
Throughout history, those individuals – like Sarah Schenirer – who had a genuine interest in adopting new approaches to modern problems have always first approached our gedolim (see Chofetz Chaim in his Likkutei Halachos to Sotah 11).This alone was proof positive of their sincere motives.
In Closing
Thousands and thousands of mezuzos are purchased every day. We have already expressed astonishment at how this is even feasible.
Alas, there are 27 oisios, but a million ways to write them incorrectly.
We have explained, if only in brief, that countless shittos exist with regard to the many separate elements that go into sta”m, leading to the potential for an unfathomable factorial of possibilities (see shu”t Min Hashamayim #3 with the notes of Rav Reuven Margolies).
If the reader walks away from this article concerned about his sta”m and becomes a savvy consumer who asks questions, then it has served its purpose. It is my opinion that only forthright questions and calm inquiries will change the current landscape.
As always, one’s personal moreh horaah should be consulted for the final psak on any-and-all questions and concerns.
I wish to thank the many expert sofrim and talmidei chachamim, both Litvish and Chasidish, who patiently aided me in my research.
Rabbi Moshe Taub is the rabbi of Young Israel of Holliswood and rabbinic editor and weekly contributor for Ami Magazine. He is the author of Jews in the World (Mosaica Press) and writes on Jewish law, history, and thought at ShulChronicles.com.
Technology Forces Challenges Us How To Best Be ‘SHOMREI’ Shabbos -Its ‘Guardians’ For The Future
November, 2015
“Will artificial intelligence have unintended consequences?” asked NPR’s MarketWatch.
Quoting from an official White House report, they went on to answer their own question.
“Artificial intelligence is coming, and policymakers need to prepare the economy for it, the White House said.
“The report, ‘Artificial Intelligence, Automation, and the Economy,’ suggests the U.S. should invest in and develop AI, because it has ‘many benefits,’ education and train Americans for the jobs of the future, and aid workers in the transition and empower them to share in future growth.
“But the authors of the report acknowledge that there are countless unknowns, from what the effects could be, to how quickly they’ll arrive.
‘Researchers’ estimates on the scale of threatened jobs over the next decade or two range from 9% to 47%,’ they write, but add that the economy has always proved to be resilient to take existing rates of change and shrinking of industry in stride.”
They are wise to consider the potential realties that technology will hurl at us in the future, both the good and the bad.
The olam halacha is concerned with the same.
In the Shul Chronicles published the week before Chanukah, after I quoted Rav Moshe’s prescient, almost prophetic teshuvah from 1969 on the subject of microwaves, I ended the column with the following tease:
“After Chanukah we will return to this discussion, and show of another area of technology regarding which Rav Moshe was able to discern the winds of the future, and how rabbanim today need to pay heed, as I believe it will become the hottest button halachik issue of the next fifty years. Stay Tuned!”
This was not hyperbole; I truly believe this to be true.
Before I go on to explain, I would be remiss not to state the obvious: this column is never intended for halacha pesuka, and it certainly should never be used to question one’s rav. The subject to which I am referring is already a debated one, but I will be discussing to where it is heading in the not-to-distant future, not how it is viewed today per se.
To what am I referring? Timers on Shabbos.
For quite some time this issue has led to many opinions among rabbanim. My balla battim already know not to come to me with questions relating to this subject. On the other hand, many chashuveh rabbanim do allow timers on Shabbos, perhaps even the majority.
Eilu v’eilu is imperative –and the greatest poskim have debated this issue (some however are often misquoted, in my opinion, e.g. see Chazon Ish, often quoted as allowing timers, in his own words, Chazon Ish,Oh’c 38: 2 and 3).
I explain to my balla battim that far be it from me to follow the strict view when the minhag yisreol, arguably, is to be lenient. Rather, I am strict for another reason.
I choose to be strict because of a point Rav Moshe Feinstein makes in the course of discussing the matter. The point was ahead of its time, and one that we will soon all have to contend with.
I will first bring Rav Moshe’s words, and then will extrapolate from them to modern times.
It is no secret that Rav Moshe was strongly against all timers on Shabbos (with a few notable exceptions, e.g. light switches).
On the 20’th of Teves 5737, corresponding to the 10th of January 1977, Rav Moshe responding to an inquiry regarding his opinion as it pertains to timers on Shabbos.
He writes, “Relating to timers (on ovens)…it is obvious that they are assur. For with these (timers) one can perform all prohibited activity on Shabbos, even in factories. There is therefore no zilzul Shabbos greater than this. And I am certain that had this (invention) been around in the days of the tannaim and amoraim they would have banned it, as they had banned amirah l’akum. Perhaps, it (timers) anyway fall under the rubric of amria l’akum…”
This last line of Rav Moshe may seem shocking, but it can be easily defended. Rishonim point out that one of the reasons offered for the prohibition of amira l’akum is that virtually every melacha could then be performed using this tool. Shabbos would vanish, and the day will have very little making it distinct from all others.
Would not then, asks Rav Moshe, timers offer the same challenge?
While not all poskim agreed with Rav Moshe’s argument, I wonder what they would say today.
In the not too distant future Google cars will be on the road. Already, many high-end cars offer varying degrees of self-driving features.
Should we allow those to be programmed to take us to shul before Shabbos?
If not, why not? For, if we allow people to have fresh coffee Shabbos morning through the use of a timer, why not this?
There already are ovens on the market that act as a refrigerator. Meaning, one can place seasoned chicken inside at 2pm on Friday, and Shabbos morning, as you are answering kedusha in shul, the cool mode will switch off and the heat mode be turned on. You will then arrive home for Shabbos lunch with fresh roasted chicken!
It will not be too long that one’s entire home and life is run through the medium of wires, what of Shabbos timers then?
To be clear, I am not seeking to convince other rabbanim to be as strict as I am, rather I sincerely wish to know the best path forward.
As our lives become more and more governed by technology, a lenient view on timers will have to come with exceptions, I would at least hope. How would these exceptions be defended? How would we then differentiate between timers’ permissible usage and forbidden?
In 1977 it may have read as peculiar his words that “all melachos can be performed with timers, even factories”; but they do not sound odd anymore.
Recently, a famous, young, secular news outlet published an article “A Gentile’s Guide to Cheating the Shabbat”. It begins with a basic primer on the 39 melachos, and delves into the most common issues that arise. After discussing our taping of the lights in our refrigerator, and even amirah l’akum, it begins the subject of timers. They only had seven words to say on that subject: “Using timers seems like flat-out cheating”.
While Torah Bagoyim Al Taamin (Eicha Rabbah 2; as opposed to wisdom, we do not look outside the fold for Torah opinions), I think the reason this journalist thought the use of timers as odd is because he is young and can easily see where such a policy can soon lead. So, will this indeed become the hot button halachik issue of the next fifty years as I predicted? I hope not. It is my wish that standards be set now by our gedolei haposkim so that we can better protect Shabbos in not just fifty years but -if moshiach has not come ch’vs– in one-hundred and beyond. For, by that time, who knows what technology will offer! Hopefully not a self-programed drasha-giver!
Rabbi Moshe Taub is the rabbi of Young Israel of Holliswood and rabbinic editor and weekly contributor for Ami Magazine. He is the author of Jews in the World (Mosaica Press) and writes on Jewish law, history, and thought at ShulChronicles.com.
One of the most intriguing studies I have read in the past several years is titled ‘Altered Placebo and Drug Labeling Changes the Outcome of Episodic Migraine Attacks’ published in the January 2014 issue of Science Translational Medicine
Here is an excerpt from the Harvard Medical School’s website that discusses this article and interviews its main chief researcher, Dr. Ted J. Kaptchuk:
“Placebos are often considered ‘fake’ treatments… To complicate matters, there is a documented ‘placebo effect,’ which means that [in double-blind studies] some people actually respond to a placebo [a ‘sugar pill’ that contains no medicine at all] even though it shouldn’t have an effect on the body. This has been thought to be largely due to the patient’s belief or expectation that he or she is getting the real treatment and not the fake one.”
So far you are likely not surprised. It has long been documented that people can respond to treatment for reasons of the mind.
But then comes this: “But what if people were told up front that they were getting a placebo and not an active medication? It stands to reason the placebo would have no effect. Right? Wrong.”
Wrong? How could that be?
The article continues, “Dr. Ted J. Kaptchuk, a professor of medicine at Harvard Medical School and director of the Harvard-wide Program in Placebo Studies and the Therapeutic Encounter (PiPS) at Beth Israel Deaconess Medical Center in Boston, has been studying placebos for more than 20 years.
“In one study, Kaptchuk looked at people with irritable bowel syndrome (IBS), a common condition that causes abdominal cramping and one that can be debilitating for many. Half of the study volunteers were told they were getting an ‘open-label’ placebo, and the others got nothing at all. He found that there was a dramatic and significant improvement in the placebo group’s IBS symptoms, even though they were explicitly told they were getting a ‘sugar pill’ without any active medication.
“Kaptchuk says placebos won’t work for every medical situation—for example, they can’t lower cholesterol or cure cancer. But they can work for conditions that are defined by ‘self-observation’ symptoms like pain, nausea, or fatigue.
“‘Our hope is that in conditions where the open-label placebo might be valuable, instead of putting people on drugs immediately—for depression, chronic pain, fatigue—people would be put on placebo,’ says Kaptchuk. ‘If it works, great. If not, then go on to drugs.’”
How shocking!
The word ‘placebo’ is derived at least partially from Tanach. This has been documented in the Journal of the Royal Academy of Medicine (October 1999, pp. 511-515, and Issue 93, 2000).
