Category: Halacha

This section of Shul Chronicles focuses on practical and historical issues in Halacha, including family law, minhag, contemporary halachic debate, and communal practice.

  • The Halacha & Kashrus of ‘Forest Honey’

    The Halacha & Kashrus of ‘Forest Honey’

    Lengthy/In-depth Post

    April, 2015

    Since Rosh Hashanah, and through Shemeni Atzeres, many Jews worldwide have been dipping their Challah in Honey.

    Aside for the risk of attracting bees inside our Sukkos, there are other, halachic, factors to consider when enjoying this sweet nector.

    The following is a short monograph regarding a new ‘hot topic’ in the world of kashrus that concerns this sweet dew.

    The following was not written with psak Halacha in mind, rather for the reader to gain some insight and appreciation for all of the Torah study that goes into kashrus.

    I

    Meet ‘Forest Honey’

    “They (the Torah and her Laws) …are sweeter than honey and the drippings of honeycombs”

    Tehillim 19:11

    Rav Yosef Shlomo Kahanaman, the famed Ponivzher rav was once asked what is the one common denominator that can be claimed from all of his travels on behalf of his yeshiva.

    He is purported to have responded: “I can share with you two things that one can find anywhere in the world: Coca Cola and Chabad!”

    This is no small matter in terms of the kosher food we put down on the table. Often, when a product is produced in a far-off country, the only mashgiach available to send is from a nearby Chabad House.

    A few weeks ago I received a call from a distinguished head of a major kashrus organization. He asked me, “Do you certify ‘Forest Honey’?”

    He knew the answer, as he was also holding in his hand a certification of mine from seven-years prior that listed ‘Forest Honey’ among other products under a proprietary name, and certified by us.

    The story was that one of the plants that I certify has a side-room where they process and package honey. Several years ago-the time of this certification- they received a request from a new company, asking if they may pay this facility to process and package their raw honey in their plant.

    The facility explained that this being a kosher plant they would need to first speak to the rabbi.

    After some investigation, in turned out that their honey was being imported from the Congo.

    At first, thinking I would have to send a mashgiach, I did what virtually every kashrus head would do: I Googled ‘Chabad Congo’. And what would you know? I got a result! The Chabad House is located in Kinshasa, Congo!

    The kashrus administrator on the phone seemed uninterested when I responded by discussing how much oversight plain, raw honey may or may not need (although, customer beware: honey, especially local honey is often processed in non-dedicated plants).

    Rather, he repeated, he was interested in the phrasing for one of the honeys processed in our plant that was listed on our certification- ‘Forest Honey’.

    When we think of honey we tend to think of bees gathering nectar from flowers.

    But that is not always the case. Like with alcohol, that can be produced from any sugar, honey too can be produced by the bee from any sugary substance it picks up.

    For this reason, we find a variety of honeys on the market, from ‘clover’ honey to ‘orange blossom’ honey.

    Connoisseurs can taste the difference. In fact, there are honey connoisseur clubs all over the country, as well as books on the subject, suggesting, like with wine, the best honey to go with which dish!

    (There is also another type of honey, about which we will not be touching upon: ‘Royal Jelly’. This comes directly from the queen bee, and which is the source for its own halachik debate, see shu’t Tzitz Eliezar 21:59)

    In fact, in lashon kadosh, Rashi explains that the term ‘devash’ is even more all-inclusive, referring to any rich, sweet nectar, mostly from fruits.

    Now, none of these popular honeys on the market have any distinction in terms of their kashrus status, with some rabbanim even allowing such honeys to be purchased without any hashgacha (although, this is debatable; everyone should speak to their local rav).

    However, as mentioned, this rav wanted to know specifically about about a more unique type of honey, the aforementioned ‘Forest’ honey.

    This honey actually carries two names: Honeydew Honey and Forest Honey.

    This type of honey is now part of a reinvigorated halachik debate, with various kashrus agencies setting differing policies on how to view it.

    Because honey is a popular product and commonly used ingredient, it is important for the reader to be aware of this vociferous discussion now taking place in the world of kashrus.

    At first blush, Forest Honey seems innocent. It gets its name for the obvious reason in that there are not enough flowers nearby from which the bee can gather its nectar, so instead it gathers it off of trees.

    In fact, quite often, this darker, richer honey is sold using the name of the tree from which it likely originated, i.e. ‘Pine Honey’. Some honey experts claim that they can even taste from which type of tree the honey came!

    The kosher customer, seeing such an item on the grocery store shelf, will likely not think much of this, as with ‘Clover’ honey.

    But, alas, there is much to think about.

    Although sounding innocuous, a highly insignificant portion of the sap that the bees draw from these trees actually come from the tree itself. If so, where does the majority of the sap come from? It comes from something called Honeydew.

    Not to be confused with the delicious fruit, this honeydew is something else entirely.

    Are you sitting down?

    I will quote directly from Wikipidia: “Honeydew is a sugar-rich sticky liquid, secreted by aphids and some scale insects as they feed on plant sap. When their mouthpart penetrates the phloem, the sugary, high-pressure liquid is forced out of the gut’s terminal opening. Honeydew is particularly common as a secretion in hemipteran insects and is often the basis for trophobiosis.”

    As for the hemipteran insect –that includes the dreaded aphid and thrip, from which we clean our romaine lettuce!

    And, although not the halachik focus, the ‘high-pressure liquid is forced out of the gut’s terminal opening’ means precisely what it sounds like.

    The sweet honeydew nectar of aphid-like insects has long been known of, and has been the stuff of legends, medicinal claims and poems for centuries.

    With this information the reader may walk away thinking that such honey is most certainly treif, and he may be right. But, he also may be wrong.

    Indeed, why is even flower-nectar honey kosher? Does it not derive from the issue of a bee, a non-kosher creature?!

    II

    Lac(h) Nisht

    “And the am went into the forest, and behold, there was a flow of honey…” Shmuel 1 14:26

    For many centuries, for reasons of water retention as well as for appearing appealing, many fruits are layered with a wax before being sold.

    In today’s wax market, because wax generally needs a protein, they either use soy or casein – a milk derivative.

    Leaving aside the dairy and cholov stam issues, most wax also contains something called oleic acid, mainly used as an emulsifier, as well as stearic acid.

    These ‘fatty acids’ can often come from animals.

    Putting aside, as well, this potential treif issues, another common ingredient in wax is shellac.

    Now, shellac is a term many are familiar with, yet few know from where it comes or how it got its name.

    Instead of educating you in my own words, I will allow a large fruit growers association do the work for me:

    “Fruit coatings used by the Pacific Northwest tree fruit industry are derived overwhelmingly from two natural sources, carnauba and shellac wax… Shellac wax is a resin secreted by the lac beetle, found in Asia, on trees to protect its eggs… No synthetic-based waxes are used on Pacific Northwest apples. Both carnauba and shellac are approved by the U.S. Food and Drug Administration (FDA) as food coatings and have been safely used on produce and other edible products for decades…Pacific Northwest fruit producers recognize that consumers have diverse dietary needs. No waxes are used that are derived from dairy or meat products…’

    Not only do they admit to using shellac, and how it comes from the lac beetle, but they brag how they use this instead of synthetics!

    The process of taking this secretion to an ingredient in a widely used food product is fascinating in and of itself. Collected from the trees into canvas sacks, one is left with a mix of tree-bark, female lac beetles and the shellac. The canvas bag is then heated over a fire where the shellac liquefies, separates from the bugs and bark and oozes out of the sack.

    They then take that liquid and harden into sections to be sold on the market.

    How do we get around this serious concern?

    Rav Moshe Feinstein, some 50 years ago, dealt with wax, shellac and the lac beetle (Ig’m yoreh deah 1:24) and suggested a number of reasons for its permissibility.

    This is where the question of shellac and forest honey collide.

    To understand his response, we first have to go back to how chazal viewed honey.

    The gemara teaches us the dictum that all food that comes from a non-kosher species is itself non-kosher. For this reason, for example, an egg of a non-kosher bird would automatically be deemed non-kosher.

    Basing itself on this principle, the gemara wonders(Bechoros 7) that honey derived from bees (which are themselves, of course, non-kosher) should be non-kosher in turn!

    So, leaving aside forest honey for a moment, it would now seem that all honey (and certainly shellac) should be forbidden!

    How does the gemara gets out of this problem, at least for bee honey? It is important to first understand how all bee honey is made, not just forest honey.

    A bee will venture as far as four miles to find nectar. Let us assume that she (all worker bees are female) finds sufficient nectar from flowers. It will then stick its long nose, suck up the nectar and temporally swallow it into one of its two stomachs.

    Inside the stomach it will mix with special enzymes that will help thicken the nectar and will, eventually, turn it into honey.

    But she is not nearly done yet. She will then fly back to the hive and vomit the nectar into the mouth of another bee, and that bee will do the same to another, and so on, all adding more and more enzymes to the recently received nectar.

    It is finally evacuated from the last bee inside the honeycomb where it will be covered and slowly thicken into the honey we know and love.

    With this is mind, the gemara brings two reasons why honey would be allowed.

    These two reasons will give us insight into not just the allowance of bee honey, but shellac as well, and perhaps, according to some rabbanim, the newly popular forest honey.

    III

    From Bee or Not From Bee

    “Out of the eater comes sweet food and out of the strong came forth sweetness” Shoftim 14

    This pasuk is the famous ‘chidah (riddle) of Shimshon with which he challenged to the pelishtim. While we do know that Shimshon was referencing a swarm of bees and their honey that he discovered inside the notorious lion he had earlier slain, untangling the riddle’s deeper mysteries has been a challenge for centuries.

    We are in the midst of a honey riddle of our own, and there could not be a more apropos pasuk with whichto open this the culmination of our own mystery.

    We mentioned above the rule: “kol hayotzei min hatemei, tamei –all that is derived from a non-kosher species is itself non-kosher”

    So we went from questioning the kashrus of forest honey, to showing the kashrus concerns of shellac, only to find ourselves back at plant-derived honey and the gemara questioning even that!

    Let us now tie it all together:

    The gemara (Bechoros 7) offers two explanations as to how bee honey, although excreted from a forbidden insect, is indeed kosher.

    The first justification comes from the unique production of honey. The Tana Kama explains that since honey is not part of the bee itself per se, rather a secretion that it first ingests from an outside source, the final product of honey is not deemed a yotzei (a secretion) of a tamei (non-kosher species).

    This is true although a bee does indeed add its own enzymes into the nectar which helps transform the sugars, in time, into recognizable honey, as these bug-additives would not be enough to make it forbidden (see Tur siman 81 and Madenei Yom Tov, Bechoros #90)

    If we accept the Tana Kama’s view as normative, an amazing heter emerges: all bugs, or any forbidden species, that secrete matter once injected, even should small quantities of natural additives from the forbidden species be tacked on inside of it, would be permissible for consumptions once secreted. This would seem to allow for not just plain, industrial honey, but honey sourced from honeydew (aphids) as well. For, the aphids’ ‘honeydew’ is also created through a secretion of an insect of a once kosher matter (the sap from the tree drawn out by the aphid) and would therefore itslef be permissible!

    This would also be true regarding the secretion of the lac beetle-which we turn into shellac –which is derived in a similar manner from the sap of trees. Although both the aphid and the lac beetle add a little of their own acids and enzymes to the final product, this, like with plain honey, would not be enough to make it assur.

    Putting it all together: when a honeybee draws nectar from ‘honeydew’ it would be drawing permissible matter, according to the Tana Kama. And, when it is finally secreted into the honeycomb from the forbidden bee, we would simply be relying on the general sevara (logic) of honey’s allowance.

    However, it is not so simple. After quoting the Tana Kama’s reason for allowing honey, the gemara then offers Rav Yaakov’s alternative justification for its permissibility.  Seemingly rejecting the logic of the Tana Kama, Rav Yaakov would ban honey if basing himself solely on halachik reasoning.Rather, explains Rav Yaakov, the reason plain honey may be eaten is based on solely on a pasuk.

    Although one may guess that the allusion in the Torah to honey’s acceptability is the fact that eretz yisroel is praised as ‘…zavas cholev u’devash’ – the honey referenced there is actually date honey (refer to Madenei Yom Tov, ibid.).

    Rather Rav Yaakov draws his inference of allowance from a pasuk in vayikra (11:21) that discusses the kosher types of insects, that are now largely lost to history (save for some Yemenite and Moroccan traditions). The pasuk states, “Only this (‘zeh’) you may eat from among all flying teeming creatures…” The pasuk, and the word ‘zeh’, is alluding to the fact that only the creatures themselves were made assur, but not what it produces from its body. The gemara concludes the lesson of the pasuk with the following: “…and what is ‘this’ referring to? The honey of bees”

    Now, all of us are aware that because Rav Yaakov, as opposed to the first view, derives his allowance from a pasuk, he is limited in its application, as we do not conjecture when dealing with the mesorah of pesukim.. Indeed the gemara states that based on Rav Yaakov’s view honey derived from other insects, like wasps, which bear the name of the forbidden species (e.g. ‘wasp honey’) would not be allowed, although according to the Tana Kama they would.

    Conversely, according to the first view, any insect which secretes a matter largely from an outside source would be, most often, permissible.

    The application of these two views to modern times, and to our discussion, is enormous. For, only if we hold like the first view, would honeydew be kosher.

    However, seemingly, according to the second view in the gemara, that of Rav Yaakov, we would not be able to apply the pasuk to anything other then to bee honey, no matter their similarity, This would make forest honey, and its cousin shellac, forbidden for consumption.

    So, which view is followed in halacha? This too is not entirely clear. We find differing views among the rishonim. While, for example, the Rosh follows the more limiting view of Rav Yaakov, both the Rambam (hil. machalos assuros 3:3) and Shulchan Aruch (yoreh deah 81:8 -in his initial view) rule like the more permissive, first view, even extending the heter for honey beyond bees, to wasp honey!

    Being that we are dealing with issurei deroiasa (Biblical concerns), it would seem that we need to rule strictly regarding forest honey, and indeed this is how Rav Wosner ruled in a teshuvah published in the Torah journal ‘Mesorah’.

    The oserim assert that the first step in allowing honey must be that the initial source of nectar is kosher. Even though one may argue that honeydew itself should carry the same permissibility as honey, we can’t apply a pasuk beyond anything chazal inform us about. And even according to the more permissive view of the Tana Kama, it is possible that we may also only apply his allowance to the few items chazal spoke of, like wasp honey, but not to extend it to anything and everything similar.

    As Rav Herschel Shechter, the posek for the Orthodox Union, is quoted as saying: “A bee is not a mikveh tehoirah for forbidden foodstuffs (thereby making anything that passes through kosher)”

    In this complete article in Mesorah (ibid.) written by the rav of Lyon, France, there is little room left for allowance.

    However, some argue, still, for its permissibility.

    They base themselves on a teshuva of Rav Moshe Feinstein (Igros Moshe 1:24) where he discusses shellac and offers several reasons why it is of no concern.

    Now, it is certainly true that some of Rav Moshe’s reasons for allowing shellac found in wax and in its own glaze do not apply to forest honey. For example, this that he writes how shellac is nullified into the wax and its glaze – whereas by forest honey there is no nullification as we eat the actual matter -, and, that he offers that shellac is not a ‘food’ item per se, or that it does not taste edible, but rather serves other purposes  -whereas forest honey is sweet and tasty and certainly a food –would be arguments of no consequence to forest honey.

    However, one of Rav Moshe’s other arguments may indeed apply to forest honey. Explains Rav Moshe that even if we accept the more stringent view of Rav Yaakov, the Levush who explains this limiting view to be unique to items with the name of the forbidden species in them – and this is why ‘wasp honey’ was disallowed according to his view – otherwise the pasuk allows for all items produced in a similar manner to bee honey!

    ‘Forest honey’ would then almost certainly be included in the allowance, according to Rav Moshe.

    So here is where we arrive: allowing forest honey would only be acceptable if:

    1. we accept the view of the Shulchan Aruch and Rambam, who follow the Tana Kama, as normative. And even then, only if we then extend their view to all items created in a similar process to honey (which many do not to extend it).

     2- or, even according to the Rosh and the other poskim who are strict like the second, limiting, pasuk-basedview of Rav Yaakov, if we accept the Levush’s explanation that the limitation inherent in this view is only activated in substances that carry the name of the forbidden species in it (e.g. ‘wasp honey’).

    At the end of the day, and certainly by the end of this year, one may simply find that forest honey sold in stores carries only certain hashgagos.

    This brief monograph should be filed under ‘appreciating what goes into kashrus’. It is also a heavy reminder that just because a group of hashgachos are reliable does not mean that they agree on even matters touching upon Biblical law. For this reason, one must have a morah horah who can guide them in not just which hashgoachos are reliable, but when and on which items to be rely on them.

    Let us end with an amazing insight that I heard in the name of the Brisker Rav. Rashi tells us (Devarim 1:44) that the Amorim were compared to bees because like bees that die upon stinging, so too the Amroites died after waging war on klal yisroel.

    The pasuk tells us (Tehillim 118:12) “savavuni k’devorim -They will surround me like bees”. This, explained the Brisker Rav, is a reference to Yishmoel, that will commit suicide in order to bring us harm, just like a bee.

    As this prophesy has been painfully borne out, let us hope for its ending (118:14), “vayehi li l’yeshuah”, when Hashem will provide our ultimate redemption.

    May it be soon!

    [1] Much of this material was taken from this writer’s weekly column in Ami Magazine

  • Butter and Cholov Yisroel

    Butter and Cholov Yisroel

    ​​August 2021

    ​​Old McDonald’s Butter

    An Uncomfortable Rejection

    We have all had something like this happen to us. A well meaning person going out of their way to offer us what they believe to be “kosher” food. 

    As kosher consumers living in a wonderful country, we are often victims of kindness.

    I was recently on a plane, when the flight attendant, seeing that I was the only noticeably frum person on the flight, came over and gave me extra “kosher” snacks. She was trying to be nice and accommodating, but the snacks had a hechsher few rely upon. I thanked her and told her I would “save” them for later (by save, I meant to give to someone on the plane).

    But it was a few weeks ago when I saw this on a grand and public level. 

    Like many families in late summer, we were looking for somewhere to go with the kids, a swan-song of summer, one last hurrah.

    My wife came up with the wonderful idea of heading to Pennsylvania.

    On our last day there, we decided to go to a farm that was located at least ten miles from the nearest town. While that may sound boring, this farm was the perfect place to spend a day with a family with children kn”a of all ages. With the state’s largest corn maze, hay rides and a myriad of activities for people of all ages, this farm was something to behold.

