The Halacha of Children Attending a Parent’s Second Marriage

Including:
Is One Buried Next to the First or Second Spouse?

Rabbi Moshe Taub

June, 2012

Part 1
The Minhag & It’s Origins

“Fourteen months ago, my mother died. But it wasn’t until tonight, at my father’s wedding, that I lost her…”

(Ami Living, 10 Kislev/November 13 5774/2013, pages 54 and 55)

The above is an excerpt of an article where a daughter described her mixed feelings when attending a parent’s second marriage.

In response to this article, a noted rav composed a letter seeking to correct what he believed was a halachic oversight – The question of children attending the second marriages of their surviving (or divorced) parents.

What follows is a translation of his letter (mistakes are my own):

“…although the magazine is not a ‘sefer halacha’, readers still assume that you would not, heaven forefend, publish something against minhag (Yisroel), therefore, if a story is published the actions taken in it will be deemed appropriate…
“…The custom is that a child does not attend the chuppah of a parent’s second marriage – due to the fact that it goes against the proper kibud we are to have for the (deceased) mother or father by seeing the surviving one marry another...”

He goes on to focus on the pain that this woman described feeling at said wedding and how this could have been avoided had she followed proper practice and simply not gone.

While this rav brings up a very real minhag, not all of his points are universally accepted.

My feeling is that this rav too was aware of this and was therefore not coming to correct an issue of halacha or minhag, rather he was seeking to urge the magazine to publicize this minhag to then be acted upon at one’s discretion.

However, it is appears to be rare today for adult children to follow this minhag.

• Personally, I lament not joining my siblings in eretz yisroel for my father’s second marriage (due to my wife being in her 9^th month).
• Anecdotally, when I inquired from other adults whose parent remarried, most shared that they indeed attended such weddings.

Before sourcing this minhag and reasons, we would be remiss not to observe that, this minhag aside, reactions to such marriages are unique to each child, family dynamics, etc. Whatever one’s minhag may be, that must always be weighed (with a rav) against these other considerations.

• We would also be remiss not to state at the outset that our discussion to follow relates only to Adult Children.Regarding younger children attending such weddings, however, our first concern must be for their emotional health.Such cases, l”a, no matter one’s minhag, demand the counsel of an expert in the field who knows the children/family well.

Only then may it be brought to one’s rav.

Let us now list, and then directly respond, to the crucial points of this rav:

• – He asserts that there is a general custom for children not to attend such weddings

(While his term ‘nohagin’ could have been referencing his Chassidic branch in particular (i.e. ‘we have a custom’), this does not seem likely. I was also unable to find any source that his Chassidic group in particular is stricter than others regarding this custom; if anything I found to the contrary)

• – He implies that this custom is that the children not attend the chuppah specifically

• – He asserts that the reason behind this custom is kibbud av v’eim

This is indeed just an assertion (although, perhaps, a good one). In addition, if indeed it is a real kibbud issue, why then call it a minhag? Should it not then be an actual halacha? Unless he means, the minhag is to assume that their presence will cause dishonor, even if basic halacha wouldn’t demand such an assumption.

• – He posits that the (assumed) reason for this minhag would then only apply in a case where there is a dead parent, l’a, as opposed to a divorced one.

Let us now delve into all of the above:

The earliest source for this minhag, that at least I was able to locate, is from the 18^th century sefer ‘Minhagim Varmisia‘, a sefer about the customs of the Jewish community of Worms.

As quoted in Minhagei Yisroel Torah (vol. evha”z), as well as in Nittei Gavriel (hilchos nisuin, vol. 1), in the aforementioned minhag book (p. 51) it is recorded that in Worms there was a custom of children not attending the (second) weddings of their parents.

Here is the original language used to describe this minhag:

“Sons and daughters of a widow or widower do not go to the shul, all the more so they do not attend the chuppah, and they do not attend the (wedding) feast…”

Minhag Varmisia, p. 51

 I am unsure what is meant by their phrase “…not go to the shul…”; perhaps this is where most weddings took place .

