One of the most intriguing studies I have read in the past several years is titled ‘Altered Placebo and Drug Labeling Changes the Outcome of Episodic Migraine Attacks’ published in the January 2014 issue of Science Translational Medicine
Here is an excerpt from the Harvard Medical School’s website that discusses this article and interviews its main chief researcher, Dr. Ted J. Kaptchuk:
“Placebos are often considered ‘fake’ treatments… To complicate matters, there is a documented ‘placebo effect,’ which means that [in double-blind studies] some people actually respond to a placebo [a ‘sugar pill’ that contains no medicine at all] even though it shouldn’t have an effect on the body. This has been thought to be largely due to the patient’s belief or expectation that he or she is getting the real treatment and not the fake one.”
So far you are likely not surprised. It has long been documented that people can respond to treatment for reasons of the mind.
But then comes this: “But what if people were told up front that they were getting a placebo and not an active medication? It stands to reason the placebo would have no effect. Right? Wrong.”
Wrong? How could that be?
The article continues, “Dr. Ted J. Kaptchuk, a professor of medicine at Harvard Medical School and director of the Harvard-wide Program in Placebo Studies and the Therapeutic Encounter (PiPS) at Beth Israel Deaconess Medical Center in Boston, has been studying placebos for more than 20 years.
“In one study, Kaptchuk looked at people with irritable bowel syndrome (IBS), a common condition that causes abdominal cramping and one that can be debilitating for many. Half of the study volunteers were told they were getting an ‘open-label’ placebo, and the others got nothing at all. He found that there was a dramatic and significant improvement in the placebo group’s IBS symptoms, even though they were explicitly told they were getting a ‘sugar pill’ without any active medication.
“Kaptchuk says placebos won’t work for every medical situation—for example, they can’t lower cholesterol or cure cancer. But they can work for conditions that are defined by ‘self-observation’ symptoms like pain, nausea, or fatigue.
“‘Our hope is that in conditions where the open-label placebo might be valuable, instead of putting people on drugs immediately—for depression, chronic pain, fatigue—people would be put on placebo,’ says Kaptchuk. ‘If it works, great. If not, then go on to drugs.’”
How shocking!
The word ‘placebo’ is derived at least partially from Tanach. This has been documented in the Journal of the Royal Academy of Medicine (October 1999, pp. 511-515, and Issue 93, 2000).
One of the Psalms most frequently recited by Catholics at funerals, going back at least a thousand years, is “Es’halech lifnei Hashem b’eretz chaim, I will walk before Hashem in the land of the living” (Tehillim 116:9). While the literal translation of the first word is “I will walk” or “I will walk in step with,” the Septuagint uses a Greek word that means “I shall be pleasing.” (See Megillah 9 and Rishonim and Acharonim for whether the Septuagint is actually the original translation of the seventy Sages, although initially they only translated the Chamishah Chumshei Torah.)
Later, when the Greek was translated into Latin, this verse read: “PlaceboD-omino in regione vivorum, I shall be pleasing to G-d in the land of the living.”
In time, people would come to funerals and cry this verse out even when most of the others present knew they had not been very close to the deceased. The term “the singer of the placebo” thus came about to describe people or things that pretend to be what they are not!
One of the issues that comes up from time to time is what type of medicine or treatment is given credence in halachah. As seen from the matter of the placebo, defining the term “medicine” is a difficult task.
For example, the Shulchan Aruch (328:17) rules that a non-Jew may be asked to assist a sick person whose condition is not life-threatening even by performing a melachah that is assur d’Oraisa.In light of the placebo study, would one be able to ask his non-Jewish neighbor to go to the store for him on Shabbos to pick up his placebo medication?
While that question may be academic in nature, many others are not.
How does halachah view alternative treatments such as acupuncture, chiropractic, and hypnotherapy? And what about segulos? Can one rely on them? Can their use supersede the halachos of Shabbos?
These sh’eilos become very real when people are seeking help for serious, ongoing, and sometimes terminal issues.
And even if one can prove that a certain alternative medical treatment is not helpful, would halachah recognize a well-documented placebo effect? (I would like to note here that I am not focused on any particular alternative treatment, and I am not offering my personal view of their efficacy.)
Medication on Pesach is an area where these issues are highly relevant. Many poskim posit that even when pills contain chametz, they may be swallowed whole on Pesach. (See, e.g., Ksav Sofer 118, Igros Moshe 2:92 and 3:62, Chazon Ish116:8,and Minchas Shlomo 1:17. Even those who differ would at least agree that it is at worst only a d’Rabbanan of “achshivei,” and even then, only according to the daas yachid opinion of the Rosh.)
But what if it’s an herbal medication? What about vitamins? May one take these on Pesach if they contain chametz?
Further, what about a choleh who is in a life-threatening situation, lo aleinu? Would halachah allow him to ride in a car on Shabbos in order to receive a brachah from a tzaddik? Is such a measure deemed curative in the eyes of halachah?
I was actually once asked if someone could take a cab on Shabbos to the late Lubavitcher Rebbe’s Ohel in order to daven for a terminally ill relative who was in surgery on Shabbos!
The Minchas Shabbos (d. 1917) discusses sending a telegram to a tzaddik on Shabbos to ask him to daven for a person who is deathly ill.He rules that it is forbidden (MinchasShabbos,siman 84, se’if 19, os 65).
Rav Shlomo Kluger (d. 1869) records a fascinating story about a rav in the nearby town of Zalutchov who allowed non-Jews to write a kvittel on Shabbos for a person who was very ill and then travel to deliver it to a rav so the choleh could be davened for (Shu”t U’bacharta B’chaim, siman 87; see this same event recorded in Shu”t Maharsham 3:225). In Rav Kluger’s response, one can sense his anger at this psak; he even forbade that rav to pasken in the future!
But why? Don’t we believe in tefillah? Why should it be viewed differently from natural cures?
The Gemara states that in certain dangerous situations, we allow certain measures on Shabbos (Taanis 14). Rav Yosi points out, however, that general tefillah and crying out would not be allowed in these dangerous situations. Rashi explains that we cannot be certain that our tefillos will be accepted.
The Tzitz Eliezer takes this further, stating that, especially in our generation, “even a d’Rabbanan may not be desecrated for the sake of tefillah for a sick person. Even regarding [sending his name] to a tzaddik who is known to have his tefillos answered, like Rav Chanina ben Dosa, it would still be forbidden.”
As we will see, all of this is due to the fact that halachah only sanctions as medicine things that work al pi teva,through nature, encouraging us to seek only proven scientific interventions.
We will discuss in detail just how this is defined, and what types of scientific experiments would be accepted in halachah as proof of the efficacy of a treatment; we will also discuss how these guidelines relate to popular alternative treatments. (For instance, the Tzemach Tzedek [siman 38] discusses the mysterious ‘segula’ of pouring hot lead while reciting certain teffilos and whether it may be done on Shabbos. A note to the reader: any divination or practice not found in chazal should not be embraced before speaking with competent morah horah, and a medical professional)
But, what about the ‘placebo effect’? Could there not be cases that the emotional calm of, say, a beracha alone could bring better health, and maybe extend a life?
These questions are not academic. On the few occasions that I was with congregants as hatzala took them away the patient requested that I somehow contact their relatives on Shabbos.
The Shulchan Aruch rules (siman 306:9), for example, that certain cholim would be allowed to send non-Jews outside of the techum so as to get relatives to come after Shabbos. The MishnaBerura (ad loc. siif 41) explains that this is a psychological concern for which certain violations are indeed made permissible, and even required at times.
While this is an allowance for rabbinical violations, the Aruch Hashulchan allows for even biblical ones to be bypassed if a doctor confirms that it could have a significant impact.
This view can be proven from what the Shulchan Aruch later writes (siman 328:4) that we perform for a choleh on Shabbos all that was performed during the week.
As we can see issues of Shabbos and emotional desires versus real treatment are vast and complex – a rav must be consulted at all times. (The reader is also directed to Piskei Teshuvosmehadura kamma 328:4, and second edition, volume two, 238 footnote 114).
There is also an extra value in consulting a rav, doctor, therapist, etc. in the above cases and those similar: Objectivity.
To explain this, let us for a moment look at another halacha. The Shulchan Aruch rules (328:14) that if a choleh does not have access to kosher food one may violate Shabbos and slaughter an animal so that he has food. This means that if there is a choice between eating treif and driving to the hospital to bring him food we take the latter option.
Why is this so? One would think that a choleh should himself eat the treif rather than have another(s) violate Shabbos on his behalf.
The poskim (see Aruch Hashulchan and Shulchan Aruch Harav) give a number of reasons for this. One of the most prominent of these is that while true that non-kosher food seems to be the right option to take in terms of halachic compartmentalization, however we must be concerned that the emotional reaction to violating the isuur(im) of treif food will scar the choleh to the point of harming his health!
I have been witness to cholim being greatly agitated at relatives who find heterim to come to the hospital during a Shabbos emergency, and visa versa.
In other words, while there are indeed times that emotions play a role in halacha, it is sometimes hard for family members to see what is best for one’s emotional well being. And, the rav as well should be aware that he may not know what is best, and therefore must listen carefully to the words of the family members and loved ones who know the patient best. Both objective voices and and those that are noggea b’davar voices are critical in these cases. Amazingly, all of the above relates to Purim. Its connection to the story of Mordechai and Esther will be discussed next week iy’H.
Dear Rabbi Taub, …I wanted to throw out an idea that I’ve had for an article with Pesach/Sefira not too far away. I always thought the laws of shaving were so bizarre/fascinating and it has been a topic that as a ba’al tshuva always catches me off guard. As a student at Sho’r Yoshuv yeshiva I would always look around to see who was shaving and who wasn’t; did their job make them putar? At least during the summer months as a counselor at (frum Camp X) many staff would shave during the 3 weeks eruv Shabbos; what was with Rosh Chodesh falling on Sunday so you could shave eruv Shabbos? Why didn’t we shave during Chol HaMoed if it is a joyous time? I most likely still don’t remember all the answers to these questions, but it is one of those things that you notice and notice about others. Best, Drew Fein Wisconsin
The writer is correct that it can be all very confusing.