One of the Psalms most frequently recited by Catholics at funerals, going back at least a thousand years, is “Es’halech lifnei Hashem b’eretz chaim, I will walk before Hashem in the land of the living” (Tehillim 116:9). While the literal translation of the first word is “I will walk” or “I will walk in step with,” the Septuagint uses a Greek word that means “I shall be pleasing.” (See Megillah 9 and Rishonim and Acharonim for whether the Septuagint is actually the original translation of the seventy Sages, although initially they only translated the Chamishah Chumshei Torah.)
Later, when the Greek was translated into Latin, this verse read: “PlaceboD-omino in regione vivorum, I shall be pleasing to G-d in the land of the living.”
In time, people would come to funerals and cry this verse out even when most of the others present knew they had not been very close to the deceased. The term “the singer of the placebo” thus came about to describe people or things that pretend to be what they are not!
One of the issues that comes up from time to time is what type of medicine or treatment is given credence in halachah. As seen from the matter of the placebo, defining the term “medicine” is a difficult task.
For example, the Shulchan Aruch (328:17) rules that a non-Jew may be asked to assist a sick person whose condition is not life-threatening even by performing a melachah that is assur d’Oraisa.In light of the placebo study, would one be able to ask his non-Jewish neighbor to go to the store for him on Shabbos to pick up his placebo medication?
While that question may be academic in nature, many others are not.
How does halachah view alternative treatments such as acupuncture, chiropractic, and hypnotherapy? And what about segulos? Can one rely on them? Can their use supersede the halachos of Shabbos?
These sh’eilos become very real when people are seeking help for serious, ongoing, and sometimes terminal issues.
And even if one can prove that a certain alternative medical treatment is not helpful, would halachah recognize a well-documented placebo effect? (I would like to note here that I am not focused on any particular alternative treatment, and I am not offering my personal view of their efficacy.)
Medication on Pesach is an area where these issues are highly relevant. Many poskim posit that even when pills contain chametz, they may be swallowed whole on Pesach. (See, e.g., Ksav Sofer 118, Igros Moshe 2:92 and 3:62, Chazon Ish116:8,and Minchas Shlomo 1:17. Even those who differ would at least agree that it is at worst only a d’Rabbanan of “achshivei,” and even then, only according to the daas yachid opinion of the Rosh.)
But what if it’s an herbal medication? What about vitamins? May one take these on Pesach if they contain chametz?
Further, what about a choleh who is in a life-threatening situation, lo aleinu? Would halachah allow him to ride in a car on Shabbos in order to receive a brachah from a tzaddik? Is such a measure deemed curative in the eyes of halachah?
I was actually once asked if someone could take a cab on Shabbos to the late Lubavitcher Rebbe’s Ohel in order to daven for a terminally ill relative who was in surgery on Shabbos!
The Minchas Shabbos (d. 1917) discusses sending a telegram to a tzaddik on Shabbos to ask him to daven for a person who is deathly ill.He rules that it is forbidden (MinchasShabbos,siman 84, se’if 19, os 65).
Rav Shlomo Kluger (d. 1869) records a fascinating story about a rav in the nearby town of Zalutchov who allowed non-Jews to write a kvittel on Shabbos for a person who was very ill and then travel to deliver it to a rav so the choleh could be davened for (Shu”t U’bacharta B’chaim, siman 87; see this same event recorded in Shu”t Maharsham 3:225). In Rav Kluger’s response, one can sense his anger at this psak; he even forbade that rav to pasken in the future!
But why? Don’t we believe in tefillah? Why should it be viewed differently from natural cures?
The Gemara states that in certain dangerous situations, we allow certain measures on Shabbos (Taanis 14). Rav Yosi points out, however, that general tefillah and crying out would not be allowed in these dangerous situations. Rashi explains that we cannot be certain that our tefillos will be accepted.
The Tzitz Eliezer takes this further, stating that, especially in our generation, “even a d’Rabbanan may not be desecrated for the sake of tefillah for a sick person. Even regarding [sending his name] to a tzaddik who is known to have his tefillos answered, like Rav Chanina ben Dosa, it would still be forbidden.”
As we will see, all of this is due to the fact that halachah only sanctions as medicine things that work al pi teva,through nature, encouraging us to seek only proven scientific interventions.
We will discuss in detail just how this is defined, and what types of scientific experiments would be accepted in halachah as proof of the efficacy of a treatment; we will also discuss how these guidelines relate to popular alternative treatments. (For instance, the Tzemach Tzedek [siman 38] discusses the mysterious ‘segula’ of pouring hot lead while reciting certain teffilos and whether it may be done on Shabbos. A note to the reader: any divination or practice not found in chazal should not be embraced before speaking with competent morah horah, and a medical professional)
But, what about the ‘placebo effect’? Could there not be cases that the emotional calm of, say, a beracha alone could bring better health, and maybe extend a life?
These questions are not academic. On the few occasions that I was with congregants as hatzala took them away the patient requested that I somehow contact their relatives on Shabbos.
The Shulchan Aruch rules (siman 306:9), for example, that certain cholim would be allowed to send non-Jews outside of the techum so as to get relatives to come after Shabbos. The MishnaBerura (ad loc. siif 41) explains that this is a psychological concern for which certain violations are indeed made permissible, and even required at times.
While this is an allowance for rabbinical violations, the Aruch Hashulchan allows for even biblical ones to be bypassed if a doctor confirms that it could have a significant impact.
This view can be proven from what the Shulchan Aruch later writes (siman 328:4) that we perform for a choleh on Shabbos all that was performed during the week.
As we can see issues of Shabbos and emotional desires versus real treatment are vast and complex – a rav must be consulted at all times. (The reader is also directed to Piskei Teshuvosmehadura kamma 328:4, and second edition, volume two, 238 footnote 114).
There is also an extra value in consulting a rav, doctor, therapist, etc. in the above cases and those similar: Objectivity.
To explain this, let us for a moment look at another halacha. The Shulchan Aruch rules (328:14) that if a choleh does not have access to kosher food one may violate Shabbos and slaughter an animal so that he has food. This means that if there is a choice between eating treif and driving to the hospital to bring him food we take the latter option.
Why is this so? One would think that a choleh should himself eat the treif rather than have another(s) violate Shabbos on his behalf.
The poskim (see Aruch Hashulchan and Shulchan Aruch Harav) give a number of reasons for this. One of the most prominent of these is that while true that non-kosher food seems to be the right option to take in terms of halachic compartmentalization, however we must be concerned that the emotional reaction to violating the isuur(im) of treif food will scar the choleh to the point of harming his health!
I have been witness to cholim being greatly agitated at relatives who find heterim to come to the hospital during a Shabbos emergency, and visa versa.
In other words, while there are indeed times that emotions play a role in halacha, it is sometimes hard for family members to see what is best for one’s emotional well being. And, the rav as well should be aware that he may not know what is best, and therefore must listen carefully to the words of the family members and loved ones who know the patient best. Both objective voices and and those that are noggea b’davar voices are critical in these cases. Amazingly, all of the above relates to Purim. Its connection to the story of Mordechai and Esther will be discussed next week iy’H.
Rabbi Moshe Taub is the rabbi of Young Israel of Holliswood and rabbinic editor and weekly contributor for Ami Magazine. He is the author of Jews in the World (Mosaica Press) and writes on Jewish law, history, and thought at ShulChronicles.com.
Dear Rabbi Taub, Thank you for a wonderful column. I wanted to throw out an idea that I’ve had for an article with Pesach/Sefira not too far away. I always thought the laws of shaving were so bizarre/fascinating and it has been a topic that as a ba’al tshuva that always catches me off guard. As a student at Sho’r Yoshuv yeshiva I would always look around to see who was shaving and who wasn’t; did their job make them putar? At least during the summer months as a counselor at (frum Camp X) many staff would shave during the 3 weeks eruv Shabbos; what was with Rosh Chodesh falling on Sunday so you could shave eruv Shabbos? Why didn’t we shave during Chol HaMoed if it is a joyous time? I most likely still don’t remember all the answers to these questions, but it is one of those things that you notice and notice about others. Best, Drew Fein Wisconsin
I thought it best to wait until the Lag B’omer issue to respond, as this way I could avoid people paskening from what is written here.
The writer is correct that it can be all very confusing.
As a rav as well, it is often a case-by-case basis. This reminds me of the old story (of the fellow who approaches his rav, “A girl who I have been trying to date finally said ‘Yes’ to the shadchann. May I shave for this first meeting during sefira?” The rav, after being told that she is a girl from an upper-class family who would not be delighted to be seen with a scraggly-bearded gentleman –responded in the affirmative.
The first date went well, so the boy was surprised to hear the next morning from the shadchan that she wished to call it off.
“Was it something that I said?” he nervously asked.
“No, not at all” replied the shadchan “She had a wonderful time”.
“So what is the issue?”
“She just could not see herself marrying a boy who shaves during sefira”!
Interestingly, this is found as a real case presented to Rav Moshe (Mesoras Moshe 3:p.142), and while he says in some cases there is room to be lenient, he is indeed greatly concerned that shaving will have the opposite of the desired affect –causing the girl to wonder why this young man is shaving during sefira.
Making these halachos most puzzling is the fact that we have the Three Weeks/Nine Days, chol hamoed, sefira, and aveilus R’l-all prohibiting haircuts and shaving.
Because the above periods all share many basic premises, they often get confused with each other. For example, the idea that one should not purchase new items during sefira –especially items that would allow for a shehechiyanu –is, according to most, not true during sefira. Simply due to these days’ confusion with the days of Av is causes many not to puraches new items during sefira (see Mishnah Berrura 496:2 –the reader should note that there are indeed minhagim not to make this beracha during sefira and every reader must follow their minhag, see Bein Pesach L’Shavuos p. 290 footnote #2 at length for many sources who support just such a chumrah).
Further confusing matters, the poskim debate to what extent we can compare these various ‘no haircutting’ times of the year.
So, for example, by hilchos chol hamoead the Shulchan Aruch (siman 531) gives us a list of people who would be able to get a haircut, e.g. a released prisoner.