    Arriving in the parking lot—which itself was in a corn field—we noticed that it was filled with one mini-van after another. Virtually every one had a license plate from either New York or New Jersey and had magnetic bumper stickers representing one of the frum camps.

    Walking into the farm was like walking onto 13th avenue, if 13th avenue had a petting zoo and sling-shots. There weren’t just a lot of frum families there; there were virtually only frum families there.

    After completing the corn maze, which actually has a store—a store!—in the middle of it to purchase sandwiches and drinks, we divided up among age groups. Suddenly there was an announcement on the speaker system: “For our Jewish visitors, Minchah (pronounced the way most non-Jews pronounce “ch” as in “‘charge”) will take place at 2:30 in Barn B.”

    At first I thought I was hearing voices, but my wife and kids heard it too. We made up that we would meet after Minchah at the butter-making seminar to be held across from davening.

    At about 3 P.M., we met up and took our seats along with all the other frum families on one of the benches. An older woman came onto the stage. She had with her a bottle of heavy cream, small plastic containers—a little larger than a schnapps glaizel—with covers for them, as well as a few packages of saltines.

    Anyone familiar with butter production saw where this was headed. We were each going to be making butter—by simply rigorously shaking our small containers of cream—and then we would get to eat “our” butter with crackers.

    Ever the showman, she promptly explained to the crowd that she made sure to purchase cream and crackers with a reliable kosher marking.

    Oh boy, I thought to myself, she went out of her way to buy kosher, but it’s doubtful that anyone in the crowd will be taking advantage of her kindness, as close to 100% of this crowd, I presumed, ate only chalav Yisrael.

    While there was little room to allow this butter to be eaten for those who do not eat chalav stam, it allowed for an enjoyable conversation—a mini shiur—that formed among the fathers.

    Butter is produced by taking heavy cream and churning it (or shaking it) until it reaches the point of flocculation, when the butterfat becomes a butter-solid, leaving behind a liquid that we call buttermilk.

    The word for butter is chemah, but even that’s not so simple. As noted kashrus expert Rav Zushe Blech points out, “We know that Avraham fed chemah to the visiting malachim, but was it really butter? Rashi (Bereishis 18:8) explains chemah as the fat that one collects from the surface of milk, which implies that it is cream and not butter. The Targum seems to concur by translating as ‘shman’, which would mean the fat. Rav Aryeh Kaplan,z”l, feels that the verse is referring to cottage cheese. Interestingly, some editions of Rashi translate it as buerre—the French word for butter! Rav Dovid Tzvi Hofman, z”l argues that chemah originally referred to a fermented milk product (leben?), derived from the word chemah. Clearly, things are not always as they seem.”

    The siman in Shulchan Aruch dealing with dairy products, (Yoreh Deiah 115), is one of the most important for people to learn, as there are many, many misconceptions regarding its laws.

    Firstly, chalav Yisrael is not a chumrah! Rather, it is a matter of clear, undisputed halachah (cf. Pri Chadash ibid.). While it is true that Rav Moshe Feinstein and others allowed milk that we have termed chalav stam, they did so because they believed that such milk is indeed chalav Yisrael, and only to avoid confusion from classic chalav Yisrael do we call it stam (but never chalav akum!).

    In other words, we all only eat what we believe to be chalav Yisrael.

    The misconceptions don’t stop there. Next, the Shulchan Aruch speaks about gevinas (cheese) akum. The prohibition of such cheese has nothing to do with the chalav akum halachah that precedes it, as cheese can only be made from milk that comes from kosher animals. While the reason for gevinas akum is debated, the Shulchan Aruch accepts that the concern was that when making the cheese they may use the lining of a (non-kosher) cow’s fourth stomach for use of the enzyme that separates the whey and the curds. The minhag is to follow the strict view of the Shach, who understands that this concern is only assuaged if a Jew pours in the kosher enzyme-rennet into the milk himself. Based on this, there are some people who while they never would drink chalav stam milk would in fact eat kosher cheese (i.e. a mashgiach poured in the rennet and made sure all other ingredients are kosher) made from chalav akum.

    The reason why most people who only eat chalav Yisrael also only eat cheese that is chalav Yisrael is because the Rama and others mention an additional concern: although cheese can only be made from kosher milk (hence, there is no need for a chalav akum ban on cheese) there is still a small fear that a manufacturer will put in small amounts of milk from a non-kosher animal and the kosher milk will harden into a cheese around the non-kosher liquid, which would give the cheese a special flavor. (The reader is directed to Chelkas Binyamin 115:67 at length)

    Finally, there is the category of butter. The Gemara never mentions butter in it discussion of these halachos, which leaves room for a great debate.

    Butter, too, can’t be made from the milk of a non-kosher animal, and further, according to the Rambam and the Shulchan Aruch and some of the Geonim, butter was not under the ban of milk or even cheese and may be eaten even if made from truly chalav akum milk!  

    The Shulchan Aruch explains therefore that when dealing with clear, solid butter (without apparent cream residue, which could be milk from a non-kosher animal), a city with no minhag regarding butter may allow chalav akum butter.

    However, he clearly states that many cities had the minhag to still avoid stam butter, and this is still the minhag among all chasidim and some of the litvishe.

    We would be remiss not to point out that today the process of making butter is far more complex than it used to be and simply purchasing any butter may not be so simple as it once was.

    Based on the above—especially in a place where there is no set minhag, such as, perhaps, a farm in Pennsylvania—some fathers suggested an allowance of this butter; after all, isn’t this what the Shulchan Aruch allows, and wouldn’t this save this woman from feeling bad?

    Yet, on the other hand the Rama (end of se’if 1) clearly makes an important distinction:

    This that cheese and butter can’t be made from milk derived from a non-kosher animal, which then opens the door to all the potential leniencies mentioned above, would only be true once made. However, should a Jew take milk that has already been deemed assur to him because it is chalav akum and then the Jew himself makes it into butter or cheese, it would retain its initial issur status. 

    This would mean that those who only eat chalav Yisrael would have very little to rely on and could not eat this butter.

    So, back to the farm: what did we end up doing? We went over to the kind lady and, after thanking her for going out of her way to purchase kosher, explained that most of the Jewish parents will not be eating the butter they make today. She looked perplexed. “But isn’t the cream kosher?”

    How did we explain to a farmer the complexities of these laws just laid out above? 

    With a smile and a heartfelt thank you for trying to accommodate us.

  • Smoking In Halacha

    Smoking In Halacha

    LENGTHY/DETAILED POST

    Originally Published 2013

    “There is something about the smell of old sefarim that I just love”, I once told my wife. She responded, “That is not the smell of old pages, rather old sefarim have the smell of cigarettes!”

    She was right.

    When I first came to Lakewood I was using an old shtender that had, strangely, holes drilled in to its side. It was explained that this shtender was first made years ago when smoking was common in the beis midrash and ashtrays were bolted onto each shtender! Another told me how at the end of each day a blue cloud hung over the beis medresh in the yeshivah where he learned some 40 years ago. Although there was once a heter to smoke in a beis medresh (see Shaarei Teshuvah 154:20) it is hard to be meykel today, especially in America (see below).

    For a long time after Sir Walter Reilly popularized tobacco in Europe the dangers of smoking were unknown. In fact, old issues of American magazines have advertisements declaring smoking beneficial for one’s health, or that a particular brand is recommended by doctors (“More Doctors smoke Camel than any other cigarette”)!

    Slowly this began to change –in 1958 only 44% of Americans believed that smoking can lead to cancer – coming to a head with the Surgeon General’s 1964 report on the dangers and risks related to smoking.

    Things have changed in the yeshiva world as well. By the time I arrived in yeshivah smoking was, to say the least, frowned upon by the hanhala, at risk of being expelled; and such is the rule across almost all yeshivos in America. Rav Meir Stern once asked me –after discovering I was a smoker –if I would like to join him on a trip to an ICU or cancer ward. Rav Meir Stern is a prince of a person and I still shudder at the memory of such stern words coming from his mouth. When I did finally quit several years later, his were the words echoing in my head.

    In truth, we already find the Chofetz Chaim writing negatively about smoking, during a time when it was quite popular (Likutei Emorim, 13). Nevertheless, in his halachik writings he seems to allow smoking on Yom Tov (see below).

    The Nishmas Avraham (oh’ch siman 503) even brings from the Birkei Yosef (Machzik Beracha oh’ch siman 210:13) who records that his grandfather asked in a dream what they think in shomayim about smoking. The reply came that anyone who smokes on yom tov is put in cherem!

          I often hear balla battim complain about the smoking of yeshivah students, and while I don’t wish to diminish their concern, a little perspective will help this discussion. In my time in yeshivah about 10% of bachurim were regular smokers (while anecdotal, it could not be far off as smokers always knew of each other). That number is far less than, say, a college campus. A recent survey of charedim in Israel reported that 17% smoke compared to 28% of Israeli general public. That being said, yeshiva bochurim must be made aware of the chilul Hashem smoking causes in present society. Subway Corp. and other vendors would never allow a worker wearing their uniform to be caught smoking, and Gd’s army mustn’t have any less a standard.

    Smoking on Yom Tov, in a Shul

    In the Pnei Yehoshua, for whom the Baal Shem Tov was the shochet while in his self-caused galus, we find references to smoking. He is often falsely quoted as saying that smoking is healthy (I saw one rabbi quote him this way in an article where this rabbi wanted to show how halacha can change with new information). In discussing smoking on Yom Tov, the Pnei Yehoshua says that so long as one is doing something which is benefiting him in a physical way, like smoking, “…which helps with digestion and appetite…” it would be permitted. This was a halachik argument that relates not to overall health. Rather, and simply, that a taanug (act for pleasure) done for just taanug alone should be viewed differently than a taanug that also serves some physical purpose [regarding if to view an act as a violation of Yom Tov law].

    The Yaavetz (Siddur Beis Yaakov, relating to Tisha B’Av) marshals the same logic in relation to smoking on a taanis, explaining that so long as it is not done for pleasure rather to help stomach ailments etc. it would be allowed then.

    Indeed, far from showing that the Pnei Yehoshua is disproven by modern science, the physical benefits relating to smoking of which he spoke are still held up by science today – in addition to digestion and appetite, nicotine can help and/or stave-off Parkinson’s, Alzheimer’s, and is beneficial for short-term memory (in need not be said that these benefits are eclipsed by the risk of carcinogenic intake).

    This is not to say that the Pnei Yehoshua had a modern understanding of smoking, rather that this entry in his work is not a strong proof to that fact.

    As for presently smoking on Yom Tov, while Rav Moshe (Igros Moshe, ohr hachaim 5:34) seems to be meyekel, many others are stringent. I am sure many readers will disagree, but the goal here should be better to get one to actually quit smoking entirely than to turn so many into mechaleli yom tov. When I was a smoker – and boy was I – I would not hear of not smoking on Yom Tov and even once paid a friend to walk all the way to Dayan Fisher zt’l –known for kulos in this area –to ask if I could smoke on Yom Tov. The shu’t Teshuvos Vehangos 1:316 quotes a general assumption with which he seems to concur that even those who allow smoking on Yom Tov speak only about those addicted, about whom cessation of smoking for a couple of days would sully their simchas Yom Tov. The Piskei Teshuvos (511: footnote #57) finds a source for this view in the Sdei Chemed. See also Shemrias Shabbos K’Hilchasah 13:7.

    Should one be lenient regarding this debate he should be highly cognizant of the innumerable shailos that arise in addition to its general Yom Tov allowance. The Piskei Teshuvos siman 511:11 lists seven different concerns should smoking be allowed on Yom Tov: is one allowed to light a cigarette from candles lit l’kavod Yom Tov?; may one smoke cigarettes with words on them? Etc. In addition to his list are even more concerns, for instance questions of carrying on Yom Tov more cigarettes than needed (Rav Moshe in two separate teshuvos allows it) and the allowance of smoking and leaving ashes in a Sukkah.

    Kashrus and Fast Days

    The old yeshiva joke went like this:

    Why don’t we make a shehechiyanu on our first cigarette?

    For an American: because its always in a bathroom.

    For an Israeli: because they are too young to make a beracha

    Behind this is a real halachik question.

    In a recent news story the following was reported:

    “University of Sydney Professor in Public Health Simon Chapman points to recent Dutch research which identified 185 different industrial uses of a pig – including the use of its haemoglobin in cigarette filters.”

    “Prof Chapman said the research offered an insight into the otherwise secretive world of cigarette manufacture, and it was likely to raise concerns for devout Muslims and Jews.”

    “I think that there would be some particularly devout groups who would find the idea that there were pig products in cigarettes to be very offensive,” Prof Chapman said today.

    “’The Jewish community certainly takes these matters extremely seriously and the Islamic community certainly do as well, as would many vegetarians.’”

     “The Dutch research found pig haemoglobin – a blood protein – was being used to make cigarette filters more effective at trapping harmful chemicals before they could enter a smoker’s lungs.”

    Prof Chapman said while tobacco companies had moved voluntarily list the contents of their products on their websites, they also noted undisclosed “processing aids … that are not significantly present in, and do not functionally affect, the finished product”.

    Would this be a halachik issue? The thrust of the question would be if smoking is like eating. The Pri Chadash warns us not to light a cigarette from a candle made from cheilev (forbidden fats) unless one lights from far atop the flame so that there is a fear of some of the cheilev substance interacting with the cigarette. Now, cheilev is only forbidden to eat, deriving pleasure in other ways from it is allowed. We see from here (see footnote in shut Yechaveh Daas 2:17 at length) that, at least according to the Pri Chadosh smoking is not a simple hanah/pleasure rather it falls under the rubric of halchik eating/drinking!

    While I doubt the measurement of blood found in cigarettes is halachikly viable, should it be shown to be significant then according to him it would indeed be problematic, although rabbinical in nature (especially since it will be cooked by the time one ‘eats’ it).

    The Shaar HaMelech (see article from this writer in the Torah journal ‘Haamek’ titled ‘Lifnei Ever’ where this Shaar HaMelech is discussed at length) (hilchos meacholos assuros, ch. 13) discusses cigarettes flavored with non-kosher wine where he is lenient for a number of reasons (although he recommends being strict). Rav Ovodia Yosef (ibid.) deduces from this that the Shaar HaMelech argues on the opinion of the Pri Chodosh and holds that smoking is simply a pleasure –although a bodily one- and does not fall under the rubric of eating. For this reason shu’t Mateh Yehudah siman 210 explains why we do not make a birchas hanehenin (blessings before one has pleasure/food) on smoking. A similar line of reasoning is given why there is no beracha achrona on smell (see Magen Avraham and Chazon Ish oh’c 25).

       In any event, should smoking in modern times be deemed assur (see below), all would agree that smoking has no beracha as we see from Shulchan Aruch 196:1 that one should not make a beracha on forbidden substances.

    For the above reason (i.e. smoking not deemed eating) many allow smoking on fast days, including Tisha B’Av (see e.g. shut Har HaKarem siman 19). The Chafetz Chaim (Mishna Berrura 556:sif katan #8) strongly disagrees and disallows smoking on any taanis, especially Trisha B’av by pain of excommunication! Others are lenient (see Yabia Omer 1:33 who allows one to be meikel in private).

    Smoking in a Shul or Beis Medresh

    The gemara teaches (Megilla 28) that we do not allow kalos rosh in shuls and batei midrashim this includes eating and drinking. In a beis medresh we can be more meikel, for even though it has a higher degree of sanctity, if someone spends most of his day there it may be allowed.

    Rav Moshe (Igros Moshe choshen mishpat 2:18) holds that if someone is bothered by cigarette smoke then it is certainly forbidden to smoke in a shul. He goes on to say that even if one’s smoking in their private home is proven to bother a neighbor then one would have to cease smoking in his home!

    Some point out, relating to smoking in a beis medresh, that even if technically allowed (so long as it does not bother another person) we should still not allow it since non-Jews are strict not to smoke in their places of worship and it would be a chillul Hashem if we did (we should point out however that we should not encourage non-Jews to enter a beis medresh accept meshum darkei shalom, especially if they have religious paraphernalia on them, see shut Har Tzvi siman 85 and Yabia Omer y’d 3:15).

    Smoking in Halacha

    Danger to Life

    So what is the halachik view of smoking in general?

    There are many sources, starting with Igros Moshe ch’m 2:76 and Tzitz Eliezer 15:39.

    Sakana/Dangerous Activity:

    The gemara (Chullin 9b-10a), after a lengthy discussion, concludes with the famous idiom, ‘Chamira Sakanta MeIsurah’, that halacha is more stringent when it comes to issues of bodily danger than it is toward issues that are purely halachik in nature.

    The gemara  (Berachos 32b, 55a, Rosh Hashana 16b, Shavous 36a) speak harshly of those who put themselves at risk, and the Shulchan Aruch rules (choshen mishpat 427:8) ‘Any obstacle which has risk to life there is a positive commandment to remove it, to guard from it and to be very fastidious regarding it’. The Chochmas Adam adds that those who see this and do not do anything to stop it or remove it are also liable. It would seem from here (see also Marcheshes 3:29) that there is both a positive mitzvah to protect life and a negative mitzvah prohibiting dangerous actions.

     The Be’er HaGoleh (ad loc.) explains that by doing so one displays a laissez faire attitude toward the life Hashem blessed one with and the mitzvos for which life is needed to perform.

    [Surprising though it may be to some, there is significant debate if this obligation is biblical or rabbinic in nature (see e.g. Levush in Ir Shoshan 426:11 and Tosphos Yom Tov, Berachos 3:4 who hold it is rabbinic; see e.g. shu’t Noda B’yehudah, kama, #10, Aruch HaShulcha c’m 427:8 for the majority view that it is biblical)]

    A frightening statement is found in the Sefer Chasidim (siman 675) where asserts that anyone who dies through their own negligent actions will have to come to din for causing his own demise!

    In order to give perspective to the issue of putting ourselves at risk (sakana) it would be worthwhile to briefly discuss sakana in cases of need, as opposed to reshus (choice) like smoking.

    The prohibition of putting our bodies in risk is so severe that Rav Moshe Feinstein (y’d 2:74, see also Dibros Moshe to Shabbos 32a) disallows one to induce labor –unless a life is at risk, the mother’s or the baby’s –due to the prohibition of putting ourselves in sakana. He explains that since Hashem gave us the commandment to procreate he clearly allows us to be the risk of giving birth, but no more than that, and one can therefore not choose when to begin that risk. In a later teshuvah (y’d 3:36) he discusses risky surgeries and rules that one would not be allowed to undertake such procedures for the sake of eliminating pain (not all agree with this psak) and further argues that if someone is very ill and will perhaps die unless a risky procedure is done, while he may be allowed to undergo it, he by no means would be obligated to.