This reminds me of the old story of the fellow who approaches his rav, “A girl who I have been trying to date finally said ‘Yes’ to the shadchann. May I shave for this first meeting during sefira? She is from an upper middle class family who would likely not be keen on being seen with an unkept-scraggly beared-person”.
The rav responded in the affirmative.
The first date went well, so the boy was surprised to hear the next morning that she wished to call it off.
“Was it something that I said?” he nervously asked the shadchan.
“No, not at all! She had a wonderful time”.
“So what was the issue?”
“She just could not see herself marrying a boy who shaves during sefira”!
Interestingly, this actual case is found as presented to Rav Moshe (Mesoras Moshe 3:p.142), and while he says in some cases there is room to be lenient, he is indeed greatly concerned that shaving will have the opposite of the desired affect –causing the girl to wonder why this young man is shaving during sefira.
Making these halachos most puzzling is the fact that we have the Three Weeks/Nine Days, chol hamoed, sefira, and aveilus R’l-all prohibiting haircuts and shaving.
Because the above periods all share many basic premises, they often get confused with each other.
For example, the idea that one should not purchase new items during sefira –especially items that would allow for a shehechiyanu –is, according to most, not active during sefira. Simply due to these days’ confusion with the days of Av causes many not to purchase new items during sefira (see Mishnah Berrura 496:2 –the reader should note that there are indeed minhagim not to make this beracha during sefira and every reader must follow their minhag, see Bein Pesach L’Shavuos p. 290 footnote #2 at length for many sources who support just such a chumrah).
Further confusing matters, the poskim debate to what extent we can compare these various ‘no haircutting’ times of the year.
So, for example, by hilchos chol hamoead the Shulchan Aruch (siman 531) gives us a list of people who would be able to get a haircut, e.g. a released prisoner.
The Pri Megadim states that this same list of allowances would be activated by sefira as well. This opinion is recorded approvingly by the Biur Halacha.
However, Rav Moshe Feinstein (Igros Moshe 2:96) is not as satisfied with such a comparison. For by chol hamoed, the reason chazal prohibited hair cutting is to get everyone to look their best before going into yom tov; so as to retard any procrastination. This is very different than sefira that carries the weight of actual aveilus!
Let me run through all potential calendar occurrences that give rise to allowances.
Sefira Haircuts/Shavingon each Erev Shabbos
Rav Moshe Feinstein was once asked (Mesoras Moshe vol. 3 p. 143) regarding someone who is shaving during sefira due to work and potential financial loss (a rav should always be consulted, see Likutei Halachos, based on Rav Shmuel Kamanetzky shlit’a, p. 114 footnote 5 at length).
“Since he is shaving anyway throughout the while week, would it not be a bizayon to not shave for Shabbos?!”
While Rav Moshe said he understood why people might think so, the truth is that doing what halacha advises is never a bizayonl’shabbos.
Nevertheless, and as the shoel told Rav Moshe (to no avail), there are poskim who always allow shaving erev Shabbos during sefira.
There are many reasons for their leniency. For one, the minhag of not cutting hair during sefira should not triumph over the words of a navi, and it says (Yeshayahu 58:13) ‘…v’karah l’shabbos oneg–you shall call unto Shabbos as a delight’. In fact, the Rama rules (siman 260) that getting a haircut erev Shabbos is a matter of halacha!
Others are quoted as allowing erev Shabbos shaving or trimming of beards because, at least in America, many go without any beards and after a few days of noticeable stubble one has already fulfilled their aveilus.
However, and as Rav Moshe concludes, short of having such a mesorah from parents or rebbeim, the minhag yisroel is not like this, as we shall clearly see in the next examples.
(See footnote to Emes LYaakov to Shulchan Aruch Siman 493 where he also rejected erev Shabbos hair cutting)
Erev Shabbos Before a Shabbos Rosh Chodesh Iyaar Haricuts/Shaving
The poskim rule that should this rosh chodesh fall on Shabbos (in which case the first day of Rosh Chodesh will always be on Friday) then one may get haircuts erev Shabbos. This is true even if one generally follows Rav Yehudah Hachasid not to cut their hair on rosh chodesh (Rav Elyahsiv and Rav Moshe, as brought in Dirshu #16). From the mere fact that the poskim allow one to shave on this particular erev Shabbos is evidence that most held that a stam erev Shabbos during sefira cutting hair would not be allowed.
Erev Shabbos Before a SUNDAY Rosh Chodesh Iyaar Haircuts/Shaving
One may not cut their hair this erev Shabbos (Pri Chadash, et al.)
Erev Shabbos Before a Sunday Lag B’Omer Haircuts/Shaving
One may cut their hair on such an erev Shabbos (Rema). As to if one must cut their hair before such a Shabbos, poskim say not (see, e.g. Rivevos Efraim 1:338).
Erev Shabbos Before a Sunday Rosh Chodesh Sivan (Or a Sunday Day 1 of the Yimei Hagbala) Haircuts/Shaving
Rosh Chodesh Sivan can’t fall on a Shabbos (in our Hillel/set calendar). However, it can fall on a Sunday, making such a case anppear akin to a Sunday Lag B’omer.
Would a haircut/shaving be allowed for such an erev Shabbos?
This is a very relevant for the many whose sefira period of 33 days ends at some point after rosh chodesh sivan –by the yimei hagbalah or erev Shavous (depending if he stopped on Rosh Chodesh Iyaar or after). The only way this allowance could even be asked would only be regarding those for whom Sunday rosh chodesh would mark the end of their mourning period. The Pri Megadim argues that this should be no different than when lag b’omer falls on a Sunday when it is allowed on the Friday before. However, many others disagree with this and do not allow haircutting on such any such Friday before sivan.
But why should this be different from lag b’omer when one may cut their hair the Friday before? When is a Sunday event enough to allow one to cut their hair on the Friday before and when not?
Rav Shlomo Kluger explains (Chochmas Shlomo, siman 493): When on Shabbos itself there is an additional added joy (like Shabbos and rosh chodesh) one could get haircuts the Friday before.
However, a Sunday event alone would not be enough, save for lagb’omer. For, following lag b’omer many revert back to sefira and not cutting their hair, making their erev Shabbos haircut in such a year kavod for that Shabbos and the next Shabbos.
This, however, can’t be compared to a Sunday rosh chodesh –even a rosh chodesh that would allow one to cut their hair, because a Sunday rosh chodesh or a Sunday day 1 of the yimei hagbala one would be allowed to cut their hair not just on that day, but all days following it, making our need for allowances far weaker.
I will conclude with the following original thought. Lag b’omer always falls out 18th iyaar. The Gemara says that according to Rav Yehoshua the first day of the mabul was 17 Iyar (Rosh Hashanah 11). According to the Sefer Hayashar the waters of the flood killed everyone on the first day, so that by 18 Iyar the deaths had ended. The 18th of Iyar is also the date when another plague—the one that afflicted Rebbe Akiva’s students—ended. I would suggest, then, that what we are celebrating is a date that represents forging ahead, picking up the pieces and rebuilding. Like Noach, Rebbe Akiva’s had to start from scratch and rebuild even after losing everything. This date represents rising from the ashes, carrying on after loss.
And, it hints to our ratzon for the ultimate ‘re-start’ –with binyan bayis shlelishi!
As I slowly and tiredly made my way downstairs after the the maariv following acharonshelpesach, I was met by two officers from the NYPD.
“We are looking for the rabbi”, they said.
“I am the rabbi”.
“Sir, we just wanted you to let you know that we at the ‘107’ (precinct) are here for you and are watching over your temple”.
I had no idea what they were talking about. We, frankly, had not yet heard about the events at the Chabad House in San Diego.
I offer this column as a zechusaliyah to Lori Kaye hy’d, a founding member of the three-decade-old congregation that was attacked, and as a zechusrefuahshleima to their esteemed rav, Rav Yisroel Goldstein,and all those injured – physically and emotionally. May Hashem avenge their blood and tears!
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Over this past Pesach –like all years, and like all rabbanim –so many new and interesting shailos arose for which one cannot prepare for in advance.
One hotel at which I was giving shiurim over cholhamoed had a petting zoo one day. It was wonderful, especially for my youngest who is madly obsessed with animals. As they unloaded the sheep and the goats one could have believed that we were preparing our korbonos pesach!
Like many Pesach hotels that have this same activity, the guests need not pay for animal feed as they would have to do separately in a traditional petting zoo; it was included and free.
However, my wife –always wiser than I –had the sagacity to inquire from what this feed was made.
Let’s just say that most feed is made from a mix of ingredients that would make any frum Jew on Pes1ach panic.
The question now was two-fold: A- if one may give this to children with which to feed the animals (No!), and B- if any Pesach hotel that utilized such a system (of which there are many) is considered to have actually purchased this feed with the guests’ money (beyond the scope of this column). In any event, the owners of this hotel were, to their credit, quite concerned at this discovery. Plans are already in motion to fix this issue for next year, and to notify the many other hotels who may not yet be aware of this dilemma.
Another unique issue which came up is of far more morbid territory.
My shul suffered two tragedies this yomtov. First, a member of our shul had to bury her mother erevyomtov. This meant that her shiva would be but for a few hours, canceled-out by Pesach.
But then, on cholhamoed, another heartbreak struck. The mother of someone who was spending yomtov in eretzyisroel with their family, passed away.
Right after the first days, when he heard the news, he booked a flight to Tuscon {name changed} to be able to take part in the kavodacharon (final respects). Arriving on cholhamoed, and not knowing too many people there, he had a fascinating shailah. On the one hand, he would not feel comfortable burying his mother without wearing a jacket; yet, on the other hand, being that for a parent one must tear outer-garments (like jackets), how could he go into yomtov with no suit? This was a fascinating shailah of what takes precedence, kavodyomtov or kavodmeis/kibbud eim. Baruch Hashem, in the last moments he found someone to lend him a jacket (making tearing unnecessary) but the initial shailah was an interesting one, and a rarity!