The Pri Megadim states by hilchos sefira that this same list of allowances would be activated by sefira as well. This opinion is recorded approvingly by the Biur Halacha.
However, Rav Moshe Feinstein (Igros Moshe 2:96) is not as satisfied with such a comparison. For by chol hamoed, the reason chazal prohibited hair cutting is to get everyone to look their best before going into yom tov; so as to retard any procrastination. This is very different than sefira that carries the weight of actual aveilus!
But, certainly, the most confusing aspect of all is when and when not there is a general allowance for haircuts during one’s ‘half’ of sefira. It is important to keep in mind that there are various customs as to when during these 49 days not to cut hair. While many avoid it all the days of sefira, most follow either the ‘first half’ (from Pesach until lag b’omer), or some type of second half (1 iyaar until 1 yimei hagbala, or, 2 iyaar until erev Shavous, or even from Pesach until 1 sivan)
Let me run through all potential calendar occurrences that give rise to allowances.
EREV SHABBOS:
Rav Moshe Feinstein was once asked (Mesoras Moshe vol. 3 p. 143) regarding someone who is shaving during sefira due to work and potential financial loss (a rav should always be consulted, see Likutei Halachos, based on Rav Shmuel Kamanetzky shlit’a, p. 114 footnote 5 at length).
“Since he is shaving anyway throughout the while week, would it not be a bizayon to not shave for Shabbos?!”
While Rav Moshe said he understood why people might think so, the truth is that doing what halacha advises is never a bizayon l’shabbos.
Nevertheless, and as the shoel told Rav Moshe (to no avail), there are poskim who always allow shaving erev Shabbos during sefira.
There are many reasons for their leniency. For one, the minhag of not cutting hair during sefira should not triumph over the words of a navi, and it says (Yeshayahu 58:13) ‘…v’karah l’shabbos oneg-you shall call unto Shabbos as a delight’. In fact, the Rama rules (siman 260) that getting a haircut erev Shabbos is a matter of halacha!
Others are quoted as allowing erev Shabbos shaving or trimming of beards because, at least in America, many go without any beards and after a few days of noticeable stubble one has already fulfilled their aveilus.
However, and as Rav Moshe concludes, short of having such a mesorah from parents or rebbeim, the minhag yisroel is not like this, as we shall clearly see in the next examples.
SEE FOOTNORE IN EMES LYAAKOV TO SA 493 WHO ALSO SAYS EREV SHABBOS NO HAIRCUTS
Erev Shabbos Before a Shabbos Rosh Chodesh Iyaar
The poskim rule that should this rosh chodesh fall on Shabbos (in which case the first day of Rosh Chodesh will always be on Friday) then one may get haircuts erev Shabbos. This is true even if one generally follows Rav Yehudah Hachasid not to cut their hair on rosh chodesh (Rav Elyahsiv and Rav Moshe, as brought in Dirshu #16). From the mere fact that the poskim allow one to shave on this particular erev Shabbos is evidence that most held that a stam erev Shabbos during sefira cutting hair would not be allowed.
Erev Shabbos Before a Sunday Rosh Chodesh Iyaar
One may not cut their hair this erev Shabbos (Pri Chadash, et al.)
Erev Shabbos Before a Sunday Lag B’Omer
One may cut their hair on such an erev Shabbos (Rema). As to if one must cut their hair before such a Shabbos, poskim say not (see, e.g. Rivevos Efraim 1:338).
Erev Shabbos Before a Sunday Rosh Chodesh Sivan (Or a Sunday Day 1 of the Yimei Hagbala)
For the many whose sefira period (33 days) ends after rosh chodesh sivan –by the yimei hagbalah – then they may not get a haircut on this Friday. However, those for whom Sunday rosh chodesh would mark the end of their mourning period there is a debate (this would also apply to a year when Sunday is the first of the yimei hagbalah for those whose mourning period ends then). The Pri Megadim argues that this should be no different than when lag b’omer falls on a Sunday when it is allowed on the Friday before. However, many others disagree with this and do not allow haircutting on such any such Friday before sivan.
But why should this be different from lag b’omer when one may cut their hair the Friday before? When is a Sunday event enough to allow one to cut their hair on the Friday before and when not?
Rav Shlomo Kluger explains (Chochmas Shlomo, siman 493): When on Shabbos itself there is an additional added joy (like Shabbos and rosh chodesh) one could get haircuts the Friday before.
However, a Sunday event alone would not be enough, save for lag b’omer. For, following lag b’omer many revert back to sefira and not cutting their hair, making their erev Shabbos haircut in such a year kavod for that Shabbos and the next Shabbos.
This, however, can’t be compared to a Sunday rosh chodesh –even a rosh chodesh that would allow one to cut their hair, because a Sunday rosh chodesh or a Sunday day 1 of the yimei hagbala one would be allowed to cut their hair not just on that day, but all days following it, making our need for allowances far weaker.
I will conclude with the following original thought. Lag b’omer always falls out 18th iyaar. The Gemara says that according to Rav Yehoshua the first day of the mabul was 17 Iyar (Rosh Hashanah 11). According to the Sefer Hayashar the waters of the flood killed everyone on the first day, so that by 18 Iyar the deaths had ended. The 18th of Iyar is also the date when another plague—the one that afflicted Rebbe Akiva’s students—ended. I would suggest, then, that what we are celebrating is a date that represents forging ahead, picking up the pieces and rebuilding. Like Noach, Rebbe Akiva’s had to start from scratch and rebuild even after losing everything. This date represents rising from the ashes, carrying on after loss.
And, it hints to our ratzon for the ultimate ‘re-start’ –with binyan bayis shlelishi!
Rabbi Moshe Taub is the rabbi of Young Israel of Holliswood and rabbinic editor and weekly contributor for Ami Magazine. He is the author of Jews in the World (Mosaica Press) and writes on Jewish law, history, and thought at ShulChronicles.com.
I was curious. The shul in question was looking for a rav and brought in three well-known talmidei chachamim for probahs.
One of the members of the board –a friend –was giving me updates throughout the process, so as to discuss the proper procedures of those three complicated shabbosim.
It was time for the vote and he volunteered that he was voting for Rav X.
At risk of avak lashon harah, I wondered what maaleh he saw in this particular rav (without sharing perceived chasronos of his or the others, hence the risk of avak lashon harah).
He explained, “Well, they were all fantastic, however, my decision was easy. On the Friday night of this particular rav’s prabah, most of the shul lined up to wish the candidate a gut Shabbos…”
I’ve been in this situation before, and it is always a strenuous pressure. Everyone shares with you their name, you respond with questions (e.g. “Oh, are you related to so-and-so?” etc.). There is simply no way to remember all of these brief –and sometimes intimate- rapid exchanges that you had. By the next day your mind is mush; an amalgam of thousands of bits of info.
He continued. “So, when it was my turn I was brief. But my teenage son asked him a quick kashah on the parsha –something that has long bothered him. We then quickly shuffled off. The next day, as we were waking to shalosh seudos the candidate walked over to my son. ‘I found that the Netziv asks your question’ he said. He then proceeded to give over the Netziv’s answer as well as an answer of his own.
“If someone, during such an significant 24-hour period of their life –and one of the busiest –took time to look-up and answer a young man’s shailah, well, that is the rav for me.”
I could not agree more. We have said often in this space that one of the great maalos of rabbanus is not just the interesting questions one receives –as we all hear great kashos from time to time – but the necessity to at least give effort in finding answers.
This year is a great example of this. There is a question which I would venture every reader has had in their back of their mind this year (and previous similar years), and even if ever verbalized rarely took the time to search for an answer.
I do not have that ‘luxury’.
This morning, after shachris, a young member asked me this question.
Whenever the 22nd of Nissan fall on Shabbos a strange situation is created. In eretzyisroel it is just a regular Shabbos, although issruchag, and they read the parshas hashavuah. For us in chutz l’aretz, it is acharon shel pesach, which has its own special kriah. Meaning, the next week we read the parsha they had read the Shabbos before.
We are out of sync!
This continues so that the week you are reading this article, if you are in chutzl’aretz the parsha is Emor, and if you are in eretz yisroel, the parsha is Bahar!
(This can happen due to Shavuos as well, see Biur HaGr’a and BiurHalachasiman 428 s.v.bamidbar for all the ways the parshios can fall out each year, and why. See also ShaareiYitzchak end of klal 11. See MagenAvraham ad loc. sif katan 6 and MishnaBerrura 10).
The questions become numerous. For instance, my father and other bnei eretz yisroel who were here for Pesach will soon be returning to eretzyisroel. They will be one parsha behind! What to do in such a case is a matter of great discussion, and the reader is advised to see YomTovSheniK’Hilchoso, pages 138-141).
But there is a deeper, non-halachik question that this creates, and it was this that the young man this morning wished to know. Why do we wait so long to get back in sync? Amazingly, it is not until the month of Av–the parshios of Mattos-Massei –that we catch up! That week, in eretz yisroel they lein only Massei while we lein both.
His question is a great one.
There certainly are sooner candidates, for example, this year, chutzl’aretz could have easily merged AchreiMos and Kedoshim and we would have been caught the very first week! Another sooner candidate is the potential double parsha of Behar–Bechukosei as is done in non-leap years.
In addition, when the 22nd of Nissan falls on Shabbos in non-leap years, we could also easily merge in chutzl’aretzTazria–Metzorah.
Why then do we wait all the way till the summer? It seems that we are going out of our way to stay out of sync for some time.
Strange.
To get an understanding of all of this, we first have to unpack the history of the parshios.
Historically, finishing the Torah once a year was not a universal custom, with some communities completing it only once every three years-three and a half (see Megilla 29b).
Still in the year 1170 there were two shuls in Egypt –one that leined what we know today as the parshios of the week, and the other that read at a third that pace (Masoas Binyamin M’Toledo, Adler edition, p. 63)!