    As to how much risk halacha allows to take in order to extend one’s life see Avodah Zara 27, shut Chasam Sofer yd 76, shut Achiezer 2:16, as well Igros Moshe and others. Some hold that so long as there is at least 50% chance of survival it would be allowed, while others would allow a patient to take on an even greater risk.

    If we find such discussion regarding inducing labor and risky-yet-beneficial procedures all the more so must we be stringent relating the risks of smoking which serves no benefit or need!

     On the one hand we have a mitzvah deoreisa: ‘ushmartem meod lanefshoseichem (Devarim 4:9,15), that we must exceedingly guard our bodies from harm, yet on the other hand not all dangers are forbidden.

    In fact there is a complicated principle based on another pasuk, ‘shomer pesaim Hashem’, that Hashem guards the simpletons (Tehillim 116:6; see Shabbos 129b, Yevamus 72a, et al). Meaning that should something be of tolerable risk, and not shunned by society, it may be allowed in spite of its risk. Because the world is filled with innumerable risk it would be difficult to know what we can and cannot do. Therfore one yardstick availed to us is the ‘ways of the wold’, which under certain conditions, may be followed (see Rav Elchanan Wasserman to Kesubos #136)

    For instance we see, as Rav Shlomo Zalman Aurbach in a letter to Dr. Abraham points out, as did the Tzitz Eliezar in a teshuva, that the Rambam lists foods that are dangerous in both hilchos deos and in hilchos rotzeach ushmeres hanefesh. While the latter list would seem to be clearly assur mamesh (forbidden in the strictest sense), the former is only severely frowned upon. Rav Moshe (ibid.) points out that there are many foods that may shorten one’s life yet are not be viewed as assur mamesh; smoking, he argues, should fall into this category. Many point to this teshuvah as a way to prove smoking is allowed.

    We will return to his perceived allowance at the end of this article.

    What then is the distinction between tolerable risk in halacha and one that is not tolerated? Rav Chaim Ozer (Achiezar 1:22) and the Aruch L’ner (Binyan Tzion 1:137) seem to have different criteria, but it is clear that a risk accepted by the masses and is common –like air or car travel (the Steipler is quoted as saying that if the Sanhedrin was around they would ban cars!) –would fall into the former, more permissive category.

    Today it is hard to argue that smoking falls under the permissive category. As Rav Shternbuch succinctly put it (shu’t Teshuvos V’Hanhgos, 1:316) we can’t choose to listen to doctors when allowing us to eat on Yom Kippur and conveniently ignore them when they are stringent regarding other things (like smoking). Rav Ephraim Greenblatt (Rivevos Ephraim, 8:586), a prime disciple of Rav Moshe, posits that the dispensation for accepted risk no longer applies to smoking as we see culture clearly rejects this vice nowadays.

    As for the argument marshaled by some that dangers that accrue over a long period of time do not fall under the rubric of ‘guard yourselves’, I would argue, as a former smoker, that the ill affects of smoking are both immediate and long term. Indeed, the mortality rate for a smoker over 45 goes up 85% compared to non-smokers! It is only a long-term problem before the cat-scan, lo Aleinu.

    Yeshiva bochurim who spend their days engrossed in Torah and seeking to avoid kol minei issur are simply seeking for a kosher escape, this we understand. We need to teach them and have them believe, however, that smoking is simply not one of them.

    An unnerving statement about smoking, considering its source, was written by Rav Dessler (Michtav Me’Eliyahu, Volume 1, page 79): “I intuit and it is intellectually certain to me, for example, that smoking cigarettes is bad for my health…nevertheless, I go ahead and (continue to) smoke. Why is this? Clearly an emotional attachment cannot be overridden by that which I know rationally.”

    Once, while still in Gateshead, Rav Dessle put up a sign on his office door stating that he had officially quit smoking. He explained that he was testing himself to see which temptation is greater: his desire to continue smoking, or his desire to be seen as a man of truth!

    Being a former smoker myself I can relate to the following words of Rav Shach: “When I used to smoke I thought I could never understand a Tosefos without a cigarette; now that I quit I do not know how I ever managed to learn with a cigarette!”

    Rav Hirsch was at one time so addicted to snuff that before retiring to bed one evening he caught himself placing his snuff box under his pillow in case he wanted a pinch in the middle of the night. Shocked at the power his habit had over him he quit that night, never to touch it again.

    Today the vast majority of major poskim –including Rav Shmuel Aurbach, Rav Elyashiv, Rav Scheinberg, the Tzitz Eleizar –have come out to declare that smoking is forbidden.

    While Rav Moshe allowed it, it must be pointed out that the concept of acceptable risk disappears should the culture be keenly aware of something’s dangers and if its risks are shown to be both present and long term (see Kesubos 39b with Rashi).

    Halacha is not magic, and one cannot blindly apply a teshuva to modern times without a deep understanding of the reasons behind it and if they still apply.

       In addition, Rav Moshe was not writing during a time when a ben Torah smoking in public is seen as a chilul Hashem. Personally, although I knew I had to quit, it was the invitation to be a scholar-in-residence in the Five Town one Shavous when I was still in Lakewood that was the catalyst. I just would not allow myself to be seen in public as both a speaker and a smoker.

    Furthermore, the issue of taking on a new addiction or a new demanding pleasure is discussed elsewhere by Rav Moshe (y’d 3:35) and he is indeed very strict.

    Yes, it is true that many tzadikim smoked (as Rav Moshe points out in his reluctance to ban smoking), but there are also many who quit once they learned of its dangers. In addition, we can’t pick and choose our maasei rav (halacha based on the lives of our sages). Should someone choose to live in every way like those great men who smoked then perhaps their argument would have more purchase.

    The negius of an addiction is so profound that it causes one to wonder if such an addict should be the one deciding if his addiction of choice is halachically acceptable (see however the amazing words of the Chazon Ish in Emunah U’Betachon 3:30 –quoted in Shaarei Aron to Devarim 16:19 – where he explains that often halacha does indeed allow one who has what to gain or lose from a psak to be the arbiter)

    The Midrash Tanchuma (Shemini 11) relates the story of a son who slowly weaned his drunken father off his dependence on alcohol. When he felt it was safe to let his father out of the house they went for a walk, and came upon an old drinking buddy of his father’s. The friend was lying in his own filth in the road, laughing to himself. Hoping that his father would now see the loss of dignity associated with drunkenness, the son pointed him out to his father. However, the father ran over to his old friend and whispered into his ear, “Where did you find such good wine?”

    Based on the above Tanchuma and Esther Rabba (5:1) the Gra interprets the verse in Mishlei (23:35), “They struck me and I did not become ill” as symbolic of an alcoholic who becomes oblivious to alcohol’s negative effects and even claims that his addiction is virtuous—a sort of Stockholm syndrome. (See Artscroll’s Esther Rabba ad loc., footnote 28 and Insights A for further elaboration.)

    [For a wonderful treatment of this topic and on addiction in general, see Rabbi Shais Taub’s article in this issue of Ami, and, Judaism and Psychology by Moshe HaLevi Spero, Ktav Publishing, Yeshiva University Press, 1980, pages 120-141]

    For those who are smokers, let me end with the following.

    I loved smoking. I thought I could never quit. One day I was walking into yeshivah and a friend told me he quit. “How did you do it?” I asked. He replied, “It was the easiest thing I have ever done”.

    I borrowed his attitude and eventually, when I was ready, quit myself. While it was not as easy as he made it, his refusal to give in to its grip, to fight it, helped me more than he could ever know.

    And I hope that it helps you.

  • ‘Shirah. Chadasha?’ Baby Naming in Halacha & Hashkafa

    ‘Shirah. Chadasha?’ Baby Naming in Halacha & Hashkafa

    LENGTHY/DETAILED POST

    Written 2013

    All About Naming, New Names, and Odd Names

    Part I – Our Names Define Us

    Once upon a time there was a man named Winner, and his little brother Loser.

    This is not an opening to a joke, or a parable. Once upon a time there really was a man named Winner and his brother, Loser.

    In a famous paper from a joint study between the University of Buffalo and the Military Academy at West Point (Implicit Egotism, Journal ‘Attitudes of Social Cognition’) the notion of our names having an impact on our life choices was seriously observed and analyzed. For example, men and women whose first names contain the letters ‘DE’ or ‘DEN’ were far more likely to become dentists!

    To demonstrate the fallibility of this theory, economist Steven Levitt from the University of Chicago, in his now iconic ‘Freakonomiks’ (p. 163), examined the story of one Robert Lane. In the late 1950’s, for reasons not entirely clear, Mr. Lane thought to perform a cruel experiment: he named his sixth son Winner, and his seventh Loser.

    The consequence of their names may seem curious to some. ‘Loser’ went on to live a winning life. He is now a family man and serves honorably in the NYPD. ‘Winner’ on the other hand became a reprobate and has been arrested, so far, over thirty times.

    While academics are just now seriously investigating these topics, the idea within yiddeshkeit of names and their power is well known, and applies both to Jews and non-Jews alike.[1] Indeed, it even applies to creatures other than Man. Immediately following creation, the Ribona Shel Olam directed Adam to name all the animals. “And Adam assigned names…” (2:19,20) is not referring to an arbitrary communical tool, rather to a perfect depiction of each animal’s quintessence, their mahus (see Radak, Rabeinu Bachayay, Bamidbar Rabbah 19:3 and Koheles Rabba 7:32).

    Due to the significance of names, rabbanim are approached with any number of interesting, intriguing and odd questions relating to this topic, shalom bayis sometimes is threatened, and family members go without speaking to each other.

    • Who has the right to name a child, the mother or the father?
    • May one fill out the baby’s birth certificate application before the baby is officially named?
    • May One name after a person who died young or tragically?
    • May one name a daughter Shira, or other ‘new’ names?

    These questions and more will be discussed in the next few chapters.

    People often quote chazal as teaching that all (Jewish) parents are gifted with a quasi ruach kakodesh when naming their children. While, to my knowledge, chazal never say this directly (I await a reader who has access to Bar Ilan or Otzar HaChochmah to prove otherwise), it is however implicit in many, many statements (see also Shaar HaGilgulim, hakdama; see however Bereishis Rabba 37:7 where one can infer that today we do not have special assistance when naming our children).

    As the gemara (Berachos 7b) explains, due to a name’s significance and its role in influencing the life of its holder Hashem must, in some way, guide its creation:

    “From where do we know that a (person’s) name is the harbinger (of things to come/their personality)? Said Rabbi Elezar, for the verse says (Tehillim 46:9), ‘Go out and witness the works of Hashem, Who has wrought destructions (‘…shum shamos…’) in the land’. Do not read it as ‘shamos’ (destructions), rather as ‘shaimos’” (names)”

    Meaning, Hashem Himself plans the names for each person (see HaKoseiv who proves from here that a parent indeed does have ruach hakodosh when naming a child).

    Based on what we have seen so far, which of the above two studies is correct according to our mesorah? The ‘DEN’ study that demonstrated correlation between names and action, or the Winner/Loser story that, perhaps, revealed that it does not? (Of course, these studies were focused on behavioral science, i.e. names subconsciously causing us to act in certain ways, while chazal are dealing with influence on a much deeper level)

    It would seem clear that yiddeshkeit would support the first study, the one that proved that names are a portent. But it is not so simple.

    The gemara (Yoma 83) brings two views: Rabbi Meir would investigate people’s names so as to ascertain what type of people they were; Rabbi Yehudah and R’ Yosi did not. This gemara has always troubled me. Based on the gemara in Berachos that Hashem directs the names of each person, why wouldn’t the latter investigate names? It would seem that Rabbi Meir was obviously correct!

    The truth is, like all grand and deep concepts, Rabbi Yehudah and R’Yosi had reason not to rely on the information provided by someone’s name alone.

    The medrash (Bamidbar Rabba 16:10) teaches us that at not all people with a ‘disgusting’ name are disgusting, nor do all people with pleasant names act pleasantly. Based on this, explains the Tosphos Yom HaKipurim, Rabbi Meir was simply relying on the rules of majority, whereas the rabbis, it would seem, were taking into account the possibility that the names of these particular people would not be a proof to anything. As the Zohar (Bereishis 59b) explains, the ‘good’ in a name, or the ‘bad’, is our choice to follow or to ignore. Maharal (Ohr Chodosh) further explains that for this reason we find that by a rasha the Torah will say a name first (e.g. “and Naval was his name”), for reshaim took control of their name and ignored their true calling; whereas by a tzadik the Torah will say his name last (e.g. “…and his name was Mordechai”), for they allowed their destiny to take hold (on this last point, see Artscroll’s Divrei HaYami vol.1, p. xxxvi).

    Whatever the degree, names do matter. It is for this reason, explains Rav Gedalia Shor, that we wait until a boy’s bris to give him his name, as opposed to a girl who typically receives her name before she is eight days old. Since until the bris the boy is somewhat incomplete, his mahus/purpose is also unclear. Once the bris is performed he is then ready, as is Hashem, for his name.[2]

    Furthermore, the Noam Elimelech (Shmos) teaches that the name given to a child will become the very name for the neshama!

    This is why we call someone by their name to wake them up – not to get their attention but to call the neshama by its name so that it comes back down to earth!

    Based on the power and mystery behind our names it becomes understood why Yaakov and the angel ended their struggle with an exchange of their names, why Hashem would seek a name change when bestowing a new beracha on someone, and why the halacha is to change a name when someone is seriously ill R’l (Rama 355:10). It explains why Moshe, Shlomo Hamelech and a host of others were given names beyond the ones conferred upon them at birth (see Shmos Rabbah 40:4, Sota 34, et al.), as names are always used as the best descriptive of either who we are or who we became, or who we should become.

    Names are what connects human beings to each other, how we call those that are dear to us. Never should they be the cause of machlokos.

    On this last point, let us explore some the halachos surrounding the issue of names and baby naming.

    Part II – Naming After One Who Died Young or Tragically R’l

    Rav Yitzchak of Vienna had a dream.

    Rav Yitzchak, the author of the 13th century classic ‘Ohr Zarua’, was also a great mystic. A student of Rav Yehudah HaChasid, he was a member of the mysterious (and first) Chasidic movement. He was also a great halachist, having been one of the prime teachers of none other than Rav Meir M’Ruttenberg, himself one of the greatest poskim who ever lived.

    According to the Seder HaDoros (p. 309, Warsaw ed. [1878]), Rav Yitzchak went to bed one evening vexed by a question, “How should the name Akiva be spelled”?

    This was not simply a matter of curiosity, but one of law; knowing the proper spelling of a name is critical as it relates to the laws of gitten. The root of his doubt stemmed from fact that the gemara always refers to Rebbe Akiva with an ‘aleph’ at the end, whereas most people spell it with a ‘hei’. In his dream the following famous verse (Tehillim 97:11) entered his mind: “Ohr Zarua L’Tzadik U’lyishrei Lev Simcha”. The last letters of each word combine to spell Akiva with a ‘hei’ (perhaps he was so taken by this dream that he also used this verse to name his magnum opus, the ‘Ohr Zarua’).

    Perhaps in another space we can delve into the issue of dreams,[3] but for now we shall ponder something else: why is Rebbe Akiva’s name spelled one way in the gemara and one way after its closing?

    Some five hundred years after the Ohr Zarua’s dream the Chasam Sofer (shu’t Evh’e 2:28, s.v. “v’ulei’) quotes ‘achronim’ who explain the shift in this spelling as being due to raya mazlei (dangerous mazel/destiny). Even though Rebbe Akiva lived a noble life and was willing to die for yiddeshkeit, due to his tragic end we would need to make a change in the name before applying it to our children.[4], [5]

    How does the above relate to the more common question of desiring to name a child after a loved who, l’a, died young?

    Sadly, this question became very real for me. My first child, a daughter, was born on the third day of shiva for my mother. While a rabbi can coolly discuss an issue from an academic standpoint, having had the experience myself I understand the dilemma. On the one hand one desires to protect their child from any physical or metaphysical harm, and on the other hand one pines, yearns, for a proper zikaron for the beloved nifter(ess).

    Rav Moshe Feinstein (Igros Moshe y’d 2:122) was asked directly if naming a child after someone who died young is a real problem. He answers that we should have ‘ktzas kpeida’,[6] a little reservation about choosing such a name.

    Rav Moshe brings from Rav Shlomo Luria [d.1573] (Yam Shel Shlomo, Gittin 4:31) who felt very strongly that one should avoid such names, and who writes that even the name Yishayahu (Isaiah) has been changed to Yeshayah due to his tragic end (at the hands of his grandson Menasheh, see Yevamus 49b).[7]

    While Rav Moshe argues that this matter is a debate,[8] and one can often be lenient (one must speak to a rav to understand when a leniency here is warranted),[9] he does say that in certain cases all would agree that such names should be avoided.

    • If one’s spouse is concerned. In such a case, even if a rav says that one need not worry, one should yield to the spouse
    • Someone who died (young) without children[10]
    • Even according to the more stringent viewpoint that one must always avoid names of those who died young, this is only true if the person died before the age of 52. That would be the cut-off simply because we see clearly that the minhag has always been to name children Shlomo and Shmuel, both of whom in died at the age of 52.

    Rav Yaakov Kamenetzky is quoted by Rabbi Paysach Krohn as putting the cut-off age at 60 (Bris Mila, p. 45).[11]

    As we pointed out from Rav Moshe, not all agree that there is any concern at all. Rav Yosef Eliyahu Henken the leading posek in America until his death in 1973 at the age 92 was asked by Rabbi Noach Gutman if he could name a child after his father in-law who had died young. Rav Henken replied that he himself (Rav Henken) was named after an uncle who died at the age of 30. “Halevay all of klal yisroel should live as long as me!”[12]

    We should note that naming after those who died young would differ from naming after someone who died tragically. After all, Rabbi Akiva was in his 80’s when he died and, as seen, we are still careful to change the spelling of his name when naming after him because of raya d’mazlei.

    Nevertheless, some poskim allow one to name a child after someone who died al Kiddush Hashem (e.g. the Holocaust).[13]

    Based on all of the above, what should one do when naming after a loved one who died young or tragically? Should they change the spelling? Add a name?

    Part III – Of Gender and the New

    Let us continue our discussion of names the issue of names in halacha and Jewish thought with a bang; a quick case that will explode into a fountain of fascinating fragmental questions relating to our subject.