But it was on yomtov when a shailah came up that intrigued me most; one that has likely already intrigued the reader as well.
Because so many in my shul were away in hotels etc. for all of Pesach, the hashkamaminyan (early, 7:30am minyan) did not have a minyan remaining inside the beismidrash for yizkar. Now, although a minyan is not at all needed for yizkar (and indeed one can say it at home), some felt that it would be best if they kept the group to at least ten. So, as I was about to begin my baruchsh’emar in the main minyan, a young man learning in eretzyisroel and home for Pesach ran in to the main shul to ask me if it was truly assur for him to stay in for yizkar.
This was –indeed –a fascinating shailah.
The minhag has long been observed that those who baruch Hashem do not have deceased parents leave the shul before yizkar commences.
The truth is, this is an odd minhag. Since when, or, where else do people leave the shul when a teffilah does not apply to them?
Can we just imagine the scene, if, say, by birchascholim on Shabbos all those who do not have names to add to the cholim list simply walk out!?
Why then do we do this by yizkar?
The first time the minhag of those who have never sat shiva to leave the shul before yizkar is mentioned is in the ShaareiEfraim (10:32): “…(last line) and we have the custom that those that have both their mother and father still alive that they leave the shul when yizkar is said on yom tov and yomkippur”.
But why? Would it not be appropriate to hear our parents mention the names of those long past? Would it not be a mussar relating to the fleetingness of life for all of us to witness the names of those we have never met but for others cared for deeply?
In 1973, a rav wrote to Rav Waldenberg arguing that perhaps no one should leave before yizkar. Rav Waldenberg responded (TzitzEliezar 12:39) that while there may be rare cases where such a change may be allowed –for instance where there is no room outside for everyone, or questions of tznius, etc. –generally it would be dangerous to ever question our minhagim.
He goes on to share several reasons that have been suggested for the minhag of leaving before yizkar.
Here, we will offer four reasons for this unique custom found in sefarim (see The Complte Yizkar Handbook, Rav Ahron Levine; for further study, see Tzitz Eliezar ibid.; shu’t Zecher Yehosef oh’c 225:3; Nitie Gavriel, aveilus, vol. 2 79:1; Pischei Shaarim on the ShaarieEfraim #35).
Most people explain children leaving before yizkar as being due to ‘ayinharah’. However, what would be the ayin harah exactly? Don’t you need another’s negative feelings to give it power? Some explain that the concern here is based on a chazal. The gemara relates (yevamus 106a) how Abayay’senvy of Rav Papa of having parents that were still alive (as Abayay was orphaned from birth) caused Rav Papa’s parents to die. Perhaps, suggests the PischeiShaarim, some who are forced to mention deceased family members will look in envy at those in the room who do not need to mention any names. We therefore suggest that they leave.
Others suggest that they leave the shul out of fear that – trying to copy what the others are doing – they may mention their still-alive parents, thus ‘tempting fate’ by ‘opening their mouths to the Satan’ (Otzar Kol Minhagei Yeshurin 71:27; Sefer Lashon Chachamom #24)
Similar to the above, because many children are named for deceased relatives, should they stay behind and be in the room when a name similar to theirs is mentioned, this too may be ‘tempting fate’ to the Satan.
Rav Moshe Mordechai Epstein, rosh yeshiva of Slobadka offers one final reason for this minhag (LevushMordechai, Bava Kama, pesichah), and it is a powerful one. First he opnes with another question. We know that we can’t say tachanun nor do hazkaras neshamos if there is a chasan in the room. This being the case, how can anyone say yizkar on yom tov? Rather, he explains, because for most people who have lost loved ones they are already thinking about these meisim on yom tov their crying and/or mentioning their names would be a relief for them, a practical oneg yom tov to do something for them! Such outpouring of inner feelings is allowed on yom tov as a way for release. However, for those that never suffered such loss, who do not have this pent-up grief, should they stay behind for yizkar their sadness would not be permissible on yomtov. More, their being there –and the need to protect their simchas yom tov – wouldm like a chasson, prevent the others from being allowed to have their relief of yizkar! This is why they must stand outside!
So many secrets are found in minhagei yisroel!
After the original publication of this article in Ami Magazine in 2019, I received a call from HaRav HaGaon Ochs, a senior rav and chaver Beis Din in Toronto. He shared from his rebbe, Rav Soloveichik, yet another explanation for this minhag of leaving shul by Yizkar. Regrettably, I can’t now recall what he shared. If anyone has this information, please comment below or share with me via email. Thank you!
Including: Is One Buried Next to Their First or Second Spouse?
Rabbi Moshe Taub
First published in Ami Magazine, June, 2012
Part 1 The Minhag & It’s Origins
“Fourteen months ago, my mother died. But it wasn’t until tonight, at my father’s wedding, that I lost her…”
(Ami Living, 10 Kislev/November 13 5774/2013, pages 54 and 55)
The above is an excerpt of an article where a daughter described her mixed feelings when attending a parent’s second marriage.
In response to this article, a noted rav composed a letter seeking to correct what he believed was a halachic oversight – The question of children attending the second marriages of their surviving (or divorced) parents.
What follows is a translation of his letter (mistakes are my own):
“…although the magazine is not a ‘sefer halacha’, readers still assume that you would not, heaven forefend, publish something against minhag (Yisroel), therefore, if a story is published the actions taken in it will be deemed appropriate… “…The custom is that a child does not attend the chuppah of a parent’s second marriage – due to the fact that it goes against the proper kibud we are to have for the (deceased) mother or father by seeing the surviving one marry another...”
He goes on to focus on the feelings of pain this woman described experiencing at said wedding and how this could have been avoided had she simply followed proper practice and not attended.
While this rav brings up a very real minhag, not all of his points are universally accepted.
For one, it is appears to be rare today for adult children to follow this minhag.
Personally, I lament not joining my siblings in eretz yisroel for my father’s second marriage (due to my wife being in her 9th month).
Anecdotally, when I inquired from other adults whose parent remarried, most shared that they indeed attended those celebrations.
Before sourcing this minhag’s source and its reasons, we would be remiss not to observe that, this minhag aside, reactions to such marriages are unique to each child, family dynamics, etc. Whatever one’s minhag may be, that must always be weighed (with a rav) against these other considerations.
We would also be remiss not to state at the outset that our discussion to follow relates only to Adult Children.Regarding younger children attending such weddings, however, our first concern must be for their emotional health. Such cases, l”a, no matter one’s minhag, demand the counsel of an expert in the field; one who knows the children/family well.
Only then may it be brought to one’s rav.
Let us now list, and then directly respond, to the crucial points of this rav:
– He asserts that there is a general custom for children not to attend such weddings
(While his term ‘nohagin’ could have been referencing his Chassidic branch in particular (i.e. ‘we have a custom’), this does not seem likely. I was also unable to find any source that his Chassidic group in particular is stricter than others regarding this custom; if anything I found to the contrary)
– He implies that this custom is that the children not attend the chuppah specifically
– He asserts that the reason behind this custom is kibbud av v’eim
This is indeed just an assertion (although, perhaps, a good one). In addition, if indeed it is a real kibbud issue, why then call it a minhag? Should it not then be an actual halacha? Unless he means, the minhag is to assume that their presence will cause dishonor, even if basic halacha wouldn’t demand such an assumption.
– He posits that the (assumed) reason for this minhag would then only apply in a case where there is a dead parent, l’a, as opposed to a divorced one.
Let us now delve into all of the above:
The earliest source for this minhag that I was able to locate is from the 18th century sefer ‘MinhagimVarmisia‘, a sefer about the customs of the Jewish community of Worms.
As quoted in Minhagei Yisroel Torah (vol. evha”z), as well as in Nittei Gavriel (hilchos nisuin, vol. 1), in the aforementioned minhag book (p. 51) it is recorded that in Worms there was a custom of children not attending the (second) weddings of their parents.
Here is the original language used to describe this minhag:
“Sons and daughters of a widow or widower do not go to the shul, all the more so they do not attend the chuppah, and they do not attend the (wedding) feast…”
Minhag Varmisia, p. 51
I am unsure what is meant by their phrase “…not go to the shul…”; perhaps this is where most weddings took place .
(see Shu’t Igros Moshe ev’h 1:93, inter alia, who discusses the concern, if any, of a chuppah taking place in a shul. See also Mahrail Diskin. However the next sentence in Minhagim Varmeisa would imply that something else was being referred to, which eludes me)
According to this source, children attending such a chuppah is:
A) a greater concern than the children ‘going to shul’ (whatever that means), and,
B) attending the wedding feast equally falls under this prohibitionary minhag.
More questions remain:
What is/are the reason(s) behind this minhag?
Was this minhag meant just for the community of Worms, or for all of us?
Should it have been intended for all of klal Yisroel, would this have the power to obligate us today, and far from Worms, to observe it?
To the third point, the ChasamSofer (Shu’t Chasam Sofer 6:52) reminds us that while one can obligate themselves to do or not to do something through a neder or shevuah, yet one certainly lacks the power to obligate someoneelse! The one exception to this would be the leader(s) of the generation (what chazal in a number of places term as the ‘gadol hador’, see, e.g., Sota 11). Such a gadolcan obligate others in new minhagim. The simplest example of this phenomenon, and the one to which the Chasam Sofer was in fact addressing, are the cheremim of Rabbeinu Gershom (e.g. marrying two wives).
In addition, while any one community can accept only upon themselves certain customs, all Jews may still become obligated in it if the vast majority of communities and their respective rabbanim all agree to it.
Prohibiting kitniyos on Pesach would be an example, although an imperfect one, of this phenomenon (see Magen Avraham 690:2 regarding a minhag from a noted posek).
Even if one could get around those criteria regarding attending a second wedding, the reason for any new custom would always have to based on some other halacha that we are seeking to protect, or a hashkafa that is rooted in mesorah.