Yes, this means that the latter group did not have ‘Simchas Torah’! (See Toldos Simchas Torah, ch. 1)
At some point, around 800 years ago, everyone began to complete the Torah cycle once every year.
The system still went through certain revisions, for instance the Avudaram gives us one double parsha that we no longer observe –Shelach–Korach!
In fact, the Chida quotes from the Rosh that “The purpose of the divisions of parshios is simply so as to finish the Torah once every year. Each leader of every community separates and combines the parshios as he sees fit, for these are not halachos rather minhag (shu’t ChaimShaal, Chazah HaTenufa; Kitzur Teshuvos HaRosh 54. See also shu’t Ohr Zarua 2:45 for an interesting communal case where he echoes the same point as the Rosh).
However, certainly at our point in history we are obliged to follow minhag yisroel.
With the above in mind our question is only stronger –why don’t we just combine an earlier set of parshios instead of waiting till the month of Av to become in sync?
Before providing an answer, one more piece of history is critical.
Have you ever wondered why we start from Bereishis at Sukkos time? Would it not make more sense to create a yearly cycle that began and ended on Shavuos?
Imagine dancing with the Torah on the very day of nesinas hatorah (sh’baalpeh, see Gittin 60)!
The answer comes from a chazal (Megilla 31b) where we are taught that Ezra established that we read the kelolos found in Vayikra before Shavous and those found in Devarim before Rosh Hashana, so that the new years (Shavuos is the new year for the fruits of trees) can commence with the curses behind them.
Meaning, even those that only finished the Torah once every three years would stop at these times of year to leinBechukosei and KiSavo.
Now, if one pauses to think about it, one will recognize that with our one-year cycle that starts on Sukkos it works out anyway to read those parshios at their designated times! Meaning, we set our weekly schedule to fit the takana of Ezra!
With all of this in mind we get an answeras to why we wait so long to be in sync with eretzyisreol.
The Maharit (d.1639) in a teshuva (2:4) asks this question. He first quotes the above gemara about takanas Ezra, and reminds us that we follow the view of Tosfos (s.v. kelolos) to lein the kelolos two shabbosim before those yomim tovim, so that we have a buffer of one stam parsha in-between.
Now we can understand why we wait so long to join eretz yisroel. Because of the way Pesach fell this year they will be leining the kelolos with a two week buffer before Shavous. While they have no choice in the matter, we certainly do not wish to join them in being so distant from the takana of Ezra!
There are other explanations to this issue –and even some who do split earlier parshios in eretzyisroel (see shu’t MishpeteiYisroel 3:58), but we chose this answer here for with it one learns so much about the history of kriashaTorah! And so, I answered the young man…thankfully I already have the job!
Rabbi Moshe Taub is the rabbi of Young Israel of Holliswood and rabbinic editor and weekly contributor for Ami Magazine. He is the author of Jews in the World (Mosaica Press) and writes on Jewish law, history, and thought at ShulChronicles.com.
As I slowly and tiredly made my way downstairs after the the maariv following acharonshelpesach, I was met by two officers from the NYPD.
“We are looking for the rabbi”, they said.
“I am the rabbi”.
“Sir, we just wanted you to let you know that we at the ‘107’ (precinct) are here for you and are watching over your temple”.
I had no idea what they were talking about. We, frankly, had not yet heard about the events at the Chabad House in San Diego.
I offer this column as a zechusaliyah to Lori Kaye hy’d, a founding member of the three-decade-old congregation that was attacked, and as a zechusrefuahshleima to their esteemed rav, Rav Yisroel Goldstein,and all those injured – physically and emotionally. May Hashem avenge their blood and tears!
____________
Over this past Pesach –like all years, and like all rabbanim –so many new and interesting shailos arose for which one cannot prepare for in advance.
One hotel at which I was giving shiurim over cholhamoed had a petting zoo one day. It was wonderful, especially for my youngest who is madly obsessed with animals. As they unloaded the sheep and the goats one could have believed that we were preparing our korbonos pesach!
Like many Pesach hotels that have this same activity, the guests need not pay for animal feed as they would have to do separately in a traditional petting zoo; it was included and free.
However, my wife –always wiser than I –had the sagacity to inquire from what this feed was made.
Let’s just say that most feed is made from a mix of ingredients that would make any frum Jew on Pes1ach panic.
The question now was two-fold: A- if one may give this to children with which to feed the animals (No!), and B- if any Pesach hotel that utilized such a system (of which there are many) is considered to have actually purchased this feed with the guests’ money (beyond the scope of this column). In any event, the owners of this hotel were, to their credit, quite concerned at this discovery. Plans are already in motion to fix this issue for next year, and to notify the many other hotels who may not yet be aware of this dilemma.
Another unique issue which came up is of far more morbid territory.
My shul suffered two tragedies this yomtov. First, a member of our shul had to bury her mother erevyomtov. This meant that her shiva would be but for a few hours, canceled-out by Pesach.
But then, on cholhamoed, another heartbreak struck. The mother of someone who was spending yomtov in eretzyisroel with their family, passed away.
Right after the first days, when he heard the news, he booked a flight to Tuscon {name changed} to be able to take part in the kavodacharon (final respects). Arriving on cholhamoed, and not knowing too many people there, he had a fascinating shailah. On the one hand, he would not feel comfortable burying his mother without wearing a jacket; yet, on the other hand, being that for a parent one must tear outer-garments (like jackets), how could he go into yomtov with no suit? This was a fascinating shailah of what takes precedence, kavodyomtov or kavodmeis/kibbud eim. Baruch Hashem, in the last moments he found someone to lend him a jacket (making tearing unnecessary) but the initial shailah was an interesting one, and a rarity!
But it was on yomtov when a shailah came up that intrigued me most; one that has likely already intrigued the reader as well.
Because so many in my shul were away in hotels etc. for all of Pesach, the hashkamaminyan (early, 7:30am minyan) did not have a minyan remaining inside the beismidrash for yizkar. Now, although a minyan is not at all needed for yizkar (and indeed one can say it at home), some felt that it would be best if they kept the group to at least ten. So, as I was about to begin my baruchsh’emar in the main minyan, a young man learning in eretzyisroel and home for Pesach ran in to the main shul to ask me if it was truly assur for him to stay in for yizkar.
This was –indeed –a fascinating shailah.
The minhag has long been observed that those who baruch Hashem do not have deceased parents leave the shul before yizkar commences.
The truth is, this is an odd minhag. Since when, or, where else do people leave the shul when a teffilah does not apply to them?
Can we just imagine the scene, if, say, by birchascholim on Shabbos all those who do not have names to add to the cholim list simply walk out!?
Why then do we do this by yizkar?
The first time the minhag of those who have never sat shiva to leave the shul before yizkar is mentioned is in the ShaareiEfraim (10:32): “…(last line) and we have the custom that those that have both their mother and father still alive that they leave the shul when yizkar is said on yom tov and yomkippur”.
But why? Would it not be appropriate to hear our parents mention the names of those long past? Would it not be a mussar relating to the fleetingness of life for all of us to witness the names of those we have never met but for others cared for deeply?
In 1973, a rav wrote to Rav Waldenberg arguing that perhaps no one should leave before yizkar. Rav Waldenberg responded (TzitzEliezar 12:39) that while there may be rare cases where such a change may be allowed –for instance where there is no room outside for everyone, or questions of tznius, etc. –generally it would be dangerous to ever question our minhagim.
He goes on to share several reasons that have been suggested for the minhag of leaving before yizkar.
Here, we will offer four reasons for this unique custom found in sefarim (see The Complte Yizkar Handbook, Rav Ahron Levine; for further study, see Tzitz Eliezar ibid.; shu’t Zecher Yehosef oh’c 225:3; Nitie Gavriel, aveilus, vol. 2 79:1; Pischei Shaarim on the ShaarieEfraim #35).
Most people explain children leaving before yizkar as being due to ‘ayinharah’. However, what would be the ayin harah exactly? Don’t you need another’s negative feelings to give it power? Some explain that the concern here is based on a chazal. The gemara relates (yevamus 106a) how Abayay’senvy of Rav Papa of having parents that were still alive (as Abayay was orphaned from birth) caused Rav Papa’s parents to die. Perhaps, suggests the PischeiShaarim, some who are forced to mention deceased family members will look in envy at those in the room who do not need to mention any names. We therefore suggest that they leave.
Others suggest that they leave the shul out of fear that – trying to copy what the others are doing – they may mention their still-alive parents, thus ‘tempting fate’ by ‘opening their mouths to the Satan’ (Otzar Kol Minhagei Yeshurin 71:27; Sefer Lashon Chachamom #24)
Similar to the above, because many children are named for deceased relatives, should they stay behind and be in the room when a name similar to theirs is mentioned, this too may be ‘tempting fate’ to the Satan.
Rav Moshe Mordechai Epstein, rosh yeshiva of Slobadka offers one final reason for this minhag (LevushMordechai, Bava Kama, pesichah), and it is a powerful one. First he opnes with another question. We know that we can’t say tachanun nor do hazkaras neshamos if there is a chasan in the room. This being the case, how can anyone say yizkar on yom tov? Rather, he explains, because for most people who have lost loved ones they are already thinking about these meisim on yom tov their crying and/or mentioning their names would be a relief for them, a practical oneg yom tov to do something for them! Such outpouring of inner feelings is allowed on yom tov as a way for release. However, for those that never suffered such loss, who do not have this pent-up grief, should they stay behind for yizkar their sadness would not be permissible on yomtov. More, their being there –and the need to protect their simchas yom tov – wouldm like a chasson, prevent the others from being allowed to have their relief of yizkar! This is why they must stand outside!
So many secrets are found in minhagei yisroel!