    Imagine a new family moves to your neighborhood. They have two children, a boy and a girl. “This is my bechor” the father says, “his name is Yona, as he was born on Yom Kippur when we read Sefer Yona”. “How nice” you sincerely respond.

    A few minutes pass and his two-year-old daughter wanders into the room.

    “Oh, and this is my daughter, Yona, named after the bird.”

    For this story, the name ‘Beracha’ also works, as it is found in Tanach (Divrei Hayamim) as a male name, and in modern usage (and Sheimos HaGittin) as a female name.

    Before the eye rolling at the far-fetched nature of the case (although, in halacha we are expected to use the most extreme case so as to better distill the law to its core systematic essence), consider the following:

    What if one has a daughter named Beracha and a son named Baruch, would that be a problem?

    This is in fact a very realistic case, for if a beloved great grandfather was named, say, Boruch, and after he passes away and the next child born into the family is a girl, so they name her Beracha, a feminization of Baruch. Some time later they have a boy and want to name him Baruch, would this be a problem? This case works for Chaim/Chaya, Dan/Dina, Yehudah/Yehudis etc.

    Another example would be the name Esther. Should one have a girl with that name and then, some years later, another girl is born on Purim it would be natural for the parents to desire a ‘Purim’ name. Being that Esther is taken by another one of their daughters already, would they be able to name the second daughter Hadassa, which was Esther’s other name? [14]

    Some achronim point out that Yaakov avinu did just that; he names one son Dan and a daughter Dina! Rav Chaim Kinievsky[15] allows the case of the Hadassa/Esther daughters as well, while he does not recommend the Yona/Yona case.

    In addition, the amara Rav Chisda had to sons with the same name, ‘Mar’ (nicknames were assigned to each to distinguish them, see Kesubos 89b).[16] [17]

    Let us now consider the following cases:

    • may one give two children the same name, say Moshe for two different sons[18]
    • if not, what if each name, although the same, is after two different people (the zaide Moshe, and Moshe Rabbeinu)[19]
    • may one give a boy a girls name, and vice versa[20]
    • may one name a boy Yona after a female relative named Yona, even though the connation and meaning will be changed. This question would apply as well to the name ‘Simcha’ where sefardim use this name for a girl and Ashkenazim use it for a boy[21]

    Relating specifically to the issue of feminizing a name, the Tzitz Eliezar mentions a case where a family named a girl after someone named ‘Eliezar’ by calling her…’Eliezarah’!

    While the minhag is to masculinize or feminize names[22], some are strict[23].

    Finally, and perhaps the question rabbis have been asked most frequently of late would be born from the fact that ‘Yona’ for a girl is a fairly recent usage. Rav Chaim Kinievsky has been quoted often as stating that ‘new names’ should not be utilized, and if one has such a name they should change it or add a name.

    In fact, the discussion about names in these pages had their genesis when my wife asked me if Rav Chaim is really saying this and why.

    Part IV – New Names

    The reports have begun to spread, and many rabbanim have been inundated with requests for clarification.

    The stories all go something like this:

    A man comes to Rav Chaim Kinievsky asking for a beracha for a daughter named Shira, or Aviva – or a son named Oren, or Ari[24] – and Rav Chaim advises that he change her/his name first, as such ‘new’ names should not be used.

    My wife was the first to bring this to my attention, wanting to know if these stories were true and, if they have verified provenance, must we abide by his psak.

    The following is one story that I not only have heard but also found in a sefer.[25] A man once came to see Rav Chaim Kinievsky asking if he could name his daughter Shira. Rav Chaim replied in the negative. The father persisted, “But she was born on shabbos shira (parshas b’shalach)!”

    Rav Chaim humorously responded, “And what would you name her if she was born parshas parah?!”

    [We should point out that there once was a Talmudic sage named for a cow: Rabbi Yochanan ben Purta (cow). In fact, this name was to represent something positive about him![26]]

    Before we continue, a word to those readers with such ‘new’ names who may, or who already have, become distressed from this ruling of Rav Chaim: Rav Menashe Klein[27], Rav Zalman Nechemia Goldberg and, most prominently, Rav Elyashiv (Rav Chaim Kinievsky’s own father-in-law) all say that there is no issue in giving ‘new’ names.[28]

    In addition, there is any number of opinions regarding names. For instance, my name is Moshe[29] and there is an opinion –as implausible as it may sound – not to use even that name![30] Another example is the view of the Mabit (d. 1585) who argued[31] that we mustn’t give any names that are found in the Torah before Avraham.[32] This would mean that we could not use the name Noach!

    Ironically, it is Rav Chaim Kinievsky who shows that we do not follow this view. In his peirush al haTorah (Taamei D’kra, p. 16 in the 5th edition) he offers 33 examples in Tanach and the entire corpus of Talmud and poskim where this clearly was not followed, and names such as Noach, Adam, Chanoch were used.

    So, while no one should grow worried, nevertheless all final psakim must come from one’s own personal rav.

    With this is mind, let us return to ‘new’ names.

    If we would distill everything to its core, we have four questions:

    • what is Rav Chaim’s source
    • must we follow this ruling
    • what is considered a ‘new’ name
    • how would one go about changing a name (this last question is also a call-back to past chapters on the subject of Names)

    These are not simple questions. Consider the problem of defining what a ‘new’ name is. For example there are many relatively recent Yiddish names, translations from the Hebrew (e.g. Dov/Ber, Aliza/Freida[33]). Are these ‘new’? What about secular names that have crept into our nomenclature, such as Zalman (Solomon), Bayla[34], and Maimon[35]. The Gemara –as Rav Moshe Feinstien points out –is chock-full of ‘new’ names.

    Even names like Shneur may be a relatively recent invention. Rav Shlomo Luria[36] (d. 1573) famously recalls how his grandfather’s father’s name was Meir while his wife’s father’s name was Uri. When he had a boy a debate arose as to which one of the newborn’s grandfathers to name after.[37] Rav Luria continues by telling us that his grandfather came up with a pshara: he named the boy Shneur, which means ‘Two Lights” (as both Meir and Uri allude to light)!

    So, would Shneur be considered a ‘new’ name”?

    In fact, it has recently been discovered that in a 17th century Spanish-Portuguese siddur, that the complier, Binyamin Shneur Godinitz, translates his name therein as Benjamin Senior Godinitz! So that, perhaps, this name too had a secular origin, or, that non Jews got the title ‘Senior’ from our name Shneur! This last possibility is supported by the fact that, contra Rav Luria, Rabbeinu Yona –who died about 310 years before Rav Luria –quotes a rebbe of his named Rabbeinu Shmuel bar Shneur (in his brief Sefer HaYirah).[38]

    One more interesting example:

    Several years ago I was speaking during shalosh seudos when I mentioned Basya bas Paroah.

    Someone corrected me, asserting that her name was Bisya, not Basya.

    Indeed, in Divrei Hayamim (1:1:4) she is called Bisya. However Rav Chaim Kinievsky[39] himself explains that at some point in Jewish history we likely changed the name so that it represents the more positive idea that we are children of Hashem (Bas=daughter Kuh =of Hashem).

    As we can see from the above, knowing the source of Rav Chaim’s stringency regarding ‘new’ names will help us answer the other questions.

    Recently a reader called me to share his story. He had named his daughter Shira and Rav Chaim said they should simply remove the yud and call her Sarah![40]

    While many believe that Rav Chaim is the first to have this hakpada (and that, indeed, ‘new’ names only became a problem of late –see further), this may not be accurate.

    Rav Avraham Eliyahu Makatovsky (d. 1976) seems to have mentioned this concern over fifty years ago!

    Now, many readers may think they have never heard of Rav Makatovsky, but most have –under his penname ‘Eliyahu Ki Tov’.

    His most famous book was the Sefer HaToda’a, translated into English by Rav Nachman Bulman under the title ‘The Book of Our Heritage” and found in so many Jewish homes.

    An earlier sefer of his was titled ‘Ish U’Beisu’, also a classic, it reviews the essentials of a Jewish home; chinuch, kashrush, tznius, shalom beis.  On page 301 (ch. 23) of this book he describes the procedure for naming children. He writes, “One must make sure to give a name that is clear/precise (‘barrur’), from the names found in Tanach (‘mikra’)”.

    It is surprising that this very popular book would write such a thing and yet few have heard of such a hakpada. This mystery was solved the other day when I discovered my shul’s copy of the English translation of this work (also by Rav Bulman) where this sentence seems to have been left out –likely because it is both without a source and would cause much confusion.[41]

    It may also be true that his concern was not a hakpada of ‘new’ names per se, rather, because this book was initially written for people uneducated in Judaism or new to our faith the author wanted, simply, to make sure that they should not run in to any problems with baby namings. So, without getting into all the various and complicated rules, he gave them one easy directive to follow that would help bypass most problems.

    As for Rav Chaim Kinievsky, he makes his source clear. The Midrash (Bereishis Rabbah 37:7) says in the name of Rebbe Shimon Ben Gamliel how the earlier generations, either through ruach hakodesh or specific wisdoms, would choose unique names for their children; but as for us, who do not have ruach hakodesh[42], we should simply name after our forefathers.

    Some bring support to this idea from a verse in Shir HasShirim (1:8, translation based on Rashi): “If you do not know where to graze (your young goats) then follow the footsteps of the sheep (that came before you), then you will graze your young goats even among foreign sheperds”.

    The word for young goat is ‘gedi’ which in English means ‘kid’, which can also mean, in English, ‘a child’. What one may not realize is that in lashon kodesh as well, the term ‘gedi’ is used to mean both a young goat and children.[43]

    What comes out from the above is that, although historically we have made up our own names, we see (from the Midrash) that a certain point we must realize we are no longer capable of this and must therefore rely on the names of the ancients. In addition, due to the many dangers of the present galus –of having to raise children among a culture that can be, at times, pernicious and pugnacious, it is high time to follow the footsteps (i.e. names) of our forefathers as protection.

    As we have pointed out above, most, if not most, disagree with Rav Chaim’s ruling. This is likely because up until this generation we have been coming up with new names without protest, and, the Midrash quoted seems to have been not used for final halacha as many after it continued to use new names. Nevertheless the surreptitious and formidable je ne se qua of a gaon  of Rav Chaim’s caliber should give us pause.

    Perhaps he sees it as if we have reached a certain tipping-point of galus where we need to lean on the shoulders of our past.[44]

    Famously, the Midrash (Vayikra Rabba, 32) teaches that among the many merits for geulas mitzraim was the fact that we did not change our names. Perhaps it does not mean that we used names in lashon hakodesh (as indeed maintaining their language was anyway the next on this list of ˆzechusim’) rather that we did not change from the names of the past. Meaning, on a subconscious level perhaps, being called “Miriam” or “Moshe” awakens our neshama in a very dark galus, attaching us to the past, and protects us for the future.

    Of course, regarding all of the above a rav should be consulted (especially if one’s ‘new’ name has a negative connotation).

    Someone once came to the Chazon Ish explaining that his wife was ill and how they desired a new name be added, and if the Chazon Ish can suggest this new name. “Miriam” he replied. The husband explained that they had a daughter named Miraim. “Devorah” said the Chazon Ish. The man left satisfied. When the Chazon Ish was asked how he came to those names he replied, “My reasons were chesed! For, in truth, any name would due, rather I saw that if I would tell him a name, any name, he would leave without worry as to what name to choose!”[45]

    I only wish this discussion abated fears, explained Rav Chaim’s psak, and has given its readers the tools to approach their rabbanim should they still have doubts.

    Footnotes

    [1]Although there may differences in degrees, see Ohr HaChaim to Shmos 2:10. See also gemara Berachos 7b brought below which is the major source that parent’s have inspiration when naming a child. This gemara was actually a discussion relating to the name ‘Rus’ who, of course, was named by gentile parents! See Maharatz Chiyus ad loc.  Compare Sefer Chasidim # 460 where he states that non-Jews may name their children after the living, while Jews should not do this, from which one can infer that issues of ‘names’ are indeed stricter by Jews than by gentiles. Incidentally, this line in the Sefer Chasidim is the main source for Ashkenazim not to name children after the living, a subject we will discuss, iy’H, in later part of this series.

    [2] See  shu’t Tzitz Eliezar 18:54 for a number of additional reasons why we wait for the bris to name a boy. These and others will be explored when we discuss the issues of using a name before a bris (say, for a birth certificate, or, l’a to daven for a child).

    [3] We should note that the poskim do discuss a case where a name came to a parent in a dream and if one is then obligated to use it for their child. See Otzar HaBris vol. 1 p. 363 note #9.

    [4] It would seem that an amazing chiddush is born from this: even if one is not naming a baby after the tanna Rebbe Akivah, but rather after a great uncle who lived, say, in Brooklyn who also had this name, we still must be concerned. Meaning if the very first person who had this name, that is the source for all of those named after him in the future, dies tragically then a change may be necessary.

    [5] If the Ohr Zarua had this same concern, or if he simply wanted to know what the right spelling was, is unclear. However, it is interesting to note that one of the first sources to discuss these issues was the Sefer Chasidim (#244,246), whose author was Rav Yehuda HaChasid, a teacher of the Ohr Zarua.

    [6] See Siach Hasadeh vol. 1 p. 45 [gilyon] from Rav Chaim Kinievsky and Shemiras Haguf V’Ha’Nefesh p. 449 note 1 if such concepts, of staying away from certain names, is a halachic one or simply midas chasidus.

    [7] See however Rav Schwab’s commentary on sefer Yeshayahu (Artscroll, introduction) where his dialogue with an Israeli professor is documented regarding the fact that even the ‘dead-sea-scrolls’ have this sefer named Yeshaya, without the final vav. In addition, I would add that other religions too seemed to have, for whatever reason, transliterated the name of Yeshayahu without the final vav.

    [8] Between the Rama evh’e 129:26 who does not seem to be bothered at such namings, and the aforementioned Rav Luria who does. We should note, as does Rav Moshe, that the Chasam Sofer rejects any debate on the matter and asserts that the Rama also would be makpid.

    [9] He explains that there is a difference in one was determined to live a short life or if one should have lived a long life yet was punished with an early death. Only the latter, he feels, would be a concern. Yet it is impossible to know why a person died young. He therefore surmises that should someone l’a die at a very young age there is A) a doubt if this was a punishment B) a doubt/debate if we even must be makpid regarding such matters. Thus we have a s’feik s’feika (double-doubt) and may be lenient.

    [10] At first blush, it seems to this writer, Rav Moshe argument that one mustn’t name after someone who died (young) without children would seem to be challenged from a gemara in Yavamus 24a. There the gemara teaches that although the pasuk says (Devarim 25:6) that when one performs yibum the firstborn son from that union should be given ‘…the name…’ of the deceased brother, the true meaning is rather in reference to inheritance. The gemara proves this from a gezeira shava. Rava then questions the need for this gezeira shava by demonstrating that the pasuk could not mean an actual naming. See there for how he shows this. Now, this would have been a perfect time for Rava or another amara to strengthen the question by saying: “And, in any event, how could we name after a young man who, by definition, died without having children?”! Indeed Rav Moshe himself would prove from a gemara’s silence on an issue that it must be allowed [see his teshuvah on elective/cosmetic surgery]. There are a number of answers to this challenge, which are beyond the scope of this article.

    [11] The Minchas Yitzchak is quoted as giving the cut-off age as 50 (Shemiras Hanefesh V’Haguf p. 449, end of note 2). Sheimos Yikarei, p. 113 note 62 quotes Rav Elyashiv as putting the age at 60.

    [12] Otzar HaYedios (Eisenberger) p.640

    [13] See shu’t Sheilas Yitzchak as quoted in Birrur Halacha (Rabbi Bohm) p. 192 and Otzar HaBris p. 347 inter alia. It would seem that these views should also allow the spelling of Akiva to go unchanged, as he too died al Kiddush Hashem. Indeed, Rav Moshe, after he gives the age-52 cut off, mentions in passing the issue of changing Akiva’s spelling without further mention. It would seem then that even a tragic death al Kiddush Hashem does not take away the concern of the Yam Shel Shlomo. Nevertheless, it seems that the minhag is to be lenient regarding the Holocaust and names.

    [14] Although tragic, a similar question is raised concerning a child who dies young and naming the next son after him. Growing up one of my closest friends was named after a brother who passed away young; his second name was after the brother and a first name was added

    See Maaseh Rav #51 and shu’t Beis Yitzchak 2 (Even HaEzer) 183 where he also rules that the new name should be the first one.

    [15] Sheimos B’Aretz p. 91

    [16] See also shu’t Tzitz Eliezar 11:56. These nicknames would solve the issue mentioned by the Yaskil Avdi 8:20;22 as well as by the Divrei Malkiel that having two brothers with the same name can lead to serious sins.

    [17] Some marshal another source for two sons with one name. The Chizkuni and Ibn Ezra to Vayigash state that aside for Chushim ben Dan was another child who died young also named Chushim. Yet, as the Tzitz Eliezar ad loc points out, they do not assert that they shared the same name, only that the Torah does not mention the name of the other since he had already passed. However, see the amazing idea (although he ultimately rejects it) in Taamei D’Kra by Rav Chaim Kinievsky who suggests that they did have the same name –‘Chush’ –and to express both of them the Torah used the plural ‘Chushim’!We do find that Dovid Hamelech had sons with the same name (Divrei HaYamim I ch. 3)

    [18] See Pischei Teshuvos Yoreh Deah 116:6, shu’t Divrei Malkiel. Cf. shut’ Shoel U’Meishiv 3:15

    [19] We should point out that what one has in mind, or rather who one has in mind at the time of naming seems to carry weight. The Steipler (‘Kreina D’Agrasa’ 2:149) would tell people who felt compelled to use a name a name that they were also uncomfortable with – say for a grandfather who tragically died in Auschwitz – to think of the original name upon naming. In other words, should his name have been Avraham, then, when naming the child, have in mind the biblical Avraham, or say the Raavad, as who you are naming after, this way whilst one is naming after someone else the grandfather will still retain some type of ‘zikaron’.