(For sources for, and a discussion about, this critical rule of for all minhagim, see/Click this link: “Fasting For A Fallen Sefer Torah‘)
As the Rambam writes (end of hakdama to mishnayos):
“…Once the Talmud closed one is not allowed to add to its laws”.
See also, shu”t Noda B’Yehudah, eh’z [2] siman 79; Radvaz in Shu’t Hon Yosef, siman 9.
For further study on this subject see ‘Tzavaas Rebbe Yehudah HaChassid Ham’ifour’ Gumbo/Otzar HaPoskim edition.
Cf. Shu’tRashba 1:9, Shu’tChasamSofer 51 in oh’c, and Sdei Chemed, ‘Mem’ klal 38.
Now, even if we momentarily postulate that this minhag is indeed in affect for all of us, we must be careful, as often a minhag is taken to its extreme, beyond its intended parameters. Meaning, even if a minhag is real, nay, because a minhag is real, it would then only mean that, like all other issues of halacha, there are times that it is not followed; where conflicting obligations must be weighed against it, etc. It is incongruous to watch people rightfully consider when one must desecrate Shabbos but refuse to do the same for their particular group’s or familial customs!
As the oft-quoted maxim goes (and can be found in the Taamei HaMinhagim, siman 840):
‘If only the Aseres haDibros were written in the Tzavah (ethical will) of Rav Yehudah HaChassid, then certainly people would care for them more!’
With all of this in mind, let us delve into this mysterious minhag, its reason(s), application, and the many beguiling issues it may touch upon.
Part 2 Possible Explanations
I. The Kibbud Av V’eim Theory
The reason the aforementioned letter-writer gives for this particular custom was kibbud av v’em for the deceased parent.
Indeed, I found this to be the ‘generally assumed’ motive behind this minhag.
However, such an approach would seem to be riddled with difficulty.
While there is certainly an obligation to honor one’s parent even after death (Shulchan Aruch siman 240:9) – although it is debated if this is a biblical or rabbinic obligation (refer to Shu’t Yabia Omer 2:66:9) – it is hard to fathom how the child attending this wedding would be thereby disrespecting the deceased parent.
The logic in this seems to suffer from reductio ad absurdum, causing a child to become paralyzed toward many other activities going foward.
But more: Even if this is the source of concern, can’t the opposite be assumed – that the deceased parent would want the child to make every effort to attend?!
In fact, Rav Moshe Feinstein used similar logic, at times, to allow an avel in their twelve months of mourning to attend an annual yeshiva‘s or chesed organization’s dinner. His logic is sound: since the obligation to mourn for one’s parent for the full year (as opposed to just the thirty days demanded for all other immediate relatives) is by dint of ‘kibud’ for the deceased parent, we may thenassert that in such a case the deceased parent would forgo their own honor for the benefit of the Torah institution one desires to assist (see Rav Felder’s Laws of Mourning, Feldheim, p. 112 and 118, footnote 115).
Now, and depending on family dynamics, this could certainly apply to a second wedding as well!
Meaning, kibbud av v’em is risked also by NOT attending !
The kibud av v’am theory brings further questions.
We mustn’t forget the obligation of honoring the surviving parent as well – which would be a strong counterweight, especially when we consider that the kibbud demanded for the surviving parent is (often) greater than that that which is demanded for the deceased one.
Furthermore, there is also the obligation to honor one’s step-parent (Shulchan Aruch Y’D siman 240:21)!
Further still, if the reason for this minhag is indeed due to kibbud av v’em, why does MinhagimVarmezia only mention the example of the parent who is getting married after being widowedand not also a divorcée? Wouldnt the latter case, which the sefer/source ignores, carry the possibility of (even greater?) hurt feelings from a parent who, A) is still alone, and, B) is known wicked brew for strife and jealousy, etc., lo aleinu?
Therefore, and without a clear source stating otherwise, I am not convinced that kibbud is the true motive behind this minhag.
However, playing devils advocate, perhaps one who explain this minhag as being predicated on kibud for the dead parent would argue thusly:
“Precisely due to the fact that one is obligated to honor the step-parent as well as the surviving parent, there is a fear (according to the leaders of Worms, at least) that the halacha of maintaining kibbud for the deceased parent will be forgotten as soon as their place is ‘filled’ by an other. In order to counter this we urge the children not to attend this wedding so as to bore into the tablet of their heart that nothing will change in their halachic relationship with the deceased parent.”
However, this seems like a forced, Rube Goldberg-esque fear that exits outside the norm of typical minhag concern.
I found other theories behind its creation:
II. The Reconciliation Theory
The Shu’t Davar Yehoshua (vol. 2 siman 113) was asked if children could attend the second marriage of their mother who was divorced from their father. Without quoting the source from Minhagim Varmezia, he points out that children seem to have the custom not to attend. The reason he suggests for this is fascinating, although limited in its application: Until the divorced wife/mother gets remarried it is still possible for the first couple to get back together. In other words the very act of this new chuppah, and the meal that will follow it, is the very moment of, and the celebration in, the severing of all bond(s) between their two parents!
Even he was not certain that this is the reason for the custom.
Yet, if he is correct, it would indeed only apply in such a case (divorced parents and the mother’s wedding).
There is another difficulty the Dvar Yehoshua‘s suggested reasoning behind the minhag:
As mentioned at the outset, the actual source of this custom goes out of its way to mention the case where one of the parents has passed-on, without even mentioning the case of divorced parents. It would be hard then to use his logic to explain that the initial custom was about a wholly different case (unless this minhag is older than Minhagim Varmizia, and they either also surmised on their own the logic behind it, or just gave the most common case.)
III. The Tzar Neshama Theory
I considered another possible reason for this minhag, but then thought it was too fanciful. However, to my surprise, I later found that others indeed suggested it! Perhaps this minhag is predicated on the minhag of placing an invitation by the grave of a loved one before a family simcha, as the Zohar writes (pinchos, 219): אף על גב דמיתו קב”ה אעקר לון מג”ע ואייתי לון עמיה לההוא חדוה לנטלא חולקא דחדוה עם קב”ה ושכינתיה In other words, Hashem carries the deceased parents from shomayim and brings them with Him to participate in the simchah [i.e. wedding]
(For more on the minhag of placing an invitation in the cemetery by a matzeiva, as well as their and the Shechina’s presence at weddings, see: Derech Sicha, vayeitzei, p. 152 where Rav Chaim Kinievsky brings another source for deceased parents attending simchos, specifically the weddings of their children; Minhagei Yisroel Torah, vol. 4 p. 101; Kitzur Nachlas Shiva Hachadash; R’ Aryeh Kaplan’s ‘Made in Heaven’, et al. As to common practice, according to Rav Chaim Kinievsky, an invitation is not necessary for the deceased parent, l”a, to attend, as Hashem brings them even uninvited [my thanks to Reb Moshe Freidman of Toronto with whom Rav Chaim shared this insight])
Could it be that for this reason children should not attend, so as not to bring pain to the visting neshama?
I imagine the reader would dismiss this as a possible approach for the same reason I initially did:
Would a deceased spouse be among the souls to attend? What would be the purpose of Hashem bringing them (see source above) to the second marriage of their spouse?
Even if they are among the souls to attend, would the children being there would be its focus and indeed cause it pain?
However, as mentioned, I later found this reasoning brought. In shu”t Ateres Paz, ev”h, siman 1 he makes just this argument!
After proving that those neshomos also attend, he then novelly explains the concern as follows:
It is not the sight of his/her living children that will cause potential tzar, rather it is the sight of the children of the other side that may bring pain!
Thus far, we can observe that this minhag is shrouded in mystery, uncertain logic, and is certainly not a universal practice.
Now let me share with you my own theory, how this custom of Worms had everything to do with sensitivity to the living and not the departed.
Part 3
IV. The ‘Second Fiddle’ Theory
To explain my own approach to this minhag, I must first touch upon a seemingly unrelated point; a misconception many have:
A woman once shared with me that she never remarried because she would then, “Not be buried alongside my first husband”, the father of her children.
It seems that this is a common misconception.
Before relating this issue back to our topic, it is important that the record be set straight, as due to it being such a sensitive nature, if we would not write about it then it may never be asked, discussed, and better understood.
The pasuk in Yeshayau (54:5), based on the Gemara (Sanhedrin 22b), teaches of the unique bond one has (especially a woman) with their first spouse.
Based on this, some say that, contra to public belief, one is always buried with their first spouse.
The Zohar (Bereishis 21) seems to also suggest that by techias hameisim it is to one’s original spouse that they will be returned to. The Ben Ish Chai (Sod Yesharim #2) says the same.
However not all seem to agree:
‘SeferHaNiztchon’ writes that after revivification, one will be united with their last spouse (see NitteiGavriel, aveilus, vol. 2, p. 699, footnote #13).
The ChasamSofer (brought in SdeiChemed, Aveilus; see shu’t Chasam Sofer, 355) also seems to disagree with the first view, suggesting that the second marriage removes all bonds to the first (see Part II above where this concept alone was explored by some as the possible reason behind the minhag of children not attending such weddings).
But there seems to be a complication, as elsewhere, the Chasam Sofer seems to say the opposite!
He writes, based on the Ari’z’l, that when Moshiach comes everyone will be reunited with their firstzivvug ((shu”tChasam Sofer 7:34, see also Shalal Rav, Bereishis, p. 42).
The Gesher HaChaim (p. 246), while not mentioning this contradiction, demonstrates that the Chasam Sofer (in the first quoted teshuvah) was only speaking about when the second wife is still alive.
Still a little confused?
The Gesher HaChaim explains:
– One may choose to be buried next to his/her first, second, or latter spouse. Full Stop.
– Should one die without ever expressing their wishes in this matter, we would then likely bury them with whom they had [the most] children (in other words, we will make an educated guess as to who they would want to buried next to).