After the original publication of this article in Ami Magazine in 2019, I received a call from HaRav HaGaon Ochs, a senior rav and chaver Beis Din in Toronto. He shared from his rebbe, Rav Soloveichik, yet another explanation for this minhag of leaving shul by Yizkar. Regrettably, I can’t now recall what he shared. If anyone has this information, please comment below or share with me via email. Thank you!
Rabbi Moshe Taub is the rabbi of Young Israel of Holliswood and rabbinic editor and weekly contributor for Ami Magazine. He is the author of Jews in the World (Mosaica Press) and writes on Jewish law, history, and thought at ShulChronicles.com.
Including: Is One Buried Next to the First or Second Spouse?
Rabbi Moshe Taub
June, 2012
Part 1 The Minhag & It’s Origins
“Fourteen months ago, my mother died. But it wasn’t until tonight, at my father’s wedding, that I lost her…”
(Ami Living, 10 Kislev/November 13 5774/2013, pages 54 and 55)
The above is an excerpt of an article where a daughter described her mixed feelings when attending a parent’s second marriage.
In response to this article, a noted rav composed a letter seeking to correct what he believed was a halachic oversight – The question of children attending the second marriages of their surviving (or divorced) parents.
What follows is a translation of his letter (mistakes are my own):
“…although the magazine is not a ‘sefer halacha’, readers still assume that you would not, heaven forefend, publish something against minhag (Yisroel), therefore, if a story is published the actions taken in it will be deemed appropriate… “…The custom is that a child does not attend the chuppah of a parent’s second marriage – due to the fact that it goes against the proper kibud we are to have for the (deceased) mother or father by seeing the surviving one marry another...”
He goes on to focus on the pain that this woman described feeling at said wedding and how this could have been avoided had she followed proper practice and simply not gone.
While this rav brings up a very real minhag, not all of his points are universally accepted.
My feeling is that this rav too was aware of this and was therefore not coming to correct an issue of halacha or minhag, rather he was seeking to urge the magazine to publicize this minhag to then be acted upon at one’s discretion.
However, it is appears to be rare today for adult children to follow this minhag.
Personally, I lament not joining my siblings in eretz yisroel for my father’s second marriage (due to my wife being in her 9th month).
Anecdotally, when I inquired from other adults whose parent remarried, most shared that they indeed attended such weddings.
Before sourcing this minhag and reasons, we would be remiss not to observe that, this minhag aside, reactions to such marriages are unique to each child, family dynamics, etc. Whatever one’s minhag may be, that must always be weighed (with a rav) against these other considerations.
We would also be remiss not to state at the outset that our discussion to follow relates only to Adult Children.Regarding younger children attending such weddings, however, our first concern must be for their emotional health.Such cases, l”a, no matter one’s minhag, demand the counsel of an expert in the field who knows the children/family well.
Only then may it be brought to one’s rav.
Let us now list, and then directly respond, to the crucial points of this rav:
– He asserts that there is a general custom for children not to attend such weddings
(While his term ‘nohagin’ could have been referencing his Chassidic branch in particular (i.e. ‘we have a custom’), this does not seem likely. I was also unable to find any source that his Chassidic group in particular is stricter than others regarding this custom; if anything I found to the contrary)
– He implies that this custom is that the children not attend the chuppah specifically
– He asserts that the reason behind this custom is kibbud av v’eim
This is indeed just an assertion (although, perhaps, a good one). In addition, if indeed it is a real kibbud issue, why then call it a minhag? Should it not then be an actual halacha? Unless he means, the minhag is to assume that their presence will cause dishonor, even if basic halacha wouldn’t demand such an assumption.
– He posits that the (assumed) reason for this minhag would then only apply in a case where there is a dead parent, l’a, as opposed to a divorced one.
Let us now delve into all of the above:
The earliest source for this minhag, that at least I was able to locate, is from the 18th century sefer ‘MinhagimVarmisia‘, a sefer about the customs of the Jewish community of Worms.
As quoted in Minhagei Yisroel Torah (vol. evha”z), as well as in Nittei Gavriel (hilchos nisuin, vol. 1), in the aforementioned minhag book (p. 51) it is recorded that in Worms there was a custom of children not attending the (second) weddings of their parents.
Here is the original language used to describe this minhag:
“Sons and daughters of a widow or widower do not go to the shul, all the more so they do not attend the chuppah, and they do not attend the (wedding) feast…”
Minhag Varmisia, p. 51
I am unsure what is meant by their phrase “…not go to the shul…”; perhaps this is where most weddings took place .
(see Shu’t Igros Moshe ev’h 1:93, inter alia, who discusses the concern, if any, of a chuppah taking place in a shul. See also Mahrail Diskin. However the next sentence in Minhagim Varmeisa would imply that something else was being referred to, which eludes me)
According to this source, children attending such a chuppah is:
A) a greater concern than the children ‘going to shul’ (whatever that means), and,
B) attending the wedding feast equally falls under this prohibitionary minhag.
Yet, many questions remain:
What is/are the reason(s) behind this minhag?
Was this minhag meant just for the community of Worms, or for all of us?
Should it have been intended for all of klal Yisroel, would this have the power to obligate us today, and far from Worms, to observe it?
To the third point, the ChasamSofer (Shu’t Chasam Sofer 6:52) reminds us that while one can obligate themselves to do or not to do something through a neder or shevuah, yet one certainly lacks the power to obligate someoneelse! The one exception to this would be the leader(s) of the generation (what chazal in a number of places term as the ‘gadol hador’, see, e.g., Sota 11). Such a gadolcan obligate others in new minhagim. The simplest example of this phenomenon, and the one to which the Chasam Sofer was in fact addressing, are the cheremim of Rabbeinu Gershom (e.g. marrying two wives).
In addition, while any one community can accept only upon themselves certain customs, all Jews may still become obligated in it if the vast majority of communities and their respective rabbanim all agree to it.
Prohibiting kitniyos on Pesach would be an example, although an imperfect one, of this phenomenon (see Magen Avraham 690:2 regarding a minhag from a noted posek).
Even if one could get around those criteria regarding attending a second wedding, the reason for any new custom would always have to based on some other halacha that we are seeking to protect, or a hashkafa that is rooted in mesorah.
(For sources for, and a discussion about, this critical rule of for all minhagim, see/Click this link: “Fasting For A Fallen Sefer Torah‘)
As the Rambam writes (end of hakdama to mishnayos):
“…Once the Talmud closed one is not allowed to add to its laws”.
See also, shu”t Noda B’Yehudah, eh’z [2] siman 79; Radvaz in Shu’t Hon Yosef, siman 9.
For further study on this subject see ‘Tzavaas Rebbe Yehudah HaChassid Ham’ifour’ Gumbo/Otzar HaPoskim edition.
Cf. Shu’tRashba 1:9, Shu’tChasamSofer 51 in oh’c, and Sdei Chemed, ‘Mem’ klal 38.
Now, even if we momentarily postulate that this minhag is indeed in affect for all of us, we must be careful, as often a minhag is taken to its extreme, beyond its intended parameters. Meaning, even if a minhag is real, nay, because a minhag is real, it would then only mean that, like all other issues of halacha, there are times that it is not followed; where conflicting obligations must be weighed against it, etc. It is incongruous to watch people rightfully consider when one must desecrate Shabbos but refuse to do the same for their particular group’s or familial customs!
As the oft-quoted maxim goes (and can be found in the Taamei HaMinhagim, siman 840):
‘If only the Aseres haDibros were written in the Tzavah (ethical will) of Rav Yehudah HaChassid, then certainly people would care for them more!’
With all of this in mind, let us delve into this mysterious minhag, its reason(s), application, and the many beguiling issues it may touch upon.
Part 2 Possible Explanations
I. The Kibbud Av V’eim Theory
The reason the aforementioned letter-writer gives for this particular custom was kibbud av v’em for the deceased parent.
Indeed, I found this to be the ‘generally assumed’ motive behind this minhag.
However, such an approach would seem to be riddled with difficulty.
While there is certainly an obligation to honor one’s parent even after death (Shulchan Aruch siman 240:9) – although it is debated if this is a biblical or rabbinic obligation (refer to Shu’t Yabia Omer 2:66:9) – it is hard to fathom how the child attending this wedding would be thereby disrespecting the deceased parent.
The logic in this seems to suffer from reductio ad absurdum, causing a child to become paralyzed toward many other activities going foward.
But more: Even if this is the source of concern, can’t the opposite be assumed – that the deceased parent would want the child to make every effort to attend?!
In fact, Rav Moshe Feinstein used similar logic, at times, to allow an avel in their twelve months of mourning to attend an annual yeshiva‘s or chesed organization’s dinner. His logic is sound: since the obligation to mourn for one’s parent for the full year (as opposed to just the thirty days demanded for all other immediate relatives) is by dint of ‘kibud’ for the deceased parent, we may thenassert that in such a case the deceased parent would forgo their own honor for the benefit of the Torah institution one desires to assist (see Rav Felder’s Laws of Mourning, Feldheim, p. 112 and 118, footnote 115).
Now, and depending on family dynamics, this could certainly apply to a second wedding as well!
Meaning, kibbud av v’em is risked also by NOT attending !
The kibud av v’am theory brings further questions.
We mustn’t forget the obligation of honoring the surviving parent as well – which would be a strong counterweight, especially when we consider that the kibbud demanded for the surviving parent is (often) greater than that that which is demanded for the deceased one.
Furthermore, there is also the obligation to honor one’s step-parent (Shulchan Aruch Y’D siman 240:21)!
Further still, if the reason for this minhag is indeed due to kibbud av v’em, why does MinhagimVarmezia only mention the example of the parent who is getting married after being widowedand not also a divorcée? Wouldnt the latter case, which the sefer/source ignores, carry the possibility of (even greater?) hurt feelings from a parent who, A) is still alone, and, B) is known wicked brew for strife and jealousy, etc., lo aleinu?