(see Shu’t Igros Moshe ev’h 1:93, inter alia, who discusses the concern, if any, of a chuppah taking place in a shul. See also Mahrail Diskin. However the next sentence in Minhagim Varmeisa would imply that something else was being referred to, which eludes me)

According to this source, children attending such a chuppah is:

A) a greater concern than the children ‘going to shul’ (whatever that means), and,

B) attending the wedding feast equally falls under this prohibitionary minhag.

Yet, many questions remain:

• What is/are the reason(s) behind this minhag?

• Was this minhag meant just for the community of Worms, or for all of us?
• Should it have been intended for all of klal Yisroel, would this have the power to obligate us today, and far from Worms, to observe it?

To the third point, the Chasam Sofer (Shu’t Chasam Sofer 6:52) reminds us that while one can obligate themselves to do or not to do something through a neder or shevuah, yet one certainly lacks the power to obligate someone else! The one exception to this would be the leader(s) of the generation (what chazal in a number of places term as the ‘gadol hador’, see, e.g., Sota 11). Such a gadol can obligate others in new minhagim. The simplest example of this phenomenon, and the one to which the Chasam Sofer was in fact addressing, are the cheremim of Rabbeinu Gershom (e.g. marrying two wives).

In addition, while any one community can accept only upon themselves certain customs, all Jews may still become obligated in it if the vast majority of communities and their respective rabbanim all agree to it.

Prohibiting kitniyos on Pesach would be an example, although an imperfect one, of this phenomenon (see Magen Avraham 690:2 regarding a minhag from a noted posek).

Even if one could get around those criteria regarding attending a second wedding, the reason for any new custom would always have to based on some other halacha that we are seeking to protect, or a hashkafa that is rooted in mesorah.

(For sources for, and a discussion about, this critical rule of for all minhagim, see/Click this link: “Fasting For A Fallen Sefer Torah‘)

As the Rambam writes (end of hakdama to mishnayos):

“…Once the Talmud closed one is not allowed to add to its laws”.

• See also, shu”t Noda B’Yehudah, eh’z [2] siman 79; Radvaz in Shu’t Hon Yosef, siman 9.

• For further study on this subject see ‘Tzavaas Rebbe Yehudah HaChassid Ham’ifour’ Gumbo/Otzar HaPoskim edition.

• Cf. Shu’t Rashba 1:9, Shu’t Chasam Sofer 51 in oh’c, and Sdei Chemed, ‘Mem’ klal 38.

Now, even if we momentarily postulate that this minhag is indeed in affect for all of us, we must be careful, as often a minhag is taken to its extreme, beyond its intended parameters. Meaning, even if a minhag is real, nay, because a minhag is real, it would then only mean that, like all other issues of halacha, there are times that it is not followed; where conflicting obligations must be weighed against it, etc. It is incongruous to watch people rightfully consider when one must desecrate Shabbos but refuse to do the same for their particular group’s or familial customs!

As the oft-quoted maxim goes (and can be found in the Taamei HaMinhagim, siman 840):

‘If only the Aseres haDibros were written in the Tzavah (ethical will) of Rav Yehudah HaChassid, then certainly people would care for them more!’

With all of this in mind, let us delve into this mysterious minhag, its reason(s), application, and the many beguiling issues it may touch upon.

Part 2
Possible Explanations

I. The Kibbud Av V’eim Theory

The reason the aforementioned letter-writer gives for this particular custom was kibbud av v’em for the deceased parent.

Indeed, I found this to be the ‘generally assumed’ motive behind this minhag.

However, such an approach would seem to be riddled with difficulty.

• While there is certainly an obligation to honor one’s parent even after death (Shulchan Aruch siman 240:9) – although it is debated if this is a biblical or rabbinic obligation (refer to Shu’t Yabia Omer 2:66:9) – it is hard to fathom how the child attending this wedding would be thereby disrespecting the deceased parent.