As for the contradiction found in the Chasam Sofer: in the teshuvah we first quoted, he was writing regarding a buried first wife who was laterdisinterred. Although usually this would demand some type of aveilus, here, because of the feelings of his present wife (see below for source for this sensitivity), he need not, indeed should not, mourn.
What comes out from all of the above:
One may be buried with whichever spouse one wishes
However, should one choose to be buried with their first spouse, they should not make such arrangements in front of the second.
What does the subject of kevura/burial by a first or second spouse have to do with the minhag found in Mihagim Varmezia stating that children not attend the weddings of their widowed (and, perhaps, divorced) parents?
Based on this discussion, lulei d’mistapina, I would suggest the following motivation behind the minhag of children, at times, not attending a parents’ second marriage:
As just alluded to, the gemara rules that a remarried man best avoid receiving condolences upon the passing of his first wife in front of his second wife, as this may yield natural feelings of insecurity and/or discomfort (moad kattan 21b; see also Shulchan Aruch, yoreh deah 385:2).
Perhaps then, since we are sensitive toward a second wife in not reminding her of the bonds of the first during major moments of dveikus to the past…at the moment of chuppa and its celebratory feast, having the children of the first wife there will seem like a pgam in the husband’s new dedication to her.
After all, they are the very personification of this prior bond! They represent a silent and, at times, disquieting, reminder that their new spouse’s prior bonds comes with ripened fruits.
So that, seeing them there – at this great new moment of bonding – may serve as a harbinger to profound insecurity at the very start of her new marriage. After all, if chazal already warned a husband to a second wife of this sensitivity when it comes to receiving condolences for his first wife, kal v’chomer it should be applied and be seen as a concern by the moment of their actual (second) marriage to each other.
Although I have not yet seen this reason suggested by others, it seems to explain the motive behind the basic minhag, supplies it with its needed Talmudic foundation (as any minhag requires; see footnote above for sources for this rule), and would clarify for us why many (if not most) are lax regarding this minhag in our day.
After all, if this minhag is in place so as to protect the feelings of the living (second spouse) then they may -and often will – be mochel and stress that their desire is to have the children there. Indeed, and leaving aside considerations for this minhag, most soon-to-be-stepparents would find greater pain in their new family choosing not to attend this wedding than the very real potential for discomfort brought by their presence.
(NOTE: I wrote the above in the plural [“step-parents”, “their”, “they”, etc.], assuming that chazal’s consideration is for both a second husband and not just a second wife. I am however unsure is this is correct)
As the Netziv wrote: “Sometimes (in the name of being strict) we run away from a fox…and into the head of a lion” (see L’Ohr Halacha, Rav Zevin, shemitta).
It should go without saying that:
This halachic discussion is not psak in any way
The concern of ’emotional readiness’ is and entirely different and critical matter one must always consider in such cases.
If a young child “could” attend, has little to do with if they “should” attend.
A slew of additional factors – including age, family dynamics, etc., especially with regard to younger children -are unique to each case, child, and family.
A child phycologist -in concert with one’s family’s rav – must be sought after so as to offer proper guidance toward the appropriate course of action or inaction in all such cases.
May we only know simchos!
(Special thanks to R’ Yehoshua Greenberg of Buffalo and R’ Mechel Gruss of Lakewood for helping me locate some of the sources in ‘Part 2’ by fulfilling my request to perform two specific searches on their ‘Otzar Hachachma‘ and for photocopying a sefer found in his vast library, respectively)
Must one support a local and Frum establishment over cheaper options? If so, why, and what are the limits to this Halacha?
Every year the esteemed Oxford dictionary chooses a ‘word of the year’. They explain: “Among their other activities, lexicographers at Oxford University Press track how the vocabulary of the English language is changing from year to year. Every year, a ‘Word of the Year’ is debated and chosen to reflect the ethos of the year and its lasting potential as a word of cultural significance.”
In 2009 that word was ‘Locavore’. This term was created to give a descriptive to those who make a commitment that all of their food, principally, comes from local farms and proprietors.
This has become a movement, for reasons of nutrition, community support, and the environment. But not everyone is on board. After countless books were published singing the gospel of ‘locavoring’, others were published, like ‘The Locavore’s Dilemma’ that demonstrate that one may be causing more harm than good by becoming a Locavore.
In communities across the frumveldt we find this same debate taking place, in fact, this has been a perennial question for centuries: must a city or town be faithful only to their own establishments? And, if so, at what cost –both halacikly and fiscally?
An addendum to this question, which we will also explore, is what halachik efficacy there is to demanding the support of a Jewish-owned store over a non-Jewish chain-store (i.e. may one buy meat from Pathmark when a heimesheyid has a butcher shop nearby).
Seeking to shake the bonds of communal responsibility, and the costs associated with that achroyos, is nothing new. In the late 1930’s, in city of Brisk, government officials placed a tax on all shochtim. The purpose of this tax was to help pay for government monitors who would perform inspections for the sake of the public health. Some local shochtim wanted to avoid this payment, and so a black market was created. These shochtim would go to a hidden place in the outskirts of the city to perform shechita thereby avoiding paying the tax. The Brisker Rav was not happy about this development and felt that the vaadha’ir could not give certification to such shechita, even if these were otherwise pious men whose actual shechita was to the highest standards. And so, he called a meeting in his house. For reasons that are too lengthy to go into here, the meeting was a disaster (see ‘The Brisker Rav: Vo. 1’, Feldheim [English] ed., p. 249 ff).
Not long after, the Brisker Rav’s worst fears came true. After getting word of illegal slaughterhouses operating around the city, plain-clothed police officers surreptitiously went to investigate the matter. One shochet was so startled at the unaccepted visitor that when he quickly turned around –and still holding his chalaf (shechitah knife) in his hand –he accidently stabbed the police officer, who soon died from his wounds!
Soon after a pogrom broke out across the city of Brisk; shuls, chedarim, bateimidrashim were damaged, windows shattered, etc., causing many to flee the city (the Brisker Rav did not flee his city; see Shul Chronicles: ‘Hurricanes, Halacha, and the Chasam Sofer’ where the halachos of a rav fleeing his city is discussed).
During these dark days in Brisk the famed mother of the Beis Yaakov movement in America, Vichna Kaplan –then Vichna Eisan – famously helped save 5 Beis Yaakov girls trapped in the school.
It took some time for the city to return to normalcy and for peace and order to be re-established.
This is not to compare the above to patronizing stores outside one’s city, rather to show that even in the face of such severe consequences the Brisker Rav was not initially listened to and people sought to beat the city system.
Where I live, Buffalo, New York, there is still but one vaad hakashrus and few meat options. It is for this reason that this particular issues matters, and why I seek to clarify it.
While I have vivid memories of coming to Buffalo as a child and going to the butcher here to get a delicious steak, years later, about a year before I came to town, the vaad had pulled their hashgacha on the one remaining certified butcher.
While there remains two delis, and a wide variety of frozen meats, this is just not the same.
I have always remained relatively tame regarding the need to support the local delis; I understood peoples’ hesitation in purchasing pre-cut frozen meat and poultry when they could stock-up on fresh meat and poultry, cut to their specifications, when they are visiting family and friends out of town.
While never a fan of these monies leaving the city, I also understood that it would not be wise using my kanois (fanaticism) capitol -which is not a finite resource – on a losing battle.
Now things has changed. We recently announced kosher local butcher to work within one of the delis. Of course, those with halachik qualms with the shechita et al. should honor their minhagim, and what follows is not written for them.[1]
While great news for the city, it also created a dilemma for the vaad and myself: how far should a vaad go in insuring the delis success? What is the vaad’s role? What is a rabbi’s role? What is halacha’s role? Most importantly, what is the role of the bneiha’ir in supporting and maintaining the local kosher and frum establishments?
The term often used by rabbanim when decrying the lack of support for local kosher establishments –especially when it comes to meat – is ‘shechuteichutz’/’outside meats’; meaning any meat brought from outside the city is seen with, at best, a negative eye.
It is not so difficult to see the results of our actions, but it takes some imagination, even lomdus, to realize the heavy burden of our inactions, and rabbanim often point to this issue as a case-in-point.
A city relies heavily on its infrastructure to foster further growth. If these are not being supported then it becomes harder to advance even further. In addition, some do not have the luxury of being able to buy outside meat and they will suffer the most should a butcher close down due to a alcak of support. Worst of all is the fear that those who would buy kosher meat (should there be a local store) would otherwise buy treif!
Interestingly, the term ‘shechuteichutz’ is found specifically by the laws of korbonos, and it is not found in reference to supporting local butchers –to my knowledge –anywhere in the classic codes. Rather, it would seem that this term is used in a colloquial sense. In that just like by a korban, where everything can be done in a ‘kosher’ and ‘halachik’ manner, and yet it still would be considered in major violation of law – simply by performing its major actions in the wrong place. Rabbanim seek to highlight that our tunnel-vision for doing everything in the right manner – to shecht with all the right chumros – causes us to ignore the question if this is the place to do it. The fact that the classic shechuteichutz also relates to meat made this a useful pun, although with a pointed edge to it.
The late 1700’s are famous for being a time of strife between the chassidim and those against this new movement. This resulted in various cheramim (excommunications) being written, proclaimated, and promulgated.
Less known is the cheremim issued by the leaders of Franfurt against the tzadik and sage –as well as prime rebbe of the Chasam Sofer –HaRav Nossan Adler.
One finds five main complaints leveled at him[2]. One of them is his ‘…desire to disqualify the shochtim of Frankfurt on the Main’, and, ‘dividing the city into groups…eating only their own meat….thereby spreading false reports about their brethren by declaring our breads and our wine forbidden to eat…’
While the cheramim were eventually removed before Rav Nosan Adler passed on, we see the sensitivity with which leadership has, in the past, taken this issue.