Therefore, and without a clear source stating otherwise, I am not convinced that kibbud is the true motive behind this minhag.
However, playing devils advocate, perhaps one who explain this minhag as being predicated on kibud for the dead parent would argue thusly:
“Precisely due to the fact that one is obligated to honor the step-parent as well as the surviving parent, there is a fear (according to the leaders of Worms, at least) that the halacha of maintaining kibbud for the deceased parent will be forgotten as soon as their place is ‘filled’ by an other. In order to counter this we urge the children not to attend this wedding so as to bore into the tablet of their heart that nothing will change in their halachic relationship with the deceased parent.”
However, this seems like a forced, Rube Goldberg-esque fear that exits outside the norm of typical minhag concern.
I found other theories behind its creation:
II. The Reconciliation Theory
The Shu’t Davar Yehoshua (vol. 2 siman 113) was asked if children could attend the second marriage of their mother who was divorced from their father. Without quoting the source from Minhagim Varmezia, he points out that children seem to have the custom not to attend. The reason he suggests for this is fascinating, although limited in its application: Until the divorced wife/mother gets remarried it is still possible for the first couple to get back together. In other words the very act of this new chuppah, and the meal that will follow it, is the very moment of, and the celebration in, the severing of all bond(s) between their two parents!
Even he was not certain that this is the reason for the custom.
Yet, if he is correct, it would indeed only apply in such a case (divorced parents and the mother’s wedding).
There is another difficulty the Dvar Yehoshua‘s suggested reasoning behind the minhag:
As mentioned at the outset, the actual source of this custom goes out of its way to mention the case where one of the parents has passed-on, without even mentioning the case of divorced parents. It would be hard then to use his logic to explain that the initial custom was about a wholly different case (unless this minhag is older than Minhagim Varmizia, and they either also surmised on their own the logic behind it, or just gave the most common case.)
III. The Tzar Neshama Theory
I considered another possible reason for this minhag, but then thought it was too fanciful. However, to my surprise, I later found that others indeed suggested it! Perhaps this minhag is predicated on the minhag of placing an invitation by the grave of a loved one before a family simcha, as the Zohar writes (pinchos, 219): אף על גב דמיתו קב”ה אעקר לון מג”ע ואייתי לון עמיה לההוא חדוה לנטלא חולקא דחדוה עם קב”ה ושכינתיה In other words, Hashem carries the deceased parents from shomayim and brings them with Him to participate in the simchah [i.e. wedding]
(For more on the minhag of placing an invitation in the cemetery by a matzeiva, as well as their and the Shechina’s presence at weddings, see: Derech Sicha, vayeitzei, p. 152 where Rav Chaim Kinievsky brings another source for deceased parents attending simchos, specifically the weddings of their children; Minhagei Yisroel Torah, vol. 4 p. 101; Kitzur Nachlas Shiva Hachadash; R’ Aryeh Kaplan’s ‘Made in Heaven’, et al. As to common practice, according to Rav Chaim Kinievsky, an invitation is not necessary for the deceased parent, l”a, to attend, as Hashem brings them even uninvited [my thanks to Reb Moshe Freidman of Toronto with whom Rav Chaim shared this insight])
Could it be that for this reason children should not attend, so as not to bring pain to the visting neshama?
I imagine the reader would dismiss this as a possible approach for the same reason I initially did:
Would a deceased spouse be among the souls to attend? What would be the purpose of Hashem bringing them (see source above) to the second marriage of their spouse?
Even if they are among the souls to attend, would the children being there would be its focus and indeed cause it pain?
However, as mentioned, I later found this reasoning brought. In shu”t Ateres Paz, ev”h, siman 1 he makes just this argument!
After proving that those neshomos also attend, he then novelly explains the concern as follows:
It is not the sight of his/her living children that will cause potential tzar, rather it is the sight of the children of the other side that may bring pain!
Thus far, we can observe that this minhag is shrouded in mystery, uncertain logic, and is certainly not a universal practice.
Now let me share with you my own theory, how this custom of Worms had everything to do with sensitivity to the living and not the departed.
Part 3
IV. The ‘Second Fiddle’ Theory
To explain my own approach to this minhag, I must first touch upon a seemingly unrelated point; a misconception many have:
A woman once shared with me that she never remarried because she would then, “Not be buried alongside my first husband”, the father of her children.
It seems that this is a common misconception.
Before relating this issue back to our topic, it is important that the record be set straight, as due to it being such a sensitive nature, if we would not write about it then it may never be asked, discussed, and better understood.
The pasuk in Yeshayau (54:5), based on the Gemara (Sanhedrin 22b), teaches of the unique bond one has (especially a woman) with their first spouse.
Based on this, some say that, contra to public belief, one is always buried with their first spouse.
The Zohar (Bereishis 21) seems to also suggest that by techias hameisim it is to one’s original spouse that they will be returned to. The Ben Ish Chai (Sod Yesharim #2) says the same.
However not all seem to agree:
‘SeferHaNiztchon’ writes that after revivification, one will be united with their last spouse (see NitteiGavriel, aveilus, vol. 2, p. 699, footnote #13).
The ChasamSofer (brought in SdeiChemed, Aveilus; see shu’t Chasam Sofer, 355) also seems to disagree with the first view, suggesting that the second marriage removes all bonds to the first (see Part II above where this concept alone was explored by some as the possible reason behind the minhag of children not attending such weddings).
But there seems to be a complication, as elsewhere, the Chasam Sofer seems to say the opposite!
He writes, based on the Ari’z’l, that when Moshiach comes everyone will be reunited with their firstzivvug ((shu”tChasam Sofer 7:34, see also Shalal Rav, Bereishis, p. 42).
The Gesher HaChaim (p. 246), while not mentioning this contradiction, demonstrates that the Chasam Sofer (in the first quoted teshuvah) was only speaking about when the second wife is still alive.
Still a little confused?
The Gesher HaChaim explains:
– One may choose to be buried next to his/her first, second, or latter spouse. Full Stop.
– Should one die without ever expressing their wishes in this matter, we would then likely bury them with whom they had [the most] children (in other words, we will make an educated guess as to who they would want to buried next to).
As for the contradiction found in the Chasam Sofer: in the teshuvah we first quoted, he was writing regarding a buried first wife who was laterdisinterred. Although usually this would demand some type of aveilus, here, because of the feelings of his present wife (see below for source for this sensitivity), he need not, indeed should not, mourn.
What comes out from all of the above:
One may be buried with whichever spouse one wishes
However, should one choose to be buried with their first spouse, they should not make such arrangements in front of the second.
What does the subject of kevura/burial by a first or second spouse have to do with the minhag found in Mihagim Varmezia stating that children not attend the weddings of their widowed (and, perhaps, divorced) parents?
Based on this discussion, lulei d’mistapina, I would suggest the following motivation behind the minhag of children, at times, not attending a parents’ second marriage:
As just alluded to, the gemara rules that a remarried man best avoid receiving condolences upon the passing of his first wife in front of his second wife, as this may yield natural feelings of insecurity and/or discomfort (moad kattan 21b; see also Shulchan Aruch, yoreh deah 385:2).
Perhaps then, since we are sensitive toward a second wife in not reminding her of the bonds of the first during major moments of dveikus to the past…at the moment of chuppa and its celebratory feast, having the children of the first wife there will seem like a pgam in the husband’s new dedication to her.
After all, they are the very personification of this prior bond! They represent a silent and, at times, disquieting, reminder that their new spouse’s prior bonds comes with ripened fruits.
So that, seeing them there – at this great new moment of bonding – may serve as a harbinger to profound insecurity at the very start of her new marriage. After all, if chazal already warned a husband to a second wife of this sensitivity when it comes to receiving condolences for his first wife, kal v’chomer it should be applied and be seen as a concern by the moment of their actual (second) marriage to each other.
Although I have not yet seen this reason suggested by others, it seems to explain the motive behind the basic minhag, supplies it with its needed Talmudic foundation (as any minhag requires; see footnote above for sources for this rule), and would clarify for us why many (if not most) are lax regarding this minhag in our day.
After all, if this minhag is in place so as to protect the feelings of the living (second spouse) then they may -and often will – be mochel and stress that their desire is to have the children there. Indeed, and leaving aside considerations for this minhag, most soon-to-be-stepparents would find greater pain in their new family choosing not to attend this wedding than the very real potential for discomfort brought by their presence.
(NOTE: I wrote the above in the plural [“step-parents”, “their”, “they”, etc.], assuming that chazal’s consideration is for both a second husband and not just a second wife. I am however unsure is this is correct)
As the Netziv wrote: “Sometimes (in the name of being strict) we run away from a fox…and into the head of a lion” (see L’Ohr Halacha, Rav Zevin, shemitta).
It should go without saying that:
This halachic discussion is not psak in any way
The concern of ’emotional readiness’ is and entirely different and critical matter one must always consider in such cases.
If a young child “could” attend, has little to do with if they “should” attend.
A slew of additional factors – including age, family dynamics, etc., especially with regard to younger children -are unique to each case, child, and family.
A child phycologist -in concert with one’s family’s rav – must be sought after so as to offer proper guidance toward the appropriate course of action or inaction in all such cases.
May we only know simchos!
(Special thanks to R’ Yehoshua Greenberg of Buffalo and R’ Mechel Gruss of Lakewood for helping me locate some of the sources in ‘Part 2’ by fulfilling my request to perform two specific searches on their ‘Otzar Hachachma‘ and for photocopying a sefer found in his vast library, respectively)
Rabbi Moshe Taub is the rabbi of Young Israel of Holliswood and rabbinic editor and weekly contributor for Ami Magazine. He is the author of Jews in the World (Mosaica Press) and writes on Jewish law, history, and thought at ShulChronicles.com.
Must one support a local and Frum establishment over cheaper options? If so, why, and what are the limits to this Halacha?