• The logic in this seems to suffer from reductio ad absurdum, causing a child to become paralyzed toward many other activities going foward.

• But more: Even if this is the source of concern, can’t the opposite be assumed – that the deceased parent would want the child to make every effort to attend?!

In fact, Rav Moshe Feinstein used similar logic, at times, to allow an avel in their twelve months of mourning to attend an annual yeshiva‘s or chesed organization’s dinner. His logic is sound: since the obligation to mourn for one’s parent for the full year (as opposed to just the thirty days demanded for all other immediate relatives) is by dint of ‘kibud’ for the deceased parent, we may then assert that in such a case the deceased parent would forgo their own honor for the benefit of the Torah institution one desires to assist (see Rav Felder’s Laws of Mourning, Feldheim, p. 112 and 118, footnote 115).

Now, and depending on family dynamics, this could certainly apply to a second wedding as well!

• Meaning, kibbud av v’em is risked also by NOT attending !

The kibud av v’am theory brings further questions.

• We mustn’t forget the obligation of honoring the surviving parent as well – which would be a strong counterweight, especially when we consider that the kibbud demanded for the surviving parent is (often) greater than that that which is demanded for the deceased one.
• Furthermore, there is also the obligation to honor one’s step-parent (Shulchan Aruch Y’D siman 240:21)!
• Further still, if the reason for this minhag is indeed due to kibbud av v’em, why does Minhagim Varmezia only mention the example of the parent who is getting married after being widowed and not also a divorcée? Wouldnt the latter case, which the sefer/source ignores, carry the possibility of (even greater?) hurt feelings from a parent who, A) is still alone, and, B) is known wicked brew for strife and jealousy, etc., lo aleinu?

Therefore, and without a clear source stating otherwise, I am not convinced that kibbud is the true motive behind this minhag.

However, playing devils advocate, perhaps one who explain this minhag as being predicated on kibud for the dead parent would argue thusly:

• “Precisely due to the fact that one is obligated to honor the step-parent as well as the surviving parent, there is a fear (according to the leaders of Worms, at least) that the halacha of maintaining kibbud for the deceased parent will be forgotten as soon as their place is ‘filled’ by an other. In order to counter this we urge the children not to attend this wedding so as to bore into the tablet of their heart that nothing will change in their halachic relationship with the deceased parent.”

However, this seems like a forced, Rube Goldberg-esque fear that exits outside the norm of typical minhag concern.

I found other theories behind its creation:

II. The Reconciliation Theory

• The Shu’t Davar Yehoshua (vol. 2 siman 113) was asked if children could attend the second marriage of their mother who was divorced from their father. Without quoting the source from Minhagim Varmezia, he points out that children seem to have the custom not to attend. The reason he suggests for this is fascinating, although limited in its application:  Until the divorced wife/mother gets remarried it is still possible for the first couple to get back together. In other words the very act of this new chuppah, and the meal that will follow it, is the very moment of, and the celebration in, the severing of all bond(s) between their two parents!

Even he was not certain that this is the reason for the custom.

Yet, if he is correct, it would indeed only apply in such a case (divorced parents and the mother’s wedding).

There is another difficulty the Dvar Yehoshua‘s suggested reasoning behind the minhag:

• As mentioned at the outset, the actual source of this custom goes out of its way to mention the case where one of the parents has passed-on, without even mentioning the case of divorced parents. It would be hard then to use his logic to explain that the initial custom was about a wholly different case (unless this minhag is older than Minhagim Varmizia, and they either also surmised on their own the logic behind it, or just gave the most common case.)