The gemara in Chagiga (22a) points out that although certain foods of an am ha’aretz (unknowledgeable Jew) are questionable, they are nevertheless allowed to bring their oil and wine, and vessels, to the beis hamikdosh when offering korbonos. R’ Yose explains he purpose of this rule so as to protect the klal from in-fighting and disputes. Should we disallow or question what they bring to the harhabayis these Jews may then go and create their own ‘vaad’, and erect unsanctioned mizbeichos, and even offer up their own parah adumah!
Imagine that! At least according to R’ Yose, in the beis hamikdosh, on the mizbeach, we were so concerned with causing friction among am yisroel so as to allow questionable items!
Tosphos, and to a larger extent the Shvus Yaakov (2:56) derive from here that in a case of a minor am ha’aretz (meaning, there is no reason to believe that he violates most of halacha due to his ignorance) his testimony is relied upon (cf. Rambam hil. Eidus, and how the Shvus Yaakov seeks to explain it).
The story behind this teshuvah of the Shvus Yaakov is quite interesting: there was a city where certain members were bringing in meat that the rabbanim feared did not meet (meat?) their standards. The rabbanim therefore issued a proclamation that not only deemed this out-of-town meat ‘treif’, but also proclaimed that the dishware that came into contact with such meat would also be seen as ‘non-kosher’.
To be clear, we are not talking about meat where there is known halachik concern and where such a proclamation would have been redundant, rather meat whose source was not approved or known by the town rabbanim.
The shu’t Shvus Yaakov rules that these rabbis should not have proclaimed that such is deemed treif –and indeed we must assume that it is kosher, for to do otherwise will lead to strife, and would, anyway, be a decree that most people would not be able to abide by (in which case we do not ban the item).
He was not suggesting that one must eat such meat, and he does in fact recommend that the city should certainly seek to monitor all shechita, rather his point was that to call what is not from their city, or where its standards are simply not known, ‘treif’ was one step too far, and would only lead to sinaschinum.
What are we to take from this story and teshuvah? Well, to my ears, I would suggest the following:
Several years ago I was visiting another city for shabbos and by shaloshseudos I met a man who recently became frum. As he was telling me about his fascinating path to yiddeshkeit he informed me that the last thing he took on was kashrus. The reason he gave for this startled me. When he was still not shomershabbos, the mashpia he was working with let it be known that the vaad in that city was ‘treif’. Not yet frum –and although desiring to eat kosher –he did not, yet, find it within him to place orders to travelers for meat and prepared food, and so he ate treif for about three more years as he was slowly beginning to keep shabbos etc.
“But the food we are both eating from right now is under that same vaad that you were told was treif!” I wondered out loud.
He explained that as he became more entrenched in the frum world he became aware that this kosher agency has a fine reputation and the concern from his mashpia was regarding debates between respected and accepted poskim having to do with bugs in fish and women mashgichos.
This should always be on our mind. Our chumros, and even how we believe normative halacha should be should never lead to someone eating treif. This was precisely the gemara’s concern. If one brings in meat from another city because they do not trust that city’s meat or vaad (which –short of seeking to fix the vaad –would be their right and even obligation to do) , they should at the very least not do so publicly, unless, of course, they believe the meat in town is halachicallytreif. I stress that we are not discussing meat that is not certified by a reliable posek.
Another reason to do such personal shopping quietly –or with only like-minded people –is the fear that breaking the ‘vaad monopoly’ can lead –and has led –to other denominations, and often less scholarly people, desiring to start their own kosher certification in town.
There have been other concerns relating to outside meat. Historically, there was a tax on most meat purchased in-town. This was so that those who can afford meat would help pay for other frum services provided by the community.This may also be one of the sources for the present-day anti Semitic canard of the ‘kosher-tax’, a fiction that will be discussed in a future column.
Back then, it was seen as an egregious violation of communal living to seek to get around this tax by buying meat from either outside the city or by hiring a shochet to slaughter for you under the cover of darkness.
The shu’tChasam Sofer (yoreh deah #5) has a lengthy teshuvah regarding the ability of a kehilla –that has such a tax –to ban all outside meat, and if such a ban applies to even those who protest it right away or who were not there at the time of its proclamation.
Finally, there is the issue which comes up most often: what are the limits of supporting a local store if the price is too high, or if one get go to a chain store –not owned by a Jew –and purchase food there for much cheaper?
I am somewhat reticent to give too much information here –as these questions are complicated and need the counsel of one’s own rav – rather the information provided should be seen as informative only.
Rashi in parshas Behar brings from the midrash Toras Kohanim that when the pasuk (Vayikra 25:14) states, “When you make a sale to another Jew, or make a purchase from another Jew…” it is informing us that one must seek to support his/her brethren above all other nations. Some suggest another, although tenuous, source. Further in that perek (25:35) the verse commands “Ve’he’chasakta Bo”, that we shall strengthen our impoverished brethren. The Rambam famously learns from here that the highest form of charity is supporting another Jew in business.
It may surprise the reader to learn that, whatever the source, neither the Rambam, the Tur, or the Shulchan Aruch mention overtly the obligation to support a Jewish store over a non-Jewish one.
Nevertheless, it is found in important halachik writings as a fait -accompli. For example, the Chofetz Chaim writes in his Mishne Berrura (ShaarHaTzion , 648:75) that when large esrog distributers should choose wholesale esrogim from Jewish farmers/businessman of non-Jewish ones, so long as they are equal in price and quality (see also shu’t Rama #10)
Dayan Weiss (Minchas Yitzchak 3:129) was asked specifically regarding a chain store that was competing with a Jewish-owned shop. For instance, would one be able to buy meat in Pathmark if it is cheaper than what is found by the frum butchers in town.
(It should be pointed out that many of the chain-stores give the frum managers of their departments a salary based on percentage of earnings, meaning that such a Pathmark would be seen as no different than a Jewish owned store –at least in regards to the concern we are presently discussing).
Although he paskens that one would not have to pay a much higher cost just to support a Jew, he does not give an exact system of measuring what that cost would be.
The Minchas Yitzchak adds that there are really two questions: 1) supporting a thriving Jewish store over a thriving non-Jewish store; 2) supporting a struggling Jewish store –or one that will close without more support –over a non-Jewish store.
The latter would be a whole different question, and would certainly fall under the rubric of ‘strengthening our impoverished brethren”, and one should seek to help him even if the price is relatively much higher.
In such a case, it would seem, that one could deduct whatever extra cost he is incurring from his ma’aser or tzedaka funds. However, like the entirely of this week’s column, do not pasken from what is written here, rather speak to your own rav. Klal Yisroel is made up by rachmanim, and even without all of the above I am confident that most take much more than price and marbling when they choose where to shop.
[1] While all our meat is glatt, some desire, say, chabad shechita.
A man once came to the Chazon Ish asking if he could rely on a certain rav’shechsher.
“I asked the rav if his hechsher is reliable and he responded by telling me that it is, however the less people who eat from it the more comfortable he feels”.
The Chazon Ish responded that if indeed this rav feels such a heavy weight of responsibility to the point of not just being unoffended if one does not eat from him, but even feeling a sense of relief, then that is surely a sign that he could be trusted.
I can relate to that rav.
I do not enjoy the achroyos of being accountable for what is deemed ‘kosher’ in Buffalo. For this reason I have never been able to understand those who seem to have not only lost no sleep due to their already heavy responsibilities, but seek more of it…in other cities than their own, cities who have their own already well-established rabbanim.
Who wants moreachriyos? Who is willing to fight for it? The idea of rabbis, but mostly scholarly balla battim, from other cities entering towns and making halachik decisions is unprecedented in Jewish history.
I am not talking about a factory that serves a national or international customer base, rather commissaries that serve primarily that particular city. Indeed, there are times that my vaad have called upon a major hechsher to take over a company for us. Large companies serve an international customer base, and are a therefore different discussion.
The issues to which I am referring goes well beyond kashrus.
Now for my story:
My first year in Buffalo, I received a call from the Buffalo Bills, the local NFL franchise. They wanted to offer their fans a kosher option at the games, and were wondering if the vaad would be able to certify a hot-dog stand.
I told them that it is certainly possible, although difficult, and certain rules would have to be set into place (like having a mashgiachtemidi).
They then put me in touch with one of the vendors. As we began the meeting I informed him of how we would go about either purchasing a new grill or koshering an old one. He then said something startling. “Oh, we are already kosher, we just now want to go under the vaad”.
I responded, “Well, yes, you may be ‘kosher’ in your eyes, but in order to become certified…”
“No, no”, he cut me off, “We are certified. We are simply switching kashrus agencies”.
May I remind the reader that this conversation was taking place in Buffalo, NY. Apparently a small-medium size vaad 2500 miles away was offering certification to a hot-dog stand in Ralph Wilson Stadium in Orchard Park, NY!
My first reaction was not, “How dare they come to ‘our’ turf…” but rather, “Who could be their mashgiachtemidi?”
The reader must keep in mind that certifying a kosher hot-dog stand during a NFL game is a great risk. A proprietor of such a commissary can never know how many hot-dogs to bring or how many costumers will patronize them on any given game-day. So that the fear of quickly re-filling your hot-dogs with those from one of the hundreds of carts within walking distance (as opposed to going to the one kosher deli in town, who likely would not have the number of hot-dogs needed anyway) is great and obvious.
Upon returning to my office I called, long-distance, this vaad. They were at first taken aback that I was asking for information about this stand in Buffalo, unsure if they should share it.
Can we imaging 100 years ago, ballabattim, or members of kleikodesh, not community rabbanim themselves nor even chosen by local rabbanim, getting involved in other cities’ religious business –to begin with – and then having the temerity to wonder if the rav in that very city is out of bounds for simply wanting to be informed as to what his town is putting in their mouths!? (I am secretly hoping that someone writes in a defense of these tactics)
I repeat that I am speaking of commissaries that serve primarily the bneiha’ir, and not national companies.
He finally gave me the name of their mashgiachtemidi –a man I knew. I called him up and asked him if it is true, that he is working for this agency stationed 2500 miles away. He laughed, and explained he was paid one time to go and look at the grill before the football season stared. That was the extent of their supervision according to him.