Every year the esteemed Oxford dictionary chooses a ‘word of the year’. They explain: “Among their other activities, lexicographers at Oxford University Press track how the vocabulary of the English language is changing from year to year. Every year, a ‘Word of the Year’ is debated and chosen to reflect the ethos of the year and its lasting potential as a word of cultural significance.”
In 2009 that word was ‘Locavore’. This term was created to give a descriptive to those who make a commitment that all of their food, principally, comes from local farms and proprietors.
This has become a movement, for reasons of nutrition, community support, and the environment. But not everyone is on board. After countless books were published singing the gospel of ‘locavoring’, others were published, like ‘The Locavore’s Dilemma’ that demonstrate that one may be causing more harm than good by becoming a Locavore.
In communities across the frumveldt we find this same debate taking place, in fact, this has been a perennial question for centuries: must a city or town be faithful only to their own establishments? And, if so, at what cost –both halacikly and fiscally?
An addendum to this question, which we will also explore, is what halachik efficacy there is to demanding the support of a Jewish-owned store over a non-Jewish chain-store (i.e. may one buy meat from Pathmark when a heimesheyid has a butcher shop nearby).
Seeking to shake the bonds of communal responsibility, and the costs associated with that achroyos, is nothing new. In the late 1930’s, in city of Brisk, government officials placed a tax on all shochtim. The purpose of this tax was to help pay for government monitors who would perform inspections for the sake of the public health. Some local shochtim wanted to avoid this payment, and so a black market was created. These shochtim would go to a hidden place in the outskirts of the city to perform shechita thereby avoiding paying the tax. The Brisker Rav was not happy about this development and felt that the vaadha’ir could not give certification to such shechita, even if these were otherwise pious men whose actual shechita was to the highest standards. And so, he called a meeting in his house. For reasons that are too lengthy to go into here, the meeting was a disaster (see ‘The Brisker Rav: Vo. 1’, Feldheim [English] ed., p. 249 ff).
Not long after, the Brisker Rav’s worst fears came true. After getting word of illegal slaughterhouses operating around the city, plain-clothed police officers surreptitiously went to investigate the matter. One shochet was so startled at the unaccepted visitor that when he quickly turned around –and still holding his chalaf (shechitah knife) in his hand –he accidently stabbed the police officer, who soon died from his wounds!
Soon after a pogrom broke out across the city of Brisk; shuls, chedarim, bateimidrashim were damaged, windows shattered, etc., causing many to flee the city (the Brisker Rav did not flee his city; see Shul Chronicles: ‘Hurricanes, Halacha, and the Chasam Sofer’ where the halachos of a rav fleeing his city is discussed).
During these dark days in Brisk the famed mother of the Beis Yaakov movement in America, Vichna Kaplan –then Vichna Eisan – famously helped save 5 Beis Yaakov girls trapped in the school.
It took some time for the city to return to normalcy and for peace and order to be re-established.
This is not to compare the above to patronizing stores outside one’s city, rather to show that even in the face of such severe consequences the Brisker Rav was not initially listened to and people sought to beat the city system.
Where I live, Buffalo, New York, there is still but one vaad hakashrus and few meat options. It is for this reason that this particular issues matters, and why I seek to clarify it.
While I have vivid memories of coming to Buffalo as a child and going to the butcher here to get a delicious steak, years later, about a year before I came to town, the vaad had pulled their hashgacha on the one remaining certified butcher.
While there remains two delis, and a wide variety of frozen meats, this is just not the same.
I have always remained relatively tame regarding the need to support the local delis; I understood peoples’ hesitation in purchasing pre-cut frozen meat and poultry when they could stock-up on fresh meat and poultry, cut to their specifications, when they are visiting family and friends out of town.
While never a fan of these monies leaving the city, I also understood that it would not be wise using my kanois (fanaticism) capitol -which is not a finite resource – on a losing battle.
Now things has changed. We recently announced kosher local butcher to work within one of the delis. Of course, those with halachik qualms with the shechita et al. should honor their minhagim, and what follows is not written for them.[1]
While great news for the city, it also created a dilemma for the vaad and myself: how far should a vaad go in insuring the delis success? What is the vaad’s role? What is a rabbi’s role? What is halacha’s role? Most importantly, what is the role of the bneiha’ir in supporting and maintaining the local kosher and frum establishments?
The term often used by rabbanim when decrying the lack of support for local kosher establishments –especially when it comes to meat – is ‘shechuteichutz’/’outside meats’; meaning any meat brought from outside the city is seen with, at best, a negative eye.
It is not so difficult to see the results of our actions, but it takes some imagination, even lomdus, to realize the heavy burden of our inactions, and rabbanim often point to this issue as a case-in-point.
A city relies heavily on its infrastructure to foster further growth. If these are not being supported then it becomes harder to advance even further. In addition, some do not have the luxury of being able to buy outside meat and they will suffer the most should a butcher close down due to a alcak of support. Worst of all is the fear that those who would buy kosher meat (should there be a local store) would otherwise buy treif!
Interestingly, the term ‘shechuteichutz’ is found specifically by the laws of korbonos, and it is not found in reference to supporting local butchers –to my knowledge –anywhere in the classic codes. Rather, it would seem that this term is used in a colloquial sense. In that just like by a korban, where everything can be done in a ‘kosher’ and ‘halachik’ manner, and yet it still would be considered in major violation of law – simply by performing its major actions in the wrong place. Rabbanim seek to highlight that our tunnel-vision for doing everything in the right manner – to shecht with all the right chumros – causes us to ignore the question if this is the place to do it. The fact that the classic shechuteichutz also relates to meat made this a useful pun, although with a pointed edge to it.
The late 1700’s are famous for being a time of strife between the chassidim and those against this new movement. This resulted in various cheramim (excommunications) being written, proclaimated, and promulgated.
Less known is the cheremim issued by the leaders of Franfurt against the tzadik and sage –as well as prime rebbe of the Chasam Sofer –HaRav Nossan Adler.
One finds five main complaints leveled at him[2]. One of them is his ‘…desire to disqualify the shochtim of Frankfurt on the Main’, and, ‘dividing the city into groups…eating only their own meat….thereby spreading false reports about their brethren by declaring our breads and our wine forbidden to eat…’
While the cheramim were eventually removed before Rav Nosan Adler passed on, we see the sensitivity with which leadership has, in the past, taken this issue.
The gemara in Chagiga (22a) points out that although certain foods of an am ha’aretz (unknowledgeable Jew) are questionable, they are nevertheless allowed to bring their oil and wine, and vessels, to the beis hamikdosh when offering korbonos. R’ Yose explains he purpose of this rule so as to protect the klal from in-fighting and disputes. Should we disallow or question what they bring to the harhabayis these Jews may then go and create their own ‘vaad’, and erect unsanctioned mizbeichos, and even offer up their own parah adumah!
Imagine that! At least according to R’ Yose, in the beis hamikdosh, on the mizbeach, we were so concerned with causing friction among am yisroel so as to allow questionable items!
Tosphos, and to a larger extent the Shvus Yaakov (2:56) derive from here that in a case of a minor am ha’aretz (meaning, there is no reason to believe that he violates most of halacha due to his ignorance) his testimony is relied upon (cf. Rambam hil. Eidus, and how the Shvus Yaakov seeks to explain it).
The story behind this teshuvah of the Shvus Yaakov is quite interesting: there was a city where certain members were bringing in meat that the rabbanim feared did not meet (meat?) their standards. The rabbanim therefore issued a proclamation that not only deemed this out-of-town meat ‘treif’, but also proclaimed that the dishware that came into contact with such meat would also be seen as ‘non-kosher’.
To be clear, we are not talking about meat where there is known halachik concern and where such a proclamation would have been redundant, rather meat whose source was not approved or known by the town rabbanim.
The shu’t Shvus Yaakov rules that these rabbis should not have proclaimed that such is deemed treif –and indeed we must assume that it is kosher, for to do otherwise will lead to strife, and would, anyway, be a decree that most people would not be able to abide by (in which case we do not ban the item).
He was not suggesting that one must eat such meat, and he does in fact recommend that the city should certainly seek to monitor all shechita, rather his point was that to call what is not from their city, or where its standards are simply not known, ‘treif’ was one step too far, and would only lead to sinaschinum.
What are we to take from this story and teshuvah? Well, to my ears, I would suggest the following:
Several years ago I was visiting another city for shabbos and by shaloshseudos I met a man who recently became frum. As he was telling me about his fascinating path to yiddeshkeit he informed me that the last thing he took on was kashrus. The reason he gave for this startled me. When he was still not shomershabbos, the mashpia he was working with let it be known that the vaad in that city was ‘treif’. Not yet frum –and although desiring to eat kosher –he did not, yet, find it within him to place orders to travelers for meat and prepared food, and so he ate treif for about three more years as he was slowly beginning to keep shabbos etc.
“But the food we are both eating from right now is under that same vaad that you were told was treif!” I wondered out loud.
He explained that as he became more entrenched in the frum world he became aware that this kosher agency has a fine reputation and the concern from his mashpia was regarding debates between respected and accepted poskim having to do with bugs in fish and women mashgichos.
This should always be on our mind. Our chumros, and even how we believe normative halacha should be should never lead to someone eating treif. This was precisely the gemara’s concern. If one brings in meat from another city because they do not trust that city’s meat or vaad (which –short of seeking to fix the vaad –would be their right and even obligation to do) , they should at the very least not do so publicly, unless, of course, they believe the meat in town is halachicallytreif. I stress that we are not discussing meat that is not certified by a reliable posek.
Another reason to do such personal shopping quietly –or with only like-minded people –is the fear that breaking the ‘vaad monopoly’ can lead –and has led –to other denominations, and often less scholarly people, desiring to start their own kosher certification in town.