III. The Tzar Neshama Theory

• I considered another possible reason for this minhag, but then thought it was too fanciful. However, to my surprise, I later found that others indeed suggested it! Perhaps this minhag is predicated on the minhag of placing an invitation by the grave of a loved one before a family simcha, as the Zohar writes (pinchos, 219): אף על גב דמיתו קב”ה אעקר לון מג”ע ואייתי לון עמיה לההוא חדוה לנטלא חולקא דחדוה עם קב”ה ושכינתיה In other words, Hashem carries the deceased parents from shomayim and brings them with Him to participate in the simchah  [i.e. wedding]

(See my post/Click “Why We Stand For Chasson/Kallah“ where we demonstrate that the Shechina attends every chuppah)

(For more on the minhag of placing an invitation in the cemetery by a matzeiva, as well as their and the Shechina’s presence at weddings, see: Derech Sicha, vayeitzei, p. 152 where Rav Chaim Kinievsky brings another source for deceased parents attending simchos, specifically the weddings of their children; Minhagei Yisroel Torah, vol. 4 p. 101; Kitzur Nachlas Shiva Hachadash; R’ Aryeh Kaplan’s ‘Made in Heaven’, et al. As to common practice, according to Rav Chaim Kinievsky, an invitation is not necessary for the deceased parent, l”a, to attend, as Hashem brings them even uninvited [my thanks to Reb Moshe Freidman of Toronto with whom Rav Chaim shared this insight])

Could it be that for this reason children should not attend, so as not to bring pain to the visting neshama?

I imagine the reader would dismiss this as a possible approach for the same reason I initially did:

• Would a deceased spouse be among the souls to attend? What would be the purpose of Hashem bringing them (see source above) to the second marriage of their spouse?
• Even if they are among the souls to attend, would the children being there would be its focus and indeed cause it pain?

However, as mentioned, I later found this reasoning brought. In shu”t Ateres Paz, ev”h, siman 1 he makes just this argument!

After proving that those neshomos also attend, he then novelly explains the concern as follows:

• It is not the sight of his/her living children that will cause potential tzar, rather it is the sight of the children of the other side that may bring pain!

Thus far, we can observe that this minhag is shrouded in mystery, uncertain logic, and is certainly not a universal practice.

Now let me share with you my own theory, how this custom of Worms had everything to do with sensitivity to the living and not the departed.

Part 3

IV. The ‘Second Fiddle’ Theory

To explain my own approach to this minhag, I must first touch upon a seemingly unrelated point; a misconception many have:

A woman once shared with me that she never remarried because she would then, “Not be buried alongside my first husband”, the father of her children.

It seems that this is a common misconception.

Before relating this issue back to our topic, it is important that the record be set straight, as due to it being such a sensitive nature, if we would not write about it then it may never be asked, discussed, and better understood.

The pasuk in Yeshayau (54:5), based on the Gemara (Sanhedrin 22b), teaches of the unique bond one has (especially a woman) with their first spouse.

Based on this, some say that, contra to public belief, one is always buried with their first spouse.

The Zohar (Bereishis 21) seems to also suggest that by techias hameisim it is to one’s original spouse that they will be returned to. The Ben Ish Chai (Sod Yesharim #2) says the same.

However not all seem to agree:

• ‘Sefer HaNiztchon’ writes that after revivification, one will be united with their last spouse (see Nittei Gavriel, aveilus, vol. 2, p. 699, footnote #13).
• The Chasam Sofer (brought in Sdei Chemed, Aveilus; see shu’t Chasam Sofer, 355) also seems to disagree with the first view, suggesting that the second marriage removes all bonds to the first (see Part II above where this concept alone was explored by some as the possible reason behind the minhag of children not attending such weddings).

But there seems to be a complication, as elsewhere, the Chasam Sofer seems to say the opposite!

He writes, based on the Ari’z’l, that when Moshiach comes everyone will be reunited with their first zivvug ((shu”t Chasam Sofer 7:34, see also Shalal Rav, Bereishis, p. 42).

 The Gesher HaChaim (p. 246), while not mentioning this contradiction, demonstrates that the Chasam Sofer (in the first quoted teshuvah) was only speaking about when the second wife is still alive.

Still a little confused?

The Gesher HaChaim explains:

– One may choose to be buried next to his/her first, second, or latter spouse.
Full Stop.