This all represents a new American reality. For the first time in Jewish history, balla–battim and non-sitting rabbanim have taken it upon themselves to involve themselves in religious questions that effect cities far, far away.
Rav Moshe Feinstein was once asked about this (Choshen Mishpat vol. 2 siman 39). He responded to the VaadHaRabanim of Pittsburgh with the following:
“Relating to the Kashrus in the city of Pittsburgh, it is clear and obvious that it should be under your authority (Rabbi Wolf Leiter) and the other members of the local rabbinate, as it has been until now…. whether due to the fact that you earned the right for the mitzvah, or the fact that the public already entrusted you with this job, or the money issues involved. There is therefore no right for anyone to come and mix into the cities kashrus without your (the vaad’s) permission, even if this individual is a kashrus expert himself…and it is forbidden for anyone (in the city) to rely on this (other) kashrus.”
What is so sad about the above letter is that it was the rabbanei ha’ir who wrote Rav Moshe asking him his opinion, not the nameless out-of-town rav; that the burden of proof is now on local rabbanim and not the nameless others is the greatest tragedy of it all. The fact that I feel I need to even write this column –and next week I will explain what brought this subject to light – is a tragedy, and a reconstruction of 3000 years of history.
Rav Akiva Eiger and the Nesivos were once walking in a park when they passed by two frum teenagers playing chess. The Nesivos turned to Rav Akiva Eiger and said, “Moshiach must be coming! For chazal (Sota 49) teach that before Moshiach comes chutzpah yasgi (chutzpah will increase), and these boys refused to stand for two elderly rabbanim!”
Rav Akiva Eiger is purported to have replied, “That is not what chazal meant when they said there will be an increase of chutzpah before Moshiach’s arrival. Rather, this is: you and I will be sitting on a park bench when these two kids will walk by. One will say to the other, “Moshiach must be coming because Rav Eiger and the Nesivos didn’t stand for me”!
We have now entered this upside down world (see Pesachim 50).
I once informed a guest in shul that what he was doing publicly during davening was not our minhag and was upsetting people, and if he could do it quietly or not at all. He looked at me and shook his head ‘No’. I explained that even in the NFL there is a need for referees so that the main players can have a good game.
I will not forget his shocked response. With a stunned look on his face he replied, “Are you actually comparing your job to that of an NFL referee?!” He then turned and continued his actions.
To him the chutzpah was that I thought a rav in his own beis haknesses was as important as a referee in a game, that I would dare compare a rav to a far, far more important occupation, a far more necessary role! Now, on the other hand, should someone call a rav and ask to take over his job, to move there in his stead so that they can then be made aware of all the issues in that city, that would at least make sense. But no one would dare do that, for that would be such a chutzpah…and, anyway, moving is so hard…
Originally published in Ami Magazine, November 2016
What is the source for – and severity of – Fasting for a Sefer Torah that, l”a, fell?
When and to whom would it apply?
I. The Event
It was as if those fifteen seconds took place in slow motion.
It was the Second Day of Sukkos 5779.
As the gollel began to roll and tighten the atzei chaim, the eitz to the right side of the sefer suddenly become unmoored from its screw.
Within a millisecond, the baal hagbah was heard letting out a shriek as half the sefer rolled away…unto the floor of the beis haknesses.
The gasp heard from all present will never leave my mind. Time stood still. Everyone was in shock.
There is something instinctive, almost congenital, in the reaction to such an event. Everyone knows, feels, that something must be done to atone for such an event.
I too was shocked.
It was the Second Day of Sukkos – zman simchaseinu – and yet all were depressed. Chazal teach that when Hashem shows us a rain on Sukkos it is a bad sign –what, then, of a sefer Torah that falls!?
Not knowing what to do, I had some siyatta d’shmaya. Right after aleinu I stood before the podium and said the following:
“I will give a shiur in the very near future as to what we need to do, but for now I have a suggestion. In just a few days we will be celebrating the completion of chamisha chumsha Torah on Simchas Torah. We now have another thirteen months until the next siyum. Let us each accepts upon ourselves one parsha to learn. On that same chosen parsha one will also write a Dvar Torah. This way, not only will be making a beautiful siyum next year on Simchas Torah but we will publish a sefer where our original Torah ideas for each parsha will be collected and sent out”
Within five minutes every parsha was taken. During chol hamoed even more wished to be a part of this project.
A tragedy was turned into an opportunity, which the shul then turned into a wonderful kiddush hashem.
So inspired, I quoted then the pasuk in Mishlei which teaches (24:16) “For a righteous man can fall seven times and [still] rise…” Hopefully Hashem too will see our response to what happened which shall eclipse the horrible event itself.
II. Fasting?
Many have likely heard or read that the necessary reaction to witnessing such an event (and, according to some, even if not witnessed, but simply if one belongs to the community) is to fast.
Some even suggest fasting for forty days!
It may be surprising, however, to learn that there is no direct source in the Gemara, or Midrash, nor any mention in the Rambam or Shulchan Aruch to any type of fasting for a dropped Sefer Torah (the same applies to dropped Teffilin not in their encasements).
Therefore, any such response falls into the category of minhag.
This is then a wonderful opportunity to not only discuss the source for this particular widespread minhag, but to examine the concept of minhagim in general.
III. What is a Minhag?
There is an all too common misconception when it comes to what minhagim are. Many may explain that opposed to a Torah law or Rabbinical law, a minhag is defined as being untethered to those first two categories of halacha. Some may even define the term minhag as referring to any custom that a family, community or individual has that relates to Jewish life but that is source-less in our legal cannon.
Nothing could be further from the truth.
All minhagim must have either a self-evident Torah rationale, an real-although minority- halachic view being followed, or be based on a source from chazal (see, e.g. Shu’t Noda B’Yehudah, 2, evh’a, #79 for how we relate this to the ethical will of Rav Yehudah HaChasid; see also Tzava Rav Yehudah Hachasis, Otzar HaPoskim edition).
For this reason, the Chasam Sofer writes (shu’t oh’c #51) that anyone who questions minhagei yisroel needs to have their yichus (pedigree) looked into!
There is even a question in halacha regarding accepting a potential ger who, while willing to accept all of the Torah and toras chazal, yet who at the same time is seemingly unwilling to accept minhagim (see ‘Sefer Minhagim’, Rav Moshe Walter, p. 14).
However, as opposed to a minhag developed to protect one from an issur (e.g. chumros relating to Pesach), the minhag to fast for a fallen sefer Torah demands we discover its source, as the poskim all strive to do.
III. The Minhag’s Source & Complexities
The shailos in these cases abound –What if someone fell with the sefer Torah? What if it fell during hakafos? What if it was a child who dropped it? What if it fell b’oness (beyond one’s control)? What if one opened the aron and a sefer just fell out?
In addition, even in a simple case, the questions are many –Should only the one who dropped it fast? Only the ones who witnessed it? What if it was a pasul sefer Torah? What if –like in our case –it was only a part of a sefer Torah? Etc. etc. etc.
Because of these common complexities, knowing the true source for this minhag becomes more than a curiosity, rather it becomes essential in order to know how to apply the many variable cases.
This minhag is mentioned by the Mishneh Berrura (siman 40:3) and the Magen Avraham (siman 44:5), and dates to at least before the 15th century (Shu’t Mahari Bruna, d. 1480, mentions this minhag).
Famously, Rav Waldenberg (d. 2006) in his shu’t Tzitz Eliezar dedicated a small kuntres (monograph) just to this topic alone (beginning of chelek 5) where he brings virtually every posek and case recorded (see also Shu’t Divrei Yoel, Divrei Chaim, Har Tzvi and many other achronim who discuss this issue).
In 1969, Rav Yechezkel Grubner, famed rav of Detroit (d. 2009), wrote to Rav Moshe Feinstein (Igros Moshe oh’c 3:3) regarding his views relating to this issue.
It is a remarkable teshuvah (responsa).
Rav Moshe was a unique posek (halachic decider) who did not often research other achronim (later authorities), so to have Rav Grubner send Rav Moshe the sources that many other achronim marshal to back-up this minhag is fascinating. Rav Moshe dissects each potential source and shows how it would affect the halacha of this minhag.
What follows are the fascinating sources that Rav Grubner provides, and Rav Moshe’s response to them.
The Mishpitei Shmuel (Rav Shmuel Kalei, Greece, d. 1585) is the earliest to suggest a source. The gemara (Moed Kattan 26a) teaches us the halacha of rending our garments on certain occasions. One of these times is after witnessing the destruction of a sefer Torah. This is a source that proves a special reaction when it comes to a dishonorable event to a sefer Torah, thereby allowing us to develop a minhag of fasting for when it falls.
Rav Moshe seems to accept this source as the most authoritative. However, Rav Moshe points out that according to many, this gemara is referring to a dishonorable act done intentionally and in spite. Therefore, fasting for an accidental fallen Torah should not be a minhag!
However, Rav Moshe explains that according to Rashi’s reading ad loc. –where even accidental dishonor would activate the clause of the gemara –our minhag fits perfectly.
The Kappos Temarim (Rav Moshe ben Chavib, d. 1696) brings a different source, where chazal teach (Sukkah 41b) that one should not daven while holding sifrei kodesh (ostensibly, lest they fall).
Rav Moshe is initially troubled by this source. “Do we really need a source that one must be careful not to drop a Torah?!” he asks. Rather we are looking for a source that allows us to have a unique reaction to such a tragic event!
Rav Moshe suggests that perhaps the Kappos Temarim’s proof was from the fact that such a far- fetched fear –and one not found when, say, holding a Lulav that could become pasul if dropped –is even a factor. After all, how many would daven with such kavana as to risk dropping a Torah? Perhaps then what the Kappos Temarim is demonstrating is that finding such an implausible concern by a Torah is proof to allowing us a strong response if dropped.
Nevertheless, Rav Moshe explains why it is difficult today to rely on this being the source. He also adds, that should indeed this be the source, the application to today’s minhag would mean that only when someone is negligent (like the case of someone who started to daven while holding a Torah, which he should have realized was a risk) would there be a need to fast, but not when something happens beyond one’s control.