There have been other concerns relating to outside meat. Historically, there was a tax on most meat purchased in-town. This was so that those who can afford meat would help pay for other frum services provided by the community.This may also be one of the sources for the present-day anti Semitic canard of the ‘kosher-tax’, a fiction that will be discussed in a future column.
Back then, it was seen as an egregious violation of communal living to seek to get around this tax by buying meat from either outside the city or by hiring a shochet to slaughter for you under the cover of darkness.
The shu’tChasam Sofer (yoreh deah #5) has a lengthy teshuvah regarding the ability of a kehilla –that has such a tax –to ban all outside meat, and if such a ban applies to even those who protest it right away or who were not there at the time of its proclamation.
Finally, there is the issue which comes up most often: what are the limits of supporting a local store if the price is too high, or if one get go to a chain store –not owned by a Jew –and purchase food there for much cheaper?
I am somewhat reticent to give too much information here –as these questions are complicated and need the counsel of one’s own rav – rather the information provided should be seen as informative only.
Rashi in parshas Behar brings from the midrash Toras Kohanim that when the pasuk (Vayikra 25:14) states, “When you make a sale to another Jew, or make a purchase from another Jew…” it is informing us that one must seek to support his/her brethren above all other nations. Some suggest another, although tenuous, source. Further in that perek (25:35) the verse commands “Ve’he’chasakta Bo”, that we shall strengthen our impoverished brethren. The Rambam famously learns from here that the highest form of charity is supporting another Jew in business.
It may surprise the reader to learn that, whatever the source, neither the Rambam, the Tur, or the Shulchan Aruch mention overtly the obligation to support a Jewish store over a non-Jewish one.
Nevertheless, it is found in important halachik writings as a fait -accompli. For example, the Chofetz Chaim writes in his Mishne Berrura (ShaarHaTzion , 648:75) that when large esrog distributers should choose wholesale esrogim from Jewish farmers/businessman of non-Jewish ones, so long as they are equal in price and quality (see also shu’t Rama #10)
Dayan Weiss (Minchas Yitzchak 3:129) was asked specifically regarding a chain store that was competing with a Jewish-owned shop. For instance, would one be able to buy meat in Pathmark if it is cheaper than what is found by the frum butchers in town.
(It should be pointed out that many of the chain-stores give the frum managers of their departments a salary based on percentage of earnings, meaning that such a Pathmark would be seen as no different than a Jewish owned store –at least in regards to the concern we are presently discussing).
Although he paskens that one would not have to pay a much higher cost just to support a Jew, he does not give an exact system of measuring what that cost would be.
The Minchas Yitzchak adds that there are really two questions: 1) supporting a thriving Jewish store over a thriving non-Jewish store; 2) supporting a struggling Jewish store –or one that will close without more support –over a non-Jewish store.
The latter would be a whole different question, and would certainly fall under the rubric of ‘strengthening our impoverished brethren”, and one should seek to help him even if the price is relatively much higher.
In such a case, it would seem, that one could deduct whatever extra cost he is incurring from his ma’aser or tzedaka funds. However, like the entirely of this week’s column, do not pasken from what is written here, rather speak to your own rav. Klal Yisroel is made up by rachmanim, and even without all of the above I am confident that most take much more than price and marbling when they choose where to shop.
[1] While all our meat is glatt, some desire, say, chabad shechita.
Rabbi Moshe Taub is the rabbi of Young Israel of Holliswood and rabbinic editor and weekly contributor for Ami Magazine. He is the author of Jews in the World (Mosaica Press) and writes on Jewish law, history, and thought at ShulChronicles.com.
A man once came to the Chazon Ish asking if he could rely on a certain rav’shechsher.
“I asked the rav if his hechsher is reliable and he responded by telling me that it is, however the less people who eat from it the more comfortable he feels”.
The Chazon Ish responded that if indeed this rav feels such a heavy weight of responsibility to the point of not just being unoffended if one does not eat from him, but even feeling a sense of relief, then that is surely a sign that he could be trusted.
I can relate to that rav.
I do not enjoy the achroyos of being accountable for what is deemed ‘kosher’ in Buffalo. For this reason I have never been able to understand those who seem to have not only lost no sleep due to their already heavy responsibilities, but seek more of it…in other cities than their own, cities who have their own already well-established rabbanim.
Who wants moreachriyos? Who is willing to fight for it? The idea of rabbis, but mostly scholarly balla battim, from other cities entering towns and making halachik decisions is unprecedented in Jewish history.
I am not talking about a factory that serves a national or international customer base, rather commissaries that serve primarily that particular city. Indeed, there are times that my vaad have called upon a major hechsher to take over a company for us. Large companies serve an international customer base, and are a therefore different discussion.
The issues to which I am referring goes well beyond kashrus.
Now for my story:
My first year in Buffalo, I received a call from the Buffalo Bills, the local NFL franchise. They wanted to offer their fans a kosher option at the games, and were wondering if the vaad would be able to certify a hot-dog stand.
I told them that it is certainly possible, although difficult, and certain rules would have to be set into place (like having a mashgiachtemidi).
They then put me in touch with one of the vendors. As we began the meeting I informed him of how we would go about either purchasing a new grill or koshering an old one. He then said something startling. “Oh, we are already kosher, we just now want to go under the vaad”.
I responded, “Well, yes, you may be ‘kosher’ in your eyes, but in order to become certified…”
“No, no”, he cut me off, “We are certified. We are simply switching kashrus agencies”.
May I remind the reader that this conversation was taking place in Buffalo, NY. Apparently a small-medium size vaad 2500 miles away was offering certification to a hot-dog stand in Ralph Wilson Stadium in Orchard Park, NY!
My first reaction was not, “How dare they come to ‘our’ turf…” but rather, “Who could be their mashgiachtemidi?”
The reader must keep in mind that certifying a kosher hot-dog stand during a NFL game is a great risk. A proprietor of such a commissary can never know how many hot-dogs to bring or how many costumers will patronize them on any given game-day. So that the fear of quickly re-filling your hot-dogs with those from one of the hundreds of carts within walking distance (as opposed to going to the one kosher deli in town, who likely would not have the number of hot-dogs needed anyway) is great and obvious.
Upon returning to my office I called, long-distance, this vaad. They were at first taken aback that I was asking for information about this stand in Buffalo, unsure if they should share it.
Can we imaging 100 years ago, ballabattim, or members of kleikodesh, not community rabbanim themselves nor even chosen by local rabbanim, getting involved in other cities’ religious business –to begin with – and then having the temerity to wonder if the rav in that very city is out of bounds for simply wanting to be informed as to what his town is putting in their mouths!? (I am secretly hoping that someone writes in a defense of these tactics)
I repeat that I am speaking of commissaries that serve primarily the bneiha’ir, and not national companies.
He finally gave me the name of their mashgiachtemidi –a man I knew. I called him up and asked him if it is true, that he is working for this agency stationed 2500 miles away. He laughed, and explained he was paid one time to go and look at the grill before the football season stared. That was the extent of their supervision according to him.
This all represents a new American reality. For the first time in Jewish history, balla–battim and non-sitting rabbanim have taken it upon themselves to involve themselves in religious questions that effect cities far, far away.
Rav Moshe Feinstein was once asked about this (Choshen Mishpat vol. 2 siman 39). He responded to the VaadHaRabanim of Pittsburgh with the following:
“Relating to the Kashrus in the city of Pittsburgh, it is clear and obvious that it should be under your authority (Rabbi Wolf Leiter) and the other members of the local rabbinate, as it has been until now…. whether due to the fact that you earned the right for the mitzvah, or the fact that the public already entrusted you with this job, or the money issues involved. There is therefore no right for anyone to come and mix into the cities kashrus without your (the vaad’s) permission, even if this individual is a kashrus expert himself…and it is forbidden for anyone (in the city) to rely on this (other) kashrus.”
What is so sad about the above letter is that it was the rabbanei ha’ir who wrote Rav Moshe asking him his opinion, not the nameless out-of-town rav; that the burden of proof is now on local rabbanim and not the nameless others is the greatest tragedy of it all. The fact that I feel I need to even write this column –and next week I will explain what brought this subject to light – is a tragedy, and a reconstruction of 3000 years of history.
Rav Akiva Eiger and the Nesivos were once walking in a park when they passed by two frum teenagers playing chess. The Nesivos turned to Rav Akiva Eiger and said, “Moshiach must be coming! For chazal (Sota 49) teach that before Moshiach comes chutzpah yasgi (chutzpah will increase), and these boys refused to stand for two elderly rabbanim!”
Rav Akiva Eiger is purported to have replied, “That is not what chazal meant when they said there will be an increase of chutzpah before Moshiach’s arrival. Rather, this is: you and I will be sitting on a park bench when these two kids will walk by. One will say to the other, “Moshiach must be coming because Rav Eiger and the Nesivos didn’t stand for me”!
We have now entered this upside down world (see Pesachim 50).
I once informed a guest in shul that what he was doing publicly during davening was not our minhag and was upsetting people, and if he could do it quietly or not at all. He looked at me and shook his head ‘No’. I explained that even in the NFL there is a need for referees so that the main players can have a good game.
I will not forget his shocked response. With a stunned look on his face he replied, “Are you actually comparing your job to that of an NFL referee?!” He then turned and continued his actions.
To him the chutzpah was that I thought a rav in his own beis haknesses was as important as a referee in a game, that I would dare compare a rav to a far, far more important occupation, a far more necessary role! Now, on the other hand, should someone call a rav and ask to take over his job, to move there in his stead so that they can then be made aware of all the issues in that city, that would at least make sense. But no one would dare do that, for that would be such a chutzpah…and, anyway, moving is so hard…
Rabbi Moshe Taub is the rabbi of Young Israel of Holliswood and rabbinic editor and weekly contributor for Ami Magazine. He is the author of Jews in the World (Mosaica Press) and writes on Jewish law, history, and thought at ShulChronicles.com.