    [20] We are not referring to naming a boy Esther or a girl Moshe –which all hold is not done (and perhaps lo yilbosh, Rav Shlomo Zalman is quoted as saying such a name is is ‘hevel v’ra’os ruach’) rather feminizing the name of a male relative for a female newborn or vice versa. See Divrei Malkiel ad loc., Bris Avos 8:29

    [21] This was the case brought in the Divrei Malkiel. Note that the name ‘Simcha’, although used, is first mentioned in the gemara Sukka 48b about an individual with that name in very negative context. Rav Chaim Kinievsky is quoted (Sheimos B’Aretz p. 51) as explaining that since it is the custom to use this name, and because it carries its own positive inflection and meaning it is used. See also Pnei Yehoshua to Kesubos 104b who explains that often times we find names that are used yet whose first mention is by the wicked (e.g. the meraglim). We would have to assume in these instances righteous people used these names long before these reshaim came along.

    [22] See Midrash Pinchos (siman 12) that this will even bring an aliyah for the soul of the opposite gender

    [23] Shu’t Tzitz Eliezar 7 p. 251 where he says that perhaps one can be strict.

    [24] See Sheimos B’Aretz p. 166-178 for a complete list of names that Rav Chaim considers ‘new’ and to what new name each should be changed to.

    [25] Ibid. p. 177.

    [26] See Midrash Rabba to Ki Sissa parsha 40 with Artscroll ed., ‘Insights’ s.v. “The Man Named for a Cow” for the fascinating story behind his name adapted, with additional sources, from the Pesikta Rabbasi 14:3. A Jew once sold a cow to a gentile. The latter was unable to get the cow to work on Shabbos. When he complained of his purchase the Jewish seller whispered in the cow’s ear that now he works for a gentile and could work on Shabbos. Indeed, the cow then began to work on that day. When the gentile realized how even a cow can recognize Hashem, he converted. When he chose a new name for himself (as converts are to do, based on Tosefta Gittin 6:6) he chose ben Purta, as a cow was his inspiration to become Jewish!

    [27] Shu’t Mishneh Halachos 9:308

    [28] See Vayikareh Shemo B’Yisroel p. 168 footnote 1 for the author’s report of their psak. We should note that Rav Shlomo Zalman Aurbach was not thrilled by such new names, although it is hard to argue that he took the more extreme view of Rav Chaim, see Valahu Lo Yuval vol. 2 p. 142.

    [29] This, in truth may not be my ‘name’, as I have two names, Moshe Mordechai, and in the future iy’h will bl’n discuss both the history of having two names and if, like the Chazon Ish seemed to have argued, those two names really make up one full name, and what difference such a view would make.

    [30] This is brought in several places in the name of the Avnei Neizer who once was handed a kvittel with the name Moshe on it and said that one is not to name after Moshe rabbeinu. When the father explained the the child in question was born on 7 Adar (Moshe’s yartzeit) the Avnei Nezer was unmoved from his position. Indeed, one will not find any tanna or ammara with that name. While one 12 volume work on names (Kuntros HaSheimos HaChodosh, vol 1, hakdama, p. 10) who seeks to find one instance (Menachos 65) it would seem to be based a misreading of that gemara. We should also note the few occasions that tannaim and ammoriam were given biblical names; although we do find Rabbi Ahron and Rabbi Mordechai (see Bava Kama 109, Menachos 64, respectively). Nevertheless, the minhag is, of course, to give the name Moshe. Indeed Rav Moshe Feinstien was also born on 7 Adar and for this reason was given the name Moshe (Igros Moshe vol. 8, Biographical Sketch).

    [31] Shu’t Mabit 2:186

    [32] While the Mabit does not give a source for this, see Chida in Shem HaGedolim, meraches Gedolim, Aleph:32 for a source. The Chida himself disagrees with the Mabit (see also Pischei Teshuvah, Yoreh Deah, 265:6).

    [33] See however Bava Kama 38b, ‘shtei preidos tovos…’ and Sheimos B’Aratz p. 50.

    [34] See Shu’t Rabbenu Tam #25 as brought in JHCS 1997 article where it is asserted that this name comes from Rabbeinu Tam’s aunt named ‘Belle-Assez’)

    [35] Rambam’s father. See Igros Moshe Even HaEzer 3:35 where Rav Moshe Feinstien suggests that this and many other secular names slowly became accepted as Jewish names.

    [36] Yam Shel Shlomo, Gittin 4:26. See Chida in Shem HaGedolim, kuntros acharon.

    [37] In the future we will, bl’n, delve into the issue of who has the right to name a child.

    [38] While certainly the events that Rav Luria described happened, however, instead of inventing a name perhaps his grandfather was searching for an already exisisting Jewish name that would act as a memory for both fathers.

    [39] Sheimos B’Aratz p. 99. All bold words in this particular sefer is a direct quote from letters received from Rav Chaim. See there footnote #54 where the compiler brings from Pardes Yosef, who in turn brings from Vayikra Rabba 1:3 that Bisya herself was named as ‘daughter of Hashem’.

    [40] When a name needs to be changed, or a Hebrew name need be given to an adult, we always seek a shem domeh, a name that is simeler

    [41] See the teshuva of Rav Menashe Klein referenced above where the questioner seems to have brought this quote to the attention of Rav Klein, and why Rav Klein rejects it.

    [42] See Part 1 on Names where we discussed the idea of all parents, even today, having ruach hakodesh of some type when naming children, and if, indeed, this comes from chazal.

    [43] See Artscroll Shir HaShirim ad loc.

    [44] See however page 52 of Sheimos B’Aretz where Rav Chaim seems to suggest that Yiddish names such as Menachem Mendel or Shraga Feivel may also have been based on a false understanding of the original name-carriers true name. Rav Moshe Feinstein (Igros Moshe in several places) seems to suggest the possibilty that some non-Hebrew names entered our lexicon in every galus and due to kibud av v’eim were/are kept in use. See also Chazon Ish as quoted in Orchos Rabbeinu 3, mila, 31, and the Steipler in Toldos Yaakov p. 317 who is quoted as saying not to use Yiddish names today (this would seem not to apply to chassidim who are naming after the rebbes – see VaYikare Shemo B’Yisroel p. 180)

    [45] Maaseh Ish vol. 1 p. 203

  • Shabbos Erev Pesach

    Shabbos Erev Pesach

    A Most Complex Shabbos!

    Rabbi Moshe Taub

    Written Nissan 5885

        If the reader is overwhelmed and confounded regarding this upcoming Shabbos-erev-Pesach, he is not alone. Even the Shulchan Aruch remarks on the confusing nature of these halachos.

       To aid the reader, I will discuss the most commonly vexing issues, opening with a more-detailed discussion about the uniqueness of this year’s taanis bechorim.

    1. Taanis Advanced

       Quick Riddle: What are the two occasions where halacha would sanction an official erev Shabbos fast-day? While most would immediately, and correctly, get the first one – ‘asarah b’teves’, the additional erev Shabbos fast may prove more allusive. Some readers, noting my introduction, may be thinking, “It’s a year like this! When the 14th of nissan falls on Shabbos, we advance the fast to erev Shabbos!” However, this would be incorrect, as we actullay advance the Taanis two days, to Thursday. This confusion is only magnified when we consider the fact that when the 14th of nissan falls on a Friday, then halacha indeed does affirm an erev Shabbos taanis bechorim. This second case would be the correct answer to our ‘riddle’.

       Why the distinction? Why not have this year’s taanbis also be on a Friday?

        As mentioned in the Purim issue this year, not only may one fast on a erev Shabbos, but the Shulchan Aruch records how some ‘anshei maaseh’ (holy Jews of distinction) would make a point to fast every Friday so as to enter Shabbos in a state of hunger! However, in our generation we are advised against this practice, as fasting all day would cause exhaustion and deleterious dispositions, all leading to a low desire for delighting in the seudah, etc.

       So, while we wouldn’t, dafka, place a taanis on a Friday, should either of these two fast-days naturally arise on an erev Shabbos then we keep it in place.

        As to this year -when the taanis falls on Shabbos-while we advance it to Thursday, the Shulchan Aruch brings an opinion not to fast bechorim bechorim at all this year! This is because, as opposed to asareh b’teves which is predicated on a pasuk in zecharia, taanis bechorim is but a minhag, for which we, perhaps, say by, “Once its missed, its missed”.

           The Rema rules, however, like the first opinion.

         Nevertheless, certain leniences are intoridces this year. Some poskim allow one to rely on the view of attending a siyum wendesday night, therby allowing him to eat on Thiursday, while others allow one who can’t attend a siyum to redeem the Taanis with tzedakah. Of course, these are for cases where one is otherwise stuck, only for this year, and still one should consilt their rav.

       On the other hand, some poskim, like Rav Shternbuch,urge bechorim to make a second siyum of Friday in addition to Thuirsday’s! Other poskim, like Rav Moshe Feinstein, support this chumrah but without recommending it (4:69).

       While this chumrah may seem hard to comprehend on a taanis that is but a minhag- it actualy has strong support that begs a larger quarrion: By our one other taanis that is a minhag–taanis esther- the Rema rules that should it fall on a Shabbos we similarly advance it to the Thurday before. He then adds that if one had a bris on that Thursday, allowing him to eat, he must make up this fast the next day, erev Shabbos!
         So consider the similarities to our erev Pesach this year, where one makes/attends a siyum which allows him to eat on Thursday…should he not similarly have to make up this fast the next day, erev Shabbos?!

     Rav Karelitz quotes his uncle, the Chazon Ish, who dismisses this concern of needing to make-up taanis bechorim on Friday because this fast is but a minhag. However, can’t one retort that taanis esther is equally a minhag?!

        Nevertheless, as Rav Moshe makes clear, the minhag for a year like this is to fast/attend a siyum for Taanis bechorim only on Thursday, and without making it up, and, for whatever reason, we differentiate from a Thursday taanis esther.

    1. Bedika Beracha Memory

    Thursday night –the 13th of Nissan –the bedika will be performed with a beracha and a kol chamira at the end. There are many obvious reasons why this cannot be done on Friday night erev pesach –not the least of which being the impossibility to search with a candle.

       What is unique –and what risks creating a false memory, a concern the Shulchan Aruch will mention below –is the beracha we say on this Thursday bedikah. In a regular year one never makes a beracha when done before the 14th (say, for one going away Pesach). This year’s night of the 13th is an exception to that rule.

    1. Chometz, Where Art Thou?

       One may keep Chometz needed for the next day’s burning/eating and for Shabbos in a secure location.

    While many houses become pesachadik at this point (save for the bedika bread needed for biur the next day), there is no halachic obligation to refrain from eating Chometz until early Shabbos morning (times depend on location).

      The one main action to perform on Friday is biur chametz.

    However, we do not say the kol chamira then, rather we say it before the fifth hour on Shabbos.

    While an actual burning obvoulsy can’t be performed on Shabbos erev Pesach, why not perform it later in the day on Friday? One can technically eat chametz all day Friday, so one should be able to do the biur up until they accept Shabbos. Why limit its timing?

       The Shulchan Aruch explains that this, too, is so as to avoid creating false memories and confusion in future years.

    IV. Eggs Matzah vs. Rolls. Vs. Soaked

       We are confronted with a quagmire on Shabbos erev Pesach–on the one hand we must have lechem mishneh by each of our Shabbos meals, but on the other hand we can’t eat matzah erev Pesach (this is a halachah; not to be confused with the minhag of refraining from rosh chodesh; if this halacha already begins Friday night is beyond the scope of this short treatment).

        The poskim offer three options.

    Chametz challah, egg matzah, or soaked matzah.

       Should one’s minhag be to use chometz, I would recommend bagels or pitas as they cause less crumbs. One would make sure to serve these on towels/plastic table cover etc., and each person would eat a kezayis over those towels immediately upon washing. These towels would be discarded down the toilet, or, if there are far too many chometz crumbs to flush, one may pour designated bleach over it in the trash, or, wrap up the tablecloth and place it somewhere hidden and secure and have in mind during the kol chamira, to be dispose of properly (burning, etc.) on chol hamoed.

    Some make the hamotzi/eat the chametz in a different room, and after following the steps above, eat the rest of their kosher l’pesach meals in their dining room. If this is followed, it is best if the dining room where the rest of the meal will be eaten can be seen from this other room. It is, however, not recommended that one make the hamotzi on a porch, balcony or the backyard and then return to eat the rest of the meal.

    Rav Moshe Feinstein and many others (ashkanazim only) recommend using kosher l’pesach egg matza.

      Care should be taken that it not mix, or crubms fall, with Pesach utensils, food, etc. (although allowed for the sick and infirm on Pesach).

       According to Rav Moshe Feinstein and others, Ashkanazim must cease eating Egg Matzah before same time one must refrain from chametz. Some (e.g. Noda B’Yehudah) allow Egg Matzah to be eaten until chatzos.

       Many sefardim encourage the use of regular kosher l‘Pesach matzah used for these Shabbos meals. In order to get around the prohibition of matzah on erev Pesach, one keeps their matzos soaking (e.g. in soup, but not to the point of breaking apart).

    IV. Biur Chometz

    Before the fifth hour chamira should be said., with some reecomending to think-but-not-recite the word  ‘hefker’.

    V. Shalosh Seudos

        In order to fulfill both the morning meal and seudas Shlishis many break their early morning meal into two, provided they wait several minutes in-between.

       Because seudas shlishis is supposed to be eaten no earlier than half hour after midday (according to many), it is recommended that some fruits or other items be eaten after this time, as well.

       Others avoid splitting their morning meal into two, rather partaking of a non-washing seudas shlishis later in the day, while making sure not to spoil their appetite for the seder.

       May Hashem see His nation’s desire to fulflfil hilchos Shabbos along with hilchos Pesach and bring us a sheffa tova!

  • AI, Robots, Minyan, & Halachic Sensationalism

    AI, Robots, Minyan, & Halachic Sensationalism

    May a Robot Join a Minyan?!

    What is a Human anyway?

    LENGTHY/DETAILED POST

    What follows is an article (originally published in Ami Magazine in two parts) on the subject of anthropomorphic robots in Jewish law.

    These were written in direct response to an opinion piece written by a researcher from Emory University that was published at CNN.com, as well as an interview that writer did with the JTA.

    Following the article below:

    -This researcher’s letter to the editor in defense of his positions and corrections to my reading of them,

    –My published rebuttal to his points.

    Eugene Gootsman is strange. He himself asserts that he’s the “weirdest creature in the world”.

    Who is Eugene? Well, he claims to be a thirteen-year-old boy living in Odessa, Ukraine.

    He may say this, but I happen to know he is lying.

    In fact, I will go on the record as saying that Eugene Gootsman is not even alive…or human! I can state this with certainty – even though over 30% of the scientists and professors who spent time with him thought he was a real, live person.

    Eugene Gootsman, you see, is a computer program.

    His story begins in 1950, when Allen Turing, the father of modern computing, proclaimed that by the turn of the century a computer program would be built so advanced that the average person will have no more than a 70% chance in adducing if he is talking to a man or machine. His goal was to reach a day when computers can ‘think’ like us.

    In pursuit of this goal, each year various ‘Turing Tests’ and contests are held all over the world.  With some variation, here is how they work:

    There are four judges in a room, each with a computer screen in front of them. They each communicate via instant text messaging with a different subject –one of whom is not real but a computer. After each of the judges alternate – giving each one a chance to talk to all three humans and the one computer – they must vote as to which of the three were humans and which one was artificial.

    This year, for the first time, a computer –claiming to be Eugene Gootsman, a thirteen year old boy from Odessa, Ukraine – fooled more than 30% of the judges. 

    While many respected news outlets questioned if this Turing victory was legitimate (for varied technical reasons), some could not resist running with the story and, some, even sought to tether this moment to matters of Jewish Law (halacha) in general, and the law of minyan in particuler (requiring ten adult Jewish males {and sometimes females, e.g. megilla, shul menorah, horog v’lo yaaver} to make up a quorum).

    Reporting for CNN and in an interview with JTA, R. Mark (Moshe) Goldfeder, a professor at Emory University, makes a bizarre and misguided – although sensational – claim:

    “[JTA] Theoretically speaking, say a robot walked into your office and said, “Rabbi, I want to count in the minyan.” Would that be enough evidence for you to count him?

    “[Goldfeder] Not necessarily. For the purposes of this discussion, I would accept the position of the Jerusalem Talmud in the third chapter of Tractate Niddah that when you are dealing with a creature that does not conform to the simple definition of “humanness” — i.e. born from a human mother or at least possessing human DNA, but it appears to have human characteristics and is doing human things — one examines the context to determine if it is human. When something looks human, and acts human, to the point that I think it might be human, then halachah might consider the threshold to have been crossed…. If I see something that for all intents and purposes looks human…I have a responsibility to treat all that seem human as humans, and it is better to err on the side of caution from an ethical perspective.”

    Wow!

    He is suggesting that it is within the realm of possibility that a computer/robot one day could be considered (a) a human (b) a male and (c) a Jew (and bar mitzvah, and a baar daas, and a bar chiyuva, etc.)!

    I imagine most readers would intuitively reject this; I certainly do.

    Although ‘Gootsman’ would make a fine Jewish last name that is as close as he will ever come to being a Jew.

    According to R. Goldfeder, would turning such a robot off be tantamount to killing?! That would give new meaning to ‘pulling the plug’!

    Would one fulfill the mtzvah of pru u’revu (‘be fruitful and multiply’) by creating such a robot? If one wishes to be consistent with the ideas of R. Goldfeder the answer would have to be ‘yes’ (see Sanhedrin 19b).

    There are many other tangents that his idea touches upon.

    For instance, what of free will?

    Or, how does R. Goldfeder account for the robot’s lack of a soul?

     Or, of it not being born to a woman (yulad isha)?[1]

    Even accepting his arguments for a moment, would such a robot be obligated in mitzvos? And, could one not obligated in mitzvos even count for a minyan?[2]

    However injudicious his publicly made assertion may be, didn’t he quote a gemara as proof, a Talmud Yerushalmi (Jerusalem Talmud) that said a creature not from a human mother or even possessing human D.N.A. would be, could be, a halachic human?

    Here is how he records/translates that same paragraph of the Yerushalmi in a forthcoming article he is working on (emphasis is mine):

    “ The Jerusalem Talmud in tractate Niddah has a fascinating discussion:

    (…)

    ‘Yet suppose it is entirely human, but its face is animal like, and it is learning Torah? Can one say to it “come and be slaughtered”? [Rather one cannot]. Or consider if it is entirely animal like, but its face human, and it is plowing the field [acting like an animal] do we come and say to it, “come and perform levirate marriage [yibum] and divorce [chalitza]”? [Rather, one cannot.]’

             “…According to the Talmud, when we cannot apply the usual biological definition of a human— which may in fact still be the general default definition for the status of personhood—then we apply the contextual definition of a human, if it fits.”

    A wonderful proof! Right?