The pasuk (Devarim 27:26) states at the end of the arrurim (curses) “asher lo yakum es divrei hatorah hazos”, which chazal (Yerushalmi, Sota 7:4) understand to be referring to the gabbei who did not make sure that the actual sefer Torah was well protected from falling (!). This is how Ramban too understands this pasuk.
Rav Moshe points out that while a beautiful source it would mean that only the person from whose hands the Torah fell would need to fast.
Chazal (Taanis 16a, and previous Mishnah) teach us the procedure for a communal fast. Aside for the kehilla (community) going out into the street to daven to Hashem, they are also tasked with bringing their aron with them. The gemara wonders what would be purpose of bringing out the aron, and explains “we had a kli tzenua (the Torah within the aron) in our shul and we shamed it with our aveiros”. We see here a clear correlation between fasting and our reverence for our own sifrei Torah.
Rav Moshe points out that such a source, while wonderful, would have the application to our minhag that the entire community fast. It may even mean that even those who were not there at its falling would also need to fast.
Although Rav Moshe concludes that fasting is the proper minhag, each case is unique and questions of who fasts and when should always be brought before a rav. In addition, many poskim today suggest giving tzedaka, or repairing the sifrei Torah in lieu of a fast (e.g. Tzitz Eliezar, Minchas Asher, Piskei Teshuvos), for a number of reasons.
IV. Signs and Responses
How should a community view such an event? What type of sign, if any, should this be seen as?
Rav Efraim Oshry (d. 2003) was the last full time rav at Beis Medresh Hagdol, the shul founded in 1852 in New York by Rav Ash.
A talmud in the Slobadka yeshiva, Rav Oshry soon rose to prominence, and was the rav of the Kovna Ghetto while it was occupied by the Nazis y’s.
There, he received countless heart wrenching shailos that, along with his responses, he recorded and buried in the ground. After the war he retrieved these notes and published them in a volume under the name of ‘Shailos V’Teshuvos Mimamkim’ –‘Questions and Answers ‘From the Depths’’.
In a recent article regarding this same topic of a fallen sefer Torah that many readers have shared with me (see also Rav Daniel Feldman’s Bina L’Ittim), the prolific Rabbi Ari Zivotofsky recounts the following from shu’t Mimiakim.
“Rav Ephraim Oshry, z”tl, discusses a case in the Kovno Ghetto where the accursed Nazis slaughtered dogs and cats in the shul, and then forced Jews to tear apart sifrei Torah with which to cover the rotting carcasses. Rav Oshry ruled that those who witnessed the event should
tear keriyah, but there is no need for anybody to fast, particularly considering the malnutrition and ill health of those in the ghetto. Rav Oshry did view the event as a call from Above for teshuvah.”
Indeed, the Mahari Bruna (d.1480) that we quoted above mentions that a fallen sefer Torah should be seen as a clear sign from shomyaim that we need to do teshuva.
I would add –and perhaps this can be an additional source to the ones mentioned above– that when was the very first time a dvar kodesh (holy object) fell to the ground?
It was by the shibrei haluchos. After Moshe rabeinu witnessed the chet ha’egel (the sin of the golden calf), he smashed the first tablets to the ground. And, what was the date of that event? Shivaser b’tamuz –a fast day!
Perhaps then, just like that event was a clear sign for us to do teshuva, so too any future event where sifrei kodesh fall should be seen in the same light.
There are many suggestions as to why such an event is seen as a call to teshuva.
Some suggest that the mere fact that one’s eyes witnessed such an ignoble event occur to a holy object, this alone can effect one’s neshama. Meaning, it is not so much that sins caused the event to happen in the first place, rather that the witnessing of the event itself demands teshuvah.
This is one of the reasons why some poskim tell people with not-yet-frum relatives who wish to come for a meal on Shabbos, that even if there is an allowance for them to be invited although they may drive (a topic for another time) they mustn’t park in the driveway. Our children shall become accustomed to witnessing our embracing of all Jews, yet, and at the same time, must not see us embrace their (forbidden) actions.
Others suggest similarly, that as opposed to thinking that this that a fallen Torah was allowed to happen in the first place as a sign, rather, the mere zilzul sefer Torah that we witnessed demands our fasting.
An allusion to this can be found in chazal (Yerushalmi, Moed Kattan 3:7) where the death of a Talmud chacham is compared to a sefer torah. “Said Rav (after such a death), ‘I did not taste any food (i.e. I fasted) the rest of the day””
However, many posit that our reaction is not simply a reaction to the event alone, rather the fact that Hashem allowed it to happen in the first place is indeed a sign from shomayim of our need to do teshuva.
I would add to this, that the one time we are demanded to destroy sifrei kodesh is the by the mei sotah when a parsha of the Torah is destroyed in water. There, perhaps like here, is a time of sin and of teshuva.
Naturally, it is this last view that most who are witness to such an event, instinctively, seem to assume as the basis.
V. Final Thoughts
Immediately following the fallen sefer Torah on yom tov, many members approached me with their take on why this happened.
“This is because of those that come late to davening” “This is due to those who I can’t get to stop talking during chazaras hashatz”
“This is because the rav allowed/disallowed X”
The next day I mentioned some of these suggestions, and explained that they all had one thing in common –‘It was not my sin that caused this, rather the sin of the other!’
I pointed out from chazal (Sanhedrin 20a) that one of the greatest generations was that of R’ Yehudah bar Ilay where six men would be able to share one tallis.
Rav Elyah Lopian wonders how that would even be physically possible. He explains that it is true that when each person takes and pulls for himself then six people could not share one tallis, however, when each person tries to give some of the tallis to the other, when they pull it toward their friend, and visa versa, indeed many could share one tallis.
In a similar vain, if instead of finding out why the sin(s) of the ‘other’ is responsible for this tragedy, and instead each person would seek to discover what they could improve in themselves then we could be confident in offering to Hashem the teshuva He is looking for.
I wish to conclude with an amazing story that is recorded by Rav Paysach Krohn.
Several years ago a shul was looking to purchase a new sefer Torah. After the Shabbos of the announcement for collection of funds for this endeavor, an elderly gentleman approached the rav with an envelope filled with enough cash to pay for the entire project.
This elderly individual was not well-off and so, naturally, the rav asked for an explanation.
The older man explained how he was a survivor from the camps.
He was getting sick and the Nazi’s had taken away his shoes, leading to a risk to his life as he worked outside. He begged one of the officers for a pair of boots.
Surprisingly, the Nazi agreed, and more, said he will make him a custom pair!
The next day the Nazi presented his gift, leather boots made…from ripped sections of a sefer Torah.
“I had no choice, it was sakanas nefashos. But with every step I took I promised Hashem that if I ever make it out alive I will pay back the kavod sefer Torah by writing a new sefer. I did survive, and every day or week or month since liberation, when possible, I would put aside a little money; a little here, a little there. Now finally I have enough to purchase the entire sefer Torah and have kapara”!
Some times things happen beyond our control and the only remaining test is how we choose to react to it.
{Our shul’s response was the study of Torah and the support for our sifrei Torah’s upkeep. For these reasons I have chosen the title ‘Sefer Simchateinu’. First, the event happened on Sukkos –our time of gladness. Instead of sullying our Yom Tov joy we brought more of the light of Torah into our lives. Also, we completed this project a year later, again during zman simchaseinu. We should feel very proud as a community! For those who wish to add to these Divrei Torah, it is not too late! Whether it is a Parsha already ‘taken’, one left blank, or a promise unfulfilled, we will welcome any addition to this wonderful new Sefer!}
May Hashem protect the nation that protects His Torah.
I am a very spoiled coffee drinker. Is there an acceptable way to prepare ground roast coffee on Shabbos? How about ground roast Turkish coffee?
Thank you.
RS
Monsey, NY
Ever since the 1773 Boston Tea Party – when many Americans switched to coffee, as drinking tea seemed unpatriotic – Americans have been serious coffee drinkers.
For Jews this presents a serious problem on Shabbos, in terms of both issues of cooking and electric timers.
As for cooking, I will try to explain the complicated issues involved with great brevity. While ‘cooking’ raw items in a kli sheni is technically often allowed, due to the exceptions mentioned in the gemara – specifically toward items that cook easily (kalei habishul) – we generally consider all raw food forbidden to place in even a kli sheni.
However, instant and regular coffee (as well as Turkish) have been pre-cooked. All are roasted and then either ground and shipped (regular brewing coffee and Turkish) or, in the case of instant, roasted, ground, brewed into large vats of drinkable coffee and then condensed into a thick liquid concentrate which is then freeze-dried.
Therefore, regarding instant, since it was once cooked technically it can be placed into a cup that is then filled directly from the urn. However, practically, it is advised that one first fill the cup with hot water and then place the instant coffee inside. This is due to the fact that instant coffee melts which therefore may give it the status of a liquid that mustn’t ever be heated in a kli rishon even if cooked before.
As for brewing coffee on Shabbos, even though the beans have once been roasted, to cook them again in water is a serious concern due to the problem of reheating a pre-cooked item with a different mode than it was originally cooked with (as well as other issues).
Turkish coffee is often ground so finely that while not technically ‘instant’ can still be added directly to hot water. However due again to cooking in water an already roasted item, this too should be avoided on Shabbos.
These issues are not a concern for instant for as explained above it is brewed with water in the factory.
What about brewing coffee with a timer? As I explained in-depth in my article about the ‘Kosher’-Switch, the opinion of many rabbanim (including myself) is that timers should not be used on Shabbos save for lights, air-conditioners and those things where its use has already been accepted. One’s rav should be consulted. For those readers who cannot take the taste of instant coffee (like me!), do what I do: brew a coffee before Shabbos and then on Shabbos morning add ice and milk for a delicious and awakening brew! (one should soeak to their rav regarding drinking items that are very flavorful before davening)