– Should one die without ever expressing their wishes in this matter, we would then likely bury them with whom they had [the most] children (in other words, we will make an educated guess as to who they would want to buried next to).

As for the contradiction found in the Chasam Sofer: in the teshuvah we first quoted, he was writing regarding a buried first wife who was later disinterred. Although usually this would demand some type of aveilus, here, because of the feelings of his present wife (see below for source for this sensitivity), he need not, indeed should not, mourn.

What comes out from all of the above:

• One may be buried with whichever spouse one wishes
• However, should one choose to be buried with their first spouse, they should not make such arrangements in front of the second.

What does the subject of kevura/burial by a first or second spouse have to do with the minhag found in Mihagim Varmezia stating that children not attend the weddings of their widowed (and, perhaps, divorced) parents?

Based on this discussion, lulei d’mistapina, I would suggest the following motivation behind the minhag of children, at times, not attending a parents’ second marriage:

As just alluded to, the gemara rules that a remarried man best avoid receiving condolences upon the passing of his first wife in front of his second wife, as this may yield natural feelings of insecurity and/or discomfort (moad kattan 21b; see also Shulchan Aruch, yoreh deah 385:2).

Perhaps then, since we are sensitive toward a second wife in not reminding her of the bonds of the first during major moments of dveikus to the past…at the moment of chuppa and its celebratory feast, having the children of the first wife there will seem like a pgam in the husband’s new dedication to her.

After all, they are the very personification of this prior bond! They represent a silent and, at times, disquieting, reminder that their new spouse’s prior bonds comes with ripened fruits.

So that, seeing them there – at this great new moment of bonding – may serve as a harbinger to profound insecurity at the very start of her new marriage. After all, if chazal already warned a husband to a second wife of this sensitivity when it comes to receiving condolences for his first wife, kal v’chomer it should be applied and be seen as a concern by the moment of their actual (second) marriage to each other.

Although I have not yet seen this reason suggested by others, it seems to explain the motive behind the basic minhag, supplies it with its needed Talmudic foundation (as any minhag requires; see footnote above for sources for this rule), and would clarify for us why many (if not most) are lax regarding this minhag in our day.

After all, if this minhag is in place so as to protect the feelings of the living (second spouse) then they may -and often will – be mochel and stress that their desire is to have the children there. Indeed, and leaving aside considerations for this minhag, most soon-to-be-stepparents would find greater pain in their new family choosing not to attend this wedding than the very real potential for discomfort brought by their presence.

(NOTE: I wrote the above in the plural [“step-parents”, “their”, “they”, etc.], assuming that chazal’s consideration is for both a second husband and not just a second wife. I am however unsure is this is correct)

While everyone should follow their minhagim and the rulings from their respective rabbanim, I hope all of the above serves to remind us that although halachic history bequeaths us with many wonderful and varying customs, yet, just because a minhag is written or known or real does not make it universally held, understood, or give it the power to outweigh other halachic concerns (see also shu”t Tzitz Eliezar, 7:46;4).

As the Netziv wrote: “Sometimes (in the name of being strict) we run away from a fox…and into the head of a lion” (see L’Ohr Halacha, Rav Zevin, shemitta).

It should go without saying that:

• This halachic discussion is not psak in any way
• The concern of ’emotional readiness’ is and entirely different and critical matter one must always consider in such cases.

• If a young child “could” attend, has little to do with if they “should” attend.

• A slew of additional factors – including age, family dynamics, etc., especially with regard to younger children -are unique to each case, child, and family.

• A child phycologist -in concert with one’s family’s rav – must be sought after so as to offer proper guidance toward the appropriate course of action or inaction in all such cases.

May we only know simchos!

(Special thanks to R’ Yehoshua Greenberg of Buffalo and R’ Mechel Gruss of Lakewood for helping me locate some of the sources in ‘Part 2’ by fulfilling my request to perform two specific searches on their ‘Otzar Hachachma‘ and for photocopying a sefer found in his vast library, respectively)