    Well, it would be, if only that is what the Talmud says.

    This is all begins as a mishnah, and a corresponding stich found as well in the Babylonian Talmud.

    Here is the background: The rule is that when a woman gives birth to a child she becomes impure for 7/14 days and then is pure 33/66 days, depending on if the child is a boy or a girl.

    This law is explicit in the Torah.

    We will refer to this as the laws of leida.[3]

    The Torah laws of a leida apply to miscarriages, l’a, as well.

    In the third perek of Nidda, the mishna wants to know about a woman who miscarries at some point after 40 days of gestation, wondering at what point can we be certain, or assume, that what was issued from her was a-once viable fetus; specifically regarding an abnormally looking issue/fetus.

    No one is debating that the issue is human, rather, and based off of verses in the Torah, there is a requirement that in order to activate the leida laws at such a stage the issued fetus would have to also represent the human form, and not be in a from unrelated to any earthly creature.

    How distant from human form may it be to still activate leida laws?

    It is relating to this question that the mishnah records a debate between R. Meir and the Chachamim, focusing on a case where the miscarried issue doesn’t look like a human yet does look like an animal. No one is suggesting that it may actually be an animal or a hybrid creature!

    Indeed, chazal have stated elsewhere that a human and animal cannot possibly crossbreed a child (Cf. Bechoros 8a).

    The gemara goes on to suggest/seek to prove that when something is issued that does not take human form yet does have the form of an entity for which the term ‘vayitzar’ (‘and He formed’) is used in the Torah, then such an entity would be enough to activate the laws of leida.

    Right off the bat we notice that R. Goldfeder’s assertion that this is a discussion of an entity not from a human mother is wholly inaccurate.

    The gemara goes on to redefine the debate of the mishna, where everyone is in agreement that should the issue have the form of a human-looking head but with deformed animal-like body it would activate the laws of leida; but a deformed animal-like head with a human-like body would not.

    The gemara then explains that the debate in the mishna is only when the head otslef is given mixed-forms, e.g. one deformed animal-like eye and one human-like eye.

    So, all the gemara is teaching is that for the mother to become tammei (impure) she must issue something that represents some natural being.

    So uncontroversial is this gemara that it is recorded in the Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh Deah 194:3)!

    Humoring R’ Goldfeder for a moment, even if the gemara was discussing what he thought it was, such an allowance of viewing the issue as human would still only be true because of a presumption within a doubt. Meaning, even in his (wrong) reading of the gemara one could not then call an issue human when we know otherwise, for instance if R. Goldfeder walks by refuse in the street that is in the form of a human fetus. To relate even his mistaken reading of this Talmudic discussion to a robot counting in a minyan would be like saying that one is allowed to buy meat from a Kosher supermarket based on a presumption of innocence (chezkas kashrus) even if one saw them place treif in their packages!

    The gemara under discussion was only speaking about when we know that the entity under discussion came from a human; one can’t learn from here to a case when we don’t even know from where it came –and certainly not to a case where we know it came from a computer lab and not from a woman!

    Furthermore, the gemara was not referring to this entity actually surviving and living on, like a centaur! Rather only seeking to discover how it would activate a leida, a once halachik fetus (See shu’t Teshuvah M’Ahavah 1:530).

    It is when the Yerushalmi (7b in Slovita ed.; see also Bavli, Nidda 23b) makes this very point that R. Goldfeder misses the rhetorical, even sarcastic, nature and instead takes it at face value.

    Here is the reading of the very same paragraph he quoted above, in context:

     “Says Rav Mana (even according the chachamim who teach that an issue that looks like an animal with the head of a human is considered a fetus, and the other way around is not) this would mean that this human with an animal head can (in the future) be found learning Torah and then be told, ‘Come to your slaughter’!? And one with an animal body and a human head can one day be found to be working the field all day (like an animal) and then be told, ‘Come perform a chalitza or a yibum’?!”

    The Pnei Moshe (s.v. kulo) explains that Rav Mana’s point is that the discussion until now could not have been about a viable fetus that could live on as half man/half beast, and, chazal deliberated these issues as they relate to the laws of leida only, and nothing further.

    Yet, it is from this statement of limiting its discussion that R. Goldfeder –very publicly –seeks to expand it…to robots…and orach chaim!

    There are also more serious matters – matters of life and death – that result from R. Goldfeder’s assertion that such robots may one day count in a minyan. Halacha dictates that a minyan of Jews witnessing a performance of a sin would require one to accept martyrdom rather than to commit such an act (sanhedrin 74b; Shulchan Aruch, siman 157; Rambam hil. Yesodei Hatorah ch. 5, inter alia).

    There is no such thing as a pure leniency in halacha, and a ‘leniency’ regarding who/what one accepts in a minyan in shul may lead to a stringency in the laws of martyrdom.

    Indeed, (see megilla 23 and sanhedrin ibid.) the same verses are used to prove a minyan in shul and that for martyrdom.

    I contacted R. Goldfeder, who clearly spent a significant amount of time researching this issue, and while I disagree with him on even the remote possibility of such a future creation ever having a human or Jewish status, the issue of human-created entities and anthropoids has been discussed in classic sources.

    Over the next few paragraphs we will source from across our halachic history, quoting from the likes of Rav Chaim Soleveitchik, the Chazon Ish, and other poskim who touch upon these and related issues, showing that we already have precedent and stare decisis from poskim relating to these matters.

    Let us begin with the case of a Golem.

    Most famous of which, as it relates to our discussion, is a teshuvah written by Rav Tzvi Ashkenazi (d. 1718). In his work shu’t Chacham Tzvi (siman 93) he wonders if a Golem would count in a minyan.

    A Golem is a humanoid-like entity created through the Sefer Yetzira (the Sefer Yetzira is one of the oldest works of kabbala, mentioned in the gemara, and often attributed to Avraham avinu).

    [See Sefer Yetzira, Levin-Epstein ed. P. 84 where R’S Gaon comments that the Ibn Ezra once made a Golem. Also, see Ibn Ezra to sefer Yehoshua and Tehillim.]

    When the Chacham Tzvi asks this question, he shares how he heard from his father that Rav Eliyahu Baal Shem (d. 1583) once made a Golem and became so frightened that he destroyed it, but not before he was scarred!

    Rav Chaim Volozion reported (in his introduction to the Vilna Gaon’s commentary to Sifra D’Tzinusa) that the Vilna Gaon desired to make a Golem but stopped himself for reasons stated there.

    One argument for a Golem counting for a minyan (and as a Jew!), the Chacham Tzvi writes, is based on the gemara in sanhedrin (19b) that teaches that if someone teaches the son of his friend Torah, or if someone raised an orphan in their house, it is as if they gave birth to them.

    However, he brings another gemara (ibid. 65b) to prove otherwise. There the gemara tells us that the great amara Rava once created a person, which Rashi explains as an entity, i.e. Golem, fashioned through the Sefer Yetzira. Upon completion, Rava sent this creation to his friend Rav Zeira. When Rav Zeira tried to converse with the Golem it was unable to respond. Upon seeing the Golem’s inability to talk, Rav Zeira said, “You are a creation of my colleagues, return to dust (Rav Zeira ‘killed’ the Golem).

    The Chacham Tzvi explains that Rav Zeira was allowed to ‘kill’ this android being because it did not come from a mother. Based on a pasuk (Berieshis 9:6) only someone born from a mother has the full status of a human (see however Gilyonei Hashas [Rav Engle] Sanhedrin 57b).

    Even those who argue with the logic of the Chacham Tzvi, like Rav Tzadok of Lublin, agree that when it comes to a minyan in shul such creations can not be counted.

    Rav Tzadok Hakohen, Divrei Chalomos, records a dream from Wednesday night the 2nd of Shevat regarding the status of such creations…only to then argue with his dream! He ends by differing with some of the logic of the Chacham Tzvi, yet stating:

    “…But how can they be counted in a minyan for a davar sh’b’kedusha? Nevertheless, perhaps for a zimun (for benchting) [they can be counted] as we see we can count a child, this needs further clarification”.

    Sdrei Tahoros (Ohalos, p. 9) also questions the Chacham Tzvi, yet he too admits that when it comes to a minyan such entities may not be counted.

    It is interesting to note (see R. Aryeh Kaplan’s Sefer Yetzira p. xxi) that the expression used in the gemara when Rava created this entity was, “Rava Bara Gavra”. ‘Rava’ and ‘Bara’ are made up of the same letters, with just the beis and reish switched; and gavra as well is just the word bara with a gimmel added to it. These ten letters, together, equal exactly 612. This is significant, for when Man was created (see Bereishis 1:27) the targum known as Targum Yonasan [see Shaarie Ahron, Bereishis, ‘Introduction and Biographies’, ‘Targum Yonasan’; Toras Sheliema volume on Targumei Torah] teaches that the number of all the limbs in a human equals 248 and all the blood vessels equal 365, for a total of 613.

    [Compare Makkos 23b where the comparison is made between the 248 positive mitzvos and the same number of limbs in the human body, yet for the 365 negative mitzvos they compare it to the (rounded) days in the solar year. See however, Shlah in Toldos Adam, beis chama, tanyana, #30 and Zohar 1:170b where they conclude similarly to Targum Yonasan.]

    It could be that the gemara here is alluding to the fact that a Golem is almost a human but not quite (612 compared to the full value of 613).

    Fascinatingly, some even suggest that the term “Abracadabra” comes from abra k’adabara – I will create as I speak, the term one may use when creating through the powers contained in the Sefer Yetzira.

    The Chacham Tzvi’s two sons came to defend their father’s position.

    One son, Rav Avraham Meshulam Zalman (shu’t Divrei Rav Meshulam #10) brings from the holy mekubal the Ramak (Rav Moshe Codovero, d. 1570) who comments that Rava was allowed to ‘kill’ the Golem because it had no neshama, no nefesh, no ruach; it was just a ‘living thing’ (‘chiyus ba’alma’).

    (See Amudehe Shiva page 6b)

    In fact the shu’t Yehuda Ya’aleh (1:26) furthers this proof with the words of many poskim who teach that a sleeping person too can’t be counted in a minyan precisely because parts of the soul leave the body while asleep. THis would be all the more so true regarding an entity that never had, or will have, a soul!

    The Chacham Tzvi’s other, more famous son, Rav Yaakov Emden (Sh’ilas Yaavetz 2:82) demonstrates that the question does not even begin, and that certainly a Golem is not given any halachik status.

    He points out that a minyan has nothing to do with life; as a woman is not kosher for a minyan for davining yet is deemed alive!

    Further, teaching a dog to fetch does not make the dog a human, even though you gave it powers!

    Chazal share other things created with the Sefer Yetzira (a calf for Shabbos, see sanhedrin 65b), so that if a Golem is considered a human simply because it was created by a human, why not all other things created by miracles?! (See Shalal Rav, Bamidbar, p. 50)

    {The general question regarding if miracle entities take on that which they are coming to represent -e.g. manna that one wishes to taste like pork, a menorah lit with miracle olive oil, etc. -is deep and complex and well beyond our scope here.}

    Rav Yosef Engle (see Tiferes Yosef, Bereishis, p. 53ff footnote 180) seems to find a middle ground: a Golem may be human, but it is neither a Jew of a Gentile.

    From what we have seen, the fantastical view that a robot of today or tomorrow can/will/may fulfill the tripod of conditions necessary for it to count as part of a minyan  – A) human, B) male, C) Jewish –has no known source in Jewish scholarship.

    ____________________________________________

    R. Goldfeder composed a letter – that was published in Ami Magazine – in response to these columns:

    I am writing to clarify a position of mine that was unfortunately misrepresented in this magazine.

    I recently gave an interview with the JTA in which I discussed the idea of robots in halacha. The entire interview had a disclaimer, which appeared in print, that it was not to be taken l’maaseh, and was only a theoretical conversation.

    In that interview I referenced a famous Gemara in Sanhedrin, where the Talmud discusses the idea of a golem, a humanoid automaton, interacting with human beings. While Rashi writes that the golem here was made by ‘Sefer Yetzirah,’ which usually refers to a mystical text, medieval kabbalists such as Rav Moshe Cordovero explain that the sefer yetzirah referred to here was actually a book of natural science, and that the golem was not spiritual, just ‘a form, made out of dust, and by natural means it was made to appear like a man.’  This gives us our clear analogue to the idea of a robot.

    Halakhists throughout the centuries have been fascinated with this story. Famously, the Chacham Tzvi, and his grandson, Rabbi Yaakov Emden, both address the possibility of this golem counting in a minyan. They conclude that this golem could not, as it lacked any ‘intelligence whatsoever…he is no more than an animal in a human shape.” They did, however, leave open the possibility of a different golem actually passing that threshold. Interestingly, the Medrash tells us that Yirmiyahu HaNavi actually did it, he created a full human being, and he only destroyed it out of fear that people would begin to treat him like a god.

    The reason I am writing though is not to argue about whether or not these aggadas are true, or worth thinking about; people are free to agree or disagree that they are interesting. My point is that it is irresponsible and potentially harmful when a writer takes a quote from a piece like this out of context, and neglects to include the original disclaimer. I wish to make three points:

    1)  Obviously I am not of the opinion that a robot can actually count in a minyan, as I reiterated to the Ami author over the phone before the article was even written. I reiterate again that the entire discussion about robots in minyanim was only theoretical as stated in the original interview.

    2) Even regarding the rhetorical strawman that the author builds to tear down, unfortunately he got it wrong. After I had mentioned the discussion in poskim about golems in a minyan, the JTA interviewer asked me if, theoretically speaking, a human-like robot (which does not yet exist) would count. My response was “not necessarily,” even in this theoretical plane. I then made a related ethical point, based on a gemara in the Yerushalmi (the Gemara discusses the concept of treating something that looks human-like as a human, even when we are not sure,) because as ethical actors we should be machmir. The author of the Ami article ignored the earlier discussion about Sanhedrin, took that Yerushalmi, and wrote that ‘based on this discussion Rabbi Goldfeder reported to the world that it is possible for a robot to be counted in a minyan.” That is in no way true; I never made such a claim (explicitly stating that even in a theoretical world such a claim would not necessarily fly), and certainly any discussion of even theoretical minyanim was based on the gemara and poskim I had mentioned, not that Yerushalmi.

    3) While it is fine to disagree, even in theory, putting claims in another person’s mouth has no place in a Torah conversation.

    Rabbi Dr. Moshe Goldfeder, Esq.

    Senior Lecturer, Emory Law School

    Senior Fellow, Center for the Study of Law and Religion

    Director, Law and Religion Students Programs

    Adjunct Professor, Emory University Department of Religion

    Adjunct Professor of Law, Georgia State University College of Law

    Phone: Office- (404) 712-0213 Cell- (917) 301-8746   

    Email: mark.aaron.goldfeder@emory.edu

    ___________________________________________

    My published response to R. Goldfeder:

     I am certainly not the vanguard of halacha. My [weekly] column, while often touching upon halacha, does not make it a habit of zeroing in on what this-or-that rabbi said.

    However, what was published and publicly said [by R. Goldfeder] was, in my opinion, so over the top, and done so publicly, that it earned a response.

    R. Goldfeder wrote a piece for CNN,[4] and then gave an interview with JTA [5], and available for any reader to read and judge for themselves, where he expressed the strong possibility of one day –“probally 30 years” – a robot counting as a Jew and in a minyan.

    It was that last focus of his from which I quoted verbatim: JTA’s direct question about a robot joining a minyan and his direct response and source chosen.

    While I do not recall being told, and having it reiterated, that he ‘obviously’ does not believe a robot could ever count for a minyan -and I can certainly marshal evidence to the contrar -I do not doubt that the writer is sincere in that complaint.

    A public charge like this will have to await the yom hadin hagodol.

    I kindly remind the writer that as a courtesy he was sent an early draft of my article, which he heartily approved.

    Due to events in Israel the robot column was suddenly delayed, and while the final draft was different in many ways, what he’s complaining about here was already in the draft he approved, including the same one and only quote from JTA, my characterization of his belief that a robot could potentially be a Jew, and that I and the readers would intuitively reject this as even being a remote possibility.

    In the final published article, not one further quote of his was taken out, nor was any added, save for his translation of the Yerushalmi for which I requested (via email) permission (and received).

    If he feels that these points are not accurate, with his permission I would share that first draft, his response to it, and all our email exchanges.

    In addition, had he said to me what he is claiming here (that he would obviously never claim a robot could ever be accepted for a minyan), then, and with all due respect, I would have looked at it not so much as a clarification, but as a retraction. Nor would I have been the only one with such a take-away.

    The JTA reported: “From the practical legal perspective, robots could and should be people,’ Rabbi Mark Goldfeder wrote in an article published on CNN’s…“

    And this:

    “(Goldfeder) -In halachic terminology we would consider him [the robot] “nolad mahul” (i.e. born circumcised).” (!)

    And it goes on (also see the quote brought in the initial column).

    Should his beliefs be as expressed here in his letter to Ami, then I would think his grouse would be with CNN and JTA for initially misquoting him-both deeply respected news outlets-and not with me or Ami. Has he contacted them yet?

    It is noteworthy that his arguments here focus on many things other than the actual halachik arguments I made; nor does he even try to defend his proof from the Yerushalmi, the only error I had actually focused on.

    To his other points, in no particular order:

    1) I never claimed he was issuing a psak, and the words ‘potentially’, ‘maybe’, etc., always appeared when discussing his views.

    At the same time, this is not “nisht oif Shabbos geret” and one does not have carteblanche to say anything, nor is one granted immunity from criticism when expressing a stunning halachic view to the lay press, simply by saying, “It was theoretical.“

    Certainly no malice is intended when a publicly made wild claim is tested, and a source is shown to be in error.

    There was nothing in my column that one would not find in letters to the RJJ Journal of Halacha, and, indeed, in what I have received in response to my own errors.

    While my column never attacked this writer personally, I fear he took it that way, which was never my intention in critiquing his public Torah statements.

    2) He mentions a disclaimer, in print, that the entire article had, that this was not l’maaseh.

    I checked again, and there is no banner or warning, or even the word “disclaimer” in the articles I quoted.

    What I can only guess he is referring to is the following. In the midst of his exchange he says:

    “I should of course clarify that this entire discussion is “l’halacha v’lo l’maaseh,” a theoretical outlaying of views.”

    All bnei Torah know what is meant by l’halacha v’lo l’maaseh.

    Why, in his letter here, did he expunge this one crucial word from his quote?

    His were serious halachic arguments in defense of something he thinks/thought is/was a real possibility.

    Besides, most sefarim are expressly shlo k’halacha, and even those are tested for their logic and sources. Perhaps academia has other standers, but I think his colleagues would side with me and argue that a source given in support of even a theory, and certainly when published, is open to fair criticism, especially if it is a source that was so demonstrably misread.

    Besides, and humbly, even if he had JTA publish a clear disclaimer, I would still be in my right to challenge his very public assertions and connections. I am surprised that a professor, instead of explaining how my critique of his proof was wrong, would rather argue against my right to dare argue in the first place.

    3. He points us to his other sources.

    But I used his chosen response/source to the direct question of minyan!

    One should not expect salutations for quoting another gemara or source correctly, but should expect, and even desire, to be corrected for those taken out of context or in error.

    Besides, now that he explained that he would never believe that a robot could count for a minyan, I fail to understand what these are even sources for.

    For the edification of the reader, and in my opinion, none his other sources brought here or in his article/interview are any more relevant to robots. Should Ami allow I would gladly write a another column explaining why that is so.

    (Also, and for the benefit of the reader, the Chacham Tzvi was the father of the Yaavetz, not grandfather.)

    4. He writes here: “My response [in the JTA] was ‘not necessarily’ even in this theoretical plane.”

    I agree, and that is why “Not necessarily” was included in the published article in Ami.

    5. As the saying goes, ‘Extraordinary claims require extraordinary proofs.        ’

    Perhaps one day a chachom will make the case for a robot minyan being a theoretical possibility. Maybe it will be this same writer.

    Thus far, I contend, he has failed to do so, as well as failed to convince us that he didn’t try.

    I do not know this writer, whom I have every reason to believe is a fine Jew and yorei shomyaim. Surely he was aware why the JTA chose to call him, that his words were sensational, and what the response would be.

    At best, he made public remarks to international lay news outlets that could be easily misunderstood as suggesting that something he now says is obviously not possible is possible.

    While I stand by my reading of his words, bl”n from this point forward, if I ever mention this subject again–short of a correction from JTA –I will include all his statements, why I disagree with them, as well as his very clear statement here that robots could never, obviously, join a minyan.

    Moshe Taub

    [1] See Rashi to Berieshis 2:7, 2:25 where it would seem that refined speech, shame, and/or bechira are all possible candidates for what separates us from animals. Although, a robot would likely not even have a status of an animal, in the classic sense. Imagine taking your robot to the store to get fixed and having to, according to R. Goldfeder, warn the programmer about tzaar baalei chaim!

    [2] See Shulchan Aruch orach chaim, siman 55 regarding those not obligated in mitzvos counting for a minyan. See also Rav Tzadok of Lublin that we will reference below.

    [3] This is all found in Leviticus ch. 12, and does not come up nowadays for reasons beyond the scope of this chapter

    [4] As they appeared on the day of this writing: http://www.cnn.com/2014/06/10/opinion/goldfeder-age-of-robots-turing-test/

    [5] http://www.jta.org/2014/06/12/life-religion/should-robots-count-in-a-minyan-rabbi-talks-turing-test.

  • Common Shailos: Egg Checking

    Common Shailos: Egg Checking

    QUICK/SHORT POST

    April 2012

    Why do we need to check eggs for blood spots? And, if we are obligated to do so, how can we eat hard boiled eggs without checking?!

    M.G. -Cleveland, OH

    What an egg-cellent question! (Sorry, I couldn’t resist!)

    When we eat eggs we are relying on many halachic factors. We are trusting that these eggs come from a kosher bird, and that the eggs are not ‘ova’ eggs, which are eggs taken from slaughtered chickens (which would be cause the eggs to be considered either meat or treif, depending on how the fowl was slaughtered).

    Being that halacha has worked out the above, what remains is the concern of blood spots.

    Fertilized Eggs

    Eating a chick embryo is forbidden, as is eating any blood found in eggs. This is not due to the issur of eating blood proper, rather because the blood may be due to the beginning stages of the egg’s embryo (Chullin 64).

    In Vietnam there is even a delicacy called Balut, which is a seasoned egg where the embryo is partially developed –yuk!

    Because of the complexity of this halacha –and debates as to when and where it applies –some had a minhag of cooking three eggs at once (see shu’t Vayiverech Dovid 1:92, bottom of p. 317), this was likely due to balla bustas wanting an assumption of the majority being non-blood eggs, and so that if a blood spot is indeed found in one of them the other two would be ok to eat due to their majority standing (this minhag may also be based on a literal translation of the Rama 66:4).

     Nevertheless, it may surprise some to learn that even checking such eggs for blood was but a minhag, since the majority of even such eggs do not have blood spots (refer to Shulchan Aruch Y’D siman 66:6).

    The Shulchan Aruch states that they would therefore eat roasted eggs even though they could not first be checked.

    Nevertheless, the Rama records the minhag of checking such eggs, although allowing one to eat a mixture that contains an egg that had blood in it, bdieved (66:4,6).

    Battery Eggs

    Today’s eggs are laid by hens alone, without roosters. Meaning, they are not fertilized and the egg can’t ever turn into an embryo! Blood found in today’s eggs (which is rare since Grade A and Grade AA eggs are checked for blood before sale) is caused by fissures in the ‘mother’ hen that gets transferred into the egg.

    Due to maaras ayin we hold that such blood should still not be eaten (cf. Shach). However, by the letter of the law, only the blood spot need be thrown out, and the rest of the egg may be consumed. However, the minhag seems to be to throw out the the entire egg (Igros Moshe YD 1:36).

    Even though we should not need to check our eggs today –as even when we ate fertilized eggs, checking was but a minhag –many poskim hold that we should not abandon this minhag.

    The customer should be warned however that it is still possible to purchase fertilized eggs, and if such an egg were to have a blood spot then, by basic halacha, the entire egg must be thrown out.

    Conclusion:

    1 – Unless one has a specific minhag, there is no need to cook today’s eggs in pairs of three

    2 –If one finds blood in today’s eggs, one need not kasher the pot according to most poskim (cf. Taamei D’Krah, minhagei Chazon Ish) (Some have the minhag of leaving such a pot idle for 24 hours before using it next)

  • Making-Up (On Shabbos) Is Hard To Do

    Making-Up (On Shabbos) Is Hard To Do

    March, 2022

    1. Preamble

     Over the years I have met some extraordinary individuals and often cannot remember how we first came into contact, or worse, the details of our conversations.

     Some years ago, I had the zechus to have a phone conversation with Rav (Dr.) Yaakov Greenwald (d. 2019). Rav Yaakov was an American original. A true tzadik and osek b’tzorchei tzibbur. He used his knowledge in mental health -of which he was a frum pioneer – to counsel many thousands. Famously (and reported by his son in an article published one year after his father’s passing) the Satmar Rebbe once was discussing the phycological needs of one of his chassidim. At the end of the conversation, the rebbe humbly asked “What about me? What would the doctor be concerned about? What issues should a rebbe look out for?” Without hesitation, he answered the rebbe’s request. He shared the famous mesorah that to understand the true essence of a term, word or concept one should find its first occurrence in chumash. The initial time the Torah shares the concept of something not being good is when Hashem states, ‘lo tov heyos ha’adam lavado-it is not good for man to be alone’. He explained that a gadol b’yisroel, especially a rebbe, must always be concerned about loneliness. The Satmar rebbe was astounded at this swift wisdom.

     There are two things I recall from my phone conversation with him. The first is discussing his letters to the Steipler. He would often write to him, asking how to deal with certain patients, especially those whose mental suffering or anguish were affecting their avodas Hashem. OCD, for example, may be difficult to differentiate from one simply being overly machmir. Many of these letters have been published.

     And then, there was the story he shared. When Rav Yaakov Kamanetzky moved to Monsey, he would be called for any number of communal matters. He shared that the many began to become concerned regarding a laxity of tznius in town. The question was how to deal with it. The rabbanim decided that they will invite all the women of the-then-smaller town to a communal event where they would speak to them about the importance of this mitzvah as well as to teach many of the pertinent halachos. They also decided that it would be best of the rosh yeshiva would be the one to open this event with divrei beracha and a shiur on the topic. However, when he was asked, Rav Yaakov gave an atypical negative response, turning them down. When asked why he would not speak at such a gathering for women about tznius, Rav Yaakov responded, “Because…its not tznius”!

     As a halacha teacher in a Beis Yaakov, I have always refused to answer any question that centers around tznius. This is not only because of the above story, but for an additional reason as well: every bas yisroel needs to find a female role model in this area. It could be a mother, an older sister or student, or a rebbitzen. Issues of nashim should be brought to her. Of course, should a serious matter arise, her personal rav should be called, and I would never negate that.

     In addition to the above two reasons, is a third: effectiveness. A lesson would be more enhanced and taken to heart if it comes from someone who better understands the sensitivities and challenges involved. I also say this as a afather of four daughters, kn’ah.

    1. The Issue

     Nevertheless, a few weeks ago, when I sat at my desk to begin my hilchos Shabbos class a student raised her hand and -speaking for the class -asked if we could discuss makeup on Shabbos. This was not pat of the curriculum for the year. It soon became clear that the issues involved were greatly misunderstood by the class -and perhaps the reader as well. I therefore spent that morning explaining its backround, and became convnvced that a short article on this same subject could also be useful.

     What I share below is only meant so as to take these facts to your rav or to a frum female mentor.

     There are certain miktzoas, subjects, that the classic pulpit rabbi wisely avoids. Halacha demands that under certain conditions, and at times, it is better not to go out of one’s way to teach halachos when there is a real fear that it would then be ignored by some in attendance.

     In our day, however, I find that, within reason, these subjects could -and should-be taught. It must be done with sensitivity, of course.

     The classic example is hilchos chol hamoed. Those without a classic yeshiva backround (and some with) are often unaware of the severity of these days, and that their ability to go to work may be contravened. I have found that if done in the right setting, and with pikchus, those attending are only gratful…and have many, many shailos.

     However, the one topic that I nevertheless have been tempted to avoid (unless asked a shaliah, of course) is the issue of makeup on Shabbos. There are any number of reasons for this, hameivin yavin, and in addition it could lead to shalom bayis issues in a multitude of ways.

     However, since the start of Covid I began a Zoom shiur where we have been reviewing hilchos Shabbos in their totality. We are up to shiur number ninety and yet have yet to even touch upon the thirty-nine melachos -as Shabbos is so chock-full of Torah and halacha aside for just these (e.g. kiddush, seudos, neros, amira l’akum, muktzah, psik reisha etc.). This weekly shiur took a brief hiatus over tishrei due to the yom tov season. Upon our return last week, I decided to open with something that would get people animated therby helping to regain our momentum. I further explained to the group that slthough the topic I chose related to a melacha, we would return to havdala (where we are holding) the next week.

     “This is not a derasha, you are not a captive audience and you came because you desire to learn about Shabbos. And so, let us discuss the ‘third rail’ -makeup on Shabbos”.

     This wasn’t my first time. In Buffalo, I gave a similar hilchos Shabbos shiur. The office sent out an email for that week’s shiur and its topic, “Shabbos Halacha: Makeup Shiur”, it said in the subject line. No one showed up! I thought it was due to the topic, and only later learnt is was because the title confused them -they thought it was a Shabbos makeup/review shiur!

     Several years ago, a sincere couple from Brooklyn asked to meet with me. They were earnest yorei shomayim, and wished to find a haskama for their new product. It was a blush or rouge that was fashioned in a way, they felt, to be used on Shabbos itself. I am not one -nor am I worthy -to write haskamos. But even if I was, this would not be a product on which I wished to be an official part. Instread, I shared with them why they were having a hard time finding a rav who would give his imprimatur. They had done extensive research into the sugya, and much of hwta I shared was likely nnot new to them.

     There are two types of Shabbos makeup. The first, is a series of different and typical makeup products that are long lasting. These are made to be used on Friday afternoon, as they will last till after Shabbos. Sadly, because some of these are marketed as ‘Shabbos Makeup’ some mistakenly assume that its meant to be used on Shabbos itself, leading to much confusion of these forthcoming halachos. This is simaler to the ‘Shabbos Mode’ oven. There too, I have seen where, some, assume that when this mode is on it allows one to place pre-cooked food inside the actual oven or warming drawer. Of course, this is in no way the case (it serves only to avoid light issues, as well as to circumvent automatic twelve-hour shut off, and other smaller issues of inconveince).  Why would such long lasting makeup be an issue?

    The mishneh and gemara offer the example of a woman who puts
    on certain types of makeup as being assur on Shabbos (perhaps not a Shabbos concern for men; see Mishneh Berurra 303:79). The only debate found there is if this is a Torah or rabbinic violation (see Shabbos 94b-95a). The issue at hand is the melacha of tzoveah/coloring. The Shulchan Aruch codifies this ruling, as well as Rashi’s view that even the act of placing (sticky) dough on her face so that its removal causes rosy cheeks would also be forbidden on Shabbos (siman 303:25). While most take the view that makeup is a rabbinic violation, this may be due to the coloring taking place on one’s skin (see Mishneh Berrura, ibid.); meaning, nail polish application may be a biblical violation (its removal
    may also be an issue; other makeup removal is often allowed on
    Shabbos).
    In addition, when it comes to lipsticks, creams, packed powders and brushes there may be a variety of other melachos involved, aside for tzoveah.
    The reader may now be wondering, ‘Based on the above, how could there possibly be erev Shabbos makeup?’. In a very brief teshuva, Rav Moshe Feinstein writes, “…and so too it is forbidden for a woman to color her face, due to tzoveah, but to throw white powder (he would later [5:27] identify that he was referring to ‘talc’) on her face, which is short lasting, would not be tzoveah”.
    Although, many disagree even with this allowance (Rav Shlomo
    Zalman Aurbach quoted in Shemiras Shabbos K’Hhilchasa
    14:note#148).
    In a later teshuvah (ibid.), Rav Moshe mentions the possibility of
    allowing even colored powders if they should fit the talc criteria (no oils, loose, short-lasting, etc.). Yet he concludes that it would still be hard to give a general allowance.
    Nevertheless, there are some poskim who would certain makeups,
    and under certain conditions (Rav Ovadia Yosef, Rav Chaim Noeh, et al.).

    It is also critical for the reader be aware that in cases of need (such
    as scaring, burns, deformities, and even, at times, shalom
    bayis/shidduchim reasons, etc.) a rav should be consulted (see Piskei Teshuvos, 303:14, note #74).
    When that couple left my office after letting me test their samples, it took days until I cleaned the powder up -it was that loose and oil free!
    So, what should a woman do? Speak to a rav; or do as my wife did:
    she spoke to the wife of a prominent posek, who was both familiar with her husband’s psak as well as able to explain his criteria to another woman with ease and makeup expertise.
    While a sensitive topic, it must be reviewed from time-to-time. And, we must never use the above information to embarrass anyone. Torah should never be a weapon, only a darchei noam.

  • Is Snow Muktzah on Shabbos & other Sundry Snow Halacha

    Is Snow Muktzah on Shabbos & other Sundry Snow Halacha

    Let’s First Share Some Quick and Basic Rules

    1 – While it’s best to salt snow and ice before Shabbos, one may salt snow and ice on Shabbos if needed.

    2 – Shoveling soft snow is permitted for areas needed on which to walk. 

    3 – Shoveling hard and packed snow should be avoided if possible. 

    4 – Either way, one should seek to avoid any strenuous shoveling.

    5 – It is better to be safe and at home than in shul and putting oneself in any danger. 

    6 – Please check on neighbors and friends to see if they are in need of any aid and Stay Safe!

    …. And now, for the interesting background!

    (The Following Was Written In 2015 for Ami Magazine by Rabbi Moshe Taub)

    “Chateichem kashanim kasheleg yalmbinu…your sins shall become white as snow” (Yeshayahu 1:18; see Tehhilim 51:9)

    Everyone complains about the weather, but nobody does anything about it!

    Attributed to Mark Twain

    Just as Nachshon ben Aminadav (see sota 37) had to ‘take the plunge’ into the yam suf with the faith that Hashem would protect and save him from its elements, so too many of us must brave the storm to make it to shul -while others should rather stay home.

    During such weather events, anyone who is ill, has a medical condition, or is otherwise not confident in their walking mustn’t try to be a hero.

    Let us discuss snow in Talmudic lore, leading us to its many fascinating shailos.

    The gemara (yoma 35b) famously tells us of the time two great leaders, Shamayah and Avtalyon, were learning until the morning. When the beis hamedresh was not becoming lit at daybreak, they looked up at the skylight expecting to see a cloudy morning. Instead they saw the image of a man! Hillel, after moving to Yerushalaim at the age of forty, famously had climbed to the roof so as to hear their Torah, for he could not afford to enter that day.

    As Hillel lay there, a sudden storm arrived during the night and buried him!

    Already in mishanyos (e.g. Mikveos ch. 7) we find discussion of a mikveh made out of snow.

    Rav Zevin zt’l, in his celebrated sefer ‘L’Ohr Halacha’, dedicates a whole chapter on snow in halacha. In fact, there is an entire sefer dedicated to snow in halacha, titled ‘Hanosein Sheleg’ (by Rabbi Yishai Mazlomyan)!

    This sefer includes over one hundred questions posed to Rav Chaim Kinievsky regarding snow.

    I recall as child wondering if a beracha would need to be recited on snow.

    It may surprise some readers to learn that there is no beracha on snow! (Please do not try it for yourself!)

    Rav Chaim Kinievsky was further asked why it needs no beracha of special praise, whereas other natural phenomena has unique berachos. He responded, “Because it is just hardened water!” (Hanosen Sheleg p. 194).

    Nevertheless, there still may be another, special, beracha. The Shulchan Aruch (siman 227:1) rules:

    “…on lightning and on thunder and upon winds that blast mightily one makes an oseh maaseh Bereishis (beracha). If one wishes they may make shekecho u’gevuroso maleh olam”

    { -see Mishnah Berrura regarding our present minhag of making only ‘maaseh bereshis’ upon lightning and only ‘shekocho’ upon thunder}

    So while snow would not, in-and-of itself, require a special beracha to be recited, major storms may. Each rav, during each storm, would need to decide if that bar had been reached.

    Perhaps one could argue that this is not considered a food and as such would require no beracha. In fact the gemara(Nidda 17) says just that –snow is neither a food or a drink!However, even that gemara points out that intent matters.

    Some point to a midrash (Eichah Rabba4:10) where it discusses those who drank snow, giving it a food status, neccesitating a shehakol(for other views, see Kol Tzvi, vol.11).

    As for a borei nefashos according to this view, likely one would not make any beracha achronah as one does not eat/drink a shiur within a single halachik eating session (I hope!).

    See also shu’t Btzel Hachachma 3:114.

    More questions abound regarding snow, some often coming from children.

    Let us briefly discuss the most common shailos:

    May one make snowballs on Shabbos?

    Shemiras Shabbos K’Hilchosah says it is forbidden, being similar to boneh. Others are lenient. Rav Chaim Kinievsky writes that it is worthy to refrain.

    My own youngest children –being loyal Buffalonians – were so excited when they saw the snow one Shabbos morning that they asked to play with it in the backyard –making ‘snow-angels’ and the like.

    Is this allowed? The truth is that this question in not merely ‘child’s play’, as it brings up the allowance of even walking in the snow on Shabbos!

    It would seem the answer depends on which of two views one holds by. Allow me to briefly explain.

    The gemara (Shabbos 51) teaches us that one may not ‘crush snow’ on Shabbos for its water that will come out (the rishonim debate the reason for this law, which is beyond the scope of our purposes here).

    This prohibition is called ‘risuk’.

    However one is allowed to cause ice to melt by, say, placing it into a cup of soda.

    Furthermore, the Shulchan Aruch (320:13) rules that one may walk upon snow on Shabbos even though this will certainly crush/melt it.

    The Mishneh Berrura offers two reasons for this last leniency:

    • Either this is allowed because there is no intent to melt the snow, or
    • (quoting others) it is because since the prohibition of risuk is merely m’derebanan, and since not allowing us to walk outside would be impossible for many to observe, chazal purposefully limited this injunction to exclude walking on snow.

    So, as for kids playing upon the snow in the backyard, if we accept that chazal were only not gozer regarding walking on snow – then playing may be forbidden. However, if the reason that walking is allowed is because the intent is not to melt the snow then for kids playing too it would be allowed.

    Often with storms there is an assumption –based on an estimate made by the rav –that the eruv is down.

    Is, then, the snow gathered on clothing and shoes on the way to shul a problem if there is no erev? So long as one does not draw the snow purposefully on oneself this would not be an issue.

    Is Snow Muktzah? May One Shovel It?

    The status of snow on Shabbos begins, in a sense, with the great Rav Tzvi Pesach Frank.

    Rav Frank was one of the leading poskim of the last generation. Arriving in eretz yisroel in 1892, he had already studied under the greatest minds in Europe, including being zocheh to once attending a shmuez given by non other than the venerated Rav Yisroel Salanter.

    Eventually he became the rav of Yerushalim. Rav Frank’s biography as a posek and a rav-to-be-emulated deserves its own entry, but for the purposes of ‘snow’ we will look at but one incident with which he had to wrestle.

    It was February 2, 1957.

    The United Nations, on this date, called for all Israeli troops to leave Egypt after ‘Operation Kadesh’ (yes, named after the same Sinai peninsula, ‘Kadesh’, found throughout the Torah)

    It was also Rosh Chodesh Adar.

    It was also Shabbos.

    It also snowed heavily in Jerusalem.

    This was not your average Jerusalem sprinkling of snow; this was a real storm, a blizzard perhaps.

    In fact, I found The Associated Press’ archive footage and pictures of the day after this storm: cars stuck in snow banks, kids making large snowmen, and makeshift tools being used to clear the roads.

    This was an event.

    The morning of Shabbos rosh chodesh Rav Frank was besieged with one question more than all others: “Is snow muktzeh?”

    In particular, as he writes in his Shu’t Har Tzvi page 288, after this “sheleg gadol“, many wanted to know ascertain if they may shovel on Shabbos, specifically their roofs that were not built to handle the weight of such snow.

    At first this may seem like a simple question –one that must have been discussed numerous of times throughout the generations, and to which there is an accepted practice.

    But this would be incorrect, as there’s a paucity of early sources discussing the issue.

    Rav Frank begins his response by proving from numerous sources that snow –even freshly fallen on Shabbos –is not deemed muktzeh or nolad (a previously ‘non-existing’ item).

    For one, he points to the gemara, quoted above, discussing the prohibition of risuk – crushing ice and snow on Shabbos.

    After disallowing that act, the gemara goes on to say that one may however place snow or ice into a beverage – even though this will cause it to melt.

    Clearly, then, the gemara was not concerned abut handling snow so long as one is not crushing it for its liquid.

    The Chofetz Chaim comes to the same conclusion regarding rain, even fresh rain that fell on Shabbos.

    But, as we already alluded to, although few discuss this issue, not all agree.

    While this may confuse rabbanim, what is worse is that this debate bleeds into another debate; one that is between two of the greatest research tools of our time…Artscroll and Feldheim.

    These two acclaimed publishers each have a wonderful sefer–written in English for the layman and rabbi alike –on the laws of muktzeh.

    Imagine you are stuck in your house on Shabbos due to a storm. Unable to contact a rav, you may look to your English lukuttei halacha.

    So, you open Artscroll’s ‘Hilchos Mukzteh’ by Rav Simcha Bunim Cohen where he writes, “Snow is not muktzeh even if it fell on Shabbos” adding the caveat “so long as it has some use”.

    To be double check if there are any other views, you then open Feldheim’s  “Tiltulei Shabbos’ by Rav Pinchas Bodner. Although he brings two opinions, he spends much of the space focusing on the view that snow is indeed muktzeh, supporting this strict view by quoting HaRav Moshe Feinstein, who paskened (to him) that snow is muktzeh. In fact, this was later published in his teshuvos (5:22:37).

    So, to end your confusion, so you take out Feldheim’s Hilchos Shabbos by Rav Eider z’l -so to be ‘machriah beineihem’. He writes (emphasis mine), “Although rain or snow that fell on Shabbos is not muktzeh…” bringing this psak from none other than Rav Moshe Feinstein himself!!

    (How to explain this seeming contradiction in Rav Moshe’s rulings is beyond our purposed here)

    At the end of the day, most rabbanim I have spoken to seem to rule that snow is not mukzteh. This is supported by Rav Frank, Rav Elyashiv and most who discuss this issue.

    Yet the question remains: Even if not muktzeh, would shoveling be allowed?

    For one, there is this from the BBC:

    “A study looking at data from 1990 to 2006 by researchers at the US Nationwide Children’s Hospital recorded 1,647 fatalities from cardiac-related injuries associated with shoveling snow.”

    I always believed that the reason why shoveling poses such a health risk is due to sweating. The chochmas hobrai olam made it so that our bodies will inform us when we are overworking ourselves. The most obvious sign is sweating. 

    Hence the risk, as shoveling is done in the cold and one’s body does not react as it would if this activity was done indoors, thus potentially causing people to overlook their limitations.

    Based on this study it would seem that shoveling is indeed a strenuous activity, and perhaps the type of which one can’t perform on Shabbos. For this reason one who does shovel on Shabbos would have to limit it to a basic, simple path. If this path is long, and the snow deep, then help should be delegated out so that one person does not do such work.

    Speaking of sweat, there is a prohibition of exercising on Shabbos. As brought in Shulchan Aruch, one cannot work his body in a way that produces sweat. Shoveling will likely not fall under this law because the person who is shoveling is not doing it for his health, rather for his peace of mind. The exercise prohibition is only activated when it is the intent.

    Rav Tzvi Pesach Frank does have a caveat to his allowance: He explains that one may only shovel if the snow is soft. Once it hardens it may be deemed as part of the ground, resulting in the prohibition of soseir (destroying), according to some views.

    There are many more questions: May one ski to shul? What about sledding? If the roads are icy, may one skate on Shabbos?

    These too are discussed and debated, and will be left, perhaps, for another time.

    Let me end with an amazing story about shoveling snow, as told by the Brisker Rav, who would cry each time he said it:

    In Volozion, each time there was a heavy snowfall –even if all the roads were closed, the path to Yeshiva was always clear.

    The bachurim were perplexed and set out to investigate the matter. The next time there was a snowstorm they would wait out and see how this comes to be.

    Sometime later a blizzard hit. The boys set out and waited. Suddenly, before dawn, an image appears…it was their holyrosh yeshiva Harav Chaim Volozion with shovel in hand!

    The navi tells us “chateichem kashanim kasheleg yalmbinu…your sins shall become white as snow” (Yeshayahu 1:18; see Tehhilim 51:9).

    It is interesting that snow is used as a reference to purity but also as a symbol of sin (by tzaaras). Perhaps it is because even something that is to be pure, if used in the wrong way, can be a path to sin.

    Through our observance of halacha during such a challenging Shabbos may we be zocheh to the whiteness of purity, and, if we experience snowfall again, may it be with all of us together in Yerushalaim habenuyah.

  • Killing the Captured Terrorist & Ethics of War

    When peace comes, we will perhaps in time be able to forgive the Arabs for killing our sons, but it will be harder for us to forgive them for having forced us to kill their sons. – Golda Meir

    The questions of the ethics of war may seem oxymoronic. Isn’t the purpose of war to kill people and destroy things?

    However, halachah is replete with guidelines for ethical conduct in war, to the point of warning us not to cut down fruit trees in the heat of battle. Indeed, after the Iraq invasion of 2003, the American administration was reproached for not defending landmarks and artifacts more carefully. It would seem that as Jews, we should relate to such a charge.

    Recently The Jerusalem Post covered issues of halachah and war, in particular the treatment of captured killers and terrorists. While there are many issues that fall under this rubric, we will focus here on the issue of whether a subdued terrorist may be killed. What follows is a discussion of Talmudic law and not of practice.

    From the article:

    “Several senior rabbis have raised a heated debate in the last few days over the approach in Jewish law toward a terrorist who has committed a terror attack but is subsequently wounded and incapacitated. …

    “Rabbi David Stav said that the nation was facing trying and difficult times but insisted that a terrorist who has committed an attack but has been wounded and therefore no longer represents a threat should not be further harmed.

    “‘In these days in which the blood is boiling…it is important to preserve our moral superiority: [We must] not harm those who are not involved in murderous acts, and we must not harm those who have already been neutralized and do not represent a threat,’ the rabbi ruled.

    “Rabbi Shmuel Eliyahu, municipal chief rabbi of Safed, reacted to Stav’s comments and said a terrorist who had committed murder should himself be killed.

    “’It is forbidden to leave a murderer alive,’ Eliyahu told the Galei Yisrael radio station on Wednesday. He accused Tzohar rabbis of ‘forgetting Jewish law’ and said ‘they are only interested in looking good to non-Jews.’”

    This is a most serious issue, one best left to our greatest poskim and those who live in Eretz Yisrael. Following is a review of some of the factors involved in making such a decision.

    First, Rav Moshe Feinstein, zt”l, recognized that not all cases are equal when it comes to imposing the death penalty for a criminal act. In a famous teshuvah to the governor of New York,1 he outlined how halachah views the death penalty. Rav Moshe sought to dissuade the governor from using the death penalty, explaining that one of the reasons the Torah prescribes it is to impress upon us the egregiousness of certain acts and that the halachic bar is set too high to allow regular use of such punishment.

    Nevertheless, he ends with the following message: “The above is true regarding crimes of passion…but if people are killing because of cruelty and because the lives of others are meaningless to them…or if there appear to be many murderers,” a country must do what is in its best interest.

    It would seem that a country that is under constant attack and is therefore in a perpetual state of war has every right at least to consider whether such terrorists deserve to be put to death by the state.

    Noncombatants

    It should not suprise the reader that such serious questions have been discussed throughout the generations, beginning with an event early in the Torah itself.

    The Ramban and Rambam famously debate the general question of war as it pertains to ostensibly innocent civilians. The debate, which is based on Shimon and Levi’s battle over their sister Dina’s abduction, is germane to the question of captured terrorists.

    The Ramban believed that Shimon and Levi’s decision to kill all the males of Shechem was an error, one for which Yaakov reprimanded them. After all, why should the city’s ordinary citizens have been held accountable for the action of their leaders? How could they have stopped it?

    Rambam, however, believes that the citizens were not powerless; in fact, they had failed to fulfill the universal obligation to establish justice systems. Because setting up courts is one of the seven Noachide laws, those who fail to do so are equally liable to death.

    In Gur Aryeh, the Maharal seeks to combine these two views. He suggests that although, on one hand, the civilians of Shechem cannot be held responsible, the rules in a time of war are different. A nation must respond to threat with force so as to end present and future danger, and this means that civilians may be affected. While this position is not an argument for the capricious killing of civilians, the Maharal does seem to support strategic strikes even if noncombatants will be harmed.

    A quick look at modern warfare would support a silent secular agreement with the Maharal’s view. From the United States’ recent bombing of a hospital (purported to be an accident) to the more than 100,000 victims of the bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, which brought World War II to an end, it seems that world powers are resigned to such carnage when it is absolutely necessary.

    In the case of a captured terrorist, therefore, it seems there may be support for a country under attack to carry out unceremonious executions of captured killers, since this is a means of deterring the enemy.

    Rodef

    Even when in a situation involving two Jews, the Torah makes it very clear that one is allowed to kill a pursuer (rodef) in self-defense. We should also point out parenthetically that the Bach and the Shach discuss the issur of retzichah and whether it is suspended during a time of war for the zayin amim.2

    Although a terrorist is clearly a rodef, a halachicpursuer whom we are permitted to kill, we can only do so if there is no other way of stopping him. As Chazal point out, if one can stop a pursuer by shooting him in a limb, for example, that is all that would be allowed. Someone in captivity is already immobilized, so what allowance would there be to kill him based on the principle of rodef?

    One may argue that a subdued terrorist should be seen as a passive pursuer. This means there are times when the mere presence of an innocent person is dangerous3—for example, a case where a baby’s crying will alert the enemy to one’s presence, or when the enemy orders a community to hand over an innocent person on the threat that they will all be killed otherwise. In such a case, halachah will sometimes view the innocent person as a rodef.4

    Based on this idea of a “passive rodef,”perhaps one can argue that the fact that we choose to keep enemy prisoners alive and in relatively good health during a time of war only emboldens the enemy to continue killing us. Astonishingly, the average weight gain among al-Qaeda detainees in American hands is about twenty pounds!5

    However, all of this is academic as many poskim contend that the halachah of dina d’malchusa (adhering to modern secular law) outweighs the halachos of redifah. This means that even if a cogent halachic argument can be made for putting to death a captured killer, there would be little an IDF soldier could do about it legally.

    Sofek Rodef: A Possible Future Rodef

    The issue of prisoner exchanges is a related—and volatile—issue that we have discussed in the past (see issue 43, “Gilad Shalit: Sundry Matters”). According to those poskim who favor such exchanges, killing the terrorist may mean eliminating a real negotiating tool. This is not to support such an argument, of course, but simply to raise awareness of it.

    Indeed, strong disapproval of such exchanges based on the argument that they may result in Jewish deaths may actually be an argument in favor of execution, because it prevents dangerous terrorists from being returned to the street. Yet at most, such an argument would only make the captured terrorist a safek rodef (possible rodef).

    Aside from the fact that the principle of dina d’malchusa dina eclipses such arguments, Rav Chaim Ozer and many others6 argue that a possible rodef is not the same as a rodef.

    Geneva Conventions

    Even if we could resolve all of the dilemmas raised thus far, perhaps the most critical issue is how the state of Israel and halachah should view the rules of war established at the Geneva Convention, as well as various United Nations agreements.

    Rav Chaim Jachter, after a lengthy treatment of the issue of killing innocents in wartime, cites the following passage from The Case for Israel by famed professor Allen Dershowitz, in support of the argument that not all international laws, or countries following them, are created equal:

    “Although collective punishment is prohibited by international law, it is widely practiced throughout the world, including the most democratic and liberty-minded countries. Indeed, no system of international deterrence can be effective without some reliance on collective punishment. Every time one nation retaliates against another, it collectively punishes citizens of that country. The American and British bombings of German cities punished the residents of those cities. The atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki killed thousands of innocent Japanese for the crimes of their leaders. The bombing of military targets inevitably kills civilians.”

    In other words while there are certainly agreements like the Geneva Conventions, there seems to be surreptitiously accepted understandings, practices and immunities in a time of war. This is without even addressing the latest United States targeted drone killings, which some argue are questionable according to a strict reading of codified international law.

    Chillul Hashem

    Above all, we must be mindful of chillul Hashem.

    Let us conclude with the words of Rav Yehudah Henkin, grandson of Rav Yosef Eliyahu Henkin, one of the great poskim of the last generation, and the father of Eitam Henkin, who was murdered along with his wife, Naama, during Sukkos in what is now viewed as the beginning of the current wave of attacks.

    In his halachicwork Bnai Banim7 he focuses on questions similar to the ones we have raised here. He writes that even in war, regardless of what halachah permits, we also must be concerned about chillul Hashem.

    He points to Sefer Yehoshua (ch. 9), in which the Givonim fool Bnei Yisrael into entering into an alliance with them and allowing them to remain alive. The Gemara8wonders why this treaty was not voided as soon as the ruse was discovered. The Gemaraanswers, “In order to sanctify Hashem’s Name”; Rashiexplains that Yehoshua was concerned about the Jewish army’s reputation among the nations if it did not honor its treaties.

    It is of interest, I believe, that while the Gemara uses a positive expression (“due to a kiddush Hashem”), the Rambam, in codifying as law the story of the Givonim,9 uses the negative (“due to a chillul Hashem”). The indication is that even during a war, when defending ourselves is a top priority, we must find ways to prevent a chillul Hashem—as well as going out of our way (if it won’t put lives at risk) to create an active kiddushHashem.

    May we achieve both of these ideals, maintaining our achdus as we debate these serious matters. And may these attacks end quickly, leaving all such questions academic in nature as we herald Moshiach Tzidkeinu.

    NOTES

    1. Igros Moshe Choshen Mishpat 2:68.
    2. See Shulchan Aruch Yoreh Deah, siman 158:1. Regarding the application of this concept today, see, for example, Rambam Hilchos Melachim 5:4, and Tashbeitz 93.
    3. See Rama Yoreh Deah 157:1 et al.
    4. See note 20 in Rabbi Bleich’s “Torture and the Ticking Time Bomb” for further details on this type of rodef.
    5. USA Today, 10/3/06. See also the thorough study conducted by Seton Hall’s Center for Research and Development, which reports that 50.67% of the detainees housed there are overweight!
    6. See the strong words of Rav Moshe in Choshen Mishpat 2:69:4.
    7. Vol. 3, maamar 4, page 4, 185-194.
    8. Gittin 46.

    Hilchos Melachim 6:5